On February 21, 2020, on the second day of the Winter Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, a side event was held in Vienna on the problem of political prisoners in the OSCE area.

Speakers Maria Eismont, a lawyer and a journalist; Vladimir Kara-Murza, Vice President, Free Russia Foundation; Gunnar M. Ekeløve-Slydal, Head of Policies of Norwegian Helsinki Committee; Ilya Nuzov, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH); and Olga Shamshur Flydal, Senior Advisor at Norwegian Helsinki Committee presented recent developments concerning political prisoners in some of the OSCE participating states including Russia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Also they discussed developments in other OSCE participating states concerning weakening of safeguards for fair trials and increased political control over the judiciary. The speakers also focused on proposing measures and ideas on how the OSCE and its participating states can deal with these problems.

The event was hosted by the Delegation of the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania and arranged in cooperation with the Permanent Representation of Lithuania to the OSCE. It was moderated by Bjørn Engesland, Secretary General of Norwegian Helsinki Committee. The opening and ending remarks were made by Ms. Rūta Miliūtė and Mr. Laurynas Kasčiūnas, members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly from Lithuania.

At the event, reference was made to the definition of political prisoners adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in 2012, and endorsed by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in 2014. According to this definition, political imprisonment or deprivation of liberty:

• violates the European Convention of Human Rights and its Protocols;
• is imposed for purely political reasons;
• is excessively long or conditions are clearly out of proportion related to the offence the person has be found guilty of;
• is discriminatory in the manner of detention compared to other persons; or
• is the result of proceedings which were unfair and this appears to be connected with political motives of authorities.

Speakers Maria Eismont, a lawyer and a journalist; Vladimir Kara-Murza, Vice President, Free Russia Foundation; Gunnar M. Ekeløve-Slydal, Head of Policies of Norwegian Helsinki Committee; Ilya Nuzov, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH); and Olga Shamshur Flydal, Senior Advisor at Norwegian Helsinki Committee presented recent developments concerning political prisoners in some of the OSCE participating states including Russia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Also they discussed developments in other OSCE participating states concerning weakening of safeguards for fair trials and increased political control over the judiciary. The speakers also focused on proposing measures and ideas on how the OSCE and its participating states can deal with these problems.

The event was hosted by the Delegation of the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania and arranged in cooperation with the Permanent Representation of Lithuania to the OSCE. It was moderated by Bjørn Engesland, Secretary General of Norwegian Helsinki Committee. The opening and ending remarks were made by Ms. Rūta Miliūtė and Mr. Laurynas Kasčiūnas, members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly from Lithuania.

At the event, reference was made to the definition of political prisoners adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in 2012, and endorsed by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in 2014. According to this definition, political imprisonment or deprivation of liberty:

• violates the European Convention of Human Rights and its Protocols;
• is imposed for purely political reasons;
• is excessively long or conditions are clearly out of proportion related to the offence the person has be found guilty of;
• is discriminatory in the manner of detention compared to other persons; or
• is the result of proceedings which were unfair and this appears to be connected with political motives of authorities.

Russian pro-democracy politician Vladimir Kara-Murza, who’s been in jail since April for allegedly spreading “disinformation” about the Russian military, now also stands accused of “carrying out the activities of an undesirable organization,” which names Free Russia Foundation in the newly filed charge.

Free Russia Foundation, unconstitutionally designated as an “undesirable” organization by the Russian government in June 2019, did not organize an event on political prisoners in Moscow in 2021. FRF does not have any presence or programs inside Russia. Additionally, FRF has never conducted any work in the State of Arizona.

FRF strongly condemns the new charges brought against Vladimir Kara-Murza by Russian authorities and demands the dropping of all charges against him and calls for his immediate release.

“All actions of the Kremlin directed against Russian opposition politicians and activists have nothing in common with establishing the truth. They are instead aimed solely at getting rid of opponents of Putin’s regime,” FRF President Arno stated.

Russia is not Putin. We are Russia.

We aim at sharing this message with our friends around the world — therefore, in cooperation with Boris Nemtsov Foundation we are launching “Russians for Change” fundraising campaign.

We are going to be telling the stories of active pro-democracy anti-war Russians who have not lost their hope. US nationals also participate in this campaign: Francis Fukuyama, investigative journalist Casey Michel, and alumni of Boris Nemtsov Foundation media school.

Thank you for your donation:

The Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom honors the political legacy of Boris Nemtsov, a Russian liberal opposition politician assassinated in Moscow in 2015. It promotes freedom of speech and education along with the vision that Russia is a part of Europe.

In the temporarily occupied territories of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, in addition to the killing of civilians and horrific destructions carried out by the Russian army: a severe violation of the norms of international law in the form of abduction of Ukrainians into the territory of Russia has been taking place.

Prior to being interned, Ukrainians are placed in so-called “filtration camps” where they are subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.

All these actions violate the Hague Conventions and constitute an international crime.

We plan to collect information about such abduction cases, put it in written pleadings, and submit them to the International Criminal Court.

If you have been subject to abduction (internment), please, fill in the form via the link.

By FRF Team

On February 24, 2022, over 100 deputies from different regions of Russia signed an open letter to the fellow citizens and condemned the military conflict with Ukraine. By March 5, the letter had been reportedly signed by 276 deputies of representative bodies of state power and local self-government. But due to the introduction of criminal and administrative liability for “discrediting the armed forces of the Russian Federation,” the names of the signatories have been since redacted.

The most noticeable dissent against the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine has been shown by the members of the Communist party:

• On February 26, CPRF members, State Duma deputies from the Samara Region and the Omsk Region, Mikhail Matveyev and Oleg Smolin, respectively, publicly raised concerns about the war. They were joined by Vyacheslav Markhaev, CRPF member from Buryatia, who condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on his Facebook page.
• On February 27, CPRF activists launched an anti-war initiative; anti-war groups appeared on VKontakte and Telegram. This work is reportedly done by members of regional and city branches of the party and the Komsomol throughout Russia. At the very core of the initiative are members of the Marxist Tendency movement.
• A Meduza source close to the party leadership in one of the Russian regions, called the war in Ukraine “imperialist” and noted that its conduct and support is contrary to the ideology of the Communist Party.
  • Anti-war statements on social media were made by the Komsomol branches in Penza, Novosibirsk, Moscow and Saratov, but they were all removed within hours.
  • The anti-war groups were later made non-public; regional party leaders also demanded that members left these groups. Some members reported the internal party order not to speak publicly about the war at all.
• Consequently, members who spoke against the war were expelled from the party, others were pressured, e.g.:
  • In late February, in Komi, head of the Communist Party faction Viktor Vorobyov said in a statement on his Telegram channel that “what is happening in Ukraine has no justification in international law.” Vorobyov was stripped of his speech rights in the State Council for two meetings.
  • Also in February, in Vladivostok, City Duma deputy Viktor Kamenshchikov resigned from the party and announced his readiness to lay down his deputy mandate due to disagreement with the invasion of Ukraine. “I am against war in principle,” he was quoted to have said.
  • In March, Voronezh deputy Nina Belyaeva condemned the special operation, which resulted in her expulsion from the party and a criminal case against her.
  • Also in March, in the Arkhangelsk region, the Communist Party expelled five members of the party for their anti-war appeals, including Alexander Afanasyev.
  • Two more Communist party members were stripped of their membership in the Tambov Region.
  • In late May, deputy of the legislative assembly of Primorsky Krai, Leonid Vasyukevich, publicly demanded that Putin withdraw troops from Ukraine (he was supported by four other party members): in response, the CPRF promised to apply “the toughest measures.” In June, Vasukevich and a fellow party member Gennady Shulga were expelled from the party.

Some members of other parliamentary parties also voiced their opposition to the war:

• In March, the deputy of the Ivanovo Regional Duma (the Just Russia–Patriots–For Truth), Sergei Shestukhin, refused his mandate, because “the political struggle in the country is over.” Earlier, the Ivanovo authorities wanted to remove his powers due to errors in old tax filings, and the party expelled him because of a post criticizing the special operation in Ukraine.
• Also in March, the head of the Penza branch of the Just Russia–Patriots–For Truth, Anna Ochkina, resigned on the grounds of “the abolition of democracy.”
• In April, at the Moscow City Duma’s meeting, Sergei Mitrokhin, former head of the Yabloko party, spoke publicly against the war.
• In April, St. Petersburg deputy Vladimir Volokhonsky during a meeting of the municipal council condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and called on the deputies of United Russia to “leave this party as quietly as possible,” since they are responsible not only for the government’s actions committed earlier, but also for the war crimes that are taking place on Ukrainian soil now.

In addition, the Yabloko party, which doesn’t have Duma representation, but holds a handful mandates in the Russian regions, has articulated its anti-war position since day one in its official statement. However, this position comes at a cost: one of its representatives, chairman of the Nizhny Novgorod branch Oleg Rodin, had to leave Russia after he discovered he had been under surveillance. This was preceded by Yabloko’s campaign against the war in Ukraine and the attack on the party’s regional office.

By FRF Team

The new bill on local self-governance in Russia, which is currently under review at the second
reading in the State Duma, was introduced on December 16, 2021–almost two months before
Russia started a full-fledged war against Ukraine. The sponsors of the bill are pro-Kremlin United
Russia party deputies Pavel Krasheninnikov and Andrei Klishas, authors of several other
antidemocratic laws.

The bill was first introduced in 2020, around the same time as Putin’s government was pushing
through the illegal Constitutional amendments and aims to replace the existing federal law on
local self-governance adopted in 2003. The new law envisions two major changes:

1. governors are empowered to single-handedly appoint mayors and unilaterally remove
   them from office;
2. rural and urban settlements are abolished, and local government is transitioned to a
   single-level system. By 2028, these administrative units are to be merged with the city or
   municipal districts within the borders of the current municipal localities.

Putin’s regime justifies these changes as a way to increase self-governance efficiency by
consolidating financial, organizational, personnel and other resources.

The bill has been met with resistance in the State Duma, especially by the members of the
Communist and Just Russia parties. Following the first reading, 700 amendments were
submitted. The review is still ongoing, and the second reading was moved to the Duma’s fall
2022 session.

According to some Russian political experts, the new law will essentially deprive the Russians
living in small urban areas of political power. Others point out that the law will simply reflect
the existing political realities on the ground—that is, the fact that residents of small
municipalities and rural areas do not possess real political power anyway.