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|“Counsellor”: Review on the topic of “Recruitment under a false flag”||“Советник”: обзор по теме “Вербовка под чужим флагом”||RU||1965||(100 MB)|
|Identification of assets: drawing from experience||Из опыта проведения оперативных установок||RU||1965||(58 MB)|
|“Albert”: Review on the topic of “Revealing the Fraud”||“Альберт”: Обзор по теме “Разоблачение подставы”||RU||1966||(37 MB)|
|Intelligence agent’s operational dictionary||Агентурно-оперативный словарь разведчика||RU||1967||(57 MB)|
|Identifying disinformation in intelligence materials||Выявление дезинформации в разведывательных материалах||RU||1968||(9 MB)|
|Using delegations and tourism for intelligence purposes||Использование делегаций и туризма в разведывательных целях||RU||1968||(40 MB)|
|Using the capabilities of the Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad in intelligence work||Использование возможностей советского Комитета по культурным связям с соотечественниками за рубежом в разведывательной работе||RU||1968||(44 MB)|
|Agency Recruiting||Вербовка агентуры||RU||1969||(315 MB)|
|Agent Communication||Связь с агентурой||RU||1970||(41 MB)|
|Agents and operational situation, key elements, and sources of study||Агентурно-оперативная обстановка, её основные элементы и источники её изучения||RU||1970||(38 MB)|
|The main directions and objects of intelligence work abroad||Основные направления и объекты разведывательной работы за границей||RU||1970||(51 MB)|
|Visual intelligence||Визуальная разведка||RU||1970||(17 MB)|
|Working with agents||Работа с агентурой||RU||1970||(18 MB)|
|Exposing the enemy’s frame-ups in the process of cultivating persons of interest for the intelligence work||Разоблачение подстав противника в процессе разработки лиц, представляющих разведывательный интерес||RU||1971||(35 MB)|
|Methods for identifying the enemy’s agents-provocateurs and fighting them. Lecture||Методы выявления агентов-провокаторов противника и борьба с ними. Лекция||RU||1971||(3 MB)|
|Working with agents||Работа с агентурой||RU||1970||(60 MB)|
|Using delegations and tourism for intelligence purposes||Использование делегаций и туризма в разведывательных целях||RU||1971||(23 MB)|
|Engaged persons in the foreign intelligence of the Soviet Union’s state security agencies||Привлечённые лица во внешней разведке органов государственной безопасности Советского Союза||RU||1972||(12 MB)|
|Confidential relations in the KGB’s foreign intelligence and working with them||Доверительные связи во внешней разведке КГБ и работа с ними||RU||1977||(8 MB)|
|Using international scientific events and exhibitions held in the Soviet Union in the interest of scientific and technical intelligence||Использование в интересах научно-технической разведки международных научных мероприятий и выставок, проводимых на территории СССР||RU||1981||(9 MB)|
|The intensification of the fight of police services of capitalist states against organized crime and its influence on foreign intelligence measures||RU||1982||(241 MB)|
|Aspects of training an operative to exert psychological influence on foreigners in the process of asset cultivation. Scientific report||Некоторые аспекты подготовки оперработника к оказанию психологического воздействия на иностранцев в процессе его разработки. Научный отчет||RU||1985||(7 MB)|
|Conspiracy in intelligence work in the Soviet Union from the position of cover agencies. Analytical review||Конспирация в разведывательной работе на территории Советского Союза с позиции ведомств прикрытия.|
|Possibilities of using psychological methods to study personality in operational practice. Analytical review||Возможности использования психологических методов изучения личности в условиях оперативной практики. Аналитический обзор||RU||1988||(6 MB)|
|Recruitment and training of recruiting agents for the purpose of infiltrating the U.S. institutions: drawing on North Africa’s experience. Analytical review||Приобретение и подготовка агентов-вербовщиков в целях разведывательнoгo проникновения в учреждения США (на примере ряда североафриканских стран)|
|Political intelligence from the Soviet Union’s territory||Политическая разведка с территории СССР||RU||1989||(54 MB)|
|Working with information in intelligence||Информационная работа в разведке||RU||(58 MB)|
|Psychological types of recruitment assets: general characteristics and methods of identification in operational practice. Analytical review||Психологические типы объектов вербовочной разработки: общая характеристика и методы выявления в оперативной практике|
|Some Aspects of Training the Operative for Psychological Influence of Foreigners During Cultivation||EN||(78 KB)|
A classified KGB training manual on “confidential contacts” explores the gray area between informant and agent.
This essay originally appeared in Newlines Magazine. The KGB training manual it refers to was translated into English by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick.
It may be the world’s second oldest profession but unlike prostitution it’s still woefully misunderstood. Is it because espionage is equal parts science and artistry — and therefore too marbled a discipline — that it usually requires years of study and practice to even begin to comprehend? Or is it because literature and popular culture have given us the enticing but mythologized image of the windswept figure in the homburg and trench coat crossing a bridge to meet his legended contact, or chalking the coded signal on a designated lamppost to indicate the dead drop has been made. Perhaps this kind of thing does happen, but 99% of intelligence work is still tedium and repetition, “like taking out the trash,” as one former spook once put it. And, contrary to the self-aggrandizing memoirists and their adaptive screenwriters, there are always rules, especially those governing the blurred lines of human interaction. Those rules were never more codified than by Soviet theoreticians of spycraft, whose job it was to train the agents of History.
Consider the following (fictional) case study.
Lucy McGrath is a political correspondent with a midlevel online news website. As part of her job, Lucy meets with all sorts: administration insiders who talk to her on deep background, representatives and senators from both parties, their legislative staffers, as well as a host of foreign diplomats whose job it is to relay the latest Beltway scuttlebutt and press clippings back to their capitals. Over the past six months, Lucy has developed a two-martini relationship with one such foreign diplomat, Viktor Sudoplatov.
Viktor’s business card describes him as the Head of the Economic Section at the Russian Embassy. He is witty, charming, and a lot of fun to talk to, a set of characteristics he’s spent years honing as an officer of the SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence service. In the past, Viktor has given Lucy what she believes were incredibly shrewd insights into the details of everything from the START treaty to Russia’s military interventions in Syria and Libya. On one lazy Thursday afternoon, over an uncharacteristic third martini at the Tabard Inn, Lucy felt comfortable enough to dispense information rather than receive it. She shared with Viktor the draft of the story she was about to file on the sexual improprieties of a high-level cabinet official. The story is airtight, backed up by a host of on-the-record comments, and will inevitably lead to the official’s resignation. And while her editor certainly wouldn’t take too kindly to Lucy’s ethical slip, she’s hardly doing anything illegal. Moreover, the sex pest in the White House is especially hawkish on Russia and Lucy is genuinely worried that America and its former Cold War adversary are sleepwalking into “World War III” (an impression subtly encouraged by Viktor over the last six months). In her mind, divulging her newspaper’s as-yet-unpublished scoop is actually in the interest of advancing world peace and fostering bilateral comity. Or maybe that’s the vermouth talking. Viktor reassures Lucy she’s a tribute to her profession and country upon scanning the jaw-dropping revelations on her iPhone.
Lucy is what’s known in parlance of Russian intelligence as a “confidential contact.” She’s not quite an agent, but she’s no longer a mere civilian. What she doesn’t realize is that she’s been vetted and cultivated for this special category of accomplice for far longer than she’s known Viktor, who, in both his official and unofficial capacities, gets to know American journalists because they’re walking storehouses of useful information and they know other people who might prove even more valuable to him. Lucy didn’t receive any special training as an asset of a foreign government, nor will she, provided she remains a reporter. She might have even convinced herself that her interlocutor is “only” a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, a delusion Viktor will continue to abet by his failure to ever come clean about who and what he really is.
In 1977, the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency, published 220 copies of a training manual devoted to confidential contacts — how to target them, how to run them, and how they differ from full-blown agents of Moscow. Written by Colonel V.M. Maksimov, the manual was released in the original Russian along with an English translation for the first time by the Free Russia Foundation as part of their ongoing Lubyanka Files project.
By Andrei Soldatov
In the third year of Perestroika, in 1988, the intelligence branch of the KGB was deep in a crisis – the headquarters in Yasenevo woods a few miles southwest of Moscow found the officers at KGB rezidenturas in Western countries increasingly reluctant to approach foreigners. They effectively turned off the aggressive recruiting mode the Soviet intelligence was once so famous.
In the United States, Soviet intelligence scored some spectacular successes in penetration, namely Aldrich Ames at CIA and Robert Hannssen at FBI, but the recruited Americans were the walk-ins – i.e. they themselves initiated the contact with Soviet spies, they were not approached by the Russians.
The Soviet Union was losing the Cold War and that certainly contributed to the confusion in KGB intelligence stations all over the world, but most importantly, the officers themselves didn’t want to risk their postings in the West. Being kicked out of a Western country if caught red-handed was not a particularly attractive idea at time when all kinds of shortages back home were already palpable.
Finally, the big shots at Yasenevo came up with a solution. It was a bold and witty idea, and the translated Analytical overview was part of it. Yasenevo suggested to exploit the natural advantages the KGB still enjoyed back home.
In addition to its espionage abroad, the KGB was always busy collecting “intelligence from the territory,” a euphemism for recruiting foreign nationals in the Soviet Union, with an eye to subsequently running them as agents in their home countries. This system worked because the Soviet Union, as a police state, had an opportunity to watch literally every foreign national in the country. Each regional KGB department had what was called a First Section in charge of recruiting foreigners.
This activity was coordinated by the Directorate RT (Razvedka s Territorii: intelligence from territory) of the First Chief Directorate in Yasenevo.
The problem was that no so many foreigners wanted to come the Soviet Union. Now that was changing, thanks to Gorbachev, who was busy opening up the country.
But the Soviet Union was still a totalitarian state, meaning that there was no media, a trade union, or a nascent private enterprise (not to mention a government agency) in position to say no to the KGB if approached and asked to plant a spy in the organization under disguise.
These spies planted by the KGB were known as DR officers, Destvuyushego Rezerva: of the active reserve. The term had a long history; it was used since the 1920s.
The KGB’s “Tradecraft in Intelligence Work from Cover Organizations on Soviet Territory,” an analytical overview presented here for the first time in both its original Russian and in English translation, suggested boosting the activities of the Directorate RT as a way to compensate the passivity of hibernated intelligence stations abroad.
The beauty of the report was that it suggested combining two things, already at KGB disposal – the capabilities of planting KGB spies in almost any Soviet organization; and the activities of the Directorate RT in approaching foreigners now coming in big numbers to the Soviet Union.
The Directorate RT was thus encouraged to plant more spies in Soviet organizations with an eye to recruiting foreigners in the Soviet Union.
The report even suggested to send officers of the Directorate RT abroad to run its assets, and not to handle them to the intelligence stations in respective countries, probably acknowledging the reluctance of the intelligence stations to taking risks.
The Soviet regime was facing its collapse, but the KGB intelligence branch once again proved its resourcefulness and ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
Andrei Soldatov, The coathor of “The Compatriots: The Brutal and Chaotic History of Russia’s Exiles, Émigrés, and Agents Abroad”
The bottom line for spy recruitment comes down to this: look for the losers, especially the ones who want to think they are winners because they hang on to important positions.