Tag Archives: Anastasia Kirilenko

The second issue of The Kremlins Influence Quarterly continues investigating the malign influence of Putin’s Russia in the areas of the economy, media, religion, civil society, politics, and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Following his essay on the Russian coronavirus-related aid to Italy published in the first issue of this journal, Dr. Anton Shekhovtsov looks at the developments around the Russian aid to Serbia. He argues that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić used the pandemic to attack the EU in order to advance his own domestic agenda and praised China for being the only friend of Serbia as it agreed to deliver aid to fight COVID-19. Moscow joined Belgrade in its anti-EU and pro-Beijing propaganda, but failed to follow up quickly with its own medical, financial, and expert assistance to “the brotherly Serbian people,” and, consequently, was unsuccessful to benefit directly from the situation in the country.

In the second and final part of his essay on Austrian-Russian business relations, Dr. Martin Malek focuses on their political framework conditions, as well as side effects and consequences over the past two decades. The author writes that, due to the increasing dependence of Austria and the EU on energy source supplies from Russia, Austrian politicians and managers find it difficult to find critical words about Russia’s domestic, foreign, security, and foreign trade policies. There is a belief among Viennese politicians and businessmen that Russia is “too important” as a power—and especially as a supplier of energy resources—so relations must not be “spoiled” under any circumstances.

Sergiu Tofilat and Victor Parlicov explore how Putin’s Russia uses gas supplies to wield malign influence in Moldova. They argue that, by exercising its monopolistic position as a natural anti-dumping gas supplier to Moldova and by loyalizing corrupt political elites from Chișinău, Russian energy giant Gazprom serves as the main instrument of financing the Russian foreign policy agenda in Moldova. The authors assert that consolidation of Moldova’s energy security by diversification of energy supply options and integration into European energy markets is not only vital for countering Russian malign influence in Moldova, but also key to solving the Transnistrian conflict, which affects regional security.

In her essay on the French editions of Russian international media, Anastasia Kirilenko discusses the question of how these media manage to impose themselves in the media landscape of France. She demonstrates that Russian media in France polarize the French society by advancing racist narratives, undermine trust towards the ruling elites by supporting anti-establishment movements, and discourage critics of the Kremlin’s politics by filing lawsuits against them. Ironically, however, the journalistic community defends RT France and Sputnik in the name of the freedom of speech.

Georgy Chizhov exposes the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) as one of the most effective instruments and mechanisms of Moscow’s malign influence on Ukrainian society. He argues that the UOC MP is an organization dependent on the Russian Orthodox Church on all ideological and political matters, and supports in its followers the identity of “the united people” (with Russians), a negative attitude toward democratic values, and a cautious perception of their own Ukrainian state.

Alexandra Yatsyk’s chapter focuses on the Russian government’s agents of influence in Estonia after 2014. She identifies three clusters of agents of Russian influence. The first group is represented by the Russian state institutions and Estonian entities supported by the Russian government. The second group consists of local activists who harshly criticize Estonia as allegedly systematically violating the very principles of liberal democracy. The third group incorporates those local agents who spread pro-Russian and anti-Estonian messages via mass media.

In her turn, Alisa Volkova analyzes a variety of methods used by Russian-affiliated forces to influence public opinion and politics in North Macedonia. The author asserts that Russia attempts – sometimes successfully – to penetrate the country’s economy and politics spreading its malign way of doing business, but the volume of resources, people involved, and lack of significant economic interest show that this Balkan country does not seem to be a priority for Russia for maintaining its influence.

Melissa Hooper explores how Moscow can indirectly spread malign influence in Europe by looking at the developments in Poland. She argues that Russian influence schemes in Poland are generally weak and ineffective because of the long tradition of Polish skepticism towards Russia. However, the Law and Justice government has borrowed laws, methods, and messaging from the Kremlin. In particular, the government waged war on meritocracy in ministries, the military, and the judiciary; routed critics from institutions such as free media and civil society; fanned the flames of conspiracy theories; and increased polarization and tensions in the country.

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Many people and under various circumstances have developed serious hunches about Vladimir Putin’s shady financial ties to the St. Petersburg mafia and the symbiotic relationship with law enforcement agencies. This information was first publicized in 2005 by an American journalist Robert Eringer, whose investigation of a Monaco-based mafia network led him to a princely palace rumored to belong to a powerful Russian. In response, a massive smear campaign was unraveled against Eringer, painting him an alcoholic and a madman gathering rumors.

Then, in 2000, there was Jürgen Roth, a journalist from Germany, who obtained documents from the German BND – Federal Intelligence Service establishing Putin’s involvement in money laundering, even featuring Putin’s personal signature. Unbeknownst to the public, Kurt Spitzer, an Austrian special prosecutor who investigated the resulting criminal case became the target of numerous hate websites. When Jürgen Roth died last year, obituaries dubbed his work “controversial”, not only displaying an outrageous lack of sensitivity for his family’s grief but clearly pushing a specific political agenda.

A Spanish prosecutor José Grinda, who collected testimonies on ways St. Petersburg gangsters laundered not only money but also their image in Europe with the support of Russia’s top leadership, was declared a pedophile by the media and social networks. According to the ongoing investigation, this defamation attack was funded by Putin’s friend in St. Petersburg’s mayor’s office.

Though from different countries, professions, and walks of life, these people are alike in their commitment to integrity and justice even when it is their safety and life are at stake. A towering presence among them was Karen Dawisha.

Karen’s research became the decisive contribution to our understanding of Putin’s crimes and the nature of his regime. It irreversibly took the discussion outside the realm of hunches and insinuations and into the worlds of widely acknowledged facts. Getting this done was a herculean task not only intellectually and through investigative means, but politically. English publishers had refused to print her submissions, despite the book’s meticulously referencing previously available publications in the Russian press and documents.

Karen’s book “Putin’s Kleptocracy” was finally printed in the United States, just in time for the new “unexpected” aggression that Putin unraveled against Ukraine. In a documentary based on this book, Karen explained that initially, she had no prejudice against Putin. Like many scholars of Russia, she had believed that the country was steadily moving toward democracy, even if with some hiccups. At one point, she even posed for a photo together with Putin. However, a scrupulous examination of evidence allowed her to conclude that Putin and his friends had been stealing from the very beginning.

Studying the Russian kleptocracy requires an uncommon amount of courage, clarity and moral fortitude. An excuse we often hear from those who shy away or even condone Putin is that Russia is dealing with many challenges, and the corruption is the only one point on the list. The point they are missing is that most of Russia’s worst problems are the consequences of kleptocracy.  Another popular theme is that Putin doing the best he can controlling the Russian gangsters while not himself being the mastermind of corruption. Karen Dawisha’s book refutes these platitudes once and for all. It takes the drama and glamour out of the story and presents it in their plain vulgarity: the bribes, corporation raids and seizures, trusts tucked away in Lichtenstein, intimidation of Western law enforcement. All of that began in 1990 and all this continues to this day.

The book by Karen Dawisha sent shockwaves through Washington. The information blockade had been finally breached. And yet, the truth has still not triumphed. To most of my journalist friends the proposition of the kleptocracy of Putin and his friends, as well as their connection with the mafia, seem so monstrous and improbable, that they do not even try to check it.

Indeed, Putin’s real biography and his professional CV, as discerned bit by bit from documents, his statements and eyewitness accounts, read like scripts of a gangster comedy. Just consider his decree to create a municipal casino, purportedly to benefit low-income citizens, but in reality, to be run by the St. Petersburg and Japanese mafias.

Investigating Putin kills

“Criminal groups and KGB were concerned about gaining control over the money of the CPSU. Those who tried to prevent it, like Galina Starovoitova, were killed”, – says Spanish the prosecutor Jose Grinda. Part of the money of the CPSU – and this is only officially – ended up at the private bank “Rossiya” – the bank of Putin’s friends, which two reputed mafia boss as shareholders.

Alexander Litvinenko, whose case became famous when he was poisoned by Russian intelligence services, claimed that Putin was involved in drug trafficking and that he had reliable documents on this matter. Much less attention was paid to a Russian parliamentarian Yuri Shutov, who suddenly died in a Russian prison, compiled file on Putin and his “board” of St. Petersburg security officers, documenting schemes such as illegal privatization of hotels. In her book, Karen Dawisha revisited the forgotten case of Shutov. For this, his family and friends would be forever grateful, as they hope that the full dossier will be published one day.

Karen Dawisha was a pioneer. She was an objective researcher whose findings and narratives were not motivated by political agenda or political struggle, — an argument that the Kremlin frequently uses to discredit similar efforts by democracy activists and human rights defenders.

Some Russians believe that the West has many powerful tools to deal with Putin, for instance, arresting his bank accounts the moment it finds doing so expedient. Those familiar with the Rule of Law based societies understand that it is not the case. A state governed by law, in the short term, seems at a disadvantage when dealing with a rogue regime. Just consider the legal nuances involved in closing bank accounts in Monaco and Liechtenstein, as compared to a business registered in Delaware. Or, for a more complicated case, take a Delaware company who owns a firm in Panama with an account in Switzerland and buys land in Mallorca for a friend of Putin. How can the Washington Obcom shut it down?

Of course, the role of the Western governments and its commitment to freedom is very important. Taking a jab at inconsistencies, Russian TV channel announces that Angela Merkel expels Russian diplomats in response to Skripal’s poisoning with one hand while approving the construction of the “Nord Stream 2” with another hand. That is a very salient point.

The President of France has been recently the target of hacking attacks by a GRU contractor. A capo controls everything— as it typical for the mafia, so the owner of the company turns out to be a neighbor of Putin’s summerhouse friends, and he bought his apartment from the Tambov mafia boss (a criminal process of which was held in Madrid). And despite it all, the “hacked” Emmanuel Macron is now heading to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum to improve relations with Putin.

Still, we do have many reasons to remain optimistic. A couple of days ago, Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of the Russia Today propaganda channel called an ambulance for her sick child and was surprised that medics that arrived looked impoverished. In a rare gleam of humanity, she suddenly felt ashamed of her own wealth.

I do not know when the patience of all Russians will end. But I do believe that people like Karen Dawisha could get through to even the Simonyans of the Putin’s regime. Not all of Putin’s “Joe Blows” understand for whom they work. Let them scold the independent journalists and writers and read furtively— what else they wrote about our mafia government? “The truth does not need to be told loudly,” said Robert Eringer explaining to me why his blog created such an uproar. And Karen was able to do the impossible: tell the truth loudly, and for that, I will be forever grateful to her. We will remember.

Last week Vladimir Putin went to pay an official visit to Hungary, where he meet Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, one of the European leaders most loyal to the Kremlin.

Continue reading A suitcase full of cash from the Solntsevo Mafia: does Putin have a compromat on the Hungarian leader?

I recently had the opportunity to speak with Ohio University political science professor Karen Dawisha while walking across Washington D.C. We discussed how Western leaders should feel about sharing the same table of negotiations with Vladimir Putin.

Continue reading Putin to a Western country leader: “I’ll crush you”

Putin’s cronies. Putin’s proxies. Putin is a Kleptocrat. These terms could have shocked us a decade ago, but thanks to recent outstanding investigations and civic initiatives, they have entered into the routine experts’ narrative.

Continue reading Why is the West so weak when it comes to the Russian mafia?