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The shifts in Russian public opinion over the two months of Putin’s war against Ukraine offer a clear proof: those who have argued that popular support for the war was related to the lack of access to information, and that counter-propaganda efforts would quickly pay off, are overwhelmingly right.

There are two important Russian opinion surveys worth examining. First, at the end of April, the Levada Center published the results of a public opinion survey regarding Putin’s war in Ukraine. This was a follow-on analysis to the poll released in late March. Comparison of the two polls gives an idea on the dynamics within the Russian public opinion on the war, and captures the collapse of “support” for Putin’s “special military operation.”  It is nothing short of spectacular. Here are the main takeaways:

  • Between late March and late April, the portion of polled who expressed solid and unconditional support for the war (“definitely support”) plunged by 8 percentage points, from 53% to 45%. If that trend persists, support will completely evaporate by the end of the year.
  • The number of people openly stating that they are against the war rose from 14% in late March to 19% at the end of April. In reality, this number is probably significantly higher, given reports that   10-15% of respondents refuse to answer polling questions about the war, and most of them have an anti-war mindset.
  • Only 18% of Russians (more or less the same percentage in every age group) believe that Putin’s “special operation” is “very successful”. While the majority still say that it’s “somewhat successful”, nonetheless, Putin’s propaganda has failed to convince the majority of Russians that, after two months of the war, Russia has achieved anything meaningful.
  • Among those questioning the success of the “operation”, the  reasons for concern cited most often are the prolonged character of the war and failure to achieve quick success (48%), and human suffering and deaths (31%).

These trends confirm what we, the Russian opposition, have predicted at the beginning of the war. Firstly, Russian society will not like nor accept a lengthy and bloody war. Putin’s only chance at sustaining public support was to have his  “operation” end quickly and successfully. Now, that such success is no longer a possibility— and the Russian dictator faces criticism which will continue to grow. Secondly, despite the unprecedented onslaught of propaganda and disinformation targeting Russians, the truth still reaches the Russian society. Despite heavy-handed attempts to persuade the public that “Russia only hits military targets” and enormous level of censorship against the truth, a sizable number of respondents acknowledge the profound human suffering caused by the war, and this sentiment becomes an important factor shaping the public opinion.

The new poll also shows that Russians, distressed by the truth about the war, mostly choose not to take active anti-war positions, but instead disengage and limit their exposure to the coverage of the war. The number of Russians who follow the events in Ukraine fell from 64% in late March to 59% in late April; with those who pay “close attention” dropping from 29% to 26%. It’s important to find ways to counter this disengagement to sustain domestic pressure to end the war.

Another poll by an international advertising outfit Group M gaged trust in Russian TV. The poll surveyed 1,700 Russians aged 18 to 60 living in cities with population over 100,000. The results captured an even deeper plunge. Whereas on March 17, television led as “the most trusted information source” with 33%,  on April 27, this number stood at 23%, levelling off with reliance on social media (also 23%), trust in which has increased.

These figures show that Putin’s propaganda has its limits, and counter-propaganda efforts do bear fruit. In March 2022, Navalny Live YouTube channel hit a record in terms of unique viewers — over 20 million  and a great majority of them from Russia. This number represents one-sixth of the total Russian adult population and about half of politically-active Russians (i.e. population which consistently follows political news and events). Between March-April 2022, personal YouTube channel of Vladimir Milov, the author of this article, for the first time exceeded 1 million unique monthly viewers, attesting to its emergence as a significant media outlet in its own right. The combined in-country audience of independent YouTube channels run by Russian opposition figures, independent journalists, investigative outlets easily exceeds 30 million unique viewers per month.

YouTube continues to operate in Russia—Putin is clearly afraid to shut it down. YouTube is an extremely popular platform among Russians, it is watched by about 80% of the Russian population. So far, the platform has not complied with the demands from the Russian government to take down individual videos. Full blocking of the platform is risky— as it will likely create a disgruntled constituency of dozens of millions of angry citizens stripped off their favorite daily content like children’s cartoons, music videos, comedy and other entertainment. The”YouTube phenomena” shows that Putin’s actions are still constrained by public opinion. No matter what happens next, YouTube’s continued operation two and a half months into the war has rendered a powerful blow to Putin’s disinformation war— the truth  broke in, propaganda’s monopoly has been cracked.

The poll figures allow to draw some important conclusions. Russians are not “imperialists by nature”, they have been simply brainwashed by propaganda. It is possible to change their mind, and to do so relatively quickly. Counter-propaganda efforts work. The demand for alternative truthful channels of information is growing. In the next few months, these trends are likely to accelerate.

Just as Ukraine is beating Putin on the battlefield, so can we win the war against him in information space. From the learning that has taken place since February, a few useful suggestions: 1. it is unhelpful to berate  Russians as a “hopeless” society which will “always be imperialistic” and more can be achieved from dropping this deterministic tone; 2. Amplifying  the messages and expanding the reach of  existing channels created by talented Russians taps into their massive audiences and leverages their credibility when we simply don’t have the luxury of time to develop those from scratch. Information campaigns are much cheaper than heavy weaponry, but the effect is similar— it opens the “third front” against Putin, complimentary to Ukrainian military resistance and Western sanctions, turning the Russian public opinion against the mad bloodthirsty dictator. With all the challenges, it’s possible, as we see in the most recent public opinion figures. Let’s double down on the hard work.

A journalist was sentenced to 6 years in prison and fined for “collecting information for the benefit of the Ukrainian intelligence services”, and during his arrest an explosive device was allegedly found in his car. The journalist himself does not admit guilt and asserts that law enforcement officers slipped a grenade into his car, and then tortured him with electricity and beat him. Here’s his story.

Who is Vladislav Esipenko?

Vladislav Esipenko was born on March 13, 1969, in Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine. He is married and has a young child. Before his detention, he worked as a freelance journalist for Radio Svoboda (the “Crimea.Realities” project). While he is a citizen of Ukraine, he also has a Russian passport as result of forced passportization of residents of annexed Crimea where Esipenko and his family lived from 2013 to 2015.

Case Background

According to the prosecution, Esipenko, who was planning a business trip to Crimea, agreed with an unknown person to purchase a hand grenade RGD-5. The grenade was placed in a hideout in the village of Pravda of Pervomaisky district of Crimea. On February 26, Esipenko supposedly took a grenade from the stash, and put it in his car. In Simferopol, he replaced the ring of the fuse and tied a nylon thread to it. The investigation claims that the explosive device was acquired by the journalist to ensure his personal safety while collecting information for “Crimea.Realities” media outlet.

On March 10, 2021, FSB officers stopped Esipenko’s car in Crimea and during search with a service dog “found” a grenade in his car. According to the FSB, Esipenko was questioned and then released under the obligation to come to the UFSB in the morning, which he did. Esipenko later said that on the night of 10-11 March he was forcefully held in a basement in Bakhchisarai and tortured.

The Arrest and the Criminal Case

On March 11, 2021, a criminal case was opened regarding the discovery of an explosive device. At the same time, Esipenko was officially detained. On that day, an interrigation was conducted in which the journalist supposedly told FSB officers about the location of the hideout. Witnesses from the FSB told the court that they brought the suspect to Pravda village from Simferopol; he himself says that he was brought directly from the basement in Bakhchisarai, and before the investigative action, they coached him on what place he should point to.

On March 12, 2021, the Kyiv District Court of Simferopol chaired by V.V. Krapko took Esipenko into custody.

On March 16, 2021, the decision to bring him as a defendant was made by the senior investigator of the investigative department of the FSS of Russia in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Major of Justice V.O. Vlasov.

Initially, Esipenko pleaded guilty. The first testimony states that the journalist collected information in Crimea not only for his editorial office, but also for Viktor Kravchuk, “who introduced himself as an employee of the Ukrainian intelligence services (SBU).” It was Kravchuk, according to the testimony, who suggested that he acquires a grenade.

Esipenko was represented by an appointed lawyer, Violetta Sineglazova, who recommended that he plead guilty and, according to Esipenko, did not respond to claims of torture. As the Ukrainian newspaper “Grati” found out, on March 11, she was not a duty lawyer of the Crimean Bar Association and should not have been involved in the case.

On March 15 and 17, independent lawyers Emil Kurbedinov and Alexei Ladin were not allowed to meet with Esipenko. The staff of the pre-trial detention facility claimed that the journalist declined their services in writing.

On March 19, the TV channel “Krym.24” in its news program published an interview with the arrested journalist, entitled “Revelations of a spy: an exclusive interview of the TV channel “Krym 24” with the detained Ukrainian saboteur.” In the interview, Esipenko answers the interviewer’s questions in a monotonous voice, answering affirmatively to every question. According to his answers, he took the grenade from the stash, which was planted by the SBU. In addition, Esipenko said that as a freelancer for Radio Svoboda in Ukraine, he cooperated with the SBU, communicating with a certain Viktor Kravchuk there since 2017. His cooperation with the SBU included making copies to the SBU “via Google disk” of all the materials he filmed for Radio Svoboda. However, Yesipenko was never officially charged with espionage or sabotage. Esipenko was able to meet lawyer Mr. Ladin for the first time on April 6, 2021 in court as he appealed his arrest. At that time, he submitted a statement in which he said that FSB officers had planted a grenade in his car and then tortured and beaten him.

On March 23, outlet “Grati” published a report, citing a source in the pre-detention center of Simferopol, saying that Esipenko was tortured with electric shocks with connecting wires to his head. According to Esipenko, on April 12 and 13, an FSB officer approached him and threatened him with torture and death if he refused to confess. Esipenko claims that the officer was detective Denis Korovin, who was assigned to the criminal case. Subsequently, the Military Investigative Committee refused to initiate a criminal case in connection with Yesipenko’s statement about torture.

In July 2021, Judge Dilyaver Berberov of the Simferopol District Court commenced hearings on the case. On February 15, 2022, the representative of the state prosecution Elena Podolnaya asked to sentence Esipenko to 11 years in prison with a fine of 200 thousand rubles.

On February 16, the Simferopol district court sentenced the journalist to six years in a general regime penal colony and a fine of 110 thousand rubles. Judge Dilyaver Berberov found Esipenko guilty of possession (Article 222 of the Criminal Code) and manufacture of explosives (Part 1 Article 223.1 of the Criminal Code).

Why Does the Memorial Center Recognize Vladislav Esipenko as a Political Prisoner?

After studying the documents of the case, the Human Rights Center “Memorial” came to the conclusion that Vladislav Esipenko is a victim of political persecution, which is due to his professional activities.

The Center experts assert that possession of a grenade as a means of self-defense makes practically no sense: it can explode along with those from whom you are defending yourself. The likelihood that a journalist, who is aware of the specifics of repressions in annexed Crimea and drives a car with Ukrainian license plates, would risk carrying a prohibited item that cannot be used in almost any way, is extremely low.

Secondly, the testimonies of key witnesses during the trial contradict each other, and the grenade simply does not physically fit into the glove compartment of the car in which, according to the accusation, it was found. The trial gave serious grounds to believe that the testimony of the FSB operatives who searched Esipenko’s car and the witnesses who were present were false. Operative Grishchenko claimed that he himself found the grenade during the inspection of the car by opening the glove compartment, while dog handler Brodsky said that the smell of explosives was detected by the dog, after which he called the explosives expert.

Some witnesses claimed that the grenade was in the glove compartment, while others said that it was in a compartment under the steering wheel. The defense performed a forensic experiment, during which they showed that the grenade did not fit into the glove compartment of the model car Esipenko drove.

When the officers stopped Esipenko’s car, Elizaveta Pavlenko, in whose apartment Esipenko and his wife were staying in Crimea, was riding in the car with him. According to Pavlenko, FSB officers immediately put her in another car and took her home for a search, even before the grenade was discovered. This indirectly indicates that the operation to detain Esipenko was orchestrated. Had the operatives not known in advance what they would “find” in the car and how it would be presented in the case, they would have waited for the results of the car inspection and would have checked Pavlenko’s involvement in the storage, transportation and refinement of the grenade.

Thirdly, the officials’ claim that after the inspection of his car on March 10, 2022, Yesipenko was released on a pledge to appear, which he fulfilled, and that he was not detained until March 11, is considered by “Memorial” a cynical lie intended to cover up the evidence of torture: Yesipenko says he was tortured on the night of March 10-11. In Memorial’s view, the investigators barred the arrested journalist from meeting with independent lawyers for almost a month for the same purpose.

The political motivation of the persecution of Vladislav Esipenko is obvious. He is a journalist working for an independent media outlet that does not recognize the legitimacy of the annexation of Crimea. His arrest fits into the campaign against non-state journalism. Esipenko’s case is used to intimidate all those who disagree with the occupation and annexation of Crimea and discourage Ukrainian journalists from working on the peninsula.

The report on the “Krym.24” TV channel clearly shows the use of the case against Esipenko by propaganda. The viewers are told that the journalist is not really a professional reporter, but an accomplice of the Ukrainian intelligence services. Apparently, the official charge of carrying a grenade seemed petty to the propagandists, so initially Esipenko was forced to talk about himself as a spy. Later, the authorities simply “forgot” about “collecting information for the SBU,” because they had already achieved the desired effect by creating the image of a “spy and saboteur” in the pro-government media.

Based on the above, Memorial considers Vladislav Esipenko to be a political prisoner and calls for his release and for a review of his sentence with respect for the right to a fair trial.

Rarely does a Friday in Russia these days go by without another round of Kremlin repression of prominent members of civil society. It seems, however, that last Friday was a record-breaking week for the number of big names sanctioned by the Russian authorities.

The Case of Vladimir Kara-Murza

On April 22, 2022, Judge Elena Lenskaya of the Basmanny Court has ordered Vladimir Kara-Murza, a prominent public figure and journalist, one of the initiators of the Magnitsky Act (2012), to remain in custody until June 12. On the same day, the Ministry of Justice recognized him as a “foreign agent.” The criminal case against him was opened for alleged “false statements ” against the Russian army, motivated by political hatred (point e, part 2, article 207.3 of the Criminal Code).

Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent Russian opposition politician, journalist, and former chairman of the board of the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom. As a reminder, on February 11, 2021, an investigative effort publicized that a group of FSB officers, who have been implicated in the poisoning of politician Alexei Navalny and several other people, also made two attempts to poison Vladimir Kara-Murza in 2015 and 2017. This conclusion was made by investigative teams at Bellingcat and The Insider, which discovered that FSB officers shadowed Kara-Murza on his trips.

The politician is represented by lawyers Olga Mikhailova and Vadim Prokhorov. According to Prokhorov, the reason for the criminal case against Kara-Murza was his March 15, 2022 address before the House of Representatives of the State of Arizona. Kara-Murza’s lawyers, as well as the defendant himself, cannot explain why, out of a series of his public speeches in the United States, the IC has chosen that particular one.

According to the ruling on the initiation of criminal proceedings, Kara-Murza “has knowingly spread false information under the guise of reliable reports, containing data on the use of the Russian Armed Forces to bomb residential areas, social infrastructure facilities, including maternity homes, hospitals and schools, as well as the use of other prohibited means and methods of warfare during a special military operation in Ukraine, thus causing substantial harm to the interests of the Russian Federation”.

The content of Kara-Murza’s speech in question is not much different from the Anti-War Committee’s first declarations, and is, in fact, a brief critical analysis of the 23-year development of Vladimir Putin’s regime. The Basmanny Court zoomed into the following statement made by Kara-Murza: “…today, the whole world sees what Putin’s regime is doing to Ukraine. It is dropping bombs on residential areas, on hospitals and schools… These are war crimes that were initiated by the dictatorial regime in the Kremlin.”

Independent resources pointed out that the translation of the speech was not made by a professional interpreter, but by a certain Danila Mikheev, who had consulted as an “expert” on several other cases against the opposition on behalf of the IC.

Kara-Murza faces between five to ten years in prison. He has plead not guilty. The court has admitted personal testimonies of the deputies of the Moscow City Duma Mikhail Timonov, Maxim Kruglov and Vladimir Ryzhkov.

“I have never committed any offenses or crimes, and all the documents of the investigation have nothing to do with reality. I am an honest politician and journalist, I have been working for more than twenty years, and all this time I have continued to exercise my right to express my opinion,
guaranteed by the Constitution,” Vladimir Kara-Murza himself said in his statement in court. “I categorically deny any involvement in any crimes. There is no corpus delicti in these documents, and my entire case is 100% political from beginning to end. All of this is an attempt to point me to my political position, to which I am entitled <…> Despite the repressive laws that were passed in March of this year, I have no intention of hiding or fleeing anywhere. My whole life and my activity prove that I am not going anywhere. I ask you to appoint a measure of restraint not involving detention,” said Kara-Murza.

Vladimir was arrested on April 12 under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (noncooperation with a police officer). On April 11, Kara-Murza was detained near his home and taken to the Khamovniki Police Department, where the politician spent the night awaiting trial. The reason for his detention was that he allegedly “behaved inappropriately at the sight of police officers, changed his trajectory, accelerated his step and tried to run away at their demand to stop.” This became known from the police reports published by the lawyer.

The criminal case against Kara-Murza is expanding rapidly. As early as 12 April, when the politician was arrested for 15 days for “disobeying a police officer,” a report on the discovery of “crime” was lodged with the IC’s desk. On the same day, Mr. Zadachin, the investigator of the Investigative Committee, examined the report and demanded to open an investigation. Ten days later, the politician was taken from the detention center in Mnevniki for questioning, and then immediately to court.

Now his wife, translator Yevgenia Kara-Murza, is fighting for Vladimir’s freedom. She left her job at international organizations to help him and continue his political activities.

“Frankly, we knew it could happen at some point. He had already been poisoned twice, there had been attempts on his life, he barely survived. Now they will hide all the opposition figures behind bars so that they can’t work, continue their activities effectively, and Volodya is very effective,” says Yevgeniya Kara-Murza.

Vladimir Kara-Murza is known to political leaders around the world as a tireless advocate for the Magnitsky Act. This crucial document, adopted in the United States in 2012, allows for the imposition of sanctions on those responsible for “extrajudicial killings and other gross human rights violations.” It now includes those who, according to the U.S., were involved in the death in custody of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who had uncovered a scheme to steal 5.4 billion rubles.

It is believed that the two poisonings of Kara-Murza were revenge for the fact that he and Boris Nemtsov lobbied the U.S. (and later Canada and the European Union) to pass this document. As a result, sanctions were imposed on employees of the FSIN, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Investigative Committee of Russia, and judges. Later, the list was expanded to include the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov; Andrei Lugovoi, a deputy (who is suspected of poisoning Alexander Litvinenko in London); and other Russian politicians and officials.

“The Magnitsky Act is passed every day in a new country, sanctions are imposed, we saw this at the beginning of the war. Yes, if these sanctions had been imposed seven or ten years ago, there would not have been a war. But the fact that such legislation was passed in different countries made it possible to impose sanctions very quickly after the invasion began. The work of Vladimir is very effective, and he is, of course, very troublesome to them. His poisonings in 2015 and 2017 were clearly linked to his activities aimed at having personal sanctions imposed on the murderers and thieves of this regime <…> Vladimir is an honest, up to his bones honest, decent, absolutely inflexible in matters of principle. He is a true patriot of his country. He says that as a Russian politician he should be where people fight evil. And he believes that he has no moral right to call on people to fight if he himself is safe. For him, the two concepts are incompatible — if he calls for a struggle, he must be at the forefront of that struggle. Again, absolute honesty. To himself, first of all,” said Yevgenia Kara-Murza.

Just before his arrest Kara-Murza in an interview to CNN predicted that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would lead to Putin’s downfall. “It’s not just corrupt, it’s not just kleptocratic, it’s not just authoritarian,” he said of the Putin government. “It is a regime of murderers. It is important to say it out loud.”

International Reaction

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken issued a statement on his twitter account that the U.S. is “troubled” by Kara-Murza’s detention. He called for his immediate release.

In a statement on Friday, The Washington Post publisher Fred Ryan said Kara-Murza has “repeatedly risked his safety to tell the truth about Vladimir Putin’s heinous violations of human
rights” and said the charges against him were for a “sham offense.” He added, “Americans should be infuriated by Putin’s escalating campaign to silence Kara-Murza. … And everyone who values press freedom and human rights should be enraged by this injustice and join in demanding Kara-Murza’s immediate release.”

“We are deeply concerned for our friend Vladimir Kara-Murza’s personal safety, and we call on Russian authorities to release him immediately,” said Michael Breen, President and CEO of Human Rights First. “Putin and his regime have shown themselves to be willing to break any law, domestic or international, to suppress political opposition at home and subjugate neighboring countries like Ukraine. We call on all of democracy’s allies to oppose criminal behavior like this to protect human rights in Russia, Ukraine, and around the world.”

“Vladimir is not a criminal but a true patriot motivated by the potential of a democratic future for Russia and freedom for its people. He must be allowed access to his lawyer and should be released immediately,” reads a joint statement by Helsinki Commission Chairman Sen. Ben Cardin, co-chairman Rep. Steve Cohen and ranking members Sen. Roger Wicker and Rep. Joe Wilson.

New “Foreign Agents”

On April 22, 2022, the Russian Ministry of Justice also added eight more people to the register of “foreign agents”.

The list includes prominent independent journalists and political observers— the former editor-in-chief of the “Echo of Moscow” radio station Alexey Venediktov, the publicist Alexander Nevzorov, journalist Sergei Parkhomenko, the authors of Radio Liberty Yekaterina Lushnikova, Arthur Asafyev and Vladimir Voronov, sociologist Viktor Vakhshtayn, LGBT activist Yaroslav Sirotkin.

Opposition politicians Leonid Volkov and Vladimir Kara-Murza were added to the “foreign agents” registry, the latter’s case was described above. This became known when the Basmanny Court in Moscow arrested Kara-Murza in the case of “false reports” about the Russian military. According to the Ministry of Justice, Volkov and Kara-Murza were engaged in political activities in the interests of Ukraine.

Alexey Venediktov immediately said that he would file a lawsuit to protect his honor and dignity “against the person who signed the decree” to include him in the register of media outlets that perform the functions of a foreign agent. According to the journalist, there are no reasons for
including him into the list. He said that at the moment he is waiting for the Ministry of Justice to justify and prepare a suit because “this is a criminal offense — insult and slander”.

Journalist Alexander Nevzorov wrote in his Telegram channel that he was completely indifferent to the status assigned to him by the Russian authorities and predicted their defeat in the war against Ukraine.

Sergei Parkhomenko learned about his inclusion in the register during a live broadcast on YouTube and said that he was quite calm about it, because he understood that the process of inclusion in the list of “foreign agents” had turned into a conveyor system.

Until now, there had been 142 designated persons and entities (including outlets, journalists, and activists) on the “foreign agents” list. The last time it was updated on April 15, 2022, nine people were added to the list, including the blogger Yury Dud, political analyst Ekaterina Shulman, and
cartoonist Sergei Elkin.

On April 5, 2022, the authorities for the first time added a new registry of “individuals who perform the functions of a foreign agent.” Journalists Yevgeny Kiselyov and Matvey Ganapolsky, who had worked in Russia in the past and now work in Ukraine, were included on it. Like Kara-Murza and Volkov, they also have Ukraine as a source of foreign funding. Now there are four people on this registry.

Like media “foreign agents,” “individual foreign agents” must mark their public materials and appeals to government agencies with a note on the status, as well as regularly report to the Ministry of Justice on their income and expenditures. The penalties for violating the requirements under the new register are more severe. Whereas the Criminal Code provides for penalties ranging from a fine of 300,000 rubles to two years in prison for media “foreign agents,” “individuals” can be imprisoned for up to five years.

“We, the undersigned leaders in legislatures around the world – the duly elected democratic voices of our constituents and countries – unreservedly condemn the arbitrary arrest of Vladimir Kara-Murza and call for his immediate release.”

On Monday, April 11th, Mr. Kara-Murza was detained by Russian Security Services as he was about to enter his home following an international media interview, arrested on the false charges of not obeying the police. He has since been charged under the new law criminalizing opposition to the invasion of Ukraine, and is now facing up to 15 years of imprisonment.

A violation of the Russian constitution and of the country’s international legal obligations, the arbitrary arrest of Mr. Kara-Murza – who is also a UK citizen, a US Permanent Resident, and a Senior Fellow at a Canadian institution – represents the continued criminalization of freedom in Putin’s Russia. United in common cause, we call for an end to Putin’s punitive persecution and prosecutions of Russian civil society leaders, the release of Mr. Kara-Murza and all political prisoners, and the expansion of targeted Magnitsky sanctions against Russia’s architects of repression.

Vladimir Kara-Murza has emerged as one of Russia’s most respected democratic opposition leaders, a noted public intellectual and voice of conscience. He has testified before our Parliaments, and represents the very best of what Russians stand for and the country that Russia can aspire to be. Targeted for his principled leadership, Mr. Kara-Murza has survived two assassination attempts, and nonetheless continues to shine a spotlight on the Russian people’s opposition to Putin and his war of aggression.

The unjust imprisonment of Mr. Kara-Murza is emblematic of the crimes perpetrated by Putin’s regime against both the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, and the international community more broadly. Left unchecked, its internal repression has often morphed into external aggression, with the atrocities in Ukraine being the latest and most pernicious manifestation in a long line of wars, murders, thefts, corruption, disinformation and election interference. We must stand with those heroes on the front lines, like Vladimir Kara-Murza, who is putting his life on the line in defence of our shared values, sacrificing his freedom to help others secure theirs.

While Russia’s leading defender of political prisoners has now regrettably become one himself, we pledge to not relent in our efforts until he is free, bringing the same dogged determination to securing his release as he has brought to building a better Russia. Our shared commitment to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law demand no less.

Contacts:

Honourable Irwin Cotler, PC, OC, OQ, Ad.E Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights +1 514.735.8778 media@rwchr.org

Natalia Arno Free Russia Foundation +1 202.549.2417 natalia.arno@4freerussia.org


Endorsements

Zygimantis Pavilionis, Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Lithuania; Former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Lithuania (2020-22); International Secretary of the Homeland Union/Lithuanian Christian Democrats

Robert Menendez, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Marco Rubio, Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues; member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States

Mario Diaz-Balart, Member of the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations of the United States; Chairman of the US Delegation to the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue; Member of the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and Vice-Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations (PCTR) of the Political Committee

Ali Ehsassi, Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights; Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of Canada Anita Vandenbeld, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Development; Member of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of Canada

Garnett Genuis, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of Canada Heather McPherson, Member of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights; Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of Canada

Heidi Hautala, Vice-President of the European Parliament Klára Dobrev, Former Vice-President of the European Parliament (2019-2022); Member of the European Parliament Urmas Paet, Vice-Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament; Former Foreign Minister of Estonia

Andreas Kubilius, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament; Standing rapporteur on Russia; Former Prime Minister of Lithuania

Guy Verhofstadt, Member of the European Parliament; Former Leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (2009-2019); Former Prime Minister of Belgium

Anna Fotyga, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament; Secretary-General of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party; former Foreign Minister of Poland

Radosław Sikorski, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament; former Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence of Poland

Frances Fitzgerald, Member of the European Parliament; Former Deputy Head of Government of Ireland; Former Minister of Justice of Ireland

Rasa Juknevičienė, Member of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament; former Minister of Defence of Lithuania

Csaba Molnár, Member of the European Parliament; Former cabinet Minister of Hungary

Raphael Glucksmann, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament; Vice-Chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights; Chair of the Special Committees on Foreign Interference in All Democratic Processes in the European Union

Bernard Guetta, Vice-Chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights; Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

Viola von Cramen-Taubadel, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament; member of the Special Committees on Foreign Interference in All Democratic Processes in the European Union

Thijs Reuten, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

Mounir Satouri, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

Michael Gahler, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

Juozas Olekas, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

Ioan-Dragos Tudorache, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

Petras Austrevicius, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

David Lega, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

Miriam Lexmann, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

Javier Nart, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

Charlie Weimers, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

Eugen Tomac, Member of the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Parliament

Attila Ara-Kovács, Member of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament

Sergey Lagodinsky, Vice-Chair of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament

Morten Løkkegaard, Member of the Special Committees on Foreign Interference in All Democratic Processes in the European Union

Ausra Maldeikiene, Member of the European Parliament

Ivan Stefanec, Member of the European Parliament

Liudas Mazylis, Member of the European Parliament

Vlad Gheorghe, Member of the European Parliament

Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Member of the European Parliament

Sándor Rónai, Member of the European Parliament

Nicolae Ștefănuțăm, Member of the European Parliament

Nils Ušakovs, Member of the European Parliament

Pavel Fischer, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the Czech Republic

André Gattolin, Vice-Chair of the Senate Committee on European Affairs of France

Gabor Grendel, Deputy Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic

Kerstin Lundgren, Deputy Speaker of the Swedish Riksdag and Foreign Affairs Spokesperson of the Centre Party

Margareta Cederfelt, President of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly; Former President of Parliamentarians for Global Action; Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Riksdag

Michael Roth, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag

Nils Schmid, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag and Foreign Affairs Spokesperson of the Social Democratic Party

Ulrich Lechte, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag and Foreign Affairs Spokesperson of the Free Democratic Party

Ines Voika, Deputy Speaker of the Latvian Seimas

Rihards Kols, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Latvian Seimas; Representative of the Latvian seimas to the OECD

Michal Kaminski, Deputy Speaker of the Polish Senate

Bogdan Klich, Chairman of the Foreign and European Affairs Committee of the Senate of Poland

Samuel Cogolati, Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Belgian Parliament

Charlie Flanagan, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Ireland; former Foreign Minister

Tom Tugendhat, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom

Mark Pritchard, Member of the National Security Strategy Committee of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom; Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Party Parliamentary Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee; 

Putin’s attack on Ukraine and a noticeable increase in aggressive imperialist sentiments in Russian society have prompted another round of deliberations on the perpetual topic that “nothing will ever change in Russia.” People argue that it is “useless” to expect Russia to transform into a normal democratic country which will renounce its imperial past. While categorically disagreeing with the authors of these theses, I would like to briefly explain why they are wrong, and why their gloomy determinism in relation to Russia is inappropriate.

In a few weeks I will turn 50 years old. During this time, I had to go through a series of dramatic, constantly changing eras, political realities, and social structures. And in each of these relatively short periods, there were wise and deeply knowledgeable people who, armed with arguments and a deep understanding of Russian society, confidently asserted that in the future everything would be about the same as it is now. There is no point in twitching around, for all that awaits is many years of the status quo. Against this background, the situation in the country changed in a kaleidoscopic way, resembling a rollercoaster. Brezhnev’s stagnation and “détente” were followed by the repressive renaissance of the Andropov-Chernenko era, with the aggravation of relations with the West until it reached the very real threat of a nuclear war. Then there was Gorbachev’s thaw and perestroika, followed by the freedoms of the Yeltsin’s era. Even Putin’s rule consisted of several completely different historical periods – absolutely everything around was constantly changing, but what remained unchanged all these years was that same tune of the ever wise ‘status quo party’ that “nothing will ever change.”

The funniest thing about this was the events which took place 22 years ago, in the spring of 2000. At that time, Putin was just being elected president for the first time, and some of his traits raised huge concerns about a possible authoritarian imperial revenge. At that moment I was a middle-level federal official, heading the department in the Federal Energy Commission, the energy monopoly regulator. I openly criticized Putin and even voted for Yavlinsky in the elections that year, a fact I did not hide; just imagine that something like this could be declared in the open – what times were these! And you know what you heard in response? That “nothing will happen! Nothing can happen! We are a democracy! We have free television, parliament, and private property! We came out against the Soviet regime and demolished it only less than 10 years ago! Nothing like this can be! Everything will always be as it is now!”

The arguments about how the status quo will stay have been unhelpful both then and now. In the days of early Putinism, the public let their vigilance down, allowing the authoritarian revanche to take place quickly and without hindrance. Today, such language demoralizes a significant part of society which, instead of doing something to achieve change, sits and wastes its energy lamenting about how bad things are and always will be.

Usually, three main arguments are used in support of the thesis about Russia’s “eternal doom to authoritarianism”, which we will analyze below. Two of them are completely insolvent, and the third is really strong – but we can discuss how to handle it. On the other hand, there are many more arguments in favor of the fact that the situation in the country will change dramatically in the future, and these arguments hold much more weight, even if the ever-wise singers of the ‘status quo’ camp prefer to remain silent about them. Let’s talk about all this in more detail.

The first argument is about the ‘deep people’, and it relates to the everyday presence and evidence of an aggressive, imperialist-minded, conformist sector of the population, that is in love with the authorities and the command system. These people are viewed as the majority that has a command on the rest of the society, while the active pro-reformist stratum of the population is traditionally portrayed as a marginal minority.

I am not going to go into quantitative analysis, but I will only note that, based on my experience traveling to more than 60 regions and speaking with thousands of people who do not support the government, I’ve uncovered that it is not the retrograde, pro-government views that are the majority. However, the pro-government views are the noisiest, because they resonate with the government propagandist narrative, which amplifies them.

However, for sake of the argument, let’s assume that the ‘deep people’, who are satisfied with the dictatorship and who do not want changes, are indeed the majority. Do you know what matters? No matter how many of them support the government, they never did and never will represent any viable political force that can prevent change when it happens. Even now, we are not seeing any increase in queues at the military registration and enlistment offices to fight in Ukraine. On the contrary, we hear news about an en-masse refusal of the military personnel to go and fight. There are also no voluntary Za-Putin rallies, which follows the general trend that there has never been any voluntary movement from below “for dictatorship” during the entire period of Putin’s rule (and even during the Soviet era). One thing is agreeing with the authorities and grumbling at your relatives about “evil America” ​​and “Putin, who raised Russia from its knees.” But political action is another thing entirely.

In fact, those who are called the ‘deep people’ are, in principle, incapable of political action. Their conformism extends far beyond the limits of loyalty to the authorities – their “hut is on the edge” in every situation. This is to say that, when turbulent political events happen, they will sit quietly. This has happened before in our history, and there are no examples where they convert their pro-government grumbling into political activity. Putin’s current vertical of power was built artificially, by administrative methods, from top to bottom. The ‘deep people’ performed the functions of an accomodating crowd here. They are incapable of organizing and impeding change when the administrative vertical collapses. Moreover, they will run to salute the new bosses for the very same reasons they saluted the old one.

Therefore, it’s irrelevant what this ‘aggressively obedient majority’ thinks. What is important is how the active part of society will behave when leading change, and, using the terminology of physicists, giving acceleration to this inert mass. It should be mentioned that, at the first Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR in 1989, where the term ‘aggressively obedient majority’ was coined, the reformers from the Interregional Deputy Group (MDG) numbered only 300-something people, against more than two thousand loyal deputies appointed by the CPSU . Formally, these deputies were able to achieve little in the session hall of the congress. But they gave such an impetus to the rest of the country that the country changed beyond recognition in less than two years, while these two thousand loyal deputies disappeared.

The second argument is that Russia lacks some sort of “worthy” of opposition, which is unable to find a common language with the people or is doing something else that’s wrong. There is a traditionally used cliche on this subject, sounding like: “the opposition has no constructive program.” In short, it’s nonsense.

In the last decade, the opposition in Russia has managed to muster up what can only be described as miracles. In one of the most repressive dictatorships of the world it created its own television with tens of millions of regular viewers. It managed to organize protests and be present in up to two hundred cities. In my estimation, at least 5 million people participated in protests and demonstrations organized by the opposition between 2017 and 2021 on a rotation basis. Interest in the opposition and enthusiastic support for it are enormous – in a bit more vegetarian times, just a street walk alongside Alexey Navalny would have easily proven that. The example of participation of Alexey Navalny and Sergei Furgal in the gubernatorial elections shows that the opposition is able to achieve very significant results even in this repressive system, and people have a big desire for political competition and presence of fundamentally different management styles. There is someone to fight, and for a good cause.

 Generally, this is the point where the supporters of the “nothing will change” camp fall back to their argument of last resort, which is that the authorities will always be able to use brute force and will never give up the levers of control, only tightening the repressive machine. Now this really is a hard argument to counter. Moreover, this is not a unique situation for Russia: the dictatorships of the first half of the 21st century is much more ready for en masse public discontent and won’t be caught off guard, unlike many of their predecessors of the second half of the 20th century. Modern dictators know in advance that at some point society will want to get rid of them, and for this case they prepare a wide and ruthless arsenal of suppression. For evidence, look no further than Belarus, Venezuela, Syria, and Myanmar.

Should this be a reason to give up? No, because for the administrative system, existence in a regime of constant repression and confrontation with society is huge stress, from which it will crack sooner or later. When and how this will happen – we do not know. However, a dictatorship cannot permanently exist in a mobilization mode – eventually, fatigue mechanisms will activate and stimulate some kind of perestroika. Eternal dictatorships simply do not exist. Take a look around – in the last four years, Putin’s entire Eurasian Union, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, have consistently rebelled. Dictatorships require enormous efforts to contain popular discontent.

We must prepare for this moment, work hard with public opinion, accelerate the erosion of support for the dictatorship, and educate the population. When the window of opportunity opens, we should act quickly and decisively.

In principle, the argument that “things will always be the same in Russia because the authorities will just use force against you to prevent change” contradicts the previously mentioned narratives about “bad deep people” and “unworthy opposition”. When proven wrong on the latter two arguments, the adherents of the ‘status quo’ party retreat to their last prepared defense frontier: “but the authorities have monopoly on violence and superiority in strength!” Yes, we know this without you, and experienced this on ourselves. But time works against brutal dictatorships – to paraphrase Lincoln: you can repress a small circle of people for a long time, a wide circle of people for a short time, but you cannot repress all people all the time.

A few extra words should be spoken on why democratic changes in Russia are, after all, a historical inevitability. For starters, there is a strong grassroots demand in Russia for democracy and real participation in running the country. For twenty years, opinion polls have always shown that about two-thirds of Russians want to directly elect the governors of regions and mayors of cities and have never been happy that Putin took away this opportunity from them. When there is real competition in elections of any level and the possibility of choosing with an uncertain result, the turnout of voters rises sharply. This trend is clearly visible in the last few years of the second round of the gubernatorial elections, unlike in the first round where intrigue is usually low and so is the turnout. Whatever people say to their relatives in the kitchen, most of them are much more interested in open competition than to continue serving the administrative vertical with a pre-programmed scenario for the development of events.

There are no significant political forces in Russia advocating an open transition to dictatorship. Aggressive anti-democratic and imperial structures such as the National Liberation Movement (NOD) or the party of Nikolai Starikov enjoy the support of an insignificant fraction of the population. Even the systemic opposition parties are putting forward demands to switch to a more open, multiparty democracy. Even United Russia is trying to hold “primaries” in order to raise interest in itself. Tens of millions of Russians who dream of dictatorship and an iron fist exist only in the imagination of skeptics and whiners, when in fact, even people who walk around with a portrait of Stalin are often very active campaigners for fair elections and against the one-party system in place. In general, widespread modern-day Russian mass views on Stalin and the USSR are very distant from historical reality and do not indicate a demand for dictatorial rule, but this is a separate conversation.

If you look at the dynamics, then the situation here is particularly impressive. Fifteen years ago, opposition rallies gathered hundreds of people and only in major cities. Now, they muster up hundreds of thousands to gather in hundreds of cities. And all this against the backdrop of increased repression. And imagine what would even have happened if the authorities would threaten and persecute those protesting. I’ll add that, for this reason, comparisons with protests in Kyiv and other capitals of democratic countries are irrelevant, because these other countries never faced such a scale of repression of protesters like Russia. If there would be no repressions, a million and many more would take to the streets of Moscow and other cities. I want to again emphasize that there is no voluntary grassroots activity in support of Putin, dictatorship, or the imperialist policy. Voluntarily mobilized demonstrations by some members of the NOD collect a few hundred people at the most, while those who gather for the massive pro-Putin demonstrations are forced to do so under duress.

The lack of public enthusiasm in terms of supporting the authorities is absolutely not surprising, because for more than 20 years Putin has not been able to build any attractive system that would work and deliver results, ensure the growth of people’s well-being, and serve as an alluring example for other societies. Yes, propaganda constructs are able to, for some time, impair people’s thinking. However, there will eventually be a collision with reality. Even now, at the moment of a temporary surge in support for Putin’s imperial policy, many of Putin’s most hardcore supporters are in despair, because for all the years of “getting up from our knees” they realize the country hasn’t learned to produce anything domestically, and absolutely for all commodity items one way or another we are dependent on imported raw materials, components, and technologies. The absence of a working socio-political and economic system is an inevitable reason for the countdown of its existence. The competition of systems is a cruel thing, only the strongest survive, as we know from the experience of the Cold War.

Another important nuance— if we examine the trends in political repression and propaganda as well as censorship vectors (administrative and criminal cases, arrests and other limitations of freedom, various forms of administrative and law enforcement pressure, acts of censorship, targeting of “enemies” by state propaganda, etc)— the picture is very clear— the Russian dictatorship views the supporters of liberal democratic form of governance as its main political competitors, with a real potential to command significant support of the society. The sheer scale of resources allocated by the Russian government for the suppression of liberal and democratic ideas and political forces that represent them within Russian politics is indeed massive. Considering how important financial and enforcement levers are to the current regime, one can easily gage the priority accorded to specific objectives based on what financial, law enforcement and propaganda resources are mobilized for their achievement. In fact, it’s safe to assert that the Kremlin, unlike the many vocal skeptical wisemen, views the potential democratic system as an extremely serious competitor— from the demand side (for the society, the idea of democracy and power by the people is a very attractive alternative to the current system), as well as from the supply side (Russian political figures espousing ideals of democratization are perceived as strong and formidable competitors).  

No other political movement in Russia meets pushback of similar scale from the Kremlin. This means that the regime evaluates the prospect of Russia evolving into a democratic society as a real and not a hypothetical one, and dedicates not just substantial, but huge resources to countering its advance. 

The Russian people have one problem feature described in our folk tales from Pushkin’s The Tale of the Fisherman and the Fish to the tale of the tale of the Frog Princess- many of us want everything at once.  “Give me a plan to overthrow the dictatorship here and now, and if there is no such plan, then I don’t play your game, and “everything will be the same as always.”

This is a very harmful attitude in this situation. What is useful now is to work hard in educating the population and eroding Putin’s propaganda structure. It works. The dynamics are in our favor. You think this happens in a day? Recall what happened in the countries of the former Eastern European bloc. We like to replay the triumphant images of victorious Velvet Revolutions of 1989, but they were preceded by decades of hard and focused struggle, starting with the bloody suppression of protests in the GDR in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. Same goes for Poland, which, before giving the world pictures of a triumphant Lech Walesa after Solidarność (Solidarity) came to power in 1989, went through decades of protests that had not led to success. Simply Google ‘protests in Poland in 1970s and 1980s’ and see for yourself. Major change can’t be done all at once.

Therefore, both the public sentiment and the dynamics of the situation in Russia suggest that dictatorship cannot last forever, and grassroots demand for democracy is sizable and growing. We need to make use of this demand. Arguments that “Russia will never make it” are extremely harmful. They demoralize people who are already under enormous stress. Moreover, they demoralize the people and exacerbate the situation for nothing, because, as shown above, all objective data and trends indicate the opposite – those things are moving towards change, albeit a difficult and slow change. However, there is no need to increase the difficulties by inciting pessimism in people, simply because it’s your aim to show off your wit with abstruse phraseology; don’t obstruct the important work aimed at bringing about change.

It has become common to criticize Russia’s leadership for falling for their own propaganda and expecting that their planned invasion of Ukraine would receive support from the local population and demoralize Russia’s elites. Most likely, what has happened is the following:  Vladimir Putin had clearly overestimated Ukrainian citizens’ negative sentiment toward their own Ukrainian government and Ukrainian citizens’ positive attitude toward Putin and Russia in general. However, multiple reiterations of such statements across the Ukrainian, international, and Russian opposition media do not prevent those who resist Russian propaganda from repeating the same mistake.

Reading the analysis of the current situation in Russia and public messages to the citizens of Russia conveyed by those who criticize Putin’s regime, one might feel that the authors of such messages about Russia are as far from reality as Putin and his propagandists are far from understanding pre-war Ukraine.

Most importantly, we need to understand who should be the target audience for counterpropaganda. First, the target audience should be those who have access to counterpropaganda sources and are willing to use them. Second, it should be those who are critical thinkers and belong to the educated part of society. People living below the poverty line, outcasts, and Putin’s ideological followers are not ready to accept anything from alternative sources of information. Targeting Putin’s nuclear electorate by leveraging social media, which is banned in Russia, and YouTube is doomed to failure. Ultimately, it comes down to the fact that people, who are already against Putin and not necessarily against soldiers, have to listen to the endless messages addressed to the soldiers and Putin’s supporters. The situation might get even worse in case of the effective ban of YouTube and VPN services in Russia. An exceptionally motivated part of society will continue to consume information from alternative sources. In contrast, the rest of society will have no opportunity to accidentally stumble upon a point of view that differs from the official one.

In this case, it is particularly important to understand counterpropaganda priorities. Unfortunately, the authors of counterpropaganda messages often stew in their own juices and try to convey what has long seemed obvious to them. However, a potential listener or reader of such messages in Russia might not find such messages obvious at all. First, very few people are ready to admit that they fell victim to propaganda. Russian propaganda is smarter and trickier than one might think. It is based not so much on demand to recognize whatever the Kremlin says is true but on the tempting offer to believe nothing and doubt everything. In light of this approach, the victim of propaganda is someone who, overly confident in their rightness and consumed by pretentious monologues, exposes “Kremlin propaganda.” “Our people are lying, and yours are lying too, why should I believe anyone’s lies?” – this is the logic on which Russia’s propaganda for the “smart” ones is built, and it actually works. More pressure on such individuals to change their minds regarding Ukraine and the West results in them more actively forming their opinion that they are being brainwashed and forced to become uncritical thinkers. Second, both the authors of counterpropaganda messages who left Russia and those who have never been there (particularly the latter) tend to depict life in the country in much darker colors than Russians themselves perceive it. What is the point of poking Moscow, St. Petersburg, or any other prominent city resident’s nose in pictures of villages with bathrooms outside the houses or ruins on the outskirts of distant cities? They live in a completely different environment. A firmly held belief of a foreign critic of Putin that the entire Russia lives in poverty, starvation, and without comfortable bathrooms only casts doubt on the rest of this critic’s messages: if you are lying that we live so badly here, then why should we believe the rest of your words?

The economic situation in Russia is indeed deteriorating. Still, it is happening slowly and not as apparent to Russia’s citizens as many critics of the Putin regime would like it to be. There is an increase in prices, but prices are rising everywhere in the world. Russians are aware of that. It is too early to talk about empty store shelves in Russia. However, those outside Russia have already convinced themselves that the store shelves are indeed empty. There are problems associated with getting some medications and other goods, but this is a serious problem only for those who need specific medications and goods. Everyone else may have not even noticed the extent of the problem. On this basis, they might believe that it is not Putin’s propagandists, insisting that everything is not so bad, who are lying to them. It is the critics of Putin’s propagandists who broadcast empty shelves and the coming famine.

Third, the course of the war in Ukraine allows Kremlin propaganda to talk about an inevitable victory and insist that the campaign is dragging on solely because Russia is striving for peace with all its might. If it was not for the notorious “Nazis” and the West, everything would have ended a long time ago. Also, Russians have been told that Russia has already lost since the first day of the war. This only undermines Russia’s belief in all other messages. It is enough for one to take a look at the map to make sure that the military actions are taking place on the territory of Ukraine, and everything looks like a defeat for Ukraine, not Russia. Especially, this applies to those consumers of information who live in Russia and think, by default, that Russians and their allied forces of the notorious DPR/LRP are “their own.” Accordingly, any messages based on the notion that Russia has already lost the war are perceived as fake by the Russian audience.

Fourth, Russian propaganda has been preparing to deal with the reports about the victims of aggression for many years. One of the most essential components of Putin’s propaganda relies on conspiracy theories and their notion that conspiracy theories can explain any phenomenon in the world. An individual living in such paradigm is ready to believe that the almighty and insidious West can produce high-quality fakes to deceive the Russians. They might also believe that the Ukrainian authorities (Nazis and puppets of the West) are so cynical and insidious that they are pretty capable of killing their own citizens to create the desired image. And here comes the statement, as mentioned earlier, that everyone around is lying.

A Russian also fully admits that the Russian authorities are capable of arranging something like that with their citizens and that, in general, all methods are acceptable during the war. So why can’t they suspect that the Ukrainian authorities can do the same? Propaganda hints at this, constantly winking at their listeners and readers: well, yes, we both lie and kill, but they are no better either – but this is us, and that’s them, they are strangers. Therefore, photo and video evidence that seems super-convincing to Western audiences can convince only those in Russia who were initially ready to accept a different point of view.

What is our conclusion, and what can we do with all this?

First, do not believe in your own propaganda and think that the living conditions in Russia are unbearable. When describing what is happening in Russia, it is important not to contradict with what people see with their own eyes. Otherwise, it undermines faith in everything else. It is necessary to speak about the impending deterioration of the situation reasonably and regularly remind people that pessimistic forecasts tend to come true. But the positive expectations of their authorities do not.

Second, there is no point in addressing an audience that does not use social networks and media. Neither the soldiers of the Russian army, nor their parents, nor Putin’s nuclear electorate is likely to watch opposition, Ukrainian and foreign news, and journalistic channels on YouTube – even though these channels are being constantly called out. Those who doubt even a little are watching. Thus, we should build trust with these people and start a conversation with them at their level. We should not call them to immediate street protests and an overthrow of Putin using arguments involving their (Russia’s citizens) genetic inferiority, cowardice, and the inferiority of everything associated with Russia.

Third, reporting on the course of hostilities should not be one-sided and reduced to a retelling of the Ukrainian version of events. It should be objective or at least strive for objectivity. Unfortunately, at the current moment, people who are in different information bubbles seem to observe two different wars that do not overlap. It is understandable that Ukraine, being involved in this war, is interested in spreading the version of events that is beneficial to them. But this position of Ukraine is obviously unacceptable to those who observe the situation through the lens of Russian propaganda. Here, the situation described above repeats again: the listener or reader concludes that of the two propagandas, they must choose the one they like best. The Russian viewer would choose the Russian version of events because it is morally difficult to view one’s own country as an aggressor, their army as criminal, and their soldiers as marauders. And this will continue until something that would destroy their faith in the truthfulness of Russian propaganda happens – for example, an evident and unconditional military defeat.

Fourth, we should systematically and consistently deal with the conspiracy foundation of Putin’s propaganda, both by turning conspiracy theories against Putin and his regime and proving their untruthfulness. Naturally, such work would require a careful and talented approach. Unsubstantiated accusations of unsubstantiation do not work and will not work.

Maxim Reznik is a well-known St. Petersburg opposition politician. After he launched his 2021 election campaign, he was placed under house arrest on charges of marijuana possession. Prosecutors charge Mr. Reznik with possession of 18.2 grams of marijuana “for personal consumption.” They claim that Maxim, present during the search of an apartment owned by his distant relative Ivan Dorofeev, put two packs of gum on the table from his bag, in which the drug substance was later allegedly found.

Here’s his story.

Who is Maxim Reznik?

Mr. Reznik was born on September 13, 1974, in St. Petersburg (then Leningrad). He is a well-known non-partisan opposition deputy, a supporter of Alexei Navalny, and one of the harshest public critics of St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov, Vladimir Putin’s protégé. In his public addresses at sessions of the city’s parliament, he frequently criticized the Kremlin’s decisions.

Reznik has been a member of the opposition “Yabloko” party since the mid-1990s, and from 2003 was head of its St. Petersburg branch. In 2012 Reznik left “Yabloko.” He himself linked his departure to a conflict with the party’s federal leadership. According to the party’s official version, he was expelled along with dozens of other St. Petersburg “Yabloko” supporters for “actual consent with fraud” in the December 2011 elections to the St. Petersburg legislature — that is, for helping the city authorities to get their deputies into the parliament.

For some time Reznik was a supporter of Mikhail Prokhorov’s Civic Platform, but left the association after its founder announced that he was leaving the party.

In 2016, Reznik was re-elected as a member of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly from the “Party of Growth.”

In September 2021, Reznik was going to run again for the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly. In early June, he opened his campaign headquarters. The politician was planning to run in the 21st electoral district of the city.

Case Background

On March 9, 2021, a criminal case was initiated against the relative of Maxim Reznik, artist Ivan Dorofeev, under part 3 of article 30, paragraph “b” and part 3 of article 228.1 of the Criminal Code (attempt to illegal production, sale or sending of drugs).

The search in Dorofeev’s workshop was in progress when Reznik arrived there. During the search operatives found a grow box with plants similar to raw materials for drugs and two cans of chewing candy with banned substances.

On the basis of this search, on March 11, 2021, Nevskiy district court arrested Dorofeyev for two months. The investigation accused him of purchasing a plant-based drug (cannabis) “weighing more than 6 grams but less than 100 grams.” The prosecutors allege that Dorofeev stored it not for personal use, but with the purpose of subsequent sale.

Reznik himself believes that this pressure was applied against  Dorofeev to force a testimony. The deputy also claimed that law enforcement officers met with him and demanded that he publicly condemn the rallies in support of Alexei Navalny. Otherwise, they “promised to give the case a go.”

On April 2, 2021, Reznik was summoned for questioning in the drug case as a witness. The deputy said that the investigator “verbally explained” to him that the interrogation was connected with the fact that narcotic substances were found in the apartment where the deputy had been on March 9.

After that, the case began to develop rapidly.

The police detained Maxim Reznik on May 1, 2021, during a May Day march along the Nevsky Prospect, where he was leading a column carrying a banner reading “Petersburg vs. the “United Russia” Party.” The deputy was, however, almost immediately released.

On the same day, media outlets controlled by the St. Petersburg administration (including businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin’s media conglomerate, which is usually linked to the Kremlin’s many “dirty assignments”) reported on the May Day parade and concluded that the protesters themselves forced the police into detention. Similar posts appeared on several federal TV-channels. Every channel repeated the same thesis, almost verbatim: Maxim Reznik, “under cover of his deputy status,” framed his comrades-in-arms for the arrests.

An hour after the May Day procession ended, accusations of provocation were added to those of drug use. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s holding media outlets published a news story titled “Reznik was stoned at May Day parade in St. Petersburg” and spoke about the deputy’s “highly inadequate” behavior at the demonstration, again without specifying what it consisted of.

Overall, media outlets (both those belonging to Prigozhin’s holding and those not affiliated with him) published several hundred news items about the deputy. News items were taken out of thin air. The day after the May Day parade, the campaign to discredit the deputy went offline. On May 2, a picket was held in front of the St. Petersburg parliament with two people holding banners reading “Reznik, go smoke”. The editorial board of the Nevskie Novosti newspaper even devoted a round table to Reznik’s behavior under the title “Youth Drugs in Adult Politics.”

In the evening of May 11, 2021, Reznik’s wife, Ksenia Kazarina, said that her husband had had a heart attack and explained that it was “intense emotional pressure.” The deputy’s wife would not comment on the situation in more detail, citing the inviolability of private life. According to their publications, employees of the media outlets controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin were on nightly duty at the house of Maxim Reznik’s mother, following his wife everywhere — even to the dentist.

The Arrest and the Criminal Case

On June 17, 2021, the police searched the apartment of Maxim Reznik as well as that of his mother and his summer house. After the search, the politician was detained, and the next day the Oktyabrsky District Court sentenced him to house arrest. On August 13, the same court extended his house arrest for another three months, and on October 27, another five months, until April 20, 2022.

The searches were conducted in the case of the purchase of marijuana without intent to sell — the deputy of the City Council allegedly bought 18.2 grams of marijuana “for personal consumption.” According to the investigation, Reznik in front of witnesses (but before the formal start of the search) put the drug substance from his bag on the table, and then, referring to the fact that he is a member of the Legislative Assembly, left the premises.

Maxim Reznik was charged under part 1 of article 228 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (“Illegal acquisition, storage without intent to sell drugs in a significant amount”). He is under house arrest from June 18, 2021, and faces up to 3 years in prison. The deputy pleads not guilty.

“We associate the criminal case against Maxim Reznik with his harsh criticism of the “United Russia” party and personally Governor Alexander Beglov, as well as a statement about his participation in the elections to the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg,” said the deputy’s team.

The authorities viewed Reznik as a popular politician with a high chance of winning in a single-mandate district — this is what ultimately led to his detention, Grigory Golosov, a professor at the European University in St. Petersburg, said in a conversation with the BBC. “Apparently, at some point it was decided that he should not be represented in the city parliament,” the professor suggested. In his opinion, Reznik’s detention isn’t so much due to his direct support for Navalny, but rather to the general trend of cleansing the political field of those politicians “whose presence in the government seems undesirable.”

Why Does the Memorial Center Recognize Maxim Reznik as a Political Prisoner?

The Human Rights Center “Memorial” considers the St. Petersburg politician Maxim Reznik to be a political prisoner according to the international criteria. The Center suggests that prosecution of Reznik is aimed at involuntary cessation of his social and political opposition activities, while house arrest is conditioned by the aspiration of the authorities to eliminate the politician from the public space.

Persecution of Maxim Reznik is a part of the repressive campaign which the Russian authorities are launching against the independent politicians who are able to compete with the pro-governmental candidates in the 2021 Russian elections.

Having studied the materials of the case, the Human Rights Center has come to the conclusion that Maxim Reznik is a victim of political persecution, which is caused by his social and political activities.

“First of all, we have doubts about the objectivity of the witnesses for the prosecution. One of the main witnesses in the case is a former employee of the Interior Ministry, the second is his fellow. The rest are security officers, who searched Dorofeev’s apartment.

Secondly, there are signs of fabrication of evidence in the case. Thus, it is known that the cans, allegedly left by Reznik, were not opened during the search, but the investigator pointed out in his testimonies that one of them contained a vegetable substance with a specific odor. How the investigator was able to establish that before the examination, he could not explain. It should be noted that there is no unequivocal evidence that the narcotic substance belonged to Reznik. When and from whom the deputy allegedly purchased it, the investigation has not established.

Third, Reznik remained as a witness in Dorofeev’s case for more than three months and was arrested only when the election campaign started. Being in pre-trial detention all that time Dorofeev was under pressure to testify against Reznik and on the eve of the meeting on April 21, 2021, unknown people stopped the deputy in the street and demanded to “denounce” the action and threatened that in case of refusal he will be charged on “case on drugs” and get real imprisonment term.

Fourthly, Reznik was put under house arrest as soon as he was arrested, which effectively made it impossible for him to take part in the new election campaign. It is noteworthy that the very next day after the election, the court ruled that it was illegal not to let Reznik see a notary, which previously prevented the deputy from filing documents to the election commission on time, and also allowed him a two-hour walk, which he had been denied many times before.

Considering the mass persecution of opposition politicians prior to the Russian elections of various levels in 2021, we believe that the initiation of the criminal case against Reznik was not accidental.

Finally, we believe that possession of marijuana for personal consumption poses very little public danger. Putting a popular opposition politician under house arrest on such a charge seems not only completely disproportionate, but also seems clearly aimed at preventing him from participating in the election race,” reads the resolution of the Human Rights Center. Based on the above, Memorial considers Maxim Reznik to be a political prisoner and calls for his release and for a review of his sentence with respect for the right to a fair trial.

Since Putin launched the Russian invasion of Ukraine early on the morning of 24 February 2022, the Russian military operation has proceeded in several tactical phases. The initial Russian plan of blitzing to Kyiv along the shortest routes out of southeast Belarus and Russia’s Bryansk Oblast failed. Ukrainian resistance, Russian logistics difficulties, and terrain difficulties have turned the larger fight around Kyiv into a slow-motion slog in which Russian tactical victories are difficult to exploit and easy to counterattack.

Along much of the rest of Ukraine’s northern border, the Russian invasion had better success advancing into Ukrainian territory by bypassing cities, focusing on rail lines, and seeking to surround Kyiv itself and the Ukrainian defenders of Chernihiv by approaching west to Brovary and to threaten the mass of the Ukrainian Army in the Donbass by approaching south to Izyum and Severodonetsk. These advances have yet to pay dividends as Ukrainian territorial defense forces continuously harass Russian logistical access to forward positions. Furthermore, Russia responded to Ukrainian refusal to surrender the cities of Sumy, Akhtyrka, and Kharkiv with continuous rear-area bombardment to enable a switch to an occupation force accomplishable by less capable Russian units. In the Donbass itself, Ukrainian defenses prepared for eight years, effectively managed to stall a Russian offensive for weeks, though the line has begun to crumble under continuous pressure combined with pincers coming from the north and south.

This southern approach out of Crimea has given Russia the biggest territorial gains of the war with Moscow claiming to be in control all of Kherson Oblast with other advances northeast to the Donbass, north to about 50km short of Zaporoizhzhia, and northwest toward Mykolaiv. This last direction has been the most active area of movement in the past two weeks with the Russians and Ukrainians exchanging control of much of the 60km highway between them several times.

In short, the Russian invasion has divided into five separate campaigns: (1) a floundering offensive northwest of Kyiv; (2) brutal sieges of Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Mariupol; (3) tactical advances hounded by logistical harassment moving west through Sumy Oblast and south from Belgorod Oblast; (4) a World War I-style breakthrough operation in the Donbass; and (5) low-density and relatively high-speed exchanges of territory in the south.

The Russian Armed Forces seem to be pivoting from an early bet of a war of destruction to the war of attrition. These two variants of war as described by Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin refer less to operational style than to the political oversight of conflict. Whereas a war of destruction seeks a rapid outcome through force of arms, a war of attrition requires greater patience but drives at exhausting and capturing the enemy’s means of resistance.

After the initial days of the conflict in which the Russians attempted to capture strategic points to deny external lines of communication to Kyiv, the effort shifted toward capturing power plants and water plumbing facilities. After some initial successes in this regard, Russian offensive strength to capture these points ebbed and so the emphasis was shifted again to destroying Ukrainian infrastructure not acquired in those days. This pattern suggests a conscious shift toward attacking the Ukrainian ability to resist rather than directly defeating them militarily on all sections of the different fronts.

Some portions of the front line, especially the Donbass, remain conventional offensives in which the Russians are tactically advancing and aiming to destroy their opposition. These offensives are frequently bypassing cities such as Mariupol and Chernihiv, leaving behind sufficient forces to surround and besiege but not storm them. In most other sections of the front, however, it increasingly seems that the Russians are at least temporarily pivoting to entrenching positions and forcing the tactical burden of the offensive to the Ukrainians seeking to evict the invaders.

The Ukrainians have had marked success in conducting counterattacks against Russian advances, especially in the battles west of Kyiv, but they have yet to score any significant rollback of Russian positions held for two weeks or more. This may change over time but with much of the Ukrainian Armed Forces located in the Donbass facing the heaviest assault and being pushed back, the resources for a major Ukrainian offensive will not be available anytime soon.

The Russian shift in tactics suggests several possibilities for the near-term conduct of the war. Firstly, the Russian conventional push in the Donbass is likely to continue. The Russian political investment in the Donbass in domestic media makes this the highest priority and that the Kremlin would attempt to realize within a couple weeks.

Secondly, by switching to a war of attrition in which civilians’ condition will be the chief measure of success, Russian political pressure falls less on the central government in Kyiv and more on local mayors and city councils. Local Ukrainian politicians have proved resilient in resisting Russian intimidation in the first month of the war, but this may be severely tested if the war does not end within coming weeks.

Thirdly, with a war of attrition Russia would attempt to grind down Ukrainian resistance and insurgency. The first month of the war saw Ukrainians successfully defend their territory against widely predicted odds, boosting morale among soldiers and civilians alike. Behind the current front lines, Ukrainian protests against the occupation have been frequent. A slow war may test the activated Ukrainian patriotism as the tangible results of resistance shine ever more bleakly against the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe and depopulation of the country. Russian political victory at this point would require extremely brutal suppression campaigns and forced population transfers of a scale that would almost certainly undermine the political stability of the Russian Federation as a whole. The economic damage to Russia from sanctions will be extreme even if China and India remain favorable to Moscow as the Russian economy of 2021 remains established as a giant commodities distributor for Western markets far more than Asian ones. Reconfiguring the flow of goods from west to east and south will be a large-scale undertaking that will almost require mortgaging more control of Russian infrastructure to Chinese and possibly Indian interests. Amidst these maelstroms, the Ukrainians will have more than a fighting chance to convince Russians that Putin’s imperial gamble is not worth the reward.

Since the start of the Russian war in Ukraine, the issue of responsibility for this atrocity remains prominently in the public spotlight:

Was it just the will of Putin alone? Or is his elite also complicit?

Are the Russian people to blame for their inaction and maybe even enthusiasm for the war? A ballerina at the Mariinsky theater who is dating a Kremlin official, a pensioner dreaming of reinstatement of the Soviet Union, and a soldier’s mother in Buryatia?

What about the Western elites who personally and handsomely benefited from shady deals with the Kremlin in the face of its crimes and repressions— lifting sanctions off the Nord Stream 2, flattering Putin by engaging his government as a legitimate stakeholder on nonproliferation deals, buying his oil and gas— financing Putin’s war machine?

What about all the states that refuse to impose full economic blockade on Russia now and deliver fighter jets and air defenses to Ukraine? Are they responsible for the continued bloodshed and loss of life?

What about international companies, who decided to not stop their operations inside Russia? Are they the reason why the blitzkrieg has stretched out to now over a month?

These are not mere philosophical ruminations but have very profound practical ramifications. How we frame and answer these questions would shape and drive our policies, our efforts at stopping the war, righting the wrong and preventing this atrocity from repeating.

These are also extremely painful questions. They evoke anger, mourning, shame, helplessness, utter loss.

They move some of us to feel violence and aggression— find the responsible ones and make them pay!

Someone who could get close to Putin and somehow “neutralize” him— would undoubtedly become a global hero and proclaimed a saint by a few churches. But this is not lost on the “bunker grandpa” who spent the first two weeks of the war in a nuclear underground shelter beyond the Urals, has fired and replaced over 1,000 of his closest personnel and is ridiculed by the exceptionally long tables that separate him from his closest advisors at meetings. So, we can’t get to Putin.

A situation of extreme frustration like this, oftentimes gives rise to instances of displaced aggression: when you can’t punish the source of your anger, find someone else in your proximity and punish them.

Free Russia Foundation is extremely concerned with one particular area of such displaced aggression— the Russian civil society.

We hear numerous calls to kick out all Russian citizens from international universities, to cancel their visas, to ban them from traveling, to not offer them scholarships or jobs based on the origin of their passports and their national identity. These come even from prominent statesmen which we see as friends. These calls ARE displaced aggression because they hit the most progressive, pro-Western, pro-Ukrainian Russians; they are the thousands of courageous Russians who have for two decades opposed and fought Putin’s regime. Who have sacrificed their economic and social status, their family ties, their freedom to actively advance the vision of democracy for their country. Who have even been ridiculed by some of their foreign acquaintances for being too intense or paranoid and advised to find common ground with Putin’s regime.

Today, their life is in extreme danger— they are hunted down methodically by the State, increasingly with the reporting by pro-war neighbors and colleagues, they are fined, imprisoned, physically and sexually assaulted. Since the start of the war, half a million of Russians have been pushed out of the country into exile, threatened by repressions.

In exile, these Russians are looking for ways to help stop the war— by breaking through to Russian audiences, by helping counter the disinformation and propaganda, by helping the West to better understand weak spots and vulnerabilities of the Kremlin and its global influence networks which have entangled Western elites.

In exile, these Russians are also cut off from access to their bank accounts— due to various western and Russian sanctions and private sector initiatives designed to stop the war. They are facing humiliating circumstances where they can’t pay for their food or motels. They also face grim uncertainty with their immigration status— once their visa-free stay expires in a few weeks.

For them going back to Russia means prison or worse. But they are not welcome where they are either.

Rightfully, ending the war, ensuring that Ukraine is victorious, that it is rebuilt and the ones responsible are punished— are the main and immediate priorities.

However, it is also abundantly clear that Russian political development cannot once again be neglected and left on an auto-pilot— or we risk seeing new cataclysms rising from the depths of the nuclear-armed dictatorship. The prospect that even after the defeat in Ukraine, Putin can hold on to power and continue as a menacing force globally, remains far too real.

Free Russia Foundation asserts that pro-democracy Russians — now predominantly in exile— hold the keys to this political development and are the main agents of change for Russia. As such, they must be supported and empowered. Supporting these Russians is not an act of charity or irrational largesse. Supporting and empowering them is a matter of shrewd strategic self-interest for the West.

In the immediate term, these Russians are the source of invaluable expertise and insight into how to defeat Putin in Ukraine and bring about the fall of his regime in Russia.

In the longer term, these are precisely the people we want to be at the helm of reforming and restructuring Russia, conducting lustrations and de-Putinification, putting it on solid ground to becoming a democratic, peaceful and prosperous state.

In practical terms, what do we mean by support for pro-democracy anti-Putin Russians?

First of all, lets acknowledge their importance and abstain from attacking them. Each of them now, I assure you, are soul-searching and wondering what more they could have done to prevent the tragedy in Ukraine.

Let’s stop the displaced aggression initiatives aimed to strip them of visas, scholarships, fire them from western institutions and kick them out from international universities.

VISA AND PROTECTED STATUS FOR PRO-DEMOCRACY RUSSIANS. Let’s help them stay in the fight— which, hopefully, everyone now understands is also our fight— to end Putin’s chock-hold on Russia. Let’s think about providing temporary visas or protected statuses and reinstating access to their own hard-earned resources.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES. Let’s connect them to western agencies and institutions fighting the Kremlin where their input can make a real difference while also allowing them to feed themselves in ways other than driving Uber. Let’s provide specialized training to help them adjust to new circumstances and fill critical gaps in capacity.

FACILITATE NEW ECOSYSTEM. Let’s help connect the global community of pro-democracy Russians into an innovative and robust ecosystem working to take down Putin in Russia and curb its influence in the West. Let’s help them rise as a force powerful to bring about real change for Russia and the world.

Buryat activists have launched a campaign calling for the end of the Russian war on Ukraine. The campaign aims to break through the Kremlin propaganda. 

Background

Since the Donbas war, ethnic Buryats from Siberia have been dubbed as the “Putin’s Buryat warriors.” It all began with the Donbas war, where the Kremlin, advancing its Novorossiya project sent Russian armed forces posing as local Donetsk separatists. And while a soldier from Pskov was visually difficult to discern from a Donetsk miner, Buryats with their clearly Asian appearance, really stood out from the local population. This is when these Buryats were humorously called the Donbass Indians. 

In Spring 2015, a 20-year-old Buryat tank crew member Dorzhi Batomunkuev, who had been severely burnt in combat in Logvinovo, gave an interview to the Russian Novaya Gazeta newspaper, in which he characterized Russian President Vladimir Putin as an insidious man who asserts to the entire world that “our military is not there,” and in reality, is pulling a fast one on the sly. Dorzhi confirmed that there are, in fact, Russian soldiers in the Donbas.

In Summer 2015, a Kremlin-backed project “The Net” released a video on behalf of “Putin’s Buryat warriors,” featuring several young men and women who attempted to contest reports in the media that Buryat soldiers participate in the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The crude video address is perhaps most memorable with its assertion that “the Ukrainian economy is free falling into the European pubic area of Concita Wurst,”—amplifying the Kremlin’s narratives tying European values to its supposed moral decay as manifested in acceptance of LGBTQ+ communities. 

Members of the Kyiv Buryat community published a civilized counter, but lacking the hype, it did not go viral.

And just like that, we got to the point, where in February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, and once again, numerous videos featuring Buryat POWs started to pop up on social media. Initially, supporters of the “special operation” dismissed as fake the video with an unidentified young man saying that he is a Buryat. However, the soldier’s mother has confirmed that the video is of her son— Sergey Ochirov. And then she staged a solitary protest on the main square of the Buryat capital, holding a sign “No War.”

In an ironic historic twist, an ethnic Buryat Yuriy Ekhanurov served as Ukraine’s Prime Minister in 2005-2006 and headed Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense from 2007-2009. 

Breaking Through the Kremlin’s Propaganda

Buryats who are not thrilled with being appropriated as “the Russian World” mascots, launched a campaign, releasing a new video each week, featuring Buryats who demand for the war to stop.

Due to the absurd new Russian laws, according to which even uttering “No to War” is interpreted as “discrediting the activities of the Russian military”— a transgression that comes with a real and lengthy prison sentence, the videos mainly feature Buryats who live outside of Russia. 

Dozens of Buryats have already recorded videos, including Buryats born or living in Ukraine. The campaign’s authors have collected enough materials for a series of videos. 

At this point, Buryats are the only ethnic minority of Russia who has initiated this type of campaign. 

An activist Victoria Maladaeva who resides in San Francisco could not remain silent having “interacted with many of her friends living in Buryatia and realizing how brutally effective was the Kremlin’s propaganda.”

“I wanted to break through to the Russian citizens, to my compatriots, and to tell them that the war is not about the joy of victory. War is always grief, death, injuries, traumas and fear,”— she explains. 

“I hope that from the mouth of fellow Buryats at least some hear the voice of truth, the voice of freedom. I also wanted to support those who in horror had already realized what’s going on and tried to tackle propaganda and its toll among family members. I am now being asked to forward these videos so that others can show them to their mothers, to other family members,”- says Maladaeva who continues to collect videos from others who oppose the war via her Instagram account. 

Maladaeva has left Russia a few years ago fleeing racism. 

Russia is not Qualified to Lecture Ukraine on Anti-Fascism

Vladimir Budaev who was involved in producing the anti-war videos had himself experienced racism in Russia. He is genuinely incensed that the Kremlin broadcasts as the main purpose of invading Ukraine its de-Nazification. Budaev feels that Putin should start out by “de-Nazifying Russia.”

Aleksei Kim, another participant in the video campaign, also raises the problems of racism and xenophobia suffered by minorities in Russia. 

According to Kim, in 2017, in Moscow, “out of the blue, a group of 7 assaulted him, kicking, proclaiming that Russia is for Russians and Moscow is for Muscovites.” None of the bystanders interfered to defend the young man, and when he came to a police department, they recommended that he does “not meander in unfamiliar neighborhoods.”

The participants of the anti-war video campaign are befuddled by the fact that non-Russians are sent to Ukraine to defend “the Russian World.”

“To save “the Russian World” the government is sending people from remote regions, people who are not of Russian ethnicity. This war cannot be justified in any way. It is cruel and senseless, as is the totalitarian regime of Russia, which has persisted for over 20 years. But right now, this regime is harming not only the Russian citizens, but also the citizens of Ukraine,” — points out Dari Mansheeva. 

“In Ukraine, the Russian state right now is conducting a senseless war, not needed by anyone, and is sending Buryat soldiers there. And I just don’t understand— why are they supposed to die there! I don’t want the families of my compatriots to receive death notices in the mail. I don’t want my people to pay in blood for someone’s military adventurism! I believe that this war is a crime,”— states Maria Vyushkova. 

“I am against my compatriots being shipped over there like cannon fodder to satisfy the ambitions and perverted fantasies of the mentally ill Putin,”— adds Budaev. 

Notably, in 2015, in St. Petersburgh, the Russian government hosted an International Russian Conservative Forum, where they hobnobbed with European neo-Nazis who use swastika as their symbol, praise the Third Reich and peddle theories on Jewish conspiracy.

The Kremlin’s efforts to befriend the Western ultra-Rights is a well-known fact, which makes its current demands to de-Nazify Ukraine even more absurd. 

Putin Should be Tried at an International Tribunal

Journalist Evgenia Baltatarova who was forced into exile to Kazakhstan underscores: “I am against the war in Ukraine. It is my conviction that Russia is the aggressor in this war. The war must end as soon as possible. And Putin must be subjected to a trial at an international tribunal.”

One of the anti-war campaign’s videos features the daughter of a famous Buryat writer African Balburov—Arina Stivrinya; as well as Kyiv-based Yulia Tsyrendorzhieva, Tatyana Vynnyk and a Buryat-Ukrainian family – the Tikhonovs. Nikita Tikhonov, points out that in Ukraine “there are no fascists, there are no Banderites, and this war is to the benefit of just one person.”

Buryats insist that the war for “the Russian World”— is not their war. And they know all too well what it is like to be “liberated”— within the framework of the “Russian World.”

How the Kremlin intimidates Russian citizens who speak out against war and persecutes them through new repressive laws

The “special military operation” in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has prohibited calling a war, has shocked the Russian society. Protests are taking place daily, and people are speaking out on social media. Putin’s government has responded to these actions with more repression.

In the first weeks of the war in Ukraine, the Russian authorities launched an unprecedented campaign of pressure against Russians who oppose the war. After the outbreak of hostilities, the State Duma adopted, in record time, a law banning activities that “discredit” the Russian armed forces, effectively outlawing any statements that deviate from the official line on the “special military operation.” At the same time, the authorities began blocking social networks and independent media, cracking down on protests, and putting more pressure on people who oppose the war through their employers. Most independent media outlets covering the war have been blocked. Many media outlets have stopped working or refused to cover the topic because of the adoption of a law imposing imprisonment for up to 15 years for “disseminating false information about the actions of the Russian armed forces.” The main social networks — Facebook, Instagram, Twitter — were also blocked by the authorities.

Below are the most important things that are happening to Russian civil society right now.

Silencing of the Media

On February 24, 2022, the Kremlin’s censor agency Roskomnadzor informed the media that when preparing materials concerning a “special military operation,” they must use only the information and data received from official Russian sources. Otherwise such media outlets can be fined up to 5 million rubles for disseminating knowingly false information under Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offences. In addition, such materials are subject to immediate blocking in accordance with Article 15.3 of Federal Law № 149-FZ “On Information, Information Technology and Information Security”, which was amended in late 2021 to tighten censorship.

On February 26, 2022, Roskomnadzor sent notices demanding to restrict access to “inaccurate information” to 10 media outlets (among them were Echo of Moscow, Mediazona, The New Times, TV Channel Dozhd, and others). Among the reasons for the restriction, Roskomnadzor indicated that these media outlets distributed “materials in which the ongoing operation is called an attack, an invasion, or a declaration of war.” A similar notice was sent to the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, with claims to the article “Russian Invasion of Ukraine (2022)”.

After that, some media outlets began adding notes to their materials stating that, at the request of Roskomnadzor, they were quoting information about the war in Ukraine based on Russian official sources.

By March 4, Roskomnadzor had blocked 16 media outlets in Russia: Meduza, BBC Russian Service, Deutsche Welle, Current Time, The New Times, The Village, DOXA, Taiga.info, Dozhd, Echo of Moscow, TV2, Radio Liberty, and six related projects: “Idel.Realii,” “Siberia.Realii,” “Sever.Realii” and “Radio Azatlyk.”

On March 6, it became known about the blocking of the media outlets Mediazone and Republic, as well as websites of Snob, Sobesednik, Agent, 7×7, Echo of Moscow in Chelyabinsk, and Echo Kavkaza.

Later, due to numerous blockages and the threat of criminal prosecution, many media outlets have announced closure. The online journal “The Village” has released a statement about the office closure in Russia. TV Channel “Dozhd”, Tomsk agency TV2, Znak.com, Bloomberg, CNN, BBC,ABC, CBS and CBC and others announced a temporary suspension of work in Russia.

Radio station “Echo of Moscow” has also stopped broadcasting. Yet, the decision to close the radio station was made not by the editorial board, but by the board of directors controlled by the state corporation Gazprom. Frequency of “Echo of Moscow” was transmitted for broadcasting to the state channel Sputnik.

Media outlets The Bell, Novaya Gazeta, It’s My City, Republic, Snob, Advocate Street, Silver Rain Radio and others decided not to cover Russia’s armed hostilities in Ukraine and delete (or change) existing publications on this topic.

On March 21, 2022, the Euronews website and the broadcasting of the TV channel itself were blocked in Russia.

According to the RoskomSvoboda project, which tracks updates to Roskomnadzor’s registry of banned sites, more than 500 different resources have been blocked in total since the war began.

Attack on the Social Media

In addition to silencing the traditional media, the authorities began restricting access to popular social networks. Thus, the Prosecutor General’s Office has recognized that the social network Facebook was involved in violations of the fundamental rights and freedoms of Russian citizens. The corresponding decision was made following Article 3.3 of the Federal Law “On measures to influence persons involved in violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms, rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation” in connection with the “discriminatory actions” of the administration of this social network (owned by the American company Meta Platforms Inc.) to impose restrictions on the accounts of individual Russian mass media such as “Lenta.ru”, “Zvezda” and “RIA Novosti”. In this regard, Roskomnadzor first began to slowdown traffic, then restricted access, and then blocked Facebook in Russia.

Roskomnadzor also blocked Twitter. The agency considered that false information about military operations in Ukraine is being distributed on the social network. In addition, Roskomnadzor demanded that TikTok exclude military content from the recommendations for minors and explain the reasons for the removal of news stories published on the official account of “RIA Novosti”. Subsequently, TikTok itself restricted its work in Russia due to increased legal risks.

Roskomnadzor also demanded that Google and YouTube remove “fakes” about the situation in Ukraine, distributed as contextual advertising.

Instagram Facebook’s parent company, Meta, was declared an “extremist organization” by the Prosecutor General’s Office on March 11, 2022, and Instagram was banned in Russia.

On March 21, Tverskoy District Court of Moscow satisfied the request of the General Prosecutor’s Office and declared “extremist organization” the company Meta, which owns the social networks Facebook and Instagram, as well as the messenger WhatsApp. At the same time, the court decided to block both of the company’s social networks. The decision to declare Meta “extremist” will take effect in a month if the company does not challenge it in court, or immediately after an appeal if the company loses. But the decision to block Facebook and Instagram went into effect immediately.

From now on, Russian media outlets must not display the logos of Meta, Facebook and Instagram. They will have to mark Meta as a banned organization in the Russian Federation.

Blocked media outlets, however, continue to operate and many Russians keep reading them using anti-blocking tools, such as VPN clients or plug-ins. In addition, the Tor browser in traffic obfuscation mode is used to bypass blocking. Telegram news channels are extremely popular: the number of subscribers of some of them has exceeded one million these days.

Harsher Punishment for “Discrediting” the Military

On March 2, 2022, amendments to the Criminal Code and the CAO were introduced to the State Duma, providing for penalties for:

1. public dissemination of deliberately false information about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

2. public actions discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including calls for uncoordinated public events;

3. calls for sanctions against Russia.

The public dissemination of deliberately false information about the use of the Russian armed forces as a new type of crime is now provided for in Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code. The punishment varies from a fine of 700 thousand rubles to imprisonment for three years and under aggravating circumstances up to five years. For the same acts that have entailed aggravating consequences, a penalty of up to 15 years in prison may be imposed (with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to five years).

The new article 20.3.3 of the CAO establishes punishment for public actions “discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” in the form of a fine of up to 50 thousand rubles for citizens, up to 200 thousand for officials and up to 500 thousand for legal entities. In the presence of qualifying signs (among them are calls for “unauthorized” public events, as well as the creation of a threat to the life and health of citizens, public safety, etc.), the fine increases to 100 thousand rubles for citizens, up to 300 thousand for officials and up to 1 million for legal entities.

If a person brought to administrative responsibility under this article repeatedly commits such an act within a year, criminal liability ensues following the new Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code. Punishment varies from a fine of 100 thousand rubles to imprisonment for up to three years (with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for the same period). If these actions caused death by negligence and/or harm to the health of citizens, property, mass violations of public order and/or public safety, or interfered with the functioning of life support facilities, transport or social infrastructure, credit institutions, energy, industry or communications facilities, the maximum penalty increases up to a fine of 1 million rubles or imprisonment for up to five years (with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for the same period).

According to the new article 20.3.4 of the CAO, calls for sanctions against Russia are punishable by a fine of up to 50 thousand rubles for citizens, up to 200 thousand for officials and up to 500 thousand for legal entities. In case of repeated violations within a year, a person will face criminal liability under the new Article 284.2 of the Criminal Code. The maximum penalty for this crime is imprisonment for up to three years (with or without a fine).

The State Duma and the Federation Council approved the amendments on March 4, and on the same day Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law that criminalized “fakes” about the actions of Russian military personnel.

The Ominous Letter Z: War Propaganda Inside Russia

The first pictures and videos of Russian military vehicles with obscure markings appeared on social networks a few weeks before the start of the war. The Latin letter Z, with or without a square, was the most common, but a V was also seen. Most likely, the letters were used as tactical markings to distinguish equipment from different Russian military districts — but in a few days Z and V (but especially Z) became almost the official symbols of the “special operation.”

The Russian Defense Ministry itself has issued no public explanation, and when it finally released several posts mentioning Z and V in its social networks, it did not become any clearer. The markings of military equipment in these statements were used in propaganda slogans: for example, “Zakanchivayem voyni” (“we finish wars”) or “Za mir” (“For Peace”) (first in the usual spelling, and then with the replacement of the Cyrillic Z and V in the hashtags with the Latin Z and V).

Russian gymnast Ivan Kulyak, who took third place at the March 5 competition in Doha, went to the awards ceremony with the letter Z on his uniform (the International Gymnastics Federation demanded to open a disciplinary investigation in connection with “shocking behavior” of Kulyak). The governor of the Kemerovo region Sergey Tsivilev announced that since March, 2 the name of the region will be written as “KuZbass” in the official materials of the regional government. According to Tsivilev, Z is “a sign of support for our fighters” involved in the “military special operation” in Ukraine. The letter Z was put on the logo on its website by the Legislative Assembly of the Kemerovo region.

At the same time, events were organized in several Russian regions in support of the “special operation” in Ukraine, with participants lining up in the shape of the letter Z.

Two events in Kazan were particularly discussed. First, on March 5, the local children’s hospice lined up its wards with the letter Z. Then, on March 9 in the Kazan Mall an action took place, in which students of Kazan State Institute of Culture (KazGIK) took part: dressed in white hoodies with St. George ribbons pinned on them in the form of letter Z, students were throwing in the air their right and left hands alternately with clenched fist and chanting the slogan “For peace!”

There have been cases of pro-war actions and demonstrations. On March 6, 2022, a motor rally in support of the “special operation” in Ukraine was held in 12 regions of Russia. In some regions, people — mostly from a state-financed organization such as schools and hospitals — lined up in the shape of the letter “Z” for a photo.

The letter Z was also found on the door of his apartment by film critic Anton Dolin, who announced his departure from Russia on March 6, as well as a theatre critic Marina Davydova.

On March 18, 2022, a rally of many thousands was held in Moscow to commemorate the eighth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea. A concert at a full Luzhniki Stadium with star supporters of Russian power was shown on all major Russian TV channels. President Vladimir Putin, speaking in a million and a half rubles down jacket, began his speech with a quote from the Constitution, continued by acknowledging Russia’s merits in developing Crimea, and then once again explained the need for a military operation in Ukraine. Then Putin quoted the Bible: “There is no greater love than that someone should give his life for his friends.” This, as it turned out, was about Russian servicemen who “help, support each other, and if necessary, like a brother cover their own body from a bullet on the battlefield,” Putin concluded.

War propaganda has also touched the youngest Russians. In the first days of the war, Russian schools received recommendations for conducting lessons for students from grades 7-11 about the war in Ukraine. These lessons were supposed to convey the official point of view of the government about the reasons for the “special military operation”, as well as to condemn anti-war rallies to the children. The training manual sent to teachers quotes the speech of President Vladimir Putin and emphasizes that there is not a war, but a “special military operation”, which is a “forced measure” taken to “save people” and “deter nationalists who oppress the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine”.

On March 3, the Ministry of Education held an All-Russian open lesson “Defenders of Peace”, where schoolchildren were presented with the background of current events in the official interpretation and also explained what danger the “NATO infrastructure” poses to Russia and how to distinguish lies from the truth.

In addition, similar conversations were recommended to be held at some Russian universities. For example, on March 1, 2022, Saint Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation (SUAI) published a decree calling to take “measures to prevent crimes and other anti-social activities of students” and “to ensure that the educational work aimed at the formation of students all-Russian civil identity, patriotism, civic responsibility, a sense of pride in the history of Russia, the preservation of historical memory, respect for the memory of defenders of the Fatherland and the exploits of Heroes of the Fatherland.”

The administrations of some Russian universities, including Moscow State University, have publicly expressed support for Russian military actions in Ukraine.

On March 21, 2022, a resident of Krasnodar city was fined with 30 thousand rubles under article on discrediting Russian military. He spit in the letter Z in the form of a St. George’s ribbon. In court, Alexander Kondratyev confirmed that he spit in the letter Z, which he perceived as a swastika, and that “spitting on a swastika does not discredit the armed forces. Kondratyev did not admit guilt, but “explained that by his actions he wanted to show his attitude towards the special operation conducted by the Russian military, in which people from both sides were killed.”

Squashing Anti-War Initiatives

A broad anti-war public campaign, despite the official rhetoric of the authorities, manifested itself quite noticeably from the very beginning taking various forms.

Petitions, open letters and statements against the war were being launched on the Internet. A petition created by human rights defender Lev Ponomarev on the Change.org has gained more than a million signatures. At the moment, there are around 100 such documents from representatives of various professions and other associations of citizens. The Economist analyzed 50,000 posts on Twitter and Instagram using the hashtag #nowar, determined the geolocation of 7,000 of them and found publications in 83 Russian regions and 50 cities all over the country — the geography and scale of support are unprecedented.

After the publication and dissemination of such statements, reports began to arrive concerning visits by law enforcement officers to the people and organizations that signed the petitions.

There are also some cases of dismissals. Managers and employees of state-funded or government-affiliated structures — theatres, museums, or large companies — resign due to moral considerations and disagreement with the policies of organizations. There are examples of forced dismissals and pressure on employees of various institutions who spoke out against the war.

A special attitude was also shown to the citizens of Ukraine. Ukrainian citizens detained at anti-war rallies since February, 24, 2022, are being questioned separately by security forces. Two citizens of Ukraine, permanently residing and working in Moscow, applied for legal assistance because of the district police officer’s visit. He asked questions about their purposes of staying in Russia, collected their data, photographed the documents, motivated the procedure with the “war with Ukraine”, warned against “information on the Internet” and suggested not to interfere “in things like sabotage and terrorism.”

On February 27, 2022, it became known that more than 10 Ukrainians living in Russia were detained, allegedly for violating migration legislation.

Marina Ovsyannikova of the news outlet Channel One, who broke into a live broadcast of Russia’s state TV channel during prime time on March 14 with an anti-war poster was arrested and fined for inciting people to participate in protests. In addition, the Investigative Committee launched an investigation into her case.

The Russian authorities Refuse to Approve Anti-War Rallies. Police Unleashes Violence Against Protesters

The authorities of Russia’s largest cities consistently refuse to permit anti-war actions and individual pickets, explaining this by the continuing pandemic of the coronavirus. At the same time, “OVD-Info” stresses that virtually all other events involving large gatherings of people have long been held without restrictions.

The number of arrests at rallies is unprecedented. Between February 24 and March 13, almost 15,000 people were detained in 155 cities across Russia. The reasons for the detentions were not only mass actions, but also any other forms of protest, such as the use of anti-war symbols, laying flowers or dressing in the colors of the Ukrainian flag. The detentions, contrary to legal requirements, were also carried out by unmarked security forces.

In addition, the police meticulously look for any anti-war statements of any kind. This includes personal correspondence on the devices of detainees and even bystanders. While vandalism can be prosecuted regarding anti-war graffiti, arrests and administrative prosecution can be initiated for placing pacifist symbols on clothing or backpacks.

Criminal Prosecution

As of March 12, 2022, 21 criminal cases are known, allegedly related to the people’s reaction to a “special military operation” in Ukraine. Detailed information about cases is not always available.

At least six cases have been initiated against people who took part in anti-war rallies. All of them were initiated under the article on the use of violence against a representative of the authorities (Article 318 of the Criminal Code provides for punishment, depending on the part from a fine of up to two thousand rubles to imprisonment for up to 10 years). Three cases were initiated in St. Petersburg, two in Yekaterinburg, one in Moscow.

On March 16, 2022 the Investigative Committee announced the first criminal cases under the article on “discrediting” the army. The defendants are two residents of the Tomsk Region and Nika Belotserkovskaya, a well-known blogger and influencer. The latter, according to the agency, “discredited the state authorities and the armed forces. According to the IC, Belotserkovskaya is currently abroad; the issue of her international wanted list is being resolved.

Veronika Belotserkovskaya commented on the opening of the case: “I have been officially declared a decent person!” She continues to write about Ukraine and says that she will not be intimidated.

Probably the most high-profile criminal case brought to trial so far is that against the famous Russian publicist and social activist Alexander Nevzorov. On March 22, 2022, the criminal case was opened on article “public dissemination of intentionally false information about the actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.”

According to the investigation, on March 9, 2022, Nevzorov published “deliberately false information about the intentional shelling of a maternity hospital in the city of Mariupol by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on his page on Instagram, which is banned in Russia, and on March 19 on his YouTube channel. The publication was accompanied by unreliable photos of civilians injured by the shelling. The sources of distribution of these images are the Ukrainian media.” The statement of the Investigative Committee notes that measures are being taken to establish the whereabouts of Nevzorov. According to the media, Nevzorov himself, like many other Russian journalists and public figures, left Russia.

Free Russia Foundation has compiled a list of Russians who had participated in Vladimir Putin’s pro-war rally that took place on March 18, 2022 at Luzhniki stadium in Moscow.

The event was held in support of the brutal war that Russia has been waging against Ukraine for over three weeks now killing thousands of civilians in Ukraine, including children, bombing residential buildings and hospitals.

The list consists of Russian opinion leaders and celebrities – propaganda bullhorns – who with their activities promote the war crimes of the Russian Federation in Ukraine.

Concert hosts

  1. Maria Eduardovna Sittel – Russian television presenter and an anchor on the Vesti program at Russia 1
  2. Dmitry Viкtorovich Guberniev – Russian TV presenter, sports commentator of TV channel Match TV, Confidant of Vladimir Putin

Concert speakers and orators

  1. Dmitry Anatolyevich Pevtsov – Russian theater and film actor, singer, musician, teacher, Member of the State Duma, member of the «New People» (political pro-Putin party) faction
  2. Vladimir Lvovich Mashkov – Russian theater and film actor and director, screenwriter, film producer, public figure. Artistic director of the Moscow Theater Oleg Tabakov, Confidant of Vladimir Putin
  3. Artem Vladimirovich Zhoga – the commander of the Sparta Battalion, a pro-Russian separatist force that is involved in the Russo-Ukrainian War. The father of ex-commander of the Sparta Battalion Vladimir Artemovich Zhoga, who was killed in in Ukraine 05 March 2022
  4. Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova – Russian civil servant, diplomat. Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA of Russia), spokesman and official representative of the MFA of Russia
  5. Margarita Simonovna Simonyan – Propagandist, Russian journalist and media manager. Editor-in-Chief of the RT TV channel, of the Rossiya Segodnya international news agency and of the Sputnik news agency, Confidant of Vladimir Putin
  6. Tinatin (Tina) Givievna Kandelaki – Russian journalist, TV presenter, producer, public figure, founder of the cosmetic brand ANSALIGY, Deputy General Director of Gazprom-Media and Managing Director of Gazprom-Media Entertainment Television, Acting Director of the TNT TV channel
  7. Victor Anatolyevich Polyakov – Russian aircraft engineer, Deputy General Director – Managing Director of PJSC UEC-Saturn of the United Engine Corporation Confidant of Vladimir Putin
  8. Vladimir Abdualievich Vasilyev – Deputy of the State Duma
  9. Sergey Mikhailovich Mironov – Deputy of the State Duma
  10. Alexey Gennadievich Nechayev – Deputy of the State Duma
  11. Alexey Yakovlevich Shloknik – The Museum of the Great Patriotic War, Director
  12. Yaroslav Yevgenyevich Nilov – Deputy of the State Duma

Singers and celebrities

  1. Polina Sergeyevna Gagarina – Russian singer, songwriter, actress, model, Confidant of Vladimir Putin
  2. Oleg Mikhaylovich Gazmanov – Russian singer, actor, composer, poet, producer, specializing in patriotic songs, Confidant of Vladimir Putin
  3. Nikolay Vyacheslavovich Rastorguyev – Vocalist, soloist, the lead singer of the Russian group Lyube, Confidant of Vladimir Putin
  4. Vitaly Feoktistovich Loktev – Keyboardist, bayanist, Lyube group
  5. Alexander Erokhin – Drummer, Lyube group
  6. Sergey Pereguda – Guitarist, Lyube group
  7. Dmitry Streltsov – Bass player, Lyube group
  8. Alexey Tarasov – backing vocalist, Lyube group
  9. Pavel Suchkov – backing vocalist, Lyube group
  10. Alexey Vladimirovich Kantur – backing vocalist, Lyube group
  11. Vasily Georgievich Gerello – Russian opera singer, soloist of the Mariinsky Theater
  12. Natalia Yuryevna Podolskaya (Natalla Padolskaja) – Belarusian and Russian pop singer
  13. Timur Ildarovich Yunusov (Timati) – Russian rapper, singer, record producer, actor, and entrepreneur. Confidant of Vladimir Putin
  14. Anastasiya Vasilevna Makeyeva (Malkova-Makeyeva) – Russian theater, film and dubbing actress, singer, fashion model, TV presenter
  15. Moscow Cossack Choir
  16. Marina Firsova – Soloist of the Moscow Cossack Choir
  17. Ksenia Babikova – Soloist of the Moscow Cossack Choir
  18. Antonina Kochergina – Soloist of the Moscow Cossack Choir
  19. Maria Korneva – Artist of the Moscow Cossack Choir
  20. Andrey Kargopolov – Artist of the Moscow Cossack Choir
  21. Svetlana Chebanko – Soloist of the Moscow Cossack Choir
  22. Anton Kornev – Soloist and director of the Moscow Cossack Choir
  23. Anna Valyavina (Goncharova) – Soloist of the Moscow Cossack Choir
  24. Artem Limin-Kosachev – Soloist of the Moscow Cossack Choir
  25. Sergei Zhuravlev – Soloist of the Moscow Cossack Choir
  26. Natalia Alexandrovna Kachura – concert performer, artist-vocalist of the Music and Drama Theater. M. M. Brovun (Donetsk, DPR)
  27. Victoria Petrovna Dayneko – Russian singer and actress
  28. Ballet by Alla Dukhovaya “Ballet Todes” – Russian dance group and a network of schools-studios for teaching dance art
  29. Nikolay Viktorovich Baskov – Singer
  30. Sergey Evgenievich Zhukov – Singer
  31. Alexander Vladimirovich Oleshko – Actor
  32. Alexander Felixovich Sklyar – Singer
  33. Dmitry Vadimovich Kharatyan – Singer
  34. Yaroslav Dronov (SHAMAN) – Singer
  35. Oksana Vladimirovna Nechitaylo (Sogdiana) – Singer
  36. Anna Sergeyevna Tsoy – Singer
  37. Evgeniy Nikolayevich Prilepin (Zakhar Prilepin) – Writer
  38. Evgeni Viktorovich Plushenko – Figure skater
  39. Adelina Dmitriyevna Sotnikova – Figure skater
  40. Svetlana Sergeyevna Zhurova – Speed skater
  41. Svetlana Vasilyevna Khorkina – Artistic gymnast
  42. Alexander Gennadiyevich Legkov – Cross-country skier
  43. Dina Alekseyevna Averina – Rhythmic gymnast
  44. Arina Alekseyevna Averina – Rhythmic gymnast
  45. Alexander Alexandrovich Bolshunov – Cross-country skier
  46. Evgeny Mikhailovich Rylov – Swimmer
  47. Viktoria Viktorovna Listunova – Artistic gymnast
  48. Vladimir Evgenyevich Morozov – Figure skater
  49. Victoria Alexandrovna Sinitsina – Figure skater
  50. Nikita Gennadyevich Katsalapov – Figure skater

Download the list as a PDF file

On February 24, 2022, the Russian military invaded Ukraine by order of Vladimir Putin. Since then, protests against the war have not stopped inside Russia. Russians demand an end to the military invasion of Ukraine and peace between two countries. In response, the government has brutally suppressed protests, and attempted to intimidate people with new draconian laws. 

Arrests at Protests. The human rights media outlet OVD-Info estimates that by March 7, 2022 over 13,500 people had been detained at anti-war rallies in Russia. Human rights activists say that this is more than at the rally in support of Alexei Navalny that took place in January 2021. 

Detentions at the March 6 rallies were among the largest and most brutal since the anti-war campaign began. Over 5000 people were detained in 56 Russian cities; some of the detainees were physically assaulted, dragged by the hair, doused with water and antiseptic and tasered. The “Protest Apology” project recorded more than 30 complaints about the unjustified use of force and special means by officers of the MVD and Rosgvardiya.

In many cities, plain-clothed law enforcement officers detained protesters and took them to police vans. They often used excessive force. The anonymity created conditions for abuse of power and helped avoid criminal responsibility.

In Novosibirsk, a woman detained at the rally said that she was beaten by the police (she was taken out of the Tsentralny department by paramedics and her leg was injured). At the metro stop “Ploshchad Revolutsii” in Moscow, riot police pinned a man on the floor, pressed him with knees and hit him several times in the head with fists. At Moscow’s Lubyanka Square, police officers demanded to check passersby’s cell phone contents — they threatened arrest in case of refusal.

Detainees at anti-war rallies in various cities say that in police stations they have their cell phones taken away and not allowed to contact lawyers. At Moscow’s Brateevo police station at least three detained girls were beaten by police. They were doused with water and hit on their faces and bodies. “We were beaten on the legs, on the head. They poured water over us. They ripped off the mask, ripped the phone out of hands and threw it against the wall twice. At the end, they picked up the phone, wiped off the fingerprints. They grabbed me by the hair and pulled me around. They yelled at me. There were two girls in the office and they just watched the torture,” said 26-year-old Muscovite Alexandra Kaluzhskikh. In the recording she made, one of the officers can be heard threatening to torture the girl with electric shocks. “Putin is on our side. You are the enemies of Russia, you are the enemies of the people ***** [f**k you]. You’ll ******** [be beaten] here and that’s it. We’ll get a bonus for this,” says the policeman.

Protest participants are charged with violation of the rules of participation in the action (Part 5 of Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code), repeat violation of the rules of participation in the action (Part 8 of Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code), organization or conduct of an action (Part 2 of Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code), disobedience to a legal requirement of the police (Article 19.3 of the Administrative Code), public actions, aimed at “discrediting the use of the armed forces” (Article 20.3.3 of the Administrative Code).

All detainees face fines from 2 thousand to 300 thousand rubles and arrest up to 30 days.

New Draconian Laws. On March 4, 2022, the Russian State Duma convened for an emergency plenary session. Among other things, the deputies adopted in the second and third readings a bill on amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses and the Criminal Code. The initiatives introduced punishment for disseminating “knowingly false information about the activities of the Russian Armed Forces” and “for discrediting the use of the Russian forces”. In order for these changes to enter into force as quickly as possible, they were carried out under an accelerated procedure.

According to the text of the law, the crime without aggravating circumstances involves a fine of up to 1.5 million rubles and imprisonment of up to three years. If “official position” was used in spreading “fakes,” there was a “mercenary motive” or a motive of “political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred,” the person faces a fine of up to five million rubles or five to 10 years in prison. If the distribution of “fakes” led to serious consequences, the case could lead to imprisonment for 10 to 15 years.

What does “discrediting the use of the armed forces” mean? It is “public actions aimed at discrediting the use” of the Russian army, including public calls to prevent its use. Whether this will mean, for example, participation in an anti-war rally, it is not yet clear, but it is very likely.

The Kremlin is hiding the true cost of war from its people.  Ukrainian presidential office reported more than 12,000 dead Russian soldiers, while the Russian Defense Ministry does not confirm these figures. During the first week since the start of the war, it never published data on casualties, and on March 2, it named the losses of the Russian army in Ukraine for the first time. According to the ministry, 498 soldiers were killed and 1,597 wounded during the hostilities. This data has not been updated since then. At the same time, in all publications of government agencies and pro-Kremlin media, it is forbidden to call this conflict the word “war”: only the term “special military operation” is used.

It is also still unclear which soldiers are involved in the operation. Russian authorities claim that only contract soldiers have been sent to the war. The Ukrainian side regularly reports about dozens and even hundreds of captured Russian soldiers, many of whom are not contract soldiers, but regular conscripts.

This is indirectly confirmed by evidence that in mid-February, the parents of soldiers serving in military units in various parts of Russia began to contact the Russian Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers. They all reported the same thing: their sons were either forced to urgently sign a contract or sent to military units located near the border with Ukraine. According to the law, if an enlisted man is ready to go to war under contract, he can sign it one month after the start of military service, but in practice the contracts were signed under pressure, the soldiers’ relatives claim.

The Russian Defense Ministry also does not tell mothers where and how to find their sons. Behind the impersonal figure of 498 people are the tragedies of specific families who, as if they had been instructed in advance, are told “this is a fake,” even when relatives bring in pictures and videos of their loved ones in captivity. There are cases when mothers of killed Russian soldiers receive a death notification, but the military unit keeps claiming that the soldier is in training. “We have no such information,” this phrase has become the universal answer of any officials and military the mothers. 

News about the victims can only be learned from reports by regional authorities or from posts of condolence published by their friends and relatives. It was the same during the war in Donbass in 2014-2015, and it was the same during the Syrian campaign. 

By March 7, 2022, according to data of human rights project “Network Freedoms”, 60 people had been detained under the new law in 16 Russian cities: St. Petersburg, Kostroma, Samara, Krasnoyarsk, Novorossiysk, Orel, Taganrog, Kaliningrad, Krasnodar, Voronezh, Elista, Vladivostok, Yaroslavl, Kemerovo, Anapa, Simferopol.

Some of the detainees are also facing charges for participating in an unauthorized rally (Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code) and violating the law on “fakes” (Article 20.3.3 of the Administrative Code). Seven of them have already been fined between 30 and 60 thousand rubles, reports “Network Freedoms.”

NGS42 reported that on March 6, 2022,  a resident of Kemerovo was fined 60 thousand rubles for calling for an anti-war rally. On the same day, a fine of 30 thousand rubles was imposed on Irina Shumilova, a resident of Kostroma, who staged a solitary picket with a poster “This war is a special operation on your taxes, and we fundraise for the medical treatment of children by SMS-messages”. According to “Network Freedoms”, no linguistic expertise was conducted in Shumilova’s case, and the police officer making the arrest said that he detected an appeal to protest in the fact that the words “war” and “special operation” were highlighted on the poster.

Another resident of Kostroma region, priest Ioann Burdin, head of the Church of the Resurrection in the village of Karabanovo, was also detained. He was charged with anti-war preaching and publishing a link to the “No to War” petition on Change.org on the parish website. “Burdin V.V., being in a public place, in the premises of the Church of the Resurrection of Christ, during his religious service in the presence of about 10 worshipers committed public actions aimed at discrediting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which conduct a special operation on the basis of the decision of the President and the resolution of the Federation Council of the RF Federal Assembly”, — said the protocol according to «Mediazone» media outlet.

Vera Kotova, a resident of Krasnoyarsk, was fined 30 thousand rubles. She was tried for writing “No to War” on the snow. The police report states that she “wrote on the snow by removing the snow cover from the granite base of the monument to Lenin: “No to War.”

The Russian State Goes After Children. On March 3, 2022, the Russian Ministry of Education held an all-Russian open lesson, “Defenders of Peace,” at which schoolchildren were lectured on “why the liberation mission in Ukraine is a necessity.” Shortly before that, principals of educational institutions across Russia directed teachers to hold daily class hours dedicated to the war in Ukraine and relations between the two countries — and sent them teaching guides that referred to the war as a “special operation.”

On March 7, 2022, it was reported that in Moscow, police came to the home of sixth-grader Kirill (surname withheld at the request of his mother) after a history lesson where the war with Ukraine was discussed, and the boy was asking questions. Kirill and his mother Natalia told “Novaya Gazeta” about it.

The lesson, where the teacher decided to discuss the Russian “special operation”, took place on March 4. According to Kirill, not only he, but a few of his classmates asked questions about the war. The consequences for them are not reported.

Among other things, Kirill asked why Putin started a war in Ukraine. To which the teacher said that it was a “special operation.” When asked how to get the government to agree to a rally against the actions of the government itself, she, according to the schoolboy, “did not give a clear answer”.

After class Kirill shouted “Glory to Ukraine!” in the hallway and was supported by other kids, the boy told reporters.

According to the mother of the schoolboy, after the class, she received a call from an unknown number and was invited to the police department for a conversation about her son. Kirill’s class master invited her to school for a meeting with the juvenile affairs inspectorate. Natalya did not show up for the conversation and took her son out of school.

On March 7, when Kirill was alone in the apartment, two police officers came to the schoolboy’s home. The boy did not open the door, so the police turned off the electricity in the apartment and left, leaving a “summons for questioning” under the door.

There is also another scandalous story involving children. On March 2, 2022 in Moscow police detained two women and five of their children, aged seven to 11, who had come to lay flowers at the Ukrainian Embassy. The detainees were first held in a police truck, then brought to the Presnenskoe police station.The authorities first wanted to keep the parents and their children overnight at the police station, but later they let them go.  A trial and fines are ahead, and the parents are afraid — the police officers shouted at them, threatening to deprive them of their parental rights.

Internet and Social Media Blockade. On March 2, Roskomnadzor blocked the websites of the Ukrainian Ministry of Health and Border Guard Service and several dozen Ukrainian media outlets in Russia, including TCN channel, Segodnya, Zaxid, Ukrinform, Censor.net, Vesti.ua, Depo.ua and Delo.ua, among others.

By March 4, Roskomnadzor had blocked 16 media outlets in Russia: Meduza, BBC Russian Service, Deutsche Welle, Current Time, The New Times, The Village, DOXA, Taiga.info, Dozhd, Echo Moskvy, TV2, Radio Liberty, and six related projects: “Idel.Realii,” “Siberia.Realii,” “Sever.Realii” and “Radio Azatlyk.”

On March 6, it became known about the blocking of the media outlets Mediazone and Republic, as well as websites of Snob, Sobesednik, Agent, 7×7, Ekho Moskvy in Chelyabinsk, and Ekho Kavkaza.

Before that, Roskomnadzor issued a statement in which it demanded that the media should write about the war in Ukraine, relying only on official Russian sources, otherwise the agency threatened to block them and impose fines of up to five million rubles. The Krasnoyarsk-based media outlet Prospekt Mira, and Echo Moskvy, InoSMI, Mediazona, The New Times, Dozhd, Svobodnaya Pressa, Krym.Realii, Novaya Gazeta, Zhurnalist, and Lenizdat immediately received cautions from the agency.

After Russia passed a law on criminal liability for “fakes” about the actions of the Russian army, a number of media outlets announced that they had stopped working (in particular, Znak.com) or refused to write about the war (in particular, Novaya Gazeta and Snob).

Roskomnadzor also restricted Russians’ access to Facebook and Twitter.

Blocked media outlets, however, continue to operate and many Russians keep reading them using anti-blocking tools, such as VPN clients or plug-ins. In addition, the Tor browser in traffic obfuscation mode is used to bypass blocking. Telegram news channels are extremely popular: the number of subscribers of some of them has exceeded one million these days.

All that happened to Russia and in Russia in the first ten days of its war against Ukraine can be understood and analyzed in detail only after many years, when all the data becomes available and when history puts everything in its place — who was right and who was wrong, whose hopes and prophecies came true and whose hopes was not in vain.

Among the many things that have happened, one cannot ignore the massive and rapid departure of tens of thousands of people from Russia. During the time when it was still possible to fly from Russia anywhere, huge airliners departed from each of the country’s metropolises many times a day to Istanbul, Yerevan, Baku, Tashkent, and Bishkek. Obviously, the main request was the absence of an entry visa requirements for Russian passport holders. Further plans in many cases remained vague — to sit out the war in Turkey or Georgia, to try to get visas somewhere else. Social networks were flooded with brief messages about leaving Russia and heartbreaking stories about planes crammed with IT-specialists,  psychologists, producers, journalists, businessmen, their families, and pets.

The large number of people in airports with pet carriers signaled that people were not leaving for a short vacation. Another alarming indicator was the fantastic prices for destinations that are not at all popular at this time of year — and yet people bought tickets and left.

Also notable is the frequency of threatening remarks by border guards to those leaving, in particular the phrase “You understand that we will not let you back?” Most likely, these are private opinions, but modern Russian law is such that normal everyday life abroad inevitably leads to crimes: contacts with undesirable and banned organizations, statements on topics forbidden in Russia in prohibited terms, and so on.

There has probably only been one period in Russian history when so many people left the country in a matter of days, bound together by one thing only: an unwillingness to accept the new reality that prevailed in the country. I am talking about the evacuation of the White Army from the Crimea in November 1920, when some 165,000 people left Russia in three days. In 2022, there was no defeated army evacuated, and there was no civil war in Russia, but in a moral sense these events have much in common. These days, those who no longer see any possibility of staying in Russia left, because the authorities had defiantly and unequivocally stripped them of everything that was important, familiar and dear to them — prospects, jobs, ways of life, the ability to move freely around the world and generally an ability to feel like free people in a free world. According to observers’ calculations, 150 journalists of the federal media alone left during the days of war — and this after the continuous departure of opposition journalists from Russia for many years.

How many people in total left Russia in the first ten days of the war? Given the multitude of flights from different cities, we are obviously talking about several thousand leaving daily. According to local reports, 20-25 flights from Russia arrived to Yerevan alone every day. We should add to this those who crossed land borders from Finland to Kazakhstan. According to Georgian authorities, about 30,000 Russian citizens entered the country in just a few days by multiple ways.

Obviously, for many of those who left Russia in recent months and years with the hope of returning at the first opportunity, the war and the accompanying rapid changes in life in Russia have become the last straw forcing them to admit that they had left their country for a long time or even forever. Finally, since the intensification of rhetoric related to Ukraine in 2021 and the increasingly realistic threats of sanctions, many companies, especially in IT, seriously considered the practicalities of the relocation of their employees — so that in the last weeks before the war, those who otherwise might not have gone or would not have gone so fast have already started to leave Russia. And so, according to the most conservative estimate, we may be talking about 50-60 thousand citizens of Russia who urgently left during the war, but maybe the real number of those who left the country is close to 100 thousand or even more, taking into account all the categories mentioned above.

Despite the looming airline crisis, the only way to stop those who suddenly feel uncomfortable in Russia from leaving is to close the border from the inside. If the war continues for a long time, this measure is practically inevitable. As long as the borders remain open in some form, the flow of people leaving will not dry up: many have been unable to pack up and leave literally for nowhere in a few days for objective and subjective reasons, so they will do so a little later. The sanctions imposed against Russia and the reaction of the Russian leadership to them have also become a serious restriction: it has become a problem to leave Russia with money, and we are not talking about taking out millions, but modest amounts of family savings. In fact, these measures have made life in Russia, where cards and payments still work, more difficult for those who have left it.

Of course, against the background of the tragedy in Ukraine, where millions of people are becoming refugees because of the Putin regime’s attack, the flow of refugees from Russia remains in the shadows, and these people not only do not expect or receive any special assistance, but even suffer from the sanctions imposed against the Putin regime, as mentioned above. Nevertheless, this wave of emigration means a great deal for the future of Russia, near and far.

In a sense, these people are victims of the cold civil war waged by Putin’s regime in recent years, which they lost. However, in a real civil war, people fight with weapons in their hands for their vision of the future; in a cold war, only one side — the citizens — is unarmed. Putin’s dictatorship is armed and does not hesitate to use all the instruments at its disposal. After the 2012 protests, Putin stopped even pretending to be tolerant of different opinions: he preferred to simply label all those who disagreed with him as enemies and not waste energy trying to please them, to change their minds, to reach a compromise with them. Since the spring of 2012, he began to pit “ordinary working people” against “office hamsters” and all kinds of “creative class.” After the occupation of Crimea in 2014, the level of hatred rose even higher, and those who disagreed with the regime were methodically turned into traitors to the homeland and enemies of the people.

One cannot say that there has not been any response. All these years the opponents of the dictatorship in Russia, especially young people and the notorious middle class, tried to do something —social activism, volunteer movement, political activity grew. Now it already seems fantastic that in 2017-2020 in Russia there was a peak of legal political activism associated with the work of Alexei Navalny and his team. As a result, it was possible not only to influence election results, but even to win regional election campaigns.

In 2020, however, Putin went on a decisive offensive. Viewing from 2022, it begins to look like the Kremlin has been preparing for war for a long time and thoroughly. In this sense, it is quite logical that a year before the elections of the State Duma (which should have demonstrated its ultra-loyalty to Putin during the war, and did so) and a year and a half before the war started, the leader of the most influential anti-Putin movement in Russia tried to be killed. They failed to kill Navalny, but the disgrace to the eyes of the world did not stop Putin, but perhaps encouraged him to abandon all disguise of his intentions and the essence of the regime created in Russia. From that time on, a new era began in Russia, the logical continuation of which was the war with Ukraine and the separation from the entire civilized world.

The brutal crackdown on rallies in support of Navalny in January 2021 was only a prelude to what happened next. Within a few months Navalny’s team was actually outlawed, and those of its members who did not manage to leave Russia in time and urgently, ended up in prison. Repressive legislation was constantly tightened, and all human rights and civil society organizations that were deemed undesirable by the authorities were crushed and banned.

As a result, by the beginning of the war with Ukraine, Russia had everything ready to finish off what was still alive and resisting. Despite all of this and the already mentioned mass exodus, Russian citizens are still coming out to protest, and there are already more people detained at anti-war rallies than at rallies in support of Navalny.

Nevertheless, the prospects for any protest movement in Russia are unclear. Now, to the fear of repression and the attrition of protesters who are already on trial or in custody, another factor is added: the physical departure from the country of a substantial part of those who either went to the protests or who would have joined them sooner or later.  100,000 people represent large rallies in 10 cities, to put it bluntly. In many Russian cities, a situation can arise when the very same few hundred or thousands of people who went to all the protests, just left. Thus, either those who have never done this before will go out, or almost no one at all. As the socio-economic indicators deteriorate, the protest may become different and come close to the Kazakh version, when desperate people take to the streets with no influential leaders, no program, and no experience of participation in actions and easily become victims of provocateurs first, and then of punitive actions of the authorities.

No one is saying that all of those who left were participants in the protest movement, but it is obvious that they are part of the environment from which the protest came, donations, ideas, and support. But the most painful thing to think about is what and with whom Russia will be left after Putin’s regime collapses. If this happens many years from now, most of the people who have left Russia are unlikely to return to the country they left — new roots and a new life have already been put down in the new place. The country destroyed by Putin’s policies will come to a standstill: the pro-Putin administrative, power and economic elite will be completely discredited, and there will be no place to hire anyone else. This will create conditions for permanent political instability in Russia and the prospect of a return of the Putinists in the first election – simply for the lack of a force that could oppose them. The Western world cannot and should not wash its hands of and stigmatize Russia and especially those who have left it in recent years. Russian emigration needs to be dealt with constantly and purposefully, so that after the fall of Putin’s regime, the country has a chance to change and return to the normal path of development, to become an ally of the West forever.

By Free Russia Foundation Team

More than a week has passed since Putin declared his “special military operation.” The rest of the world refers to it as “war on Ukraine.” Along with Ukraine, Putin is rapidly destroying Russia. The West may be unable to appreciate the extent of the tragedy unfolding inside Russia right now, as its economy collapses, and the society feels the hatred of the entire world.

It’s not a war — it’s a “special operation

This week, Putin has completed his task of eliminating Russia’s independent media. In the late nineties, a fresh TV channel NTV used to broadcast a satirical program “Puppets,” which poked fun at prominent government figures. In the first decade and the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, on the same channel, viewers could watch the protests taking place on Bolotnaya Square and at the polls during the 2012 presidential elections.

Putin has skillfully seized control of the Russian television, depriving citizens of the opportunity to soberly assess the situation both inside the country and the implications of Putin’s foreign policy. Today, only “Putin’s” journalists are allowed on the airwaves. There, they create an alternative reality and suppress the truth. Notably, the name of the opposition leader Navalny is never mentioned on TV. Television is the only source of information for many Russians. This is true for most retirees, for example, who find it hard to “learn the Internet.”

Elections in Russia have also been hijacked. No independent, liberal or democratic candidates are allowed to participate in elections. And if they somehow make it onto the ballot, numerous schemes have been developed by authorities to prevent them from attaining the minimum threshold, leaving him or her with a measly 1 to 4% of the vote. As a result, political forces cannot unite to coordinate a mass protest similar to the Ukrainian “Maidan.” Those who do join protests end up in jail and are even assassinated.  

Right now, the Russian authorities are dealing a lethal blow to independent media. The TV Rain channel has decided to halt its broadcasting. This decision was made in response to the amendments adopted by the State Duma on imprisonment for “public dissemination of knowingly false information about the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.”

The punishment includes both a fine of 1.5 million rubles and 15 years in prison.

Even the word “war” is considered to be “knowingly false information”. This is why Roskomnadzor issued a warning to “Novaya Gazeta.”

On March 2, “Ekho Moskvy” was forced to stop broadcasting.

The Silver Rain radio station also stopped broadcasting.

As of March 4, 2022, all of the following media outlets have been blocked: “Dozhd”, Taiga.info, DOXA, “Echo Moskvy”, “Present Time”, The New Times, “Crimea. Realii”, “Ukrainian Pravda”, “Gordon”, “Interfax-Ukraine”, The Village, TSN, “Segodnya”, UNIAN, “Zerkalo Nedeli”, Vesti.ua and Zaxid.

Novaya Gazeta, Lenizdat.ru, Mediazone, Svobodnaya pressa, Journalist, and Wikipedia have received warnings.

This is not a laughing matter.  The authorities are imposing censorship, banning the words “war,” “attack,” and “invasion.” Information about the shelling of Ukrainian cities and the deaths of Ukrainian civilians caused by the Russian army has been declared untrue and is prohibited from dissemination. It is now forbidden to call the ongoing operation an attack, an invasion, or a declaration of war.

Kremlin’s media oversight agency Roskomnadzor mandates the media to cite only Russian government sources in their coverage of these events. Journalists breaking with this practice  face real prison sentences.

Along with the blocking of media platforms, Russian authorities are also slowing down Meta social networks, and in particular, Facebook. They are also restricting Twitter. On March 2, RoskomSvoboda reported on the supposed blocking Youtube in Russia. The same “slowdown” is taking place on Youtube. Users from Russia were unable to load static elements of YouTube, such as avatars and artwork. Roskomnadzor denies any slowdown of service.

All Google advertising banners that, in the judgement of the Russian authorities, spread inaccurate information, have stopped working.

These developments do not only cut off the Russian civil society from truthful information, but also deny Russians the opportunity to show the world that they are, in fact, against the war.

On the ill-fated date of February 24, 2022 Russians began to protest Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Some protests got off to an early start amid news of the alleged invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops. However, when the reports were confirmed, civil society exploded.

Online petitions and open letters began to appear, appealing to Putin and the world to stop the fighting in Ukraine.

People take to the streets

At the time of writing on March 3rd, a total of 7,634 people have been detained at protests in 115 cities since February 24th. Of the total, 3,608 protesters were detained in Moscow, and  2,599 were detained in St. Petersburg.

Statistics of the human rights projectOVD-Info (updated in real time).

Number of detainees at protests against the war with Ukraine

Due to the intensification of the protests, the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation began to issue warnings. Under Article 275 of the Criminal Code “Treason,” Russians now face up to 20 years in prison for providing virtually any assistance to Ukrainians. I would like to provide some specifics, however, as often happens in the Russian Federation, the department’s wording is rather vague. “State treason” can now apply to people who provide advisory assistance (whatever that means), as well as financial, material, technical and “other” assistance. Using the phrase “other assistance,” the Prosecutor’s Office can include anything that it wants.

On march 3, 2022,  the Prosecutor General’s Office made an official announcement promising to initiate criminal charges against those who take part in protests— under Part 2 Article 282.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (participation in the activities of an extremist organization).

“Amid an unprecedented information attack on the Russian Federation, appeals to citizens to hold supposedly peaceful “anti-war” actions are spreading on the Internet.

It must be noted that the source of many such appeals are associations that, due to their extremist activities, have been banned in the territory of the Russian Federation by a court decision,” the agency writes.

Russians face from 2 to 6 years in prison under this article of the Criminal Code.

Over the course of the past week, the police visited the homes of activists and participants in anti-war actions on a daily basis. All have been charged with participation in an unauthorized mass event (Part 5 Article 202.2 of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation, carrying fines of 10-30 thousand rubles, or arrest for up to 15 days). Some people are charged under part 8 of the article, with “repeated violation of the rules for holding mass events,” for which the punishment is a fine of up to 300 thousand rubles or imprisonment of up to 30 days.

During the rallies, the police are also detaining journalists. This happens despite the fact that the journalists observe the law (by wearing a special vest, and carrying a statement of their assignment, a press card and a media badge). On March 2nd, the police detained two Sota correspondents for more than 7 hours, attempting to charge them with organizing an unauthorized event (part 1 of Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Violations).

The police also detained journalists from Novaya Gazeta, Radio Liberty, 93.ru, TASS, Pskov Gubernia and many others.

The police regularly use violence during arrests. Children, the elderly, and mothers with infants are detained.

Initially, the anti-war rallies were spontaneous, but on March 2nd, the politician Alexei Navalny, who is in prison, called upon all Russians to attend daily rallies against the war with Ukraine.

“Don’t wait another day, no matter where you are – in Russia, in Belarus or on the other side of the planet. Come out to the main square of your city every weekday at 7 p.m. and at 2 p.m. on weekends and holidays.”

Even before the military conflict began, a number of Russian oppositionists, including Alexei Minyaylo and Dmitry Tsorionov (Enteo), had applied to the Moscow City Hall to hold an anti-war rally of 150,000 people on March 5th in Moscow.

The “Vesna” movement from St. Petersburg had also announced that they would hold an all-Russian anti-war rally on March 6th across the country.

“The all-Russian protest rally will take place on March 6th. We will meet at 15.00 in the central squares of all Russian cities to express our protest. We have every right to do so according to the Constitution.”

Green ribbons began to appear on the streets of Russian cities, as a symbol of the protest promoted by Vesna.

From Olympian to deputy

Among those who disagree with the need to send troops to kill are members of a variety of professions.

The organization We are not alone has compiled a list of open letters against the war from members of various professions. The site is updated every day as new letters appear.

Here are a number of examples of open letters:

— IT workers: 32,050 signatures;

Correspondents of Russian media. This letter was penned by “Kommersant” journalist Elena Chernenko, for which she was removed from the Ministry of Foreign Afffairs press pool.

— Doctors: 11,650 signatures;

— Students and university staff: 14, 850 signatures.

In total, “We Are Not Alone” has recorded 62 open letters and more than 160,700 signatures from members of professional communities.

In addition to letters from professional associations and unions, political activists have created several petitions, both for Russians and for the international community. The largest of these is the petition Stop the War on Ukraine! created by Russia’s oldest human rights activist, Lev Ponomarev. As of this writing, 1,166,617 people have signed the petition.

On February 24th, Ponomarev was detained, allegedly for organizing an anti-war protest. He received a fine of 30,000 rubles.

On March 3rd, he went to the prosecutor’s office to have a report drawn up for having failed to note “foreign agent” at the bottom of the petition. He was attacked by journalists of the pro-governmental NTV channel.

The international civil society organization “Avaaz” launched the international petition Stop This War.” At the time of writing, 2,272,973 people have signed the petition.

Civil society activist Dmitry Ratner launched the petition Impeach Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin“. At the time of writing, 273,560 people have signed the petition.

Prior to the start of hostilities, the “Yabloko” party launched the petition NO WAR“. It is also possible to leave a signature in the offices of the party. On March 2nd, the Nizhny Novgorod office was attacked and the premises were vandalized.

Conclusion

Hundreds of thousands of Russians are speaking out against the war. Thousands of Russians are detained every day at anti-war rallies. Government agencies are threatening the media and ordinary citizens with decades in prison.

Unfortunately, hundreds of thousands of other Russians have been misinformed through years of brainwashing by pro-government propaganda. The independent media outlets that could fight the propaganda are either blocked, or forced to stop broadcasting, or to leave Russia altogether. The journalists of independent media outlets that have not yet been blocked are being detained.  

Despite the censorship and the threat of criminal charges, Russian citizens are taking to the streets, reporting about the reality of the war on social media and are trying to convince the public that this is no “special operation of liberation,” but the very real war that it is.

By Yury Krylov, Contributing Author, FRF

The situation around Russian threat against Ukraine keeps tensions high globally. The atmosphere in Donbass escalated dramatically on February 18, when the Kremlin-controlled leaders of the self-proclaimed and internationally unrecognized DNR and LNR republics publicly asserted that Kyiv was preparing an assault (the Ukrainian authorities categorically deny such intentions) and announced the evacuation of some residents of these regions to Russia. Shooting resumed on the front line. U.S. President Joe Biden forecasted that “Russia may launch an invasion in the next few days,” and the Kremlin reiterated its demands for security guarantees.

The State Duma’s Appeal to the Russian President

On February 15, 2022, the Russian State Duma appealed to President Putin to officially recognize the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics. The resolution was introduced by deputies from the Communist party, but representatives of other parties also voted for it.

United Russia party prepared an alternative draft of the resolution. It was more cautious and stipulated that parliament should first consult with the Foreign Ministry and then apply to the President. In the end, United Russia’s proposal received only 310 votes, while the Communists’ resolution received 351.

“The deputies of the State Duma appeal to you, Mr. Vladimir Vladimirovich, to consider the issue of recognition by the Russian Federation of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic as autonomous, sovereign and independent states, as well as the issue of holding negotiations with the leadership of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic as soon as possible to create a legal basis for interstate relations, ensuring regulation of all aspects of cooperation, including security issues,” — it says, among other things, in this document.

After summarizing the results of the vote, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said that the parliament’s appeal to the president to recognize the DNR and LNR would be signed immediately, after which it would be sent to Vladimir Putin.

The Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics declared independence from Ukraine in May 2014 after a majority of participants in referendums held in the regions supported the adoption of acts of self-determination for the DNR and LNR. Diplomatically, the two Donbass republics are recognized only by South Ossetia, a partially recognized state in the Caucasus.

Vladimir Putin himself commented on the Duma address during a press conference with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who visited Moscow for talks on the escalating situation around Ukraine. According to Putin, when voting on the issue of recognition of the DNR and LNR, deputies were guided by “the opinion of their voters,” which they “subtly feel.”

The Evacuation of DNR and LNR Citizens to Russia

On the evening of February 16 and morning of February 17, OSCE observers reported about 500 explosions near the line of contact in the east of Ukraine, which is several times higher than on previous days.

On the morning of February 18, 2022, the leaders of the LNR and DNR republics announced the evacuation of their residents to Russia. Denis Pushilin, head of the DNR, said that women, children and the elderly would be evacuated first. According to him, the evacuees will be accommodated and provided with everything they need in the Rostov region. After Pushilin’s appeal, sirens went off in Donetsk, and city residents lined up at ATMs. Soon the evacuation was announced in the Luhansk People’s Republic. Its head Leonid Pasechnik urged residents who had not been mobilized and were not involved in the provision of social and civil infrastructure to leave for Russia as soon as possible.

A few hours after the announcement of the evacuation, Pushilin said in a new speech that “it is going to full-scale war” and expressed the opinion that the number of refugees to Russia could reach hundreds of thousands. The DNR Emergencies Ministry said that it was planning to evacuate about 700,000 people. First buses with refugees left the republic around 8 p.m.

Both leaders of the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass explained the need for evacuation by rising tensions in the region. Pasechnik, citing “intelligence data,” said that the “Ukrainian aggressor” was planning provocations on the line of contact and a “deep breakthrough” into LNR territory.

Putin ordered to provide each person arriving from the self-proclaimed DNR and LNR in Rostov Region with 10,000 rubles. And in the Rostov Region, which borders on Ukraine, an operational headquarters was set up to coordinate the evacuation from the DNR and LNR.

Remarkably, the heads of the DNR and LNR recorded their video messages announcing the evacuation as early as February 16. The timestamp contained in the metadata of the videos was publicized by Bellingcat investigator Arik Toller. The head of DNR Denis Pushilin, in particular, draws attention in his speech that he said it “today, on February 18”. The folder, in which Passechnik’s address was filed, was entitled “Mongoose throw”.

By Monday evening, February 21, 2022, more than 60 thousand people had already crossed the border with Russia. A state of emergency was introduced in the Voronezh region and a state of heightened readiness in the Ryazan region.

Ukraine’s Response

Ukraine rejected accusations of preparing sabotage and invasion operations in Donbass. “We categorically refute Russian propaganda reports about allegedly offensive operations by Ukraine <…> Ukraine does not conduct or plan any such actions in Donbass. We are fully committed exclusively to a diplomatic settlement,” Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba tweeted. The commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valery Zaluzhny, said that the statements of the “occupation administrations” of Donbass about the attack of the Ukrainian military are not true.

On February 19, 2022, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky spoke at the Munich Security Conference, emotionally expressing his grievances against both Russia and the West. Western countries, according to Zelensky, are not doing enough to restrain Vladimir Putin.

Zelensky said he was initiating consultations within the framework of the Budapest Memorandum, which provides guarantees of Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity in exchange for its renunciation of nuclear weapons. The Budapest memorandum was signed on December 5, 1994 by Great Britain, Russia, the United States and Ukraine. The document came into force in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Other states pledged to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and refrain from using force against it in connection with the removal of nuclear weapons from its territory.

The Ukrainian president also offered Russian leader Vladimir Putin a meeting. “I don’t know what the president of the Russian Federation wants, so I suggest a meeting,” he said.

International Reaction

On February 18, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden delivered an address on the situation around Ukraine in which he said that, according to his sources, Vladimir Putin had already made a decision about a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine. The speech was broadcast live by the White House.

The American leader believes that Kyiv is being tried to be provoked in the Donbass. He is confident that Russian troops remain close to the borders with Ukraine: according to him, they are planning an invasion within days. Biden noted that the U.S. is not going to send its military to Ukraine but assured that Washington will continue to support Kyiv.

“There is no point in Ukraine attacking. Russia continues to fabricate claims that Ukraine is preparing to attack Russia. This is a classic that Russia has already used,” Biden said.

Before his speech, Biden had time to discuss the situation with the leaders of NATO countries —Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, Canada, the alliance itself and the EU.

The White House also reminded that in case of Russia’s military aggression, the US would impose sanctions on the biggest Russian financial institutions and state-owned companies, as well as on a number of industrial sectors.

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson called an invasion inevitable and warned of “the biggest war in Europe since 1945.”

On February 20, French and Russian presidents Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin held telephone talks to discuss the situation in Ukraine. Macron and Putin agreed to intensify diplomatic work— the ultimate goal should be a summit to define a new peace and security architecture in Europe. The presidents also agreed to resume work in the “Normandy format.”

Against this backdrop, the airline Lufthansa announced that it would suspend flights to Kyiv from February 21 to 28, 2022. The carrier will also suspend flights to Odessa. At the same time, Austrian Airlines said it would stop flights to Kyiv and Odessa from February 20 until the end of the month. Suspension of commercial flights gravely harm the Ukrainian economy.

On February 19, the German and Austrian authorities urged their citizens to leave Ukraine due to a possible Russian invasion.

What’s Happening Right Now

Early Monday morning, February 21, 2022, the heads of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics Denis Pushilin and Leonid Pasechnik asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to recognize their independence.

“On behalf of the entire people of the Donetsk People’s Republic, we ask you to recognize the DNR as an independent, democratic, legal and social state,” said DNR head Denis Pushilin.

The heads of the DNR and LNR also asked Putin to conclude treaties of friendship and partnership with the republics after the recognition of independence.

Shortly thereafter, Putin commenced an emergency meeting of the Russian Security Council. The Russian leader said that he convened the meeting to discuss the situation in Donbass. All of its participants supported the recognition of the independence of the DNR and LNR.

Head of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov spoke about “two sabotage groups” on the border between Russia and Ukraine and “a captured Ukrainian military man,” as well as about the 68,500 refugees arriving in Russia from Donbass.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu spoke about more than 40 bombings in Donbass “overnight alone,” damaged infrastructure, and Donetsk residents left without water.

At the end of the meeting, Putin said that he had heard his colleagues’ opinions and promised that “a decision will be made today.”

On the same day, Vladimir Putin addressed the Russians. He explained why Russia recognized the DNR and LNR. The president spoke for about an hour, during which he shared his own very bizarre history of Ukraine, denying grounds for its statehood. In the first part of the address, Putin spoke in detail about the collapse of the USSR, which resulted in an independent Ukraine; lamented the corruption and high utility bills in modern Ukraine; said that aggressive actions in Ukraine are supported by foreign special services; and added that Ukrainian authorities can build nuclear weapons and that NATO bases are “actually deployed on Ukrainian territory.”

Ukraine’s accession to NATO, Putin said, poses a direct threat to Russia’s security. “That is why I have decided to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the DNR and LNR. I am sure the citizens of Russia and all patriotic forces of the country will support me,” Putin concluded. Immediately afterward, television broadcasted the footage of the signing of treaties with the LNR and DNR in the Kremlin. Vladimir Putin also issued an order for the Russian Armed Forces to “perform peacekeeping functions” in the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass.

On February 22, the United States threatened new sanctions against Russia over its recognition of the LNR and DNR. “Putin wants the world to go back in time, when there was no United Nations and the world was ruled by empires. But the rest of the world has moved on. It’s not 1919, it’s 2022,” Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. permanent representative to the organization, told an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council. According to her, with his latest actions, Vladimir Putin “ripped the Minsk agreements to shreds.”

The United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union also announced their intention to impose new sanctions against Russia. The United Kingdom said that it might increase military aid to Ukraine. According to DPA and Der Spiegel, the sanctions could include 350 Duma deputies who voted for the recognition of the DNR and LNR, as well as Russian banks with ties to Donbass. The EU sanctions provide for the freezing of assets on the territory of the association and a ban on entry into the EU.

President Joe Biden signed a resolution prohibiting investments in the DNR and LNR, as well as the import of goods, services or technologies from there. The document implies blocking the US property of people associated with the DNR and LNR, and also allows imposing sanctions against those who decide to operate in the self-proclaimed republics. The document said that Russia’s decision threatens the national security and foreign policy of the US.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in an address to the nation that Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders would remain the same. He stressed that the country was pursuing a peaceful path but was ready to defend itself. Ukraine demanded an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, the OSCE and the “Normandy quartet.” The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry condemned Russia’s decision, saying that it violated the basics of international law and the UN Charter, as well as Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry also asked Volodymyr Zelenskyy to consider severing diplomatic relations with Russia.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel said that “the recognition of two separatist regions in Ukraine is a blatant violation of international law, Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and the Minsk agreements. Polish President Andrzej Duda called on NATO and the EU to act tough on Russia to “stop the aggressor.” Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Shimonite said that Putin’s actions “put Kafka and Orwell to shame.”

On Tuesday, February 22, Great Britain imposed sanctions against Gennady Timchenko, Boris Rotenberg and Igor Rotenberg — Russian oligarchs and close personal associates of Vladimir Putin. Five Russian banks also fall under British sanctions.  The assets of these individuals and companies in Britain will be frozen, Boris Johnson said.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that the certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline would be halted indefinitely due to the recognition of the DNR and LNR.

And the final news: the Federation Council allowed Putin to deploy Russian troops to the DNR and LNR. At the same time, the documents signed by Putin and the heads of the LNR and DNR do not specify the boundaries within which the republics are recognized. Representatives of the LNR and DNR stated that it could be the borders of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, some of which are controlled by Ukraine.

Free Russia Foundation, on behalf of the global movement of pro-democracy Russians, stands in solidarity with the people of Ukraine in their pursuit of freedom, peace and self-determination.

We condemn the hostile actions of the illegitimate regime of Vladimir Putin and his accomplices threatening Ukraine with military and hybrid operations and upending the European security.

We call on the international community to act decisively to end the Kremlin’s military provocations internationally and its domestic repression against the Russian civil society.

By Leah Silinsky, FRF Fellow

The violence unleashed by the government against Russians who came out to protest Navalny’s arrest in early 2021 demonstrates that Putin’s regime has no tolerance for any form of dissent or criticism of the political status quo. 24-year-old Pavel Grin-Romanov is yet another victim of the Kremlin’s assault on civil liberties in Russia.

Pavel was born on July 7, 1997, in Krasny Luch. Krasny Luch is a city in Luhansk Oblast, which is a region of Ukraine that has been occupied by Russia since 2014. Pavel is a citizen of both Ukraine and Russia. After graduating high school, he moved to Moscow where he lived with his wife Polina and worked as an MC, promoter, and as an administrator of an internet cafe. He is known by others for his love of computers and technology.

Pavel Grin-Romanov was arrested on January 31, 2021 for allegedly pepper-spraying a riot police officer during a street protest he attended with his wife on the Komsomolskaya Square by the Leningradsky railway station. Pavel has remained in police custody since February 2, 2021.  On April 9, 2021, the Meshchansky District Court of Moscow sentenced him to a 3 year and 6 month prison sentence to be served in a penal colony.

Pavel was charged under Article 318, Part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, for “violently threatening the life of an official on duty”. Though Pavel did plead “partially guilty”, this sentence is disproportionate and is the symptom of a corrupt legal system designed to punish those who openly criticize the Russian government. 

Despite his extremely difficult circumstances, Pavel has maintained an optimistic, positive attitude. His lawyer, Artem Nemov, confirmed that Pavel has remained in relatively high spirits given the situation. Unfortunately, it has been very difficult for Pavel’s wife, Polina, to visit him in detention.

Upon examination of the evidence in his case, it becomes clear that Pavel Grin-Romanov not only lacked the intent of carrying out a supposed “violent attack,” but that he also inflicted no physical or psychological harm on said OMON officer, Lieutenant Colonel-D.N. Terletsky.

OMON officers and riot police were attempting to disperse the protest on Komsomolskaya Square— attended by Pavel and his wife Polina. Videos provided as evidence by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation showed a chaotic crowd, with many confused individuals pushing against each other. Witnessing riot police officers acting violently, Pavel doused pepper spray in the air, to protect his wife and himself from riot police near him. Pavel stated that he sprayed pepper after seeing an officer beat a protester on the head with a truncheon.

On February 4, 2021, Pavel was taken to the Presnensky District Court of Moscow. Seven days later, he was officially charged under Article 318, Part 2, although his initial charges were under Article 318, Part 1. Part 2 of Article 318 provide for far harsher punishment and can result in a 5-to-10-year sentence. Analysts from MediaZona hypothesize that his sentence was increased because the OMON officer went to Botkin Hospital and received papers for sick leave from his departmental polyclinic despite suffering no injuries. Originally, the prosecution sought to sentence Pavel to 8 years, though this was reduced to 3 years and 6 months.  On July 30, 2021, Pavel’s sentence of three years and six months was shortened to three years. Despite being reduced, Pavel’s sentence is still highly unjust.

Pavel’s lawyer Artem Nemov asserted that his client’s sentence is entirely unjust given that it is based on false evidence, and that the prosecution could not prove that Pavel had any intent to harm, despite the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation posting the video where Pavel uses his pepper-spray canister. Moreover, the OMON officer in question has accepted Pavel’s apology and was wearing a helmet and face shield when he was allegedly pepper-sprayed, meaning that he could not have suffered any harm. 

Pavel’s lawyer has also pointed out that it was highly suspicious that officer Terletsky could not get a sick pass from a regular hospital and had to obtain one from his departmental polyclinic. The officer received his sick pass on February 2, but was registered as being on sick leave on February 1, 2021. Had the officer truly been injured, he would have received a sick pass from a regular hospital, the day that he came in. The judge reviewing Pavel’s case disregarded these arguments. He also chose not to wait for papers to come in from Ukraine, which attest to Pavel’s non-aggressive nature, to substantiate the assertion that Pavel showed no intent to aggressively assault officer Terletsky.

Pavel’s arrest is a politically-motivated punishment for his participation in the pro-Navalny protests which took place last year. There is undeniable evidence which points toward his innocence, and that he rendered no serious harm to the allegedly injured OMON officer. The unsubstantiated biased reporting in official Russian sources referring to Pavel as an aggressive individual, who was engaging in “unsanctioned activity” by simply attending the protest are highly suspicious.

Pavel’s arrest has received attention in both the U.S. and Russian media. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty published an article about him on April 9, 2021—the day that Pavel received his sentence from the Moscow court. Several Russian news sources wrote about Pavel’s arrest including Memorial, OVD-Info, Delo212, MediaZona, and the Official Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. Additionally, several twitter users have also posted about Pavel’s arrest, including users “nesteliza_”, “DaniilKonon,” and “leonidragozin.” Memorial recognizes Pavel Sergeevich Grin-Romanov as a political prisoner because it is clear that he was arrested simply for taking part in a pro-Navalny protest; and that his arrest, trial and sentence have been politically motivated. Memorial asserts that Pavel acted in self-defense and inflicted no injuries on the OMON officer.

Roskomnadzor’s ultimatum: a new round of censorship in Russia

On February 1, 2022, dozens of independent media outlets received a 24-hour order from Roskomnadzor (Russian Federal Service for Supervision in Information and Communications) to remove news and materials related to investigations by Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation.

TV channel Dozhd was ordered to remove six specific articles.  Radio station Echo of Moscow— thirty-four posts. Meduza media outlet received a list of seventeen items, Znak.com—thirteen, The Village—eight, the Saratov newspaper Svobodnye Novosti —nine, and Bumaga from Saint Petersburg— three. Radio Liberty may have set a record with a notice enumerating 40 posts ordered for removal by Roskomnadzor; letters have also been received by the Ukrainian, Tajik, Kazakh, and Tatar-Bashkir services of the radio station.

The information that the Russian government finds so offensive mainly deals with real estate owned by officials and their families, including the head of Roskosmos Dmitry Rogozin, presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky, State Duma deputy Leonid Slutsky, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev. Among the materials that Roskomnadzor demanded to be urgently removed were also FBK’s investigation into a luxury palace near Gelendzhik allegedly custom-built for Putin.

On January 28, 2022, Roskomnadzor also alerted the Office of the Prosecutor General that the outlets “disseminate materials from an organization whose activities are banned under the law against extremism.” In 2021, Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation was designated as foreign agent, extremist organization and banned in Russia.

Many of the outlets complied with Roskomnadzor orders to avoid having their online resources blocked. Tikhon Dzyadko, editor-in-chief of Dozhd, wrote in a Telegram post that he views such developments as an undeniable act of censorship, but “the blocked site would prevent the media from reporting on the following investigations,” he added. In addition, the Navalny investigations targeted by Roskomnadzor have been distributed on many platforms “and in general everywhere on the Internet,” he noted. Meduza, Echo of Moscow, Znak.com and other editorials have also removed publications under the threat of being blocked in Russia.

However, Radio Liberty and Current Time TV channel refused to remove articles about Navalny’s investigations. Jamie Fly, director of the media corporation, said that Radio Liberty would not comply with Roskomnadzor’s demands. “We will not allow the Kremlin to dictate our editorial decisions,” he said. The corporation called the Roskomnadzor’s demands “a blatant act of political censorship.”

Alexey Navalny’s spokesperson Kira Yarmysh called Roskomnadzor’s demands an act of censorship. “Absolutely pure naked evil that everyone resents by reading about it in history textbooks. And now it’s all in reality before our eyes,” the Navalny associate tweeted.

Roskomnadzor is the Russian federal executive agency responsible for monitoring, controlling and censoring Russian mass media. The service has repeatedly been accused of attempting to censor the Internet and violate freedom of speech by blocking websites and services under the pretext of not transferring data to Russia from foreign web servers or “protecting children from harmful information” or directly criticizing the activities of the Russian Government or Parliament.

Censorship and violations of the right to freedom of speech are expressly prohibited by Article 29 of the Russian Constitution, but Clause 4 contains an exception to the rule that the legislature has the right to restrict the right to disseminate information by a federal law, which is regularly used by Roskomnadzor.

Why the Navalny Team’s Investigations Are Important Not Only to Russians

Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation investigated corruption in the highest echelons of the Russian government, big business, and regional elites.

The Foundation was created by Navalny in 2011. According to its website, its only source of funding over the years has been donations from supporters. The organization employed approximately 40 people who searched for and uncovered corrupt schemes and cases of illicit enrichment, and drafted complaints to the Investigative Committee of Russia, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the municipal services.

Since 2013, the FBK has released over 80 investigations, making serious waves in the public opinion. FBK’s documentary “Putin’s Palace.The Story of the Biggest Bribe” received over 120 million views and became the most viewed non-interactive content on Russian-language YouTube, as well as the record-breaker in the number of positive user ratings in the Russian YouTube segment.

Alexey Navalny has consistently emphasized that corruption is not only one of Russia’s main problems, but also one of the most important issues for the entire world. “After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the global ideological confrontation, it was corruption— in its classic definition of ‘the use of one’s official status for personal gain’— has become the universal basis for the new authoritarian international to blossom, from Russia and Eritrea to Myanmar and Venezuela. And corruption has long ceased to be only an internal problem of these countries. It is almost always one of the main causes of the world’s problems that the West faces,” Navalny wrote in his 2021 column published in major Western media outlets.

An important aspect of corruption in authoritarian countries— and Russia is a prime example here— is its use of the financial infrastructure of the West— 90% of the money stolen by an autocrat is stored there. According to Navalny himself, the FBK investigations should not only open Russians’ eyes to corruption in Russia, but also encourage Western leaders to show determination and political will towards Russian corrupt officials who take their assets to the West and legalize them there.

Alexey Navalny has expressed dismay that the FBK investigations do not seem to trigger action by Western tax authorities and prosecutors. “The US, the UK and Germany have excellent tools and laws for fighting foreign corruption. Guess how many cases were opened after the investigations of our Anti-Corruption Foundation, which is now qualified by Putin’s government as an extremist organization? That’s right, not a single one. Even Western law enforcement agencies behave cautiously with corrupt foreign officials,” Navalny reports.

Navalny’s team’s meticulously documented investigations churn up materials that could serve basis for the introduction of more precise sanctions —not only against law enforcement officials, but also against oligarchs and corrupt businessmen from Vladimir Putin’s inner circle and beyond. This is how Navalny describes it: “Until personal sanctions are imposed on the oligarchs – first and foremost from Putin’s entourage, who is a role model for corrupt officials and businessmen around the world – any anti-corruption rhetoric from the West will be perceived as a game and a hollow talking point. There is nothing more frustrating than seeing the names of colonels and generals of special services no one has ever heard of on another sanctions list, but not seeing the names of those in whose interests these colonels are acting. Putin’s oligarchs who run “state-owned” or formally private companies are not businessmen, but leaders of organized criminal groups. Right now the Western establishment is acting like Pavlov’s dog. You show them a secret service colonel, they shout, “Punish him!” You show them an oligarch who pays the colonel, and they shout, “Invite him to Davos!”

Perhaps this issue will move forward thanks to the Navalny List, a 2021 listing of 35 individuals from the upper echelon of Russia’s elite implicated in corruption and human rights abuses, as well as those directly linked to the poisoning and imprisonment of the Russian opposition leader. The list was compiled thanks to years of hard work by the FBK team. On September 24, 2021, the U.S. House of Representatives approved an amendment to tighten anti-Russian sanctions in the new fiscal year’s defense budget. The House of Representatives bill calls the list’s members “Russian kleptocrats and human rights violators.”

Five Strikes Against The Kremlin.

Strike One: “Chaika”

Case in focus: an investigation into the business activities of the family of Russian Prosecutor General Yury Chaika. The investigation mainly focuses on the official’s sons Artem and Igor.

Release date: 12/01/2015

Number of views on YouTube: 25 million

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eXYQbgvzxdM   

Contents:

Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) published a huge investigation about the family of Prosecutor General Yury Chaika. It is mainly about his eldest son, Artem Chaika.

Artem Chaika owns the posh Pomegranate hotel in Greece on the Halkidiki peninsula. Olga Lopatina, the former wife of Deputy Prosecutor General Gennadi Lopatin, also owns a stake in the hotel. The FBK staff believes that their divorce is a formal one, as she still wears a wedding ring.

Olga Lopatina is a co-owner of the Kuban Sakhar company, shares in which belong to the wives of Sergei Tsapok and Vyacheslav Tsepovyaz – leaders of the Kushchevskaya organized crime group, who committed the brutal murder of 12 people, including four children, which shocked Russia.

Artem Chaika has a villa in Greece where construction is continuing. Nearby, Olga Lopatina is building a villa for herself. FBK examined her tax returns from her time as the wife of Deputy Prosecutor General (up until 2011) and found that Lopatin earned 18 million rubles – not enough to buy part of a hotel and a villa.

Artem Chaika owns a house in Switzerland worth about three million dollars. At the same time, he lists the Swiss address of his more humble home in all the documents. Artem Chaika keeps money in Swiss accounts.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Artem Chaika seized the Verkhne-Lenskoe River Shipping Company in the Irkutsk region and appropriated 12 ships. That’s how Yury Chaika’s son allegedly earned his first capital, which he exported to Switzerland. The FBK investigation details the entire embezzlement scheme.

Artem Chaika has a holding company with a turnover of hundreds of millions of dollars. He buys assets randomly: he has salt and sand mining, construction, brick-making, and law offices.

The business structures of the youngest son of the Prosecutor General, Igor Chaika, were able to get government contracts worth 300 billion rubles.

Domestic and international reaction:

According to a mid-December 2015 study by the Levada Center, 38 percent of Russians knew about the film “Chaika” in one way or another. At the same time, 82% of Russians who have heard of the film consider the corruption schemes and connections with criminal groups described in the film to be typical for the modern Russian authorities.

In his official statement on December 3, Prosecutor General Yury Chaika called the film a fraud, and the facts presented in it untrue.

On December 7, Presidential Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the information from the film did not arouse the Kremlin’s interest.

On December 8, 2015, the Anti-Corruption Foundation filed a complaint against Artyom Chaika with the Swiss Prosecutor’s Office based on suspicions of money laundering. The complaint mentioned Artyom and Igor Chaika, the sons of the Russian Prosecutor General, as well as other individuals, firms, bank accounts, and real estate allegedly connected to them. In order to exclude any bias in the verification, the prosecutor’s office assigned the investigation to a special police unit in Lugano, which investigates “white collar” crime. The investigation confirmed that the individuals named in the complaint were in Switzerland and were connected to the company mentioned in the complaint. However, no money laundering facts were identified. Later, Artyom Chaika received a notification from the Swiss prosecutor’s office that there were no claims against him. Also, based on his own petition, Artyom Chaika received a notice from Greek officials stating that the transaction he had conducted in Greece to purchase a hotel on the island of Halkidiki was legal.

Strike Two: “He Is Not Dimon To You”

Case in focus: An investigation into the multibillion-dollar property and corruption schemes used to enrich Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, formerly President of Russia.

Release Date: 03/02/2017

Number of views on YouTube: 44 million

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7_GF9g&t=2090s 

Contents:

The investigation “He Is Not Dimon To You. Palaces, Yachts, Vineyards – Dmitry Medvedev’s Secret Empire” deals with the real estate and expensive hobbies of then-Prime Minister Medvedev in Russia and abroad. The film is divided into 10 parts – “chapters”, each lasting about five minutes. The majority of episodes deal with the assets of the “Dar” charitable foundation and its related companies. The chairman of the foundation’s supervisory board is Ilya Eliseev, an old acquaintance and classmate of Medvedev’s, who is referred to in the film as Medvedev’s key confidant. The film shows that, on the one hand, Medvedev is acquainted with the foundation’s management and uses the foundation’s property for recreation, while, on the other hand, the foundation is filled with contributions from Russian oligarchs.

According to the authors of the investigation, the image of an official who no one takes seriously has been created artificially. In reality, Medvedev is “the creator and head of a huge, multi-level corruption scheme. According to the FBK, the house on Rublevka District of Moscow, worth about 5 billion rubles, was a gift from oligarch Alisher Usmanov to structures associated with Medvedev. The FBK called this “gift” a “bribe.”

According to the anti-corruption activists, Medvedev is also connected to another estate on Rublevo-Uspensky Drive, as well as a residence in Kursk region, a mansion in St. Petersburg, two estates by the sea in Krasnodar Krai, a mansion near Sochi, vineyards near Anapa (Krasnodar Krai, Russia) and in Italy, and an estate in Ivanovo region of Russia (already announced by Navalny’s supporters last year).

The FBK investigation also disclosed two yachts registered in the names of people close to Medvedev. Navalny’s supporters claim that the funds of the foundations and companies that the head of the government controls total at least 70 billion rubles. In addition to Usmanov, the sources of this money include shareholders of the gas company Novatek Leonid Mikhelson and Leonid Simanovsky, as well as Gazprombank and Bashneft. Most of the funds, according to FBK, are withdrawn to offshore accounts.

Based on this information, Navalny accused Medvedev of creating a “multi-level corruption scheme” and “taking bribes from the oligarchs.” He said that thousands of people are involved in “servicing the schemes” and that his real estate is “guarded by state security services.”

Reactions:

Following the release of the film, FBK sent a statement to the Russian Investigative Committee demanding that criminal charges be filed against Dmitry Medvedev and billionaire Alisher Usmanov for bribery. Navalny accused the Russian authorities of failing to respond appropriately to the investigation and called for rallies across Russia to “ask the authorities to answer our questions about corruption.” On March 26, 2017, tens of thousands of people marched in several dozen Russian cities for mass anti-corruption protests, which were then repeated on June 12, 2017. The protesters’ main demand was the resignation of Dmitry Medvedev from his post.

On April 5, at a plenary session, the State Duma refused to support the CPRF party’s proposal to contact law enforcement agencies and verify the information presented in the FBK investigation.

On April 4, 2017, Dmitry Medvedev called the FBK investigation “rubbish, nonsense,” collected “according to the principle of compote,” and on April 19, he said that he would not “comment on the absolutely false products of political crooks.” For his part, Alisher Usmanov filed a libel suit against Navalny and FBK. On May 31, 2017, the Lublinsky District Court in Moscow ordered Navalny to retract the information in the investigation and remove the publications about Usmanov.

Navalny refused to comply with the court’s decision and appealed.

At the moment, materials about this investigation have been removed from the websites of most Russian media outlets at the request of Roskomnadzor and under the threat of blocking.

Strike Three: “Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov transports dogs on a private plane”

Case in focus: in two investigations, the FBK found that Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov has a private jet for transporting dogs, as well as a large amount of luxury real estate

Release dates: 07/14/2016 and 03/06/2018

Number of views on YouTube: 2.5 million (1st investigation), 7.5 million (2nd investigation)

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tx8ZqZtjyT4 

Second Investigation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbRoZyuOijk 

Contents:

The Anti-Corruption Foundation published an investigation showing that Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov spends 130 million rubles a year on flights on a private jet and another 40 million on transporting his wife’s dogs to participate in foreign shows.

The FBK staff found that a member of the Russian government may own a $50 million Bombardier Global Express plane, which Shuvalov uses as a private jet. In the summer of 2018, it was also reported that Shuvalov’s family actually also owns a Gulfstream G650 aircraft with an estimated value of about $70 million.

Most often (18 times a year) the plane flew to Salzburg, Austria, where Shuvalov’s wife owns real estate. It was found that sometimes a private plane flew this route several times a week. The FBK investigation noted that the service of a one-way flight to Salzburg on a private plane costs from $40,000.

Olga Shuvalova, the wife of the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, confirmed to FBK the fact of flights with dogs on a private plane: “We take our dogs to exhibitions on our declared plane. By the way, of international level, to defend the honor of Russia”.

The investigation also revealed that Shuvalov’s money manager is buying up an entire floor of apartments in a high-rise on Moscow’s Kotelnicheskaya Embankment – 10 apartments worth about 600 million rubles. The fund previously wrote about Deputy Prime Minister’s London apartment of about 500 square meters and costing about 700 million rubles, as well as a luxurious Rolls-Royce for 40 million rubles.

Shuvalov’s family also occupied the former state summer residence of CPSU Politburo member Mikhail Suslov in the Odintsovsky district near Moscow on the area of about 7.5 hectares. The Italian architect Giuliano Moretti was in charge of designing the buildings, and the official’s neighbors include billionaires Roman Abramovich and Suleiman Kerimov.

Reactions:

Some economic observers believed that Shuvalov caused great irritation to the public by his indifferent attitude to the problems of ordinary citizens and the obvious “inter-class gaps.” Negative assessments of Shuvalov were given by opposition politician Vladimir Milov, who once worked with Shuvalov, drawing attention to the fact that he “does not hesitate to show money,” unlike his former boss Alexander Voloshin.

Shuvalov resigned as first deputy prime minister of the Russian government on May 24, 2018, and was appointed by the Russian president as chairman of Vneshekonombank. It was reported that “the investigations did not affect the official’s career and are not related to his possible departure from the government.”

Strike Four: “I Know All Those Who Tried To Kill Me”

Case in focus: A two-part video narrative about the secret group of assassins who tried to poison Alexey Navalny with a deadly chemical agent

Release Date: 12/14/2020 and 12/21/2020

Number of views on YouTube: 26 million (1st investigation), 29 million (2nd investigation)

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smhi6jts97I  

Second investigation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibqiet6Bg38 

Contents:

On December 14, 2020, The Insider, Bellingcat and CNN, with the participation of Der Spiegel and FBK, released a joint journalistic investigation. According to its conclusions, eight employees of the FSB special group followed Alexey Navalny for several years and poisoned him with Novichok warfare agent.

The investigators established the identities of the employees involved in the poisoning by comparing cell phone billing data with offline databases.

By analyzing airline flight records, investigators found that members of the group had flown to dozens of Russian cities where Navalny had flown to since 2017 – usually two or three operatives went on each trip, their lineup constantly alternating. They bought tickets under real and fictitious names, and tried to fly not on the same flights as Navalny, but on parallel ones, often from other Moscow airports. The main activity came in 2017 (when Navalny announced his intention to run for presidency) and then in 2020.

Navalny himself, commenting on the investigation, called what happened “state terrorism.”

At the end of December 2020, the second part of the investigation came out: Navalny called an FSB officer and recorded a conversation with him, saying that this conversation was an actual confession by a Russian special services officer of his participation in an assassination attempt.

Domestic and international reaction:

The poisoning of Navalny caused an international outcry and became a turning point in modern Russian history.

Even before the release of the investigation, on September 3, 2020, the European Union Foreign Affairs Office issued a declaration in which on behalf of all 27 EU member states, as well as Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, Georgia and Ukraine condemned in the strongest terms the attack on Alexey Navalny. German Chancellor Angela Merkel issued a statement calling the attempt on Navalny’s life an attempt to silence him, “a crime against the basic values for which we stand.” Boris Johnson, for his part, said that the poisoning of Navalny “shocked the world” and called Russia’s use of chemical weapons “outrageous.” On October 15, “for the use of chemical weapons for the attempted murder of Alexey Navalny,” the European Union imposed sanctions against FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov and five other high-ranking Russian officials and security officers, as well as against the state-owned plant that was involved in the development of Novichok. On the same day, the United Kingdom announced similar sanctions.

According to the EU, the poisoning of Navalny was possible “only with the consent of the presidential administration” and with the participation of the FSB. Navalny himself believes that Russian President Vladimir Putin was personally behind the attempt on his life. Putin himself characterized the investigation as “legalization of materials from the American secret services,” and said that if the Russian secret services had wanted to poison Navalny, they would have completed the case.

On December 23rd, a U.S. State Department spokesman accused the FSB of poisoning Navalny and the Russian leadership of creating conspiracy theories around him.

In mid-January 2021, Navalny returned to Russia. He was detained at the airport on suspicion of violating his probation in the Yves Rocher case. According to the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service, Navalny failed to report to his place of residence several times, as required by law for those sentenced to probation. Navalny himself indicated that he had been unable to do so because he had been undergoing rehabilitation in Berlin after being poisoned. On February 2 the politician was sentenced to two and a half years in a penal colony, after which several more criminal cases were initiated against him.

On August 20, 2021, on the anniversary of the poisoning of Navalny, Britain imposed sanctions on seven FSB officers it believes were involved in the poisoning. The U.S. imposed sanctions against nine FSB officers. In addition, the U.S. announced a second round of sanctions against Russia for the use of chemical weapons in the poisoning of Navalny, under which the U.S. imposed additional restrictions on exports of nuclear and missile-related products and technologies, as well as restrictions on imports of certain Russian firearms and ammunition.

Strike Five: “Putin’s Palace”

Case in focus: An investigative documentary about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s personal, incredibly expensive “mini-state” on the shores of the Black Sea.

Release Date: 01/19/2021

Number of views on YouTube: 121 million

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipAnwilMncI

Contents:

The documentary “A Palace for Putin” tells the story of a 17,700 square meter palace for the Russian president built on the Black Sea near Gelendzhik. According to the FBK, its construction was financed by state and private companies connected to Putin’s friends through corrupt schemes. The FBK estimated the total amount of money spent on the palace and the vineyards around it to be at least 100 billion rubles.

The authors of the investigation managed to unravel the complex web of property relationships around the palace. The data they collected showed that the palace belongs to Putin’s nephew, and its maintenance is entrusted to old cronies of the Russian president: former KGB employees.

The area of the palace complex is 68 hectares, and 7,000 hectares of land around the palace (including the airspace) is a closed area under the jurisdiction of the FSB.  The film claims that the Russian president’s residence near Gelendzhik was built in 2010 and has an underground ice palace, an “aquadiscotheque,” a concert hall, a church, an 80-meter bridge “for the approach to the tea house” and a tunnel to descend from the palace to the sea.

Domestic and international reaction:

Vladimir Putin, commenting on the investigation, stated that the palace had never been registered in his name and did not belong to his close relatives. In response, Navalny’s team pointed out that neither Putin’s brother-in-law Nikolai Shamalov, in whose name the palace was registered, nor Putin’s great-nephew Mikhail Shelomov, who was managing the construction site, were indeed close relatives under the Russian Family Code. Later, the owner of the facility called himself a businessman longtime acquaintance of Putin’s Arkady Rotenberg. He claimed that he was building an apartment hotel.

According to the Levada Center, of those who have seen the film, are aware of its contents, or have heard about it, the attitude toward Putin has worsened; 3% of those who have improved; 80% of those who have not changed. At the same time, 17% are certain that the content of the film is true; 38% believe that it is similar to the truth, but it is difficult to verify; and 33% are certain that it is not true.

The film caused widespread resonance and outrage in almost all of the world’s major media outlets.  Many Western journalists were shocked by the size of Vladimir Putin’s alleged palace, which is 39 times the size of the Principality of Monaco.

According to experts, the investigation was a serious blow to the position of the authorities and the image of the Russian president. It has also seriously broadened Navalny’s audience, allowing him to collect additional donations from sympathizers.

The investigation about Putin’s palace was a serious hit to the Kremlin, after which any actions by the authorities against Navalny were perceived as retaliation for the investigation. And so it happened: Alexey Navalny was detained at Sheremetyevo airport on January 17, 2021, immediately after returning from Germany, where he had undergone treatment and rehabilitation after severe poisoning. He was sentenced to two years and eight months in prison.

In the winter and spring of 2021, there were mass street protests in Russia – protests related to the detention of Navalny and rallies in his support. Police and Rosgvardia officers detained a record number of people at these events. The law enforcement agencies acted harshly; criminal proceedings were instituted against dozens of protesters.

Many of Navalny’s supporters were also put under investigation, or forced to leave Russia in a hurry. The politician’s structures are now considered extremist and banned in Russia. Any individual who has in any way helped or expressed sympathy for the opposition leader is now barred from running for a seat in the State Duma for several years.

On June 9, 2021, the FBK in Russia was recognized as an extremist organization and liquidated by court order.

2019 was an unprecedentedly good year for Russian-Chinese military cooperation featuring six joint exercises – nearly as many as Russia held with its longstanding ally Kazakhstan in that same year. However, the coming of COVID-19 in 2020 paralyzed Chinese military diplomacy and greatly reduced the quantity of interaction. Though cooperation recovered somewhat in 2021, pre-pandemic levels have not been regained, though some interesting developments did occur.

In the heady early days of the pandemic, the Russian Armed Forces’ medical specialists interfaced multiple times with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Military Medical University for notes on controlling the spread of the disease. The respective militaries cooperated on sealing the Russia-China border as ordered by Moscow to stop transmission of the disease. When Vladimir Putin belatedly held the 75th Victory Day parade in June, the Chinese National Defense Minister Wei Fenghe travelled to Moscow and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Y-20 transport aircraft participated in the celebration.

Yet despite this interaction and ceremonial interfacing, mil-to-mil contacts declined overall. Russia’s annual Army International Games – one of Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu’s obsessions – had featured PLA participation in 12 different events in 2019 but only 6 in 2020. China had hosted 4 events of the Army International Games in 2019 but none in 2020, sending only a small number of troops to compete in Russia.

From 6 joint exercises in 2019, only 1 was held in 2020 but it was an important one: the strategic exercise Kavkaz-2020. Kavkaz is one of the four rotating annual exercises the Russian Armed Forces conduct as a capstone of annual training. Kavkaz, which literally means “Caucasus,” features the Southern Military District, which includes the territory between Ukraine and Kazakhstan down to Georgia and Azerbaijan. As with Vostok-2018 and Tsentr-2019, the PLA was invited to participate in the main maneuver event of the exercise, this time at Kapustin Yar alongside Armenia, Belarus, Myanmar, and Pakistan. PLA troops from the 76th Group Army of the Western Theater Command participated in the exercise. Before Vostok-2018, only Belarus ever participated in these capstone exercises; after a trial of including China and Mongolia in 2018, Russia has opened participation to countries in favor in Moscow.

As with the previous two strategic exercises to which the PLA had been invited, though the PLA took part in the grandest spectacle of the event with Putin personally looking on, the more interesting components of the exercise testing new tactical concepts occurred elsewhere without PLA onlookers. Whereas each Russian capstone exercise features a day of large and dramatic maneuvers, many ancillary events also take place generally across many different training areas. Though the capability to do large maneuvers is a source of political pride for Moscow, the key capability Russia practices in these dispersed activities is the ability to exercise command-and-control (C2) across an enormous amount of territory and ably respond to disparate combat conditions.

Despite this stilted interaction in 2020, the year still ended happily with Shoygu and Wei extending an agreement on mutual notification of launches of ballistic missiles and space vehicles in December. This agreement gives Russia and China considerable insight into the early warning detection capabilities of the other as the two countries exchange information about rocket launches around the world from satellite launches from French Guiana to North Korean rocket tests. However, whereas Wei – uniquely among Chinese officials in 2020 – visited Moscow twice first for the 75th Victory Day parade and later for a SCO ministerial, he opted to conduct this ceremony extending the agreement virtually. Indeed, Chinese government officials literally phoned in all their regular diplomatic exchanges with their Russian counterparts in late November, demonstrating that their rapprochement with Moscow was insufficient to merit risking spread of COVID-19 through an in-person meeting.

2020 nevertheless ended dramatically with only the second ever joint strategic bomber patrol over the Sea of Japan and East China Sea on 22 December 2020. 4 Chinese H-6K and 2 Russian Tu-95MS strategic bombers took part in the event surrounding the Korean peninsula. Such a joint patrol is important as it signals the ability to potentially conduct joint nuclear targeting, i.e. the most drastic act of warfare. Though this patrol is on a very small scale relative to Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities, it would potentially be sufficient either to nullify North Korean capabilities or else disable U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea. The first such patrol took place in 2019.

Though 2020 had seen a contraction in Russian-Chinese military interaction, 2021 saw some revival albeit at a still-reduced rate from 2020. The PLA participated in Russia’s Sayanskiy Marsh competition, another Russian military prestige event focused on sports, in Shoygu’s native Tyva Republic in April. PLA participation in Army International Games events surged to 15 and Russian troops were even welcomed back to Korla to participate in 3 of these.

Instability in and the ultimate Taliban takeover of Afghanistan also prompted military conversations on Central Asian security. In August, the Russian 29th Army of the Eastern Military District travelled to Qingtongxia, China, to conduct the Sibu/Vzaymodeystvie-2021 exercise, a nominally anti-terrorist event but with strong offensive desantand reconnaissance-strike components. For the first time, Russian troops used Chinese military equipment. though the Russian Armed Forces uses the Army International Games to let other countries’ militaries practice using Russian equipment, the PLA was always allowed to bring its own equipment; this deviation from the standard Russian practice of using mil-to-mil interaction as a sales pitch may hearken future Russian military equipment purchases from China. After the fact, the Chinese Ministry of Defense claimed Xi himself had not only thought of the exercise but designated where it should be held.

Though the Chinese name for the exercise – Sibu – meaning “west” in Chinese seemingly in anticipation of the Russian strategic exercise Zapad-2021 (“zapad” means “west” in Russian), the PLA did not fully participate in the strategic exercise. Whereas the armed forces of Armenia, Belarus, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Mongolia all participated in the exercise, China along with Vietnam and Myanmar merely observed the exercise.

Russia also hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) exercise Mirnaya Missiya-2021 at Donguz in September after the 2020 iteration (also planned to be held in Russia) was cancelled. This exercise also heavily featured developments in Afghanistan as a pretext, though notably did not take place in SCO member Tajikistan, which hosted a number of Russian-led exercises at other points in 2021 to signal anti-Taliban resolve.

Russia and China did resume joint naval exercises in 2021 with the renewal of the Morskoe Vzaymodestvie/Joint Sea exercise in the Sea of Japan in October. Afterward, a collective 10 ships of the People’s Liberation Army Navy ad Russian Pacific Fleet went on a joint cruise over 17-23 October into the west Pacific Ocean via the Sangar Strait, encircling Japan. This joint activity in East Asia was repeated in the air domain on 19 November 2021 with a third joint patrol of Russian Tu-95MS and Chinese H-6K strategic bombers accompanied by a Russian A-50U AEW aircraft over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea for more than 10 hours. Once again, the Korean peninsula was surrounded by this patrol.

Within a week of this joint patrol, Shoygu and Wei had a videoconference where they again renewed the agreement on mutual notification of ballistic missile and space vehicle launches and approved a cooperation plan extending to 2025. They also took the occasion to denounce U.S. strategic bomber patrols as “increasing geopolitical turbulence” as part of a general diplomatic campaign the two capitals have launched to claim that the United States is threatening the “United Nations Charter-centered international system” rather than Russia and China threatening the “rules-based international order.” Thus, Russia and China returned to three joint exercises in 2020 not counting two joint patrols. Already in early 2022, the Pacific Fleet sent its cruiser and a destroyer to the Indian Ocean for a trilateral anti-piracy exercise with China and Iran. Though COVID-19 seems to have dampened the pace of Russian-Chinese military cooperation, it has by no means broken it. In the short term, we can probably expect a gradual return toward 2019 levels of military cooperation and further such growth unless a more serious point of contention emerges between Moscow and Beijing. China does not yet rank with the pro-Russian former Soviet republics for Russian military cooperation: in 2019, Russia conducted 6 joint exercises with the PLA but 9 each with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 11 with Armenia, and fully 17 with Belarus. China may not yet rank with these states, but the gap is closing and the spectrum of Russian cooperation with China far exceeds the range with any of Moscow’s treaty allies.

NATO, U.S., Russia, Ukraine: What’s Happening Right Now?

In late December 2021, the U.S. and NATO responded to Russia’s threats by asserting that Russian demands are unacceptable for the alliance —in particular, the demand to definitively preclude the incorporation of Ukraine into NATO. At the same time, NATO countries expressed their willingness to cooperate with Russia on such issues as arms control and disarmament.

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that the alliance is “prepared for the worst,” so NATO would strengthen its posture in the Baltic and the Black Sea region. The US forces of 8,500 people stand ready for mobilization to Europe. Stoltenberg also called on Russia to “withdraw its troops” from Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. The U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken asserted that Ukraine’s sovereignty, its territorial integrity, and the right to choose its allies are values that the United States and NATO are committed to defend.

In early January 2022, Russia, the U.S. and NATO held negotiations at which Moscow’s demands were discussed. Russia assessed these talks as unsuccessful and asked the U.S. and NATO to provide a written response. It was handed over to the Russian Foreign Ministry on January 26. Afterward, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg held press conferences stating that NATO would not abandon the open-door principle.

While Russia waited for the U.S. to respond to its offers of security guarantees, the situation around Ukraine continued to escalate. Following the statements about the evacuation of Western diplomats from Kyiv, NATO leaders resolved to strengthen their eastern flank and sent additional forces to Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania, while the US hinted that up to 50,000 American soldiers could be sent to Eastern Europe. Officials of the self-proclaimed republic of Donetsk and Luhansk expressed fears of an attack from Kiev, and the ruling United Russia party asked Putin to start supplying Russian weapons to the rebellious republics.

How Russia and Ukraine Found Themselves on the Brink of a Big War

The conflict between Moscow and Kiev has its roots far back in history, but its nature is simple: the Kremlin refuses to recognize Ukraine’s independence. Some of the key Kremlin’s positions are reflected in a document titled On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, an oped by Putin published on July 12, 2021. In his oped, Putin advances the concept of the triune Russian people, which for centuries has formed a single cultural and spiritual space of historical Russia. According to the author, today’s Ukraine is “entirely the brainchild of the Soviet era,” largely created at the expense of what he calls “historical Russia.” Putin fails to mention that Russians and Ukrainians were not always on the same path and that two languages and two cultures had been formed—similar, but different. When Russia and Ukraine became separate states after the collapse of the Soviet Union, another difference became very clear— that of a political orientation. Kyiv has aspired to join Western democracies, with a rotating system of government, while Moscow turned away from it. The annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbass and the current conflict are the natural result of the Kremlin’s policy of the last 20 years.

Ukraine Coverage in the Russian Media

The downward spiral in the Russian-Ukrainian relations is widely covered in the Russian media, both state-owned and independent. Depending on the political stance and proximity to the Kremlin, the portrayal of current events in various media outlets differs significantly. Just as in a hypothetical armed clash between Russia and Ukraine, the balance of power in the information battle is not equal— the state-owned media with anti-Ukrainian positions far outnumber the opposition media in terms of coverage and influence.

And it is no longer just about funding: during 2021, the Kremlin unleashed an onslaught against independent journalism. While, at the end of 2020 there were only 17 individuals and organizations on the black list of Foreign Media Agent, by the end of 2021 their number increased to 111, with the most influential and popular editorial teams and journalists added. In addition, many journalists independent of the Kremlin were forced to flee the country as exiles.

“Journalism in Russia is going through dark times right now. In the last few months, more than a hundred journalists, media outlets, human rights activists, and NGOs have already been given the status of “foreign agents.” In Russia, these are “enemies of the people.” These are the words of Dmitry Muratov, editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta, in his Nobel speech. This is how he described what happened to the journalistic profession in 2021.

The main narratives of the Russian media affiliated or controlled by the Kremlin include:

  • Relations between Russia and the United States have come to a dangerous critical edge due to the latter’s fault. The NATO bloc is carrying out hostile activities in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s borders, from military maneuvers to arms sales to Ukraine.
  • Russia has attempted to become friends and reliable partners of NATO, but the steps we took toward it were misinterpreted as weakness, and all we got in return was disregard for our priorities and a threat to our borders.
  • In Ukrainian society, a culture of fear is being cultivated, neo-Nazis are being indulged, militarization is on the rise, and Russophobe sentiments and the fight against the Russian language and culture are intensifying. At the same time, the Ukrainian media is actively spreading rumors of an impending Russian invasion of Ukraine, but this is only a distraction for building NATO infrastructure and preparing its own military provocations, such as a combat operation in the rebellious republics in the east of the country.
  • Ukraine’s military is ineffective, unprepared and unable to deal not only with Russia, but even with the DNR and LNR militias.

Key purveyors and amplifiers of these narratives include:

TV channels: Pervyi TV-channel, Rossiya-24, REN-TV, NTV, RT (Russia Today)

News agencies: RIA Novosti, Interfax, RT

Media outlets: Lenta.ru, Izvestiya, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moskovsky Komsomolets, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Argumenty i Fakty

Pro-Kremlin media taking a neutral stance: Kommersant, RBC

Most stories on the escalation of the situation between Russia and Ukraine in the official Russian media violate basic principles of quality journalism, first and foremost the principle of neutrality and non-judgmentalism. Subjective evaluations are prominent event at the level of headlines, and are especially amplified in the texts of news and op-eds. When presenting information, journalists of pro-Kremlin media regularly use expressive language and evaluative epithets, such as “Ukrainian militants,” “neo-Nazi Ukrainian groups,” “terrorist authorities,” and “militarist psychosis.”

The state television and Kremlin-funded sources suggest to audiences that active military action in Ukraine is necessary to ensure Russia’s own security. Numerous political talk shows on state-run television stations make direct threats and statements about the need to use the force.

An important place in pro-Kremlin media is reserved for sessions in which readers’ and viewers questions are answered by experts. Oftentimes, the experts chosen by the editorial staff make evaluative and negatively expressive judgments in their answers, which are not supported by precise facts (or are counterfactual). When making even the loudest accusations, authors of such publications often do not cite a source of information that could serve as proof of their accuracy.

The language of publications in the state media can be characterized as extremely negative, and the tonality is dismissive and disparaging of Ukraine and its citizens.

In the article “Ukraine is always shooting itself in the foot,” Lenta.ru forecasts how the next escalation of the conflict between Moscow and Kiev will turn out for Ukrainians: “The problem is that the entire political life in Ukraine is a constant regrouping of resources in order not to touch its cronies, semi-criminal politics and manipulation of Western partners. The political class in Ukraine has only chimerical ideas and has proven to be bankrupt <…> Ukraine’s current economic situation is not the result of Russia’s actions, but of its own reckless attitude toward the resources it has received. Ukraine, of course, is a record-breaker in the way it can be wasted. It’s not Russia who carried it out <…> The new fragile countries with a large Russian community should be sensitive to the interests of the Russian minority, because this is what interethnic peace and stability in these countries are based on. And the well-being of this minority directly affects the quality of relations with Russia.

In loud and often misleading headlines Lenta.ru journalists use expressive phrases and evaluative epithets: “Rada deputy revealed “hellish” plans of the West for Ukraine”, “The actions of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry were compared to the behavior of a ” offended maiden”, “In Donbas they prepared for chemical attacks of Kiev”, “In Ukraine they warned about the growing “spiral of disasters”, “Accidentally gained control of the country” Zelensky was called to choose words more carefully.”

Part of the news stream is devoted to discussion of combat capabilities of the Ukrainian army and Ukrainian civilian population, as a rule, in a humorous manner: “Ukraine’s place in the rating of the strongest armies of the world was named” (“Experts gave Russia the second place in the pedestal of the strongest armies of the world, the first place went to the United States. Ukraine in the global list got only 22nd place”), “Ukrainian woman spent two thousand dollars on ammunition for “Russian invasion”, “Ukraine accused the US of “lame” and outdated weapons”, “Ukrainian commander promised to “tear Russians with his bare hands”, “Ukrainian reservists were trained to use an archaic machine gun.”

One of the world’s largest news agencies, RIA Novosti, is not far behind its colleagues. In the background of many news items on the topic of the conflict, journalists of the state news agency place the following text: “Moscow has repeatedly denied accusations of “aggressive actions” by the West and Ukraine, noting that it does not threaten anyone and is not going to attack anyone, while statements about “aggression” are used as a pretext to place more NATO military equipment near Russian borders.”

In the article “Total Dependence. Why the West Pushes Russians and Ukrainians” the head of Crimea, Sergey Aksenov, states that “Ukrainian politicians are dependent, they do not make independent decisions. First of all, President Zelensky. America and other Western countries do not need a prosperous Ukraine, they need a conflict with Russia. Their task is to push us against each other, two brotherly nations. This is solely the fault of the Ukrainian administration.”

RIA Novosti journalists regularly inform its readers about the West’s alleged preparations for major provocations in Ukraine: “Western countries are preparing several major sabotages in the situation around Ukraine, and Moscow does not rule out that they may be information or military, said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the Russia-24 TV program ‘An Evening with Vladimir Solovyov'”.

RIA Novosti agency openly manipulates the facts, reinforcing anti-Ukrainian moods in Russian society. The news piece “Kiev told us when it will start organizing terrorist attacks in Russia” tells about how Ukraine will engage in sabotage on Russian territory in case of a full-scale war. And in the article “CIA teaches Ukrainian special forces to kill Russians. But they will blame Russia” the agency draws readers’ attention to the allegedly “leaked recent information that the CIA is intensively training the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SDF) at some secret base in the south of the USA. A former CIA official familiar with the details of this operation directly admits its purpose: “The program teaches Ukrainians to kill Russians.”

Journalists of the agency often mock Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky. “Well, that’s it then. Why have they started laughing at Zelensky in America?” (Quote: “In Ukraine itself, few people believe Zelensky’s statements. At one time, the main motive of Vladimir Zelensky’s election campaign was to establish peace in Donbass. However, he did not fulfill his pre-election promises, essentially deceiving his voters, so the current critical attitude of many citizens toward the Ukrainian president is completely natural”), “In Crimea they compared Zelensky to a disco dancer for the USA” (Quote: “Crimean political expert and VII State Duma deputy Ruslan Balbek, commenting on Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky’s call to activate the country’s foreign intelligence, compared his actions to dancing to the music of American composers”)

The main Russian news agency also regularly discusses the Ukrainian army. “The U.S. found out how long Ukraine will last in a naval battle with Russia” (Quote: “Taking into account Russia’s significant sea and air advantage, there is a high probability that the entire Ukrainian fleet will go down in one or two hours after the start of the operation”), “Forbes named the reason for Ukraine’s defeat in a hypothetical war with Russia” (Quote: “Outdated artillery and lack of ammunition will not allow Ukraine to defeat Russia”), “Expert assessed how the condition of the Ukrainian army has changed for seven years” (Quote: “Ukrainian army failed to make a leap in technical equipment”)

Other Headlines of Russian Media Financed by the Kremlin

RT (Russia Today)

  • “Pumping up arms”: how foreign military aid to Ukrainian army contributes to escalation of tensions in Donbass”
  • “Neo-Nazis get carte blanche for provocations”: the Russian embassy claimed the consequences of US arms supplies to Ukraine”
  • “Militarist psychosis”: how the Ukrainian authorities are preparing to repel possible “Russian aggression”
  • “Ukraine is sliding back to the tragic past”: radicals march in honor of Bandera was held in Kiev”
  • “Hate ideology”: how Ukraine continues to glorify collaborators”

Izvestia

  • “They need NATO: why foreign troops will move into Ukraine. North Atlantic Alliance draws nearer to Russia’s borders”
  • “A deal stronger than money: why NATO is escalating tension around Ukraine and why the alliance will not stand up for Kiev in case of a big war”
  • “Pregnant women and women with children to be registered for military service in Ukraine”
  • “Imprisonment: Ukraine has declared war on Russian citizens”
  • “Know your place: women in Ukraine are still “second-rate people”

Pervyi TV-channel

  • “NATO countries are whipping up hysteria over fictitious Russian aggression in Ukraine”
  • “Who will start World War III?”
  • “From the lectern of the Rada, the President of Ukraine talks about a military scenario, and not only in Donbas”

Rossiya-24

  • “Destruction of Russia is the main task of the West”
  • “Insanity in Ukraine Continues”
  • “Expert: Modern Ukraine is a cannon fodder”
  • “Ukraine will fall even without an invasion”
  • “Anglo-Saxons have gone crazy”
  • “Ukrainian Nazis will be killed in back alleys”

Moskovsky Komsomolets

  • “Rumors of war with Russia ruined the economy of Ukraine”
  • “Wasserman called Ukraine an artificial nation”
  • “In Ukraine they said that Zelensky would flee in case of war with Russia”

Komsomolskaya Pravda

  • “It is impossible to be photographed with the Russians, to talk, too. Ukraine frightens athletes before the Olympics”
  • “Shoigu: neo-fascists are paying back on Donbass for the decision of Crimeans”
  • “It has become easier for Russians to obtain Ukrainian citizenship. But who needs it”

Independent Russian Media

Key messages of the independent Russian media outlets include:

  • NATO does not surround Russia. Russia has over 20,000 kilometers of land border, NATO has only 1,215 kilometers, less than one-sixteenth of that. NATO is a defensive alliance with no aggressive intentions against Russia. On the contrary, NATO has been trying for years to get friendly with Russia, but these efforts have unfortunately been rejected.
  • Vladimir Putin’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine is due to the fact that he does not believe that Ukraine is a sovereign state. Also, the president of Russia claims that Ukraine is a threat to Russia.
  • Russia has deployed more than 100,000 troops, including tactical units, near the borders of Ukraine, a country it has recently invaded. This does not look like troop rotations or preparations for a military maneuver – more like preparations for an actual invasion or a politico-military adventure to force NATO and the U.S. to enter into negotiations on the non-extension of the alliance.
  • There are no credible reports of persecution of ethnic Russians or Russian speaking people in Ukraine. However, there are credible reports that Ukrainians in Crimea and Donbass face suppression of their culture and national identity and live in fear.
  • The Ukrainian army has become more combat-ready than it was during the 2014-2015 war and is ready to offer substantial resistance in the event of a Russian military invasion.
  • The economic sanctions that the West would impose if the country invaded Ukraine would be devastating for the whole country, undermining the economy for many years to come.

Key Media Participants

TV channels: Dozhd TV channel

Radio stations / News agencies:  Echo of Moscow

Media outlets: Meduza, Novaya Gazeta, Mediazona, Republic, Znak.com

Plots and Headlines

The pages of the independent Russian press contain both news and analysis on the current confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. In the news articles, the absence of explicit or implicit journalistic assessment of the actions of the parties to the conflict prevails. Neutrality of presentation is also preserved in large investigative articles, where facts are supported by quotations from credible sources.

The texts in the non-state media in Russia do not contain explicit signals of evaluation or signs of verbal aggression. These outlets, especially Meduza and Novaya Gazeta, engage in investigative journalism in which the authors collect and analyze large amounts of information from a variety of credible sources.

Criticism from the pages of independent press is usually directed at Russian political figures. Journalists use sarcasm as their main artistic device. This is especially evident in analytical articles, where the objects of sarcasm are statements by Vladimir Putin, his press secretary Dmitry Peskov and other first persons of the state.

In the article “In recent months, the Western media write about a possible war between Russia and Ukraine. How do ordinary people from both countries react to it?” Angelina Karyakina, head of the news department of the National Public Television and Radio Company of Ukraine, tells Meduza about the feelings of ordinary Ukrainians. And independent journalist Ulyana Pavlova tells how she worked on materials about the attitude of Russians to a potential military conflict.

In the article “If War Does Begin, Will the Ukrainian Army Be Able to Resist Russia? We Examine What Has Changed Since 2014,” Meduza journalists, together with military experts, explore the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian army, concluding that propagandists’ claims that the Ukrainian army is unprepared for war with Russia are nothing more than a fake. “Has the Ukrainian army become more combat-ready than it was during the 2014-2015 war? Yes, undoubtedly. Ukraine’s armed forces have been preparing to continue the war in the Donbass for seven years; the state spent more on the army during that time than any country of the former Soviet Union except Russia. They succeeded in their preparations: Ukraine now has the second largest army in the region, an experienced reserve, a new command and control system, and a significant proportion of modern weaponry in combat units. This will probably be enough to prevent itself from being defeated by the two ‘corps’ of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics and several battalion tactical groups of the Russian army sent ‘seconded’ to the region.” – reported in the article.

In the article “Who in the Russian Administration Wants War with Ukraine?” Meduza comes to a dreadful conclusion: if Russia starts hostilities, the country will face isolation, economic decline and a political system like in Turkmenistan.

The Echo Of Moscow also draws disappointing conclusions about the prospects for a hypothetical war and warns the Kremlin against such a scenario: “A war with Ukraine in the model of 2022 cannot be a repeat of the 2014-2015 military campaign that led to the signing of the “Minsk Protocol,” which is unbearable for Ukraine. Even if Ukraine is defeated in this war (which is possible, but not guaranteed), the price of victory will be completely different. The West, without directly intervening in the conflict (also likely, but not necessarily), will give Ukraine all the military and financial aid it needs to continue this war “to the last Ukrainian”. If anyone hopes that the Ukrainian army, with all its known vulnerabilities, being equipped in unlimited numbers with modern high-tech weapons, will not be able to inflict significant damage on the Russian army, he is mistaken.

Other Headlines from the Independent Russian Media

Novaya Gazeta

  • They are not there, but everyone is there! Deliveries of modern Russian weapons to the Donbass may become a new stage of escalation
  • Dead Man’s Donbass. What they sell, who covers them up, and who earns the most in Russia’s “gray zone”
  • Sergei Loznitsa: “War is always a disgusting way to solve a problem”

TV Channel Dozhd

  • The patriotic wave has subsided: why a possible war with Ukraine would not become “a second Crimea”
  • State Department published examples of “Russian lies” about the situation around Ukraine
  • “There are no people left around Putin who could dissuade him from madness.” Evgenia Albats on who may be pushing the president to start a war with Ukraine
  • This is what war is all about. What the propagandists on TV don’t talk about

Republic

  • The days when everybody lies: peculiarities of the pre-war propaganda
  • Oleg Kashin: For humanism and the cause of peace. What pacifism is missing now?
  • Putin’s hybrid ultimatum. How Russia’s president demonstrates to the world the comparative advantages of authoritarianism.

What do Ordinary Russians Think About a Possible Military Conflict with Ukraine?

Credible opinion polls – such as those conducted by the Levada Center (https://www.levada.ru/2021/12/14/obostrenie-v-donbasse/) – show that about half of Russians do not believe that a war between Russia and Ukraine will take place. However, a comparable number of people – 39% – hold the opposite opinion. Only 15% completely exclude the possibility of such a development of events. A quarter of the respondents consider a conflict between Russia and NATO possible.

More than half of respondents at the end of 2021 pointed to worsening relations with Western and NATO countries, which was one of the highest values of this indicator in the history of observation – it was higher only in 2014.

At the same time, the fear of a big war is much more widespread in Russian society. As recently as spring 2021, 62% of respondents felt it – a record high for a quarter-century of regular nationwide polls. Participants in focus groups explained: “When the state media say that we are going to enter a war not today or tomorrow, it’s scary! It’s scary, it’s tense… Everything pales in the background.” However, by the end of the year the fear of war had somewhat weakened (in December 2021 the corresponding figure was 56%). This was most likely due to the meeting between the presidents of Russia and the United States and the start of the U.S.-Russian negotiations.

A significant proportion of Russians believe that the war between Russia and the West has long been going on, albeit invisible, cold, and in the form of media war – an opinion that has been voiced in focus groups in various parts of the country for many years. According to surveys, Russian participation in all recent international conflicts has been perceived by Russian public opinion almost exclusively through the prism of geopolitical confrontation with the West, primarily with the United States.

The sociologists of the Levada Center, in their research, see that the majority of Russians blame the United States and NATO for the current escalation. This is the opinion of half of those surveyed. Only 3-4% hold the Russian leadership responsible, which can be considered a marginal position. And this structure of assessments of what is happening is quite stable: “Interference by the US and the West in the internal affairs of other countries” has long ago become a universal explanation for any foreign policy disturbances: from the conflict in Syria to the recent war in the Karabakh or the crisis on the Belarusian-Polish border. No matter what happens in the world, America is to be blamed.

In conversations with respondents, the United States and the West are not just seen as responsible for the conflict, they are deliberately and purposefully dragging Russia into the war. The word “provocation” was repeatedly heard from respondents. At the same time, the prevailing opinion was that Russia cannot but react.

At the same time, publications in the Western press about the pulling of Russian armed forces to the Russian-Ukrainian border seemed to most focus group participants not as an exposé of Russia’s aggressive intentions, but as an incitement to war on the part of the West itself.

All the events of recent months – Western claims about Nord Stream-2, the Belarusian border crisis, NATO naval maneuvers off the coast of Crimea, the constant threat of new sanctions, Western criticism of Russian military aid to Kazakhstan, talk of an upcoming invasion of Ukraine – for the average Russian has long blended into a stream of poorly discernible negativity “coming from the West.” This news causes nothing but annoyance to the vast majority of Russians, and they do not want to be understood. But with existing perceptions of what is happening, the war seems to be externally imposed and therefore practically unavoidable.Hence the growth of mass fears, conclude sociologists.

So most Russian citizens blame the West for the current escalation, while almost entirely absolving the leadership of their own country of responsibility. At the same time, there is no mobilization of public opinion around Russian leaders. In the last two months, when the topic of the conflict and new sanctions has been discussed most actively, the ratings of the president, the prime minister, and the government have been declining rather than increasing. Apparently, the confrontation with the West has already become boring and routine and does not arouse much excitement, despite the politicians’ harsh statements.

The majority of respondents see full-scale negotiations as practically the only alternative to the conflict. However, neither politicians nor ordinary Russians are confident that negotiations will lead to détente.

The asymmetry in Russian-Sino relations is caused above all by the disparity in the military and economic potentials of Russia and China. China’s economic power in the last two decades has significantly surpassed that of Russia. But Russia’s military mainly (mainly its strategic nuclear forces) significantly surpasses that of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Therefore, the two countries complement each other in different spheres.

In the last 20 years, the economic gap between China and Russia has continued to increase. According to the World Bank, in 2001, Russia’s nominal GDP was $306.6 billion, but the PRC’s GDP was $1.3 trillion, and in 2020, these figures were $1.5 and 14.7 trillion, respectively. Thus, China has increased its advantage by a factor of approximately four to 10, and the gap continues to grow. And China’s superiority over Russia in military expenditures in the last 20 years has increased from double to quadruple.

During this period, China significantly closed its military gap with Russia and the US, as can be seen with its tests of a hypersonic missile and the building of new silos for ballistic missiles.

At a parade in Beijing in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Republic in October 2019, China’s latest armaments were demonstrated for the first time – the Dongfeng-41 (DF-41), an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the Dongfeng-17 (DF-17) hypersonic medium-range missile. The ICBM DF-41 can be modified to carry a hypersonic glide platform equipped with a conventional or nuclear warhead. According to a Nezavisimaya gazeta report based on an article in the Financial Times, Michael Gallagher, a Republican member of the House Armed Services Committee, issued a statement that China “now has an increasingly credible capability to undermine our missile defenses and threaten the American homeland with both conventional and nuclear strikes.”

At the present time, China has already formulated a nuclear triad and is actively increasing production of weapons-grade plutonium. Analysts at the RAND Corporation, in a report titled “Understanding Influence in the Strategic Competition with China” devoted to the position of the PRC on the world stage, acknowledged Beijing’s serious economic influence. China’s main trump card, in the opinion of experts, is its economic might. For China, the most effect lever of influence on third countries is its ability to offer them a trade or investment partnership – this is more effective than direct military threats or promotion of the Chinese political model.

Recently, China’s economic pressure on Russia has been increasing. A full-scale “trade war” has broken out in the fishing industry between Russia and China. Moreover, the degree of China’s brutality has been unprecedented.

For the Russian Far East, the fishing industry is a very important branch of the economy: 65% of the extraction of Russia’s aquatic biological resources comes from the Far East. And about 70% of all exports of fish and fish and seafood products are made to China.

Pollock is the chief type of fish produced in Russia, making up about 55% of the entire catch of Russian fishermen in the Far East this year. Most of Russia’s catch is exported. China is the chief buyer of pollock. In 2020, Russian exported a total of 793,000 tons of frozen pollock; of these 579,000 went to China, which is 73% of the export.

In October 2020, China began restricting imports after traces of COVID-19 were found on fish packaging coming from Russia. To combat the spread of the coronavirus, China began closing the ports through which Russian fish had been transported into the country; the last port, Dalian, closed in December 2020. Chinese ports remain closed to Russian refrigerated transport vessels to this day.

The Chinese government has announced that the reason for the closure of the ports is to tackle COVID-19 infection, but the reluctance of Chinese authorities to produce the results of laboratory tests and their methodology has caused concern. In the opinion of Russian fishing industry representatives, the actions of the PRC’s authorities appear more likely to be a trade war. From January to June 2021, exports of pollack to China dropped 64% compared to 2020.

Russia has already proposed to China that they discuss the issue of opening the ports and establish quotas for catching pollock in Russian waters. Russia offers other countries fishing quotas on a paid basis in its exclusive economic zone.

China was offered a quota of 20,000 tons of pollock in Russian waters “for cash,” but China refused to buy the quota on general terms, because it wishes to get a much larger amount for free.

China has been the world’s center for fish processing for many years. China adds at least $250 million in additional cost to processed filet of pollack. The high profitability of fish processing in China has for many years been ensured by a cheap work force, low tariffs on electricity and other expenses. But in recent years, the situation has changed; Chinese enterprises require more efforts to preserve their financial stability.

The position of China as the chief buyer of Russian fish gives it substantial advantages in negotiations. China may use the restriction on import of Russian pollack to strengthen its negotiating positions and as a method of trade warfare. The closure of the ports is an instrument of growing pressure on the Russian government.

China may put pressure on Russia in order to obtain permission for its trawlers to catch pollack in Russian waters, since the margin from the pollack haul is much higher than the margin for processing. In Latin America, there is a precedent when a Chinese fleet began to catch calamari directly, and not import it. This is the conclusion of a report titled “Pollockonomics” published in July about the pollock market by Planet Tracker, a British non-profit financial think tank.

As a result of the restrictions placed by China, export of Russian fish to what was once the largest sales market has collapsed. And although Russia has managed to redirect part of its exports to South Korea, the situation with deliveries to China has affected the volumes of fish caught – Russia does not have sufficient capacity for its own fish processing, and the catches have been reduced.

The trade war in the fish industry illustrates that China’s economic pressure on Russia will very likely increase. Chinese state companies already have experience in pressuring Russia, and in fact have been successful in the past. In 2011, the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) was able to force the Russian oil companies Rosneft and Transneft to insert changes into an already-signed contract for delivery of oil to China via the Skovorodino-Mohe pipeline or Eastern Siberian Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, and got a discount of approximately $1.50 per barrel.

Rosneft, Transneft and the CNPC had signed an agreement in 2009. In exchange for loans from the China Development Bank amounting to $15 billion and $10 billion, respectively, the Russian state companies contracted to deliver 15 million tons of oil annually from 2011 through 2030 via the ESPO pipeline. For this, Transneft signed a contract to purchase 6 million tons of oil from Rosneft at the price tied to the cost of export to China. The price was determined by a special formula on the basis of quotations by Argus and Platts FOB to the end of the ESPO line, the port of Kozmino.

But as soon as the deliveries began in January 2011, problems emerged with the contract. The two sides made different assessments of the co-efficient which determined Transneft’s logistics costs for delivering the oil. CNPC began to underpay $13 per barrel, since it received oil from a branch of the ESPO – a route that was half as short. Transneft responded that a single network tariff was in effect throughout the pipeline equal to $65 per ton. For Russian companies, the losses from CNPC’s position for the period of the entire life of the contract could equal nearly $30 billion.

Rosneft, Transneft and CNPC agreed to changes in the contract in late December 2011. Rosneft and Transneft offered a “country” discount to the CNPC of $1.5 per barrel. China had initially demanded a discount of $13.5 per barrel. In total, the settlement of the dispute with the Chinese cost Rosneft about $3 billion.

Under conditions when the pipeline was built with a Chinese loan secured with oil deliveries, and which depended on a single consumer – China – it was clear that in fact China’s CNPC  would dictate its own terms.

It is quite logical that Russian has turned out to be the largest recipient of “hidden” loans from China.  From 2000-2017, Russia received $125 billion dollars from China. These loans were obtained largely by state oil and gas companies and secured by future deliveries of oil and gas. All the loans fall into two categories: official development assistance (ODA) and other programs of financing (other official flows or OOF) aimed at the demonstration of increased cooperation of Russia with China, and military or commercial projects advantageous to China.

Russia’s loans are in the OOF category. Venezuela follows Russia in this list ($85.5 billion), then Angola ($40.66 billion), Brazil and Kazakhstan ($39 billion each), Indonesia ($30 billion), Pakistan ($27.84 billion), and Vietnam ($16.35 billion).

In 2020, Beijing’s pressure forced Rosneft to refrain from drilling on a part of the continental shelf of Vietnam, which China considered part of is marine territory. Rosneft was forced to cancel a contract with the London company Noble Corporation for an exploration rig which had been planned for use on the shelf in Vietnam. The breaking of the contract took place amidst serious pressure from China.

In 2017, Rosneft signed six contracts with a Vietnamese drilling company for a total sum of $42 million.

Russian oil companies own two oil fields on the Vietnamese shelf. It was proposed to use the British platforms from Noble Corp. for drilling wells. In mid-July 2020, however, Petro Vietnam canceled the contract for the drilling platform due to pressure from China. Rosneft Vietnam became concerned that China had complained about its project, considering that drilling in the contested offshore waters was its prerogative.

Beijing is trying to push all foreign oil companies out of the South China Sea, leaving itself as the only potential partner for joint development by competing interests.

In the future, as Russia’s economic dependence on China increases, Beijing’s position in potential commercial disputes may grow significantly stronger.  Furthermore, China may use economic levers to change Russia’s position not on specific contracts, but on issues concerning Beijing’s foreign policy interests, for example, Moscow’s relations with Vietnam, India, or the countries of Central Asia.

Long-term trends of development of economic and military capacities are of prime importance in analyzing Russian-Sino relations. The current trends  are not favorable for Russia. They indicate that Russia’s role in bilateral relations with China will continue to diminish. Meanwhile, China’s role will grow and the asymmetry in the bilateral relations will increase.

Consequently, this will cause serious shifts in geopolitics since China in the near future is very likely to play the leading role in their relations.

Today, the greatest threat to international security and basic human rights is the military and political union of Russia and China which has virtually already been forged.

The reality of this union is demonstrated by the joint exercises of their armed forces.

Under these conditions, increasing disagreements in Russo-Sino relations would play a positive role, since the threats to international stability on the part of China and Russia (above all for Ukraine and Taiwan) would be reduced.

The Russian-Sino union suits the Russian political elite almost entirely. But it does not please the Russian military elite.

An important problem in the military-technical sphere of Russia and China is the extreme techno-nationalism of the military and military-industrial circles of both countries. Their ambition is to concentrate all important design and production within their respective countries. The import of goods and services for military purposes is viewed by both countries as a threat to security and a national problem that must be solved as quickly as possible.

Rossiysko-kitayskiy dialog: model’ 2017: doklad no. 33/2017/ [S.G. Luzyanin (ruk) i dr.; Kh. Chzhao (ruk.) i dr.] [gl. red. I.S. Ivanov] [Russian-Chinese Dialogue: 2017 Model: Report No. 33/2017, director S. G. Luzyanin et. al.; director Kh. Chzhao et. al; Rossiyskiy sovyet po mezhdunarodym delam  (RSMD). – Moscow, Non-Profit Partnership Russian Council on Foreign Affairs (NP RSMD), 2017, 112 pp., p. 28.

The Russian political elite will very likely be satisfied with the role of the “junior partner” in Russian-Sino relations. Until the union with China threatens loss of power and loss of corrupt dividends for the semi-criminal Russian elite, they will be prepared to play by the Chinese rules.

An effective method of Chinese influence is the development of informal ties with representatives of elites in other countries. As examples, RAND experts cite China’s attempts to influence elites in Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea. Chinese representatives have offered economic preferences to politicians in Australia and New Zealand so that they would take measures advantageous to Beijing.

A noticeable weakening of the Russian-Sino union, or rejection of it could very likely occur as the result of a drastic change in the domestic political situation in Russia or China, which could be provoked by a struggle for power in the ruling elite. This could be a struggle between the military and political (primarily Chekist) elites in Russia.

Meanwhile, concern is growing among those very siloviki (the intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies) about the growing activity of Chinese intelligence in Russia, and also the increasingly obvious domination of China in the economic and military spheres.

In the opinion of Igor Denisov and Alexander Lukin (authors of the article “Correction and Hedging,” in the journal Rossiya v global’noy politike [Russia in Global Politics], 2021, no. 4), fears are growing among Russian intelligence services regarding a new “assertiveness” in Chinese partners.

It is precisely as a consequence of these fears, in my view, that the Russian authorities are taking measures to contain the emergence of new Confucius Institutes. An agreement was reached so that the number of Russia Centers in China and Confucius Institutes in Russia were equal. In certain cases, law-enforcement agencies have even tried to halt the operation of several Confucius Institutes for supposedly unlawful activity, but to date, unsuccessfully.

Thus, in Blagoveshchensk in 2015, the city prosecutor’s office demanded that the Confucius Institute at the Blagoveshchensk State Teachers’ University be closed. Subsequently, the prosecutor’s office withdrew its demand.

This demarche by the city prosecutor’s office was likely coordinated with the leadership of the prosecutor general’s office and intelligence agencies in Moscow due to the particular importance of the issue for Russian-Sino relations. Such a step likely reflected the concern of Russian intelligence and law-enforcement over the growing activity of Chinese intelligence in Russia.

Right up to my departure from Blagoveshchensk in 2016, I had occasion to hear from informed persons there that among the Chinese teachers at the Confucius Institute, there were people who displayed a professional interest toward Russians.

Any domination by China in the military and military-technical sphere is absolutely unacceptable for the Russian military elite. The joint Russian-Sino exercises which took place in 2021 more than likely caused great worry about Russian military people.

Military cooperation between China and Russia this year has made a breakthrough, the Chinese Ministry of Defense announced, according to a TASS report December 23, 2021. The ministry noted that this was facilitated by the joint exercises Zapad [West]/Interaction 2021 and Joint Sea 2021.

“These measures have demonstrated a new breakthrough in the strategic cooperation between the armed forces of China and Russia,” said a statement published on the Defense Ministry’s site. (See Highlights of the China-Russia Joint Sea-2021 Military Exercise and Joint Cruise).

The joint Russian-Chinese strategic military exercises Zapad/Interaction 2021 took place in the Ningxia autonomous region of China from August 9-13. About 13,000 military personnel were involved in them, with approximately 200 planes and helicopters, 200 armored vehicles, and about 100 artillery systems.

The exercises gave the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLAC) the opportunity to test their latest weapons, and also demonstrate the ability to coordinate work with Russian troops.

For the first time, the armed forces of both countries used a joint system of command and control. According to a statement by the Chinese Defense Minister, Russian troops were integrated into larger Chinese formations and conducted operations planned by the PLAC.

From the political and training perspective, the most important aspect of the past exercises was the new level of integration during the maneuvers of the military of both countries. For the first time, a common joint staff was formed which led the maneuvers of the soldiers through a united command information system. Following commands transmitted through this system, Russian paratroopers along with their fellow Chinese servicemen landed from Chinese helicopters (to be sure of Russian manufacture) and captured the key objectives of a mock enemy, and the Russian Su-30SM launched mock air strikes on commands sent from the Chinese military.

Such a level of integration were characterized in the Chinese press, which is more inclined to vivid commentary in such areas, as “demonstrating a level of cooperation as in NATO.”

In 2013, the Russian military expert Vasily Kashin wrote: “On the whole, the formation of general-purpose forces is made with a clear consideration of the threat of hostility from the PRC.”

Each year, exercises are conducting in airlifting forces from the European part of Russia to the Far East. Great attention is paid to improving the strategic military transport aviation fleet. And nevertheless, the maximum which the general-purpose Russian forces can expect is a comparable armed provocation modeled on the Soviet-Sino border conflicts of 1969 or something slightly larger.

The Vostok [East]-2010 exercises in June-July 2010 in airlifting troops and military equipment to the Far East from the European part of Russia were the largest of those conducted in Russia up to that time.

About 20,000 troops took part in Vostok-2010, more than 5,000 units of weapons and military vehicles, more than 40 ships, and about 75 planes and helicopters.

There was nothing analogous in Soviet history, if we note the number of troops and military vehicles deployed from the west to the east of the country. In the opinion of the military expert Alexander Khramchikhin, who often articulates the concerns of the Russian military elite regarding the Chinese threat, the Vostok-2010 exercises were Russia’s response to the PLAC’s Stride-2009.

In 2009, Stride-2009, the largest military exercises up to that time were conducted in the PRC.  They were held on the territory of four of the seven military districts — Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan, and Guangzhou. Up to 50,000 soldiers from the ground forces and air force took part, along with 6,000 transport vehicles. In the course of the exercises, the troops covered a total of 50,000 kilometers. In particular, four combined arms divisions completed a march (first by railroad, and then on their own) over a distance of 2,000 kilometers.

Stride-2009 was an obvious development of the exercises conducted in 2006.

The scenarios for the 2006 exercises were a preparation for war with Russia, and in fact an offensive, not a defensive war.

Alexander Khramchikhin believes that during this period (2006-2009), the Chinese leadership and command of the PLA seriously reviewed the possibility of conducting in the foreseeable future offensive military actions against Russia and the countries of Central Asia.  Gen. Nikolai Makarov, chief of the Russian Federation General Staff of the Armed Forces (June 2008-November 2012) state that Russia, in conducting these exercises, demonstrated a readiness for the change in military political situation in the region.  “Changes” apparently was to be understood as the change from a declarative “strategic partnership” between Russia and the PRC to a confrontation.

Russia’s chief defense capability vis-à-vis the PRC involves nuclear weapons, including tactical ones. The Chinese factor likely explains many aspects of Russian behavior in the area of control and reduction of strategic weapons.

Quite likely the idea expressed by past Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov (March 2001-February 2007) about withdrawal of Russia from the treaty on medium and short-range missiles was related to the Chinese factor.

In February 2007, speaking at a press conference upon the conclusion of the 43rd international Munich Conference on Security Policy, Sergei Ivanov emphasized that India, Pakistan, North Korean, China , Iran, and Israel had medium- and short-range nuclear missiles: “These countries are situated near our borders, and we cannot help but take this into account. Only two countries do not have the right to possess these missiles: Russia and the USA. This cannot continue forever.”

The Chinese threat is one of the chief factors defining Russian foreign policy and military development.

In 2013, Vasily Kashin articulated the Russian position regarding the Chinese threat.

Understandably, after 2014 (with a drastic deterioration of relations with the West and a declared turn to the East), such publications in the open press were no longer possible. But the military threats from China did not disappear and specialists involved in military planning also did not disappear.

Therefore, the policy of Putin and the Russian political elite aimed at clear subordination of Russia to China, including in the military sphere (which was demonstrated by the latest Russian-Chinese exercises) will very likely provoke increasing irritation and resistance on the part of the military elite (the senior officers).

If for domestic policy, the chief irritant for the military elite is the omnipotence and monopolist position of the Chekist elite (the Federal Security Service [FSB], the Federal Protective Service [FSO] and other agencies), then in foreign policy, the increasingly obvious subordination of Russia to China, both in the economic and in the military, spheres may become such an irritant.

Anti-Chinese sentiments have always been strong among senior officers in the army and navy (the military elite).

Many of them remember well (or know from their parents’ stories) of the battles between Soviet and Chinese forces near the Daman Island on the Ussuri River in March 1969. Therefore, many of them are clearly not thrilled with Putin’s open pro-Chinese policy and do not approve of it.

Alexei Navalny addresses supporters on the anniversary of his detention, as rallies were held all over the world demanding his release. A year ago, he bravely returned to Russia, having recovered from the Novichok poisoning — and was immediately detained by the government.

Opposition politician Alexei Navalny called on his fellow Russians to be brave and fear nothing. On the anniversary of his return to Russia after his rehabilitation in Germany, he published a post on his Instagram page (https://www.instagram.com/navalny/p/CY01DoLoJec/

“Having served my first year in prison, I want to tell everyone the same exact thing that I shouted at the crowd near the court, when the guards were taking me to the back of the truck: Don’t be afraid of anything. This is our country and we have no other. The only fear that should remain is that we may allow our homeland to be looted by a bunch of liars, thieves and hypocrites; that we surrender without a fight, voluntarily, forfeiting both our future and the future of our children. Thank you all very much for your support —I can feel it,” Alexei Navalny addressed his supporters in an emotional post.

“There are a lot of honest people in Russia—tens of millions. There are far more of them than is commonly thought. But it is not honest people who scare the authorities— disgusting then, and even more so now— but those who are not afraid. Or rather, to be more precise: those who are afraid, but overcome the fear,” he wrote.

He said that the year since his return to Russia flew by quickly. All this time Navalny remained behind bars.

“I do not know when my cosmic journey will end and whether it will end at all — just last Friday I was told that another of criminal cases against me goes to court. And there’s another one coming up —charging me as an extremist and a terrorist. So, I’m one of those “astronauts” who doesn’t bother counting the days until the end of the sentence. There is no point in counting. There have been  people who spent 27 years in prison.

But I find myself in this group of “astronauts” because I tried my best to pull this end of the rope. I pulled to this side those among the honest ones who did not want to or could no longer be afraid.

I did it, I do not regret it for a second, and I will continue to do it,” Navalny wrote.

Navalny’s Arrest and What Happened in Russia Over the Year

On January 17, 2021, Russian politician Alexei Navalny was detained at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport after returning to Russia from Germany, where he was being treated for poisoning with the Novichok nerve agent. Navalny spent the following year in custody: first in the Matrosskaya Tishina prison, and then in prison no. 2 in Pokrov in the Vladimir region. The formal reason for his imprisonment was parole violation. The authorities claim that while Navalny was treated in Germany, he failed to register with the Federal Penitentiary Service as required by the sentence from the “Yves Rocher” case.

According to the parole violation sentence, the politician must be released no later than fall 2023. However, several other criminal cases have been brought up by the government against him, including one for creating an “extremist community”. According to prosecutors, Navalny has created an “extremist community,” the purpose of which was to “discredit the state authorities.” Under this article Navalny faces up to 10 years in jail.

In addition, in late 2020, Navalny was charged with criminal fraud— the case is expected to be heard in court in late January or early February 2022. According to prosecution, Navalny had spent 356 million rubles collected as donations for the activities of non-profit organizations headed by him for personal needs. The fraud case is combined with the charges of insulting Judge Vera Akimova, who presided over the trial on the case of “defamation of a veteran.” The criminal case on “defamation of a veteran” was opened after Navalny called the heroes of RT TV channel’s propaganda video about amendments to the Constitution, in which Ignat Artemenko, a 94-year-old veteran of the World War II, appeared, “corrupt lackeys” and “traitors”. The Investigative Committee considered that Navalny’s comment attacked the veteran’s honor and dignity. The court sentenced Navalny to a fine of 850 thousand rubles.

In the winter and spring of 2021, mass rallies in support of Navalny were held in Russia, resulting  in mass detentions. In June, Navalny’s political network was declared “extremist organization” by a Russian court.

Navalny’s headquarters throughout Russia have been decimated, with dozens of their members either under arrest or forced to leave Russia, including Leonid Volkov, the former head of Navalny’s federal headquarters; Ivan Zhdanov, director of FBK;  and Lyubov Sobol, a lawyer for the foundation. On January 14, Leonid Volkov and Ivan Zhdanov were added to the list of terrorists and extremists. During the entirety of 2021, repressions in Russia continued to intensify: dozens of organizations and citizens, including media outlets and journalists, were declared foreign agents, and opposition activists were put behind bars.

Free Russia Foundation estimates that more than 1,500 activists and journalists left the country in 2021. This estimate includes only “political” emigrants.

At the end of 2021, the European Union recognized Alexei Navalny and awarded him the Andrei Sakharov Human Rights Prize. Navalny’s daughter, Darya Navalny, attended the ceremony to accept the prize on behalf the imprisoned politician. “This is a message to the tens of millions of citizens of my country who continue to fight for a better life in Russia,” she said, speaking at the European Parliament.

In January 2022, it was announced that CNN and the streaming service HBO Max had produced and intend to stream a documentary, “Navalny,” about the Russian opposition leader. The movie, with the tagline “Poison Always Leaves a Trace,” was created by Canadian documentary filmmaker Daniel Roher. The film’s synopsis says it is about “a courageous and controversial presidential contender who is willing to sacrifice everything to bring reform to his homeland.” The film’s premiere date has not been disclosed. Navalny wrote on Instagram from prison: “The film is ready, and you will definitely see it before I do.”

Navalny in Jail: Deteriorating Health, Hunger Strike, Doctors’ Denial of Access, and Torture by Prison Authorities

In March 2020, Navalny filed a formal complaint stating that prison authorities purposefully deprived him of sleep. Navalny said he was woken up eight times a night by guards asking him to confirm to a camera that he is still in his prison cell. Navalny also complained that he was not allowed to read newspapers or have any books including a copy of the Quran that he planned to study.

Navalny’s lawyers said that he was suffering from health problems, including a loss of sensation in his spine and legs, and that prison authorities denied Navalny’s requests for a civilian physician, claiming his health was “satisfactory”. On March 31, Navalny declared a hunger strike demanding proper medical treatment. On April 6,  six doctors, including Navalny’s personal physician, Anastasia Vasilyeva, and two CNN correspondents, were arrested outside the prison when they attempted to visit Navalny whose health significantly deteriorated. On April 7, 2021, Navalny’s attorneys claimed he had suffered two spinal disc herniations and had lost feeling in his hands, prompting international outrcy. Agnès Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International accused Vladimir Putin of slowly killing Alexey Navalny through torture and inhumane treatment in prison.

On April 17, it was reported that Navalny was in urgent need of medical attention. Navalny’s personal doctor Anastasia Vasilyeva and three other doctors, including cardiologist Yaroslav Ashikhmin, petitioned prison officials to grant them immediate access, stating on social media that “Our patient can die any minute”, due to an increased risk of a fatal cardiac arrest or kidney failure “at any moment”. Test results publicized by Navalny’s lawyers showed heightened levels of potassium in the blood, which may signal cardiac arrest, and sharply elevated creatinine levels, indicating impaired kidneys.

The following day, his daughter called on Russian prison authorities to let her father be checked by doctors in a tweet. Prominent celebrities such as J.K. Rowling and Jude Law also addressed a letter to Russian authorities asking to provide Navalny with proper medical treatment. U.S. President Joe Biden called his treatment “totally unfair” and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that the Kremlin had been warned “that there will be consequences if Mr. Navalny dies.” The European Union’s head diplomat Josep Borrell stated that the organization held the Russian government accountable for Navalny’s health conditions. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, also expressed her concern for his health. However, Russian authorities rebuked such concerns by foreign countries. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Russian prison officials are monitoring Navalny’s health, not the president.

On April 19, Navalny was moved from his cell to a prison hospital, according to the Russian authorities, for a course of “vitamin therapy”. On April 23, Navalny announced that he was ending his hunger strike on the advice of his doctors and as he felt his demands had been partially met. His newspapers are still being censored as articles are cut out before the newspaper is given to him.

On May 20, Navalny’s ally Ivan Zhdanov reported that Navalny had “more or less” recovered and that his health was generally satisfactory. On June 7, Navalny was returned to prison after fully recovering from the effects of the hunger strike.

In early November 2021 Navalny’s former prison-mates described his harassment in detention. An independent Russian TV channel Dozhd broadcast an interview “Torture for Navalny: Who Surrounded Him in the Penal Colony, How They Compromise Him and Break Him”. In the expose, former inmates at the Pokrov’s Correctional Facility Number 2, described the torture and abuse targeting Navalny.

Dozhd reporters spoke with former convicts Nariman Osmanov and Yevgeny Burak, who served time in the same quarters as Navalny. According to Osmanov, this unit was put together by authorities before the arrival of the opposition leader to the prison, and with each of the prisoners a conversation had been held in advance. Osmanov said that all prisoners in the brigade were instructed not to communicate with the politician and record each of his steps on a daily basis.

“Naturally, we suffered with him. Mentally, I still haven’t recovered, to be honest,” Osmanov told reporters. According to him, Navalny tried to talk to him, but he stopped these attempts.

During the hunger strike, which Navalny held from March 31 to April 23, inmates brought a bag of sausages into the barrack and roasted the sausages on the premises, perhaps with the intent to seduce Navalny with the smell of the food, which is not allowed could have only been done with the permission of authorities.

On another occasion, a detainee was placed in the same cell as Navalny, and later taken to the sanitary unit and declared to have a contagious form of tuberculosis.

Osmanov claimed both events had been staged and he managed to tell Navalny about that.

Another prisoner, Yevgeny Burak, talked about a movie screening that was held for the colony’s inmates on Navalny’s birthday, June 4. The movie insinuated that Navalny is a homosexual— which, in Russian prisons, would expose an inmate to grave danger of physical and sexual abuse by other inmates. The movie was attempting to discredit and threaten Navalny. These claims have been corroborated by Osmanov.

After Navalny returned from the hospital warden to the regular prison cell, he was again precluded  from sleeping for several days — an inmate was roomed in the same cell with him and “made different sounds,” and all this was done on the instructions of the colony’s leadership, Osmanov claims.

Global Support

To mark the anniversary of Alexei Navalny’s arrest, his supporters rallied in dozens of cities around the world to call for his freedom. Pickets and rallies were held in Russia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, the United States, Switzerland, Denmark, New Zealand, France, Canada, Norway, Belgium, Estonia, Australia, Spain, Finland, Georgia and other countries.

The U.S. Congress released a statement on the anniversary of Navalny’s arrest (https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/press-and-media/press-releases/helsinki-commission-marks-one-year-anniversary)

Helsinki Commission Chairman Sen. Ben Cardin (MD), Co-Chairman Rep. Steve Cohen (TN-09), Ranking Member Sen. Roger Wicker (MS), and Ranking Member Rep. Joe Wilson (SC-02) wrote:

“In the past year, while Alexei Navalny has remained unjustly imprisoned, the Kremlin has doubled down on its absurd persecution of his anti-corruption organizations as ‘extremist’ /…/ Nevertheless, Mr. Navalny’s colleagues, friends and allies, in the face of grave threats, continue to risk their own freedom to expose Putin’s thuggery across Russia.”

“Putin would not have gone to the trouble to imprison Alexei Navalny unless he perceived a serious threat to his power,” said Co-Chairman Cohen. “Mr. Navalny and his team across Russia were instrumental in revealing the ill-gotten gains of Putin and his cronies. This tells you all you need to know about why they are a target.”

“During his imprisonment, Alexei Navalny has used his own suffering to call attention to the plight of the hundreds of other political prisoners in Russia,” said Sen. Wicker. “We have not forgotten him or others who are persecuted for their beliefs, and we look forward to a Russia in which they finally are free.”

“Despite the Kremlin’s attempts to push Alexei Navalny out of public view and prevent him from challenging Putin, we will not stop calling for his release,” said Rep. Wilson. “Russians who challenge Putin should not have to fear for their safety in their own country.”

“A Man Has Entered the Cage with a Tiger.” What Russian Public Figures are Saying on the Anniversary of Navalny’s Arrest

Vladimir Milov

“It’s been a tragic year. I don’t think it’s right to put it in the category of defeat, because the authorities had pretty obvious goals— to completely isolate Navalny from society. And it didn’t succeed. As you can see, we constantly get his messages of hope even from the colony, even from prison. The second goal was to completely destroy his team. And that also failed, although many of them had to go into exile, but we continue not just to work, but to influence the political situation in Russia <…> So we continue to fight. Of course, we received a very serious hit, but we have withstood, we are fighting, I am sure that we will win in the end.”

Kirill Rogov

“What a great man Navalny is. How great that he flew to Moscow a year ago. What a sensitive politician.

Have you looked in history books? There’s a lot of it there. At first, for a few years, everyone will say: Why did he do it? It made no sense, he miscalculated, he set us all up, do you see what happened as a result? But then. Everyone will say: can you imagine, it didn’t seem to make any sense, it seemed that he miscalculated, there were those who said “he set us all up”.

The Man went into the tiger’s cage, the Man puts his head into the beast’s mouth. And the beast is thinking— do I  bite off the head and show everyone, which is all they expect, that I’m a bloodthirsty scumbag, or do I not bite it off and appear weak?

A man risking his life is high stakes, it’s memorable for decades, if not more. History is made up of these actions. Here we have another entry in Russian history. Our backbone.”

Viktor Shenderovich

“When he returned a year ago, Alexei Navalny acted as a courageous man and a professional politician. Putin wanted to drive him out of the country, that’s why he allowed him to leave for treatment. Since Navalny could not be killed, Putin tried to throw him out of the country this way. He didn’t succeed. At the cost of his freedom, luckily, not his life, Alexei Navalny remains a huge factor in Russian politics even in prison. If he were free now, but outside, abroad, he would not be a factor in Russian politics.

He has acted as a politician, as a courageous, responsible and consistent man. The price he pays for his confrontation with Putin is enormous. It is not only the time he has spent in jail, but also his health. That said, Navalny is indeed Vladimir Putin’s number one political opponent.”

Fedor Krasheninnikov

“I believe that the return of Alexei Navalny was the catalyst that forced Putin’s regime to finally throw off its mask and unleash repressions against the entire class of political activists, human rights defenders, independent journalists and opposition activists. There is no point in talking about any kind of hybridity: we are dealing with an authoritarian police dictatorship that is actively using terror against its opponents as a permanent practice. Vladimir Putin’s main goal is to remain in power, and intimidation is a method for achieving this goal.”

Boris Akunin

Today is a year since Alexei Navalny has been behind bars. He will, of course, get a new sentence (they might even kill him), but the winner in this war of one man against the whole machinery of the police state is already clear. And that’s exactly what Alexei does, every day and every hour: he holds the front line. The first part of the oath— “one for all”— is done. Now it’ s time to fulfill the second part.

Ilya Yashin

“Exactly one year ago, Navalny flew to Moscow. They tried to kill him there, tried him in absentia, and made sure that he wouldn’t even think about returning to Russia. And as soon as Alexei crossed the border, they immediately snapped handcuffs on his hands.

Today again everyone will discuss— was it really necessary to take that risk? Was there a point in voluntarily going to jail? Maybe he should have stayed in exile? But the truth is that the question was never framed that way. There were no meetings, no discussions about Navalny’s return to his homeland. Because almost the first thing he said when he came out of his coma was, “I will definitely go back to Russia.”

And I understand very well why he did that. Many of us think that the point of Navalny’s work is to expose crooks and thieves in power. But this is a shallow view. The point of Navalny’s work is to demonstrate by personal example: in Russia, it is possible to live without fear, without hunching one’s shoulders or lowering one’s eyes. It is possible to remain a free man in an unfree country.

And when each one of us learns not to be afraid, the country will change very quickly. Navalny sets an amazing example of courage, and I am proud to call him my friend and comrade. And I believe he has a great future. Freedom to Alexey Navalny!”

Elections to the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament, took place on September 26, 2021, and not surprisingly, attracted a great deal of attention. Their outcome determined not just the formation of a new ruling coalition of Europe’s largest economy but changed the head of its government. Angela Merkel left the post of federal chancellor, which she had held since 2005; and Olaf Scholz of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was elected in her place.

It is hard to summarize dispassionately the results of the outgoing year 2021 – it turned out to be just too turbulent. And this turbulence did not let up for even a second, even in the days running up to New Year’s Eve. There were new arrests of Alexey Navalny’s colleagues, the hasty liquidation of Memorial Society, and the unprecedented war hysteria from Putin and Russian state propaganda – all of this not only diminished the holiday mood but let us know that we can hardly expect calm in the coming year.

Nevertheless, we must preserve our composure in the current situation. It is important to understand that Putin’s current domestic and foreign policy hysteria has only one understandable cause:  a growing lack of confidence in his own powers amid an unprecedentedly low level of support and the loss of positions in the world.

Very little time remains until 2024, when Putin has planned for himself not just the next extension of his presidential term, but essentially the start of a presidency for life. But his ratings are worse than ever. According to the latest poll from the Levada Center (https://www.levada.ru/2021/12/09/elektoralnye-rejtingi-partij-i-prezidenta/, Putin’s real rating has fallen to 32%. That means he is practically guaranteed to lose the next presidential election to an opponent who will go into the second round with him.

The demographic trend is also important here: the same Levada Center polls indicate that more than half of Russians under the age of 40 oppose the extension of Putin’s term after 2024, and Putin has an assured majority only among the oldest age group of Russians. Clearly, in the next two years, this will heavily influence the general sociological alignment, simply for natural demographic reasons.

The State Duma elections in September demonstrated that the party of power manages to describe itself as a majority in the elections only through unprecedented falsifications.  According to calculations by the electoral mathematician Sergei Shpilkin, United Russia ascribed to itself 14 out of 28 million votes, that is, half. If the counting had been honest, the party of power would have received only 200 or so seats in the Duma; that is, it would have lost the majority and would have become merely a large faction. The Duma elections prove that the government can still secure for itself the necessary scale of falsifications to preserve the majority, but this all comes at the price of incredible effort and unprecedented repression. Putin’s very active personal participation in the United Russia campaign – the first since 2007 – could not raise the party’s rating. Putin’s magic wand no longer works.

This means an extremely poor prospect for the Russian dictator; extending power in 2024 is turning from an easy stroll into a serious battle for him. Especially given Alexey Navalny’s working strategy of “smart voting,” which the regime threw every effort into battling. Despite the fact that the “smart candidates” did not manage to deprive United Russia of a majority, in a significant number of voting districts, the fight between them and the party of power’s representatives was equal (in more than 80% of districts, “smart voting” candidates took first or second place). Next time, a little less in-fighting and a little more mobilization of opposition-minded citizens around this strategy could bring greater success.

For Putin, there is another piece of bad news: his propaganda television is losing its influence. Not as rapidly as one would like, but for a fact: if we look at yet another Levada Center poll conducted last year by Rossiyskiy medialandshaft [Russian Media Landscape] (https://www.levada.ru/2021/08/05/rossijskij-medialandshaft-2021/), the fall in the popularity of Putin’s TV staggers the imagination. Since 2014, the percentage of Russians who use TV as the basic source of their information has dropped from more than 90% to 60%. Accordingly, the percentage of those relying on the Internet rose to nearly 40%. Clearly, by 2024, these curves will not just meet, but most likely the Internet will overtake Putin’s television as the basic source of news for Russians.

Of course, the Internet should not be considered as totally the opposition’s territory. But social media by definition is more pluralistic than the propaganda television screen staged by the Kremlin, and Putin has failed to control the minds of Russians through the Internet using the standard media script. He understands this, which explains the growing pressure of censorship on Ru.net. But we should not panic here, either.  Although we can expect a lot of news of the blocking of important independent web sites, on the whole, the authorities are trailing in its wake. Although the obstructions cause people a lot of inconveniences, on the one hand, many have already learned how to circumvent them, and on the other, the truth about what is going on in Russia still reaches people and cannot be hidden. In that sense, the government has been unable to mount a full-fledged Chinese firewall.

Yet another important result of the passing year – Putin’s failed attempt to destroy the movement of Alexey Navalny’s supporters.  The dictator calculated that by forcing Navalny’s colleagues into emigration, he would make them irrelevant, like many past generations of opposition members. But it turned out otherwise; modern technologies enable their continued effective broadcasting to Russia, thus increasing their audience and number of new supporters. The attempt to destroy the opposition failed; the opposition’s audience figures have nearly returned to the levels before Navalny’s arrest. Hence the new arrests and criminal cases – but Putin can no longer stop the resistance.

The economic situation is no better; the federal budget for the next three years signed by Putin (https://vot-tak.tv/novosti/18-10-2021-byudzhet-milov/) does not provide for a significant growth in Russians’ incomes, i.e. a solution to the fundamental problem causing the collapse of Putin’s ratings.  The government’s forecast pledges a growth of real incomes in 2022-2024 at best by 2-2.5% with inflation at 4% — that is, if inflation will be lower, even this miniscule rise will not occur. This year, inflation, in Putin’s expression, has already “eaten into” the indexation of pensions – in real terms, pensions have been falling since February, and in October fell to 2.5% of October 2020. Pension reform has failed miserably, and the one-time 10,000-ruble payments (US $136) have not solved this problem.

Thus, by all criteria, Putin can expect a very difficult 2024. Foreign affairs are no better. He failed to draw the Biden Administration into a new “reboot” of relations. The new German government is not only taking a harder position regarding Putin; it reflects general systemic changes in German policy regarding Russia. For example, Christine Lambrecht, the new German defense minister from the SDP (who are seemingly traditional advocates of a soft Ostpolitik) made her first international visit to Lithuania, whose relations with Putin are near zero, and made quite hardline statements there about not letting Putin dictate terms to NATO.  Putin contrived to quarrel even with quite loyal France; at the culmination of the 2+2 meeting in November, the French ministers of defense and foreign affairs released a statement that was unprecedentedly harsh by French diplomatic standards (https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/russia/news/article/russia-meeting-of-the-minister-for-europe-and-foreign-affairs-and-the-minister). They condemned Russia’s actions across the board, from the atrocities of the Wagner private military contractors in Africa to the threatening of Ukraine and the situation with Navalny – there was not a single positive word. The escalation of the situation around Ukraine has noticeably consolidated the democratic countries; there are no signs of division regarding the need to deter Putin. Clearly, none of his “red lines” will be accepted.The hysterics we observe from the Russian leadership in domestic and foreign policy are an immediate reaction to the worsening of the domestic and foreign situation for Putin. The Russian dictator refuses to understand that his time is up; that Russian society is refusing to accept him as a leader, and the understanding is growing and strengthening in the world of the need for a tougher rebuff of the totally unbridled Russian ruler. Everything is working against Putin – trends in the media, demographics, and the economy. Again, he does not have a life-saving magic wand.

Of course, he will not give up easily, so the sad news is that in 2022, we must expect a worsening of repression and new escalations of the international situation. But history cannot be turned back; although Putin does try, in the literal sense of the word, to rewrite the history of Russia and its neighbors. To rephrase the saying ascribed to Lincoln, you can repress part of the people for a long time, or all of the people for a short time, but you cannot keep all of society endlessly in fear and the grips of repression. The bad news is that the finale of the Putin dictatorship will be quite dramatic. The good news is that this finale is inevitable. All objective factors prove that we are moving to the denouement.

Just a few days remain before the Russian State Duma elections.

Early voting has already begun in remote polling stations and abroad. The ballots have been printed. This analysis assesses the situation as the campaign approaches the finish line.

The General Environment

The elections take place during a period of dramatic intensification of oppression and curtailing of the rights and liberties of Russian citizens.  Over the course of the campaign, several dozen media outlets, private citizens and NGOs have been designated as “foreign agents” and “undesirable organizations,” and their activities have been either considerably reduced or completely shut down.

Dozens of political activists have been pushed into exile. Dozens have been handed sentences that disenfranchises them in election rights

For the first time, there will be no international observation effort from OSCE.

Approximately nine million people have been disenfranchised in their election rights. 

Dozens of activists and regional politicians have been purged from electoral lists due to their association with Navalny’s movement.

Russia saw the largest disbursement of “helicopter money” in memory. Approximately 65 million people have received money from the government, and for the first time in Russian history, over 60% of adult residents in Russia received social support payments. In total, there are 104 million voters in Russia. For comparison, the “maternity capital” payments made to families for having a second or third child, which previously had been the largest state welfare program, had been extended to 10 million people, maximum. This is a direct violation of the election law prohibiting bribing of voters.

For all intents and purposes, the US and EU have lifted international sanctions on Russia’s state entities as they relate to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. The completion of the Nord Stream 2 construction has been purposefully timed and heavily promoted.

The introduction of the second round of sanctions punishing Russia’s use of chemical weapons against Navalny has not taken place. According to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Chemical Weapons, initial sanctions should be imposed immediately once the Organization for the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons confirms that these weapons have been used, with a second round following six months later. Joe Biden has not introduced the second round of sanctions.

There has been a clear attempt at suppressing votes during these elections. Neither the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) nor the media are encouraging people to go out and vote. Political parties have barely even spent any money campaigning since the start of the electoral season— a couple of rubles per voter over the course of the entire campaign.

Electronic voting has been introduced, making it possible to control how people vote— providing a way to monitor the process and the outcome. For example, in Moscow, government employees are forced to register for electronic voting, and on election day, they are to come to work and press a button in the presence of their supervisors. This violates the confidentiality clause of the election law. Out of 7.7 million voters in Moscow, over 1.3 million have registered for electronic voting.

The CEC has basically eliminated video monitoring of polling stations, restricting access to just a small group of individuals. Rather than simply streaming the video openly online, the CEC has introduced a multi-step online access procedure available only to a small, previously registered group of people.

Between the 2016 and 2021, over 600,000 Russian passports have been issued throughout unrecognized territories such Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Crimea, and the Donbass. Remote electronic voting and streamlined voting procedures have been made available for the new Russian citizens in the Donbass.

Absolutely all platforms associated with Alexei Navalny’s “Smart Voting” have been blocked in Russia, including the movement’s website and apps. The courts have ordered Google and Yandex to stop processing searches for the term “Smart Voting”. Yandex has already stopped turning up links for this search.

For the entirety of the election campaign as well as the entire year leading up to the elections, there has been a ban on all public mass events under the guise of fighting the Covid-19 pandemic. Public events for Putin’s United Russia party, however, have been exempt from this restriction.

Polling data helps to further substantiate the general impression of the situation leading up to the election:

United Russia, the main pro-government party, is entering the elections at its 15-year lowest ratings.  At the beginning of the campaign, in June 2021, approval for United Russia was to around 30% (in 2016, this figure vacillated between 42%-44% according to various polling services as the election campaign season began). Throughout nearly the entire campaign, approval for United Russia has steadily declined, hitting 27% and then rebounding to about 30% only after the unprecedented handout of “helicopter money” to nearly 45 million Russian citizens (announced on August 22, though the payments were actually disbursed on September 1). The approval for the main opposition party—the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) has grown slightly, from 13% to 17%. The CPRF and its candidates in single-mandate districts are actively campaigning, and this is reflected in its growing approval. The other two parliamentary parties, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and A Just Russia (SR) have not seen any change to their approval since the beginning of the campaign, at 11% and 7%, respectively.

The opinion polls do not answer the main question—whether we will see a repeat of the phenomenon known as the “Navalny 2013 effect,” when, one week prior to the Moscow mayoral elections, polling services predicted that Alexei Navalny would receive 13-14% of the vote, but he ended up taking  27%. Pollsters later chalked this up to the super-mobilization of Navalny supporters during the final week of the campaign. According to Russian legislation, candidates cannot be removed from ballots within the last five days before the election, and the polls were not able to predict that level of mobilzation.

Will the same happen in the Duma Elections in 2021? Remember, in April 2021, one polling service estimated the approval for a hypothetical “Navalny party” at 10%. Political scientist Grigoriy Golosov and mathematician Sergei Shpilkin have conducted analysis and concluded that Smart Voting—the “hypothetical Navalny party’s” main project—in 2020 endowed candidates in cities like St. Petersburg with an additional 7% of votes.

Smart Voting has Emerged as the main unknown factor in these elections.

The balance of forces in this electoral campaign is such that “those in power have money, administrative resources, and the means to disenfranchise voters, but do not have more than 30% approval; while the opposition languishes in jail or has been forced into exile, has been deprived of tools for voter mobilization, and still commands over 40%-42% of  Russian voters”. The 40%-42% represents combined approval for a hypothetical Navalny party + CPRF + LDPR + SR.

At the same time, in single-ticket districts, United Russia is ubiquitous, while the opposition is fragmented, with the most charismatic candidates sidelined from running or removed from electoral lists during the campaign process, including in the case of well-known politicians such as Yuneman, Furgal, and Shlossberg. In reality, the opposition candidates are campaigning in about one-third of the single-mandate districts, whereas in the others, they simply do not have enough money to campaign.

Assessment of the remaining candidates and real level of competition on party lists and in single-mandate districts

All parties that were able to legally register for the elections without collecting signatures have registered with party lists. There are 14 registered parties in all. Just before elections were announced, PARNAS (Boris Nemtsov’s party) had been suspended from registering for six months, preventing it from taking part in the State Duma elections. There was no explanation for this, and everything was arranged by the Russian Ministry of Justice.

The Kremlin’s strategy was to prevent the most media-savvy and popular candidates from being included into party lists—such as the CPRF’s Platoshkin and Bondarenko, both of whom have their own media resources and hundreds of thousands of followers on social media and YouTube. 

Parliamentary parties were banned from including or nominating charismatic politicians such as Anton Furgal (the son of jailed Khabarovsk governor Sergei Furgal) or Evgeniy Yumashev (the mayor of Bodaybo district in Irkutsk, and the only politician in Russia to have passed the so-called “municipal filter,” that is, the votes of 5% of all deputies in his region) in single-ticket districts.

Even among parties running in the elections, the number of candidates has significantly dropped—the list of CPRF candidates has shrunk by 46 people, and the LDPR by 96, with SR by 31. However, the number of candidates removed from the elections has grown and now stands at 321, with 15 more who may end up being disqualified based on CEC complaints (due to their ownership of foreign assets).

It is important to note that the registered parties have raised very little for the election campaigns. The reason is that there are no private sponsors in Russia, and collecting money from abroad is overtly prohibited.  Systemic parties are either incapable of collecting small sums of money or banned from doing so.

Overall, by September 2, registered parties had collected about RUB 2.4 bln, which amounts to RUB 23 or 31 US cents per each voter. At this level of spending, any active campaigning or real competition between the parties simply is not possible.

The parties’ main task is to break the 5% threshold in order to get into the Duma. Throughout the campaign, not a single party from outside the Duma has been able to come close to 5%, according to polling data. New People, Pensioners for Social Justice Party , and Yabloko have come the closest to reaching 5%. Polls indicate that each of these parties may be able to receive between 2% to 4% of the electoral votes.

The situation is even more interesting in the single-mandate districts. There, similarly to party lists, there are not many charismatic candidates, and several candidates have already been removed from the ballots. At the same time, in about 20 out of 225 districts, United Russia has either not nominated a candidate, or has nominated a candidate who is not campaigning at all. In about half of all districts, opposition candidates have not managed to collect more than RUB 1-2 million for the election campaign, which is not nearly enough to conduct a real campaign (most districts in Russia have between 400,000-500,000 voters). It is important to note that nearly all candidates in single-mandate districts have been nominated by the parties. The number of registered self-nominated candidates in 2021 fell to a record low of just 11 individuals (five years ago, there were twice as many). For the most part, these candidates are either spoiler candidates or share the same last name as opposition candidates. However, about 60-80 districts are in cities of more than a million people, such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and also in protest-Practically, in each of these districts, the opposition has a strong chance to claim victory, either due to an extensive track record of protest voting, or due to a large support base for Smart Voting initiative.

This means that out of 225 single-mandate districts, the opposition may score up to 100. Such forecast can be viewed as both justified and reasonable, and the situation in such district as highly-competitive independently of the roster of registered candidates.

Assessing the Prospects of the Smart Voting Initiative

Despite the Russian government’s attempts to shut it down, the Smart Voting initiative  remains active. Navalny Live YouTube channel continues to release videos, and mailings continue targeting the network of supporters. The website and app are up and running.

On average, each Smart Voting video is viewed by 300,000-400,000 people.  The number of mailing subscribers is not disclosed, but it is clearly over 1 mln people.  

Despite the fact that Smart Voting has not significantly expanded its platforms, its impact has grown manifold. This is due to the fact that as the United Russia approval ratings have plummeted, the vote gap between candidates has shrunk.

As a hypothetical example, let’s consider that, in 2016, with an average rating for United Russia candidates at 42%-44%, and for CPRF candidates at 15%-17%, no initiative similar to Smart Voting, with its 7%-10% boost, would have been able to ensure to shrink the gap to guarantee a victory by a CPRF candidate.

In 2021, with a 27-30% rating for a United Party candidate, and a 15-17% rating for a hypothetical second candidate— 10% would be enough for the Smart Voting initiative would be enough to secure victory in one-fourths of races. One-fourth of 225 districts translates to 50-60 districts. In Moscow, St. Petersburg and cities with million-plus populations, Smart Voting candidates are likely to score victory in most of the races.

Therefore, it is possible to say, that the majority of opposition parties’ candidates who will have claimed victory in September, will do so exclusively due to the Smart Voting initiative. This is not lost on the candidates themselves, who are currently very active in trying to persuade the administrators of Smart Voting to support their campaigns.

The outlook for election observation

Over the past five, a slew of amendments has been adopted into the Russian electorate law, severely restricting the ability to observe elections. New requirements have been introduced for early registration of observers with the Territorial Election Commission (TEC) and Precinct Election Commission (PEC). Independent organizations who had coordinated election observations have been designated as foreign agents. OSCE observers, for the first time in 30 years, have been denied access.

Nevertheless, according to regional coordinators from the Golos movement, citizen electoral observation initiatives have generally endured. None of the interviewed experts could offer an estimate of the number of polling centers that will be closed to independent monitoring, with responses ranging between 35,000-50,000 out of 96,000 districts. Only one thing is sure—despite the deterioration of the general situation with electoral observation, most polling stations will be closed to independent observation organized by the opposition and independent observation efforts. How much space there will be to contest the registered election violations is not yet clear.  

General Outlook for the Elections

In assessing possible election outcomes, we need to highlight several key uncertainties:

  1. How accurately do opinion polls have captured the voters’ attitude? Has it managed to capture the situation accurately, or there may be another black swan event similar to the Navalny-2013 Surprise?
  2. How determined is the Russian government to violate its own rules and unleash violence in the few days remaining before the elections?
  3. What would be the turn-out in Russia’s largest cities?
  4. Will there will be expansion of the election fraud geography (at this moment about 28% of Russian citizens live in regions of outright election falsification)?

Based on the available polling data, it can be concluded that in voting on party lists, United Russia will receive fewer than 50% of the votes, even considering the areas where elections are entirely rigged.

In single-mandate districts, the opposition stands to take between 50 to 100 mandates.

Thus, the overall outcome of the elections is likely to be the following: United Russia will retain its majority in the State Duma but will have to face a prominent and stable opposition faction. Thanks to single-mandate district voting, for the first time in 15 years, the Duma will feature a large number of true opposition legislators (currently, only three deputies out of 225 were elected in the single-mandate districts on their own without any support from the Kremlin).  This offers hope that the Duma will once again become a “place for debate” (one former State Duma speaker opined that the Duma is not a place for debate, and this policy governed the chamber for the past 15 years). In other words, public opposition may return to the State Duma.

The makeup of the deputies core will change, becoming younger, with 30%-50% made up of new deputies, who have not previously been elected to the State Duma. This is important, because the Kremlin has been unwavering in its policy of ensuring most deputies’ indefinite tenure, especially when it comes to systemic opposition deputies such as Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky. It is likely that during this term, the State Duma will see a shakeup of most parties’ leadership as party leaders get older and pass away.

There is some reason for optimism when it comes to the September 19 elections. Most Russian political analysts forecast that the opposition will take between 20 to 40 seats in the Duma. In the best-case scenario, the opposition may take as many as 100 seats in single-mandate districts.

The reason for such optimism is the demographic shift currently underway in Russia, as the largest generation of Russians, the Baby Boomers, or people born between 1951 and 1964, begin to pass away. This generation is the most strong supporter of the incumbent government. However, it. Is also the generation who has borne the brunt of the COVID-19 pandemic. In Russia, the level of mortality attributed to COVID now stands at 1 mln people (both from high mortality rates from COVID itself, or from conditions that went untreated during the pandemic).

Russia is also being reshaped by urbanization.  The population of villages and small towns is shrinking, while the population of large cities is growing. Small towns and villages are the concentration of the voter base for the current regime.

Gerrymandering is another important factor. Nearly in all large Russian cities, borders between districts have been spliced, with support from the authorities in small cities compensating for large cities’ protest vote potential (the percent of voters who support the opposition). Traditionally, there are more of them cities than in small towns, and the larger the city, the more votes it has. But once approval ratings for the ruling party and opposition began to even out in the cities, protest cities began funneling their votes into the majority of single-mandate districts nationwide.

Let’s take a look at the Irkutsk region, and the city of Irkutsk. Until 2011, the Irkutsk region included four districts that elected deputies to the State Duma, including one district on the outskirts of Irkutsk, and three constituencies consisting of small cities and villages. For the 2011 elections, the government redrew the districts’ boundaries, and cut Irkutsk itself into three equal portions, each of which was incorporated into various single-mandate districts. This effectively neutralized the protest potential of the Irkutsk voters by diluting it with rural voters in the elections of 2011 and 2016.

However, after the passage of the pension reform, United Russia’s approval rating dropped to the point that even small towns were no longer capable of giving it the edge it needed in elections. One of the most important promises that United Russia and Putin himself made was to not raise the retirement age. The reform was a direct default on that promise and deception of voters.

Now we have a situation where protest vote from Irkutsk feeds not one, but three election districts.

No analysis of this development is available as of now, and yet it clearly greatly improves the outlook for the opposition.

Recommendations:

Considering the conduct of the elections, the international community should consider the following:

  1. Declare the elections —held in violation of rights and freedoms of Russian citizens —as illegitimate and their results as invalid
  2. To not admit or host elected deputies in international government agencies and parliaments
  3. Be prepared to an emergence and quick unraveling of a political crisis in Russia connected to the refusal of the majority of population to accept the announced outcome of the election
  4. Provide support to the opposition and to Russia’s political prisoners; demand their immediate and unconditional release

To abstain from signing agreements with the Russian government even when it is seeking a compromise with the West. Demand the Duma to be disbanded and demand a conduct of a free election where all opposition forces are allowed to run.

Nord Stream 2 – Entrenching Putin’s Economic and Political Corruption

The traumatic exit of the US military from Kabul has removed covers from an elephant in the room that most western policy makers had an inkling about for a long while. Rabid corruption in Afghanistan has made all wishful thinking about democratic transition in this country futile from the outset. It is something that western policy-makers should have started speaking about openly and loudly years ago, not now.

We should be prepared to face a similar revelation and rude awakening with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline—an utterly corrupt gas export project doggedly pushed through by the Kremlin—as soon as it becomes operational.

This brief aims to highlight in concrete and unequivocal ways in which Nord Stream 2 has already spurred grave economic and political corruption in Russia and Europe and will undoubtedly continue to do so on an even grander scale once the project is operational. This is something that, as with Afghanistan’s corruption, is already intuitively understood in most circles in Washington D.C. and Brussels but continues to be swept under the rug in pursuit of “normal” relations with the Kremlin and allies in Germany.

NS2 Grand Corruption

Critical analysis of corruption surrounding Gazprom its Nord Stream 2 has been met with vicious pushback from Russia even targeting its most loyal commentators. In May 2018, analysts from Sberbank CIB, Alex Fak and Anna Kotelnikova, published research on the Russian oil and gas industry. The head of Sberbank, German Gref, fired Fak for the research and apologized to Gennady Timchenko and Arkady Rotenberg – Putin`s cronies named as beneficiaries of the Gazprom pipeline construction strategy by the report.[i] The main points from the Sberbank CIB research were the following:

A. Gazprom`s investment program can best be understood as a way to employ the company`s entrenched contractors at the expense of shareholders. The three major projects that will eat up half of the capex in the next five years – Power of Siberia, Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream – are deeply value-destructive.

B. It is commonly believed that the Russian government has been forcing Gazprom to construct the major routes to bypass Ukraine —Turkish Stream and Nord Stream 2. Because they reach no new markets, these routes entail no marginal revenue whatsoever. Whatever benefit they derive comes from savings on transit costs, but their main rationale is a geopolitical one – to bypass the existing Ukrainian system.

NS1 and NS2 – Entrenched Corrupt Networks and Methods

Arkady and Boris Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko

Corruption stories surrounding Nord Stream 1 and 2, Gazprom, and Putin’s inner circle demonstrate that the more money the Kremlin gets, the greater is the retreat of democracy in Russia and in Europe.  To better understand value destruction rendered by Gazrpom, the US public should be informed that both Nord Stream 1 and 2 have been implemented at a direct loss to the Russian budget, taxpayers and the environment, and the damage will continue to grow.

Putin’s insiders Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, along with Gennady Timchenko, are the main beneficiaries of Nord Stream 1 in Russia. Between 2003 and 2006, firms of the Rotenberg brothers functioned as artificial intermediaries in the sale of the trunk pipeline from the Chelyabinsk pipeline plant to Gazprom. In 2007, they opened the Nord Stream Pipeline Project company, which became the main intermediary for the re-sale of pipelines for Nord Stream 1, bringing around $1bn of profit between 2008 and 2012. Eventually, Russia’s Anti-Monopoly Agency acted against this scheme, but only after the construction and money transfer for Nord Stream 1 had been finished.[ii] Essentially, this means that Rotenberg brothers got away with the funds, and the Anti-Monopoly Agency late interference was just for show. Sberbank CIB report mentions Rotenberg-controlled company StroyGazMontazh (STM) as a key beneficiary of Nord Stream 2 construction process.[iii]

Gennady Timchenko, Putin’s partner and friend from early 1990s, gained control over StroyTransGas (STG) and StroyTransNefteGaz (STNG) at deflated price from Gazprom in 2007-13, as did Rotenberg brothers when they bought STM from the monopoly in 2008 which experts Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov considered evidence of corruption.[iv] These three companies then received lucrative contracts to complete onshore work for Nord Stream 1[v] and 2[vi] and pipeline work for connection with future distribution network of Nord Stream 1 and 2 in Czech Republic. STG and STNG were also cited by Sberbank CIB report along with STM as benefiting from Nord Stream 2 contracts while Gazprom tried to hide some of their involvement with the project.[vii]

Timchenko also has acquired multiple other assets previously owned by Gazprom[viii] through his stake in Bank Rossiya, Novatek and other entities closely associated with Putin’s inner circle (see more on this in the section on Kirill Shamalov). According to Nemtsov and Milov, these cronies of Putin and firms that they control gained billions of dollars from these insider deals with Gazprom.[ix]

Timchenko and the Rotenberg brothers, sanctioned by the US Treasury for their involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine,[x] continue to benefit heavily from Gazprom’s murky schemes in the production and transportation of gas, including for Nord Stream 1 and 2 and associated $35 billion expansion of onshore gas pipeline network all the way from Yamal Peninsula to the Baltic Sea,[xi] even though they have been more careful to cover up their insider relations with offshore Nord Stream 2 development.

Aslan Gagiyev, Gennadiy Petrov and Igor Yusufov

Between 2008-2016, top Russian officials (including the head of the Moscow Nord Stream 1 office) and mafia bosses, bought and controlled Nordic Yards, a shipbuilding dock in Angela Merkel’s electoral district in East Pomerania, where they ran money-laundering and other corruption schemes.[xii] One of the shadow co-owners, Aslan Gagiyev, was extradited by Austrian court to Moscow in 2018[xiii] and is now being tried in Russia for over 60 murders, including related to the Yards, while the other mafia boss, Gennadiy Petrov, is a top fugitive from Spanish courts[xiv] residing in total safety in his own luxury palace in St. Petersburg with the protection from Russian government.

As western audits and police reports later showed, Igor Yusufov was involved in this criminal scheme as a shadowy partner and was one of the key officials who had control over the asset and money laundering around it. Yusufov is an insider of Putin’s circle who was previously minister of energy (2001-04), the president’s special envoy for international energy cooperation, and a Gazprom board member. He and his son Vitaly Yusufov, the then head of the Nord Stream 1 office in Moscow, hid their involvement with the asset until 2009 and later denied any corruption or criminal links with gangsters.

Alexey Miller

Alexey Miller, sanctioned by US Treasury for involvement in worldwide malign activity,[xv] has been implicated in various corruption stories long before he became CEO of Gazprom, including in the corrupt incident involving the port of St. Petersburg in late 1990s.[xvi] In 2001 and soon after becoming CEO, Miller carried out his first major aggressive corporate raiding campaign when Gazprom, at the instigation of Putin, gained control over the privately-owned petrochemical company Sibur. In the following years, Gazprom, using similar “administrative leverage” (i.e. the backing of Putin’s security services, law enforcement and courts), gained control over many gas industry assets: Vostokgazprom, Zapsibgazprom, Nortgaz, and many others, often at prices much lower than the market price. Miller was instrumental in passing control stakes in SOGAZ and other multiple subsidiaries under control of Putin’s cronies in Bank Rossiya.

Since 2005 the minority shareholders of Yukos have filed multiple lawsuits against Miller and Gazprom for illegally nationalizing parts of the company. In recent years, the Court of Arbitration of The Hague satisfied some of these claims, and as a result Gazprom announced the threat of seizure of its assets.

Kirill Shamalov

There have been numerous cases where Miller allowed Gazprom to buy and sell assets at a great financial loss to the company, including Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat (GNS), Transinvestgaz, Sibneft, and many others.[xvii] The most notorious story of enriching Putin’s insiders with such price manipulation and controversial loans has been the gradual transfer of a stake of over 20% in Sibur to Putin’s son-in-law, Kirill Shamalov, through another Putin crony, Gennady Timchenko (mentioned above). In 2018 Kirill Shamalov was sanctioned by US Treasury for involvement in worldwide malign activity.[xviii]

Shamalov, his father, as well as Timchenko, have been Putin’s closest associates, and they have received numerous lucrative assets and contracts from Gazprom and other state companies in Russia and are beneficiaries of some of the projects surrounding the expansion of the Russian gas system for Nord Stream 1 and 2.

Gazprom

If one looks at Gazprom’s Board of Directors or Management, it requires considerable effort to find a single top manager who is not implicated in any major corruption scandal:

1. Viktor Zubkov, Chairman of the Board: Zubkov has been partner of Vladimir Putin’s criminal schemes ever since their joint work in the mayor’s office in St. Petersburg in 1990s. Zubkov’s son-in-law Anatoliy Serdyukov has been dismissed from the position of defense minister due to overwhelming corruption cases in his ministry while Zubkov was prime minister of Russia. Spanish prosecutor’s office when dealing with the Russian mafia case in Spain, has called Zubkov mediator for Russian criminal bosses.[xix]

2. Andrey Akimov, Board member: in 2003 through his control of Gazprombank he created the Centrex group of companies, which engaged in controversial gas sales in Europe. In 2005 the European Commission noted that managers of Centrex had inappropriate close business relations with the Gazprom management.[xx] After the Panama Papers were leaked, Swiss authorities banned Gazprombank from attracting new clients for its money-laundering operations, including with Putin’s friend and cello player Sergey Roldugin.[xxi] In Cyprus, Akimov managed to extract 2 million euros from Laiki bank just 9 days before the authorities froze the bankrupt bank.[xxii]

In 2018 Akimov was sanctioned by US Treasury for involvement in worldwide malign activity.[xxiii]

3. Denis Manturov, Board Member: one of the conspicuously wealthy Russian ministers was observed practicing insider contracts during his previous role as director of a helicopter plant.[xxiv] He has also been described as a protégé of Putin’s friend Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Rostec Corporation, and involved in many controversial businesses in the defense sector.

4. Dmitry Patrushev, former Board Member: Son of Putin’s close KGB associate Nikolay Patrushev, Dmitry was appointed to manage Rosselkhozbank, a key state agricultural bank.[xxv] Under his leadership the bank lost several billion dollars, including in deals with partners of his father, but the bank was compensated at the expense of the Russian budget.[xxvi]

5. Mikhail Putin, Management Committee Member: Vladimir Putin’s cousin came to Gazprom through nepotism.[xxvii] For many years he was a key figure in SOGAZ, an insurance company run by Putin’s confidants which has benefited from multiple insider deals.

6. Kirill Seleznev, former Management Committee Member: Seleznev worked for Miller in St. Petersburg’s port where a lot of corruption scandals took place. He oversaw insider deals on condensate trade between Kazakhstan and Gazprom that benefited unnecessary intermediaries with $4 billion.[xxviii] He was also seen as the main insider in corrupt transactions around Gazenergoprombank.[xxix] In 2019 Seleznev stepped down from Gazprom soon after the arrests of his advisor Raul Arashukov and his son, corrupt senator, Rauf Arashukov who were accused of being involved in the murky gas trade in the Russian Caucasus. Seleznev remains closely involved with Russian gas distribution and export projects run by Kremlin insiders.

Gazprom, NS2 and the Environment

Green policy and environmental concerns seem to be now at the forefront of western policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic, especially in Germany and the US, this is why it is imperative to emphasize that Nord Stream 2 has brought about multiple corruption problems related to climate change and natural environment on top of massive economic and political corruption. Activity of Nord Stream 2 AG and its patron Gazprom has a devastating impact on greenhouse emissions, Baltic Sea nature, and indigenous people.[xxx]

Despite two decades of futile promises from the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, and Gazprom to tackle the problem of gas flaring, Russian monopoly has been among top world emitters of methane, according to the World Bank data. Latest report shows that Russia tops the list of global gas flaring countries in 2020, contributing to 15 percent of global gas flaring, while Gazprom’s highly advertised new region of production in Yamal that is supposed to feed Nord Stream 2 has seen consistent rise in flaring.[xxxi]

Flaring is not simply an issue of negligence but a deliberate corrupt choice, as Gazprom’s wasteful and predatory but lucrative monopoly policy is based on denying third party access to domestic and export pipelines to more efficient gas producers. Gazprom’s poor maintenance of pipelines and associated high methane leaks are equally corrupt and inefficient.

On the territory of Russia, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline passes through the high-value natural area called Kurgalsky Nature Reserve which has now become a place of environmental catastrophe because of Gazprom.[xxxii] Evgeniya Chirikova, an environmental activist from Russia, conducted a special survey of violations that Nord Stream 2 has inflicted on the Kurgalsky reserve. According to her research and interviews with individuals from multiple environmental NGOs, the chosen pipeline route is extremely destructive for nature and violates several domestic and international laws.

Important information about the significance of the Kurgalsky Nature Reserve is hidden in Environmental Impact Assessment reports of Nord Stream 2 AG, also known as Espoo (Espoo reports document potential transboundary impacts of the project on nature). The regime of the Kurgalsky reserve is not reflected in the Espoo materials and other materials justifying the choice of the pipeline route. The Espoo materials are in violation of multiple laws and regulations, both domestic and international, such as Article 4 of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention) and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. The Espoo materials present unreliable data about the choice of the route with respect to conservation of marine mammals and birds.

The Nord Stream 2 AG company’s website has several statements that can safely be called false or misleading. In the section about Nord Stream 2 in Kurgalsky reserve the site states, “Nord Stream 2 will be implemented in accordance with Russian and international legislation.” This statement is a lie, since the Nord Stream 2 project violates several international conventions: the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, and the Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. Additionally, construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is in violation of the Russian Federal Laws “On Wildlife” and “On Specially Protected Natural Territories”.[xxxiii] 

Greenpeace Austria has received secret minutes of meetings between Russian government members and representatives of Nord Stream 2 AG and Gazprom from a former high-ranking official of the Russian Ministry of the Environment, which discussed the changes in environmental legislation or the boundaries of Kurgalsky Nature Reserve for the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project.[xxxiv]

Gazprom also manipulated public hearings, which are supposed to be an integral part of any genuine due process but were carried out fraudulently by Gazprom. Contrary to what the Nord Stream 2 AG and local officials argue, residents that attended public meetings did not express support for the Nord Stream 2 project.[xxxv]

Some residents in the Kurgalsky region identify themselves as indigenous people: Izhora, Ingermanlanders, and Vod. According to the ILO 169 (The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 is an International Labour Organization Convention, also known as ILO-convention 169) standards, these people fall under the protection of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). As these people were not properly informed, nor consulted with, FPIC was not implemented. Residents of 18 villages of Kingiseppsky district in the Leningrad region addressed the President of Russia. In their public letter they asked to stop construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and spare the Kurgalsky reserve but to no avail.

The bottom line from all these pieces of evidence is that Gazprom and Nord Stream 2 AG are not shy to manipulate and forge environmental documents, fizzle out rule of environmental laws and regulations and tramp over key international agreements related to the protection of nature.

Price of Inaction

International and Russian media and activists —among them the late Boris Nemtsov and current opposition leaders Alexey Navalny and Vladimir Milov —have uncovered numerous other corruption schemes .[xxxvi] These include illegal expropriation of Gazprom’s assets and cashflows by Putin’s insiders, construction of palaces and acquisition of luxury property by Gazprom associates, influence operations in the West by Nord Stream 1 and 2 and other Gazprom-controlled entities.

Despite the substantial evidence publicized by these investigations, Western policymakers and corporations refuse to fully appreciate the grave implications of corruption that has accompanied the construction of Nord Stream 1 and Gazprom’s and is now clearly linked to Nord Stream 2. Here is a list of the most common schemes used by Gazprom, which is far from exhaustive, but could be likely transplanted further in European jurisdictions:

  • Opaque procurement processes and employment of unnecessary expensive intermediaries
  • Using connections with organized criminal groups and money laundering in Europe to advance deals and acquire distressed assets
  • Manipulating regional and country markets and energy pricing, insisting on bilateral opaque deals that circumvent western sanctions and EU regulations on market transparency and competition
  • Spreading malign propaganda against renewable energy and climate change policies, forging or manipulating documentation on environmental protection
  • Coopting senior politicians and corporate figures/entities in Gazprom’s network in Europe through excessive salaries and other incentives

Gazprom’s corruption, including through its operations via Nord Stream 1 and 2 and other export channels in Europe, have shown a consistent track record of poor governance and outright criminality. A careful observer of Gazprom’s activity in Europe over the last two decades will have to come to the conclusion that the monopoly’s unabetted operations through Nord Stream 2 will bring even more of Kremlin-supported corruption into Europe, destroying democratic societies and institutions.

U.S. and EU Responses

Most European policy-makers are now aware of the problems posed by Gazprom’s opaque methods and inquiries into Gazprom’s corrupt strategy have been made at highest ranks of the EU. In 2011, an antitrust investigation against Gazprom was initiated in eight EU countries. In 2015, the European Commission filed charges and denounced Gazprom for the illegal partitioning of EU markets, denying third-party access to gas pipelines, and unlawful pricing, all of which aimed at politically and economically strangling Central and Eastern European countries.

In 2018, Gazprom, however, made a deal with the EU on the outcome of the investigation without incurring hefty fines by promising a reformed approach.[xxxvii] Thusly, Gazprom’s past corrupt behavior was swept under the rug for political reasons, namely, to appease the Kremlin. Many EU members still saw the deal as too lenient on Gazprom.

Since then, the U.S. and EU have placed Gazprom, Gazprombank and multiple other affiliate companies on sanctions lists that are supposed to limit their ability to raise long-term capital in the West and gain access to new advanced technology for upstream production. Even though Gazprom and its subsidiaries lost access to some of the traditional loan mechanisms from international banks, they are still receiving lucrative hard currency cashflows from gas exports and are free to use European bond markets. Just this year, Gazprombank has raised billions of dollars in U.S. dollar issue Eurobonds, including from U.S. investors who found ongoing sanctions against Nord Stream 2 toothless.[xxxviii] Gazprom has abandoned some of its more technically advanced offshore projects (mainly because of the downturn in global energy prices and the general economic downturn, not so much due to U.S. sanctions) but had no trouble getting all necessary technology for its ongoing projects, including for Nord Stream 2.

The U.S. Treasury has slowly sanctioned some but not all vessels (for some only prohibited US companies to cooperate with them)[xxxix] that help Gazprom complete Nord Stream 2 pipeline, but stopped short of sanctioning all shipping companies and port infrastructure entities (Russian and western) involved in the final stages of the project. U.S. administration also has kept key waivers that allow Nord Stream 2 AG to complete the pipeline.[xl]

Individual sanctions targeting key Gazprom figures have restricted their travel to the West (reportedly, this is the case with Timchenko, Rotenberg brothers and few other figures). However, it is well known, that these and other sanctioned oligarchs have regularly circumvented western sanctions by transferring their assets to relatives and other non-sanctioned insiders, forcing the U.S. Treasury to play a protracted and reactive cat-and-mouse game of chasing newly evolving circumvention schemes.[xli] Just recently, a bi-partisan Congressional investigation has uncovered that Rotenberg family successfully used largely unregulated U.S. art industry to circumvent sanctions.[xlii]

Given the ways Gazprom and its proxies brazenly use corruption and circumvent sanctions, the US Congress must act to:

  • Sanction all relevant Kremlin-connected oligarchs under existing mechanisms, such as Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and Global Magnitsky Act (GMA)
  • Enact full weight of mandatory sanctions as prescribed by the Congress under Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA) and Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA), such removing waivers for Nord Stream 2 AG and its CEO Mattias Warnig[xliii]

[i] https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles/2018/05/24/770650-uvolennii-analitik-cib-kritiku-grefa

[ii] https://www.4freerussia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Corruption-Pipeline-web.pdf p.7

[iii] https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2018/05/23/770451-uvolen-posle-obzora-pro-gazprom

[iv] https://www.putin-itogi.ru/putin-corruption-an-independent-white-paper/

[v] http://www.stg.ru/ru/press-centr/dokumentyi-foto-i-videomaterialyi/foto/nord-stream.html

[vi] https://www.interfax.ru/business/625840

[vii] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMmFI7hqcF4

[viii] https://www.4freerussia.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/05/Putin2018_US_web.pdf p.43

[ix] https://www.putin-itogi.ru/putin-corruption-an-independent-white-paper

[x] https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl23331.aspx

[xi] https://rethinkthedeal.4freerussia.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/10/Brochure-A4-Germany-EN-Web.pdf pp. 20-21

[xii] https://www.4freerussia.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/06/MisruleOfLaw-Web.pdf pp. 23-26

[xiii] https://www.occrp.org/en/28-ccwatch/cc-watch-indepth/8539-the-brotherhood-of-killers-and-cops

[xiv] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/russian-mob-mallorca-spain/545504/

[xv] https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/treasury-designates-russian-oligarchs-officials-and-entities-in-response-to-worldwide-malign-activity

[xvi] https://www.underminers.info/publications/2018/7/15/profile-alexey-miller; https://www.4freerussia.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Corruption-Pipeline-web.pdf pp. 5-6

[xvii] https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/russia-capitalism-shamalov; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/putins-alleged-son-in-law-in-top-10-list-of-russian-state-contract-winners

[xviii] https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/treasury-designates-russian-oligarchs-officials-and-entities-in-response-to-worldwide-malign-activity

[xix] https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/148113/

[xx] https://www.forbes.ru/forbes/issue/2015-04/283037-bankir-pod-prikrytiem

[xxi] https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2018/02/20180201-mm-gazprombank-schweiz/; https://krug.novayagazeta.ru/12-zoloto-partituri

[xxii] https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2013/04/03/5242401.shtml

[xxiii] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0338

[xxiv] https://www.svoboda.org/a/27850315.html

[xxv] https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/05/18/76515-patrusheva-otpravili-na-kartoshku

[xxvi] https://sobesednik.ru/politika/20180213-molodoj-da-blatnoj-ili-novyj-dvoryanin-dmitrij-patrushev

[xxvii] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-49019951

[xxviii] https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/03/02/67629-kondensat-milliardov

[xxix] https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/02/28/67588-171-gazprom-187-sbyvaet-mechty

[xxx] https://rethinkthedeal.4freerussia.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/09/RethinkTheDeal-EN.pdf pp.4-11

[xxxi] https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/1f7221545bf1b7c89b850dd85cb409b0-0400072021/original/WB-GGFR-Report-Design-05a.pdf

[xxxii] https://ccb.se/savekurgalskiy

[xxxiii] https://media.greenpeace.org/archive/Illegal-Construction-of-Nord-Stream-2-Pipeline-in-Russia—Clipreel-27MZIFJJJNB8T.html; https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/11830/gazprom-wants-to-build-a-gas-pipeline-through-a-unique-nature-reserve/

[xxxiv] https://democratic-europe.eu/2019/12/28/hypocrisy-and-double-standards-of-the-nord-stream-2-project/; https://docplayer.org/48370135-Geheimakte-nord-stream-2.html

[xxxv] https://www.ccb.se/Evidence2017/NS2/Protokol_Espoo_public_Kingisepp.pdf

[xxxvi] https://www.putin-itogi.ru/putin-corruption-an-independent-white-paper/; https://www.putin-itogi.ru/kommunalnye-tarify-putin-i-gazprom/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KejGTmnev18; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMmFI7hqcF4; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ox2w5-sFkN4

[xxxvii] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-gazprom-antitrust/eu-ends-antitrust-case-against-gazprom-without-fines-idUSKCN1IP1IV

[xxxviii] https://www.reuters.com/article/gazprom-eurobond/update-3-investors-buy-2-bln-in-gazprom-eurobond-shrugging-off-nord-stream-2-sanctions-idUSL1N2JV0OA

[xxxix] https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2217764-us-details-sanctions-against-nord-stream-2-ships

[xl] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-issues-nord-stream-2-related-sanctions-russians-blinken-2021-08-20/

[xli] https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0314.aspx

[xlii] https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/29/probe-russian-oligarchs-evade-art-sanctions-386154

[xliii] https://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/in-letter-to-blinken-house-foreign-affairs-committee-urges-immediate-removal-of-nord-stream-2-sanctions-waivers/

Administrative cases after the protests for the release of Alexei Navalny

2021 saw widespread political repressions across Russia. On January 17, 2021, opposition leader Alexei Navalny returned to Russia where he was immediately arrested at the airport on charges related to the “Yves Rocher case,” for which he had previously received a suspended sentence. Two days after his arrest, a film was released about Putin’s alleged palace in Krasnodar Krai worth $1.35 billion.[1]

On January 23, protests were held against the arrest of Navalny in 198 cities. According to the head of the regional headquarters of the Anti-Corruption Foundation, they were attended by up to 300,000 people across the country.[2] During the protests, police beat the participants, and 4,033 people were detained by the police, about 300 of whom were teenagers. Throughout the next eight days, protests were held in 121 cities and resulted in detention of 5,754 people. On the day of Navalny’s trial on February 2, police detained another 1,463 protestors, 1,188 of them in Moscow. Between January 23-February 2, more than 11,000 people were detained.

The overwhelming majority of those detained were convicted under Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offenses, which provides punishment for participating and organizing protests without permission. The article establishes fines (from $130 to $4,000) or arrests up to 30 days. Because there is not enough space in Moscow to accommodate such a large number of arrested people, protesters were taken to the Foreign Citizen Temporary Detention Center in the village of Sakharovo, just outside Moscow. The center held about 800 protestors at a time and was unprepared to house so many people. On the night of February 2, 200 people were brought to Sakharovo and were each processed for 20 minutes. People spent hours in cold paddy wagons without access to toilets, food, or water. Some of those arrested weren’t able to eat for 40 hours.

Conditions in Sakharov were also torture. The cells, with capacity to hold eight people, held up to 27 people at a time. The cell toilets were holes in the floor and were not partitioned off. A significant number of those arrested did not receive mattresses and were forced to sleep on the floor.

Criminal cases following the protests for Navalny’s release[3]

After the protests between January 23rd-February 2nd, 90 criminal cases were initiated. People were charged with incitement to riot (Part 3 of Article 212 of the Russian Criminal Code), involvement of teenagers in illegal actions (Part 2 of Article 151.2) and attacks on police officers (Article 318).

For blocking the roads

In several regions, criminal cases were brought against activists for blocking the roads under Part 1 of Article 267, which permits up to one year of imprisonment for those convicted. Dozens of activists have been questioned in these cases and searches have been carried out. In Moscow, the libertarian Gleb Maryasov has been charged under this criminal article. Similar criminal cases were brought against nine people in Chelyabinsk, nine in Vladivostok, and one in Izhevsk. A case under Article 267 was also opened in St. Petersburg, though no one has been accused yet.

For violating sanitary and epidemiological standarts

On January 24, the day after the first protest for Navalny’s release, a criminal case was initiated under Part 1 of Article 236, “Violation of sanitary and epidemiological standards,” which allows for up to two years in prison. The investigators insist that the rally on January 23rd endangered the lives of its participants due to the risk of spreading COVID-19. Ten Russian opposition politicians were accused: municipal deputies Dmitry Baranovsky, Lyudmila Stein, and Konstantinas Jankauskas; member of the punk rock and performance art  group Pussy Riot, Maria Alyokhina; leader of the independent trade union Doctors’ Alliance, Anastasia Vasilyeva; and Navalny’s associates Nikolai Lyaskin, Oleg Stepanov, Lyubov Sobol and Kira Yarmysh, as well as his brother Oleg Navalny.

On July 14th, 2021, the case against Jankauskas was dropped. At the moment, the freedom of movement for Oleg Navalny, Yarmysh and Stein is restricted; the rest of the accused are under house arrest.

A similar charge was brought against two people in Nizhny Novgorod.

For assaulting police

The most common criminal charge after the protests was for attacking government officials under Parts 1 and 2 of Article 318. The consequence of this charge can be up to 10 years in prison. Not a single case was brought against police for using unjustified violence despite the abundance of documentary evidence.

In Moscow, under this article, a case was brought against 13 people: one person was sentenced to three and a half years in prison, three were sentenced to two years in prison, one to one year in prison, and another was convicted, conditionally. The rest of the trials continue, and some of the accused remain in jail.

In St. Petersburg, nine people were accused of attacking the police: three received suspended sentences, and for the rest, the trials are ongoing.

Across other regions, 21 cases were brought against the protesters under Article 318. As of August 2021, there has not been a single acquittal. It is interesting that only ordinary participants have been charged under this article.

For acts of hooliganism

A number of protesters on January 23rd were accused of hooliganism under Article 213—this charge can result in up to seven years in prison. Protestors have been accused on video of throwing snowballs at police officers, beating other people, and damaging city infrastructure. At the moment, seven people have been charged under this article.

For incitement to mass disorder

 Nine people were accused of calling for protests on social media platforms under Article 212.3, which permits up to two years of imprisonment. Two people were sentenced to one year and six months, respectively, while the rest are under investigation. In all cases, the charges are related to publications on the platforms, VKontakte (VK) and Telegram.

For incitement to extremism

In Primorsky Krai, Penza, Kazan, Vladimir, Novosibirsk, and Tula, seven people have been accused of inciting violence under Article 280 and face up to five years in prison. All cases are related to posts on social media platforms.

For vandalism (Article 214 of the Russian Criminal Code, up to three years in prison)

Across six regions in Russia, activists have been accused of vandalism. The cases are a reaction to graffiti on walls and monuments: “Putin is a thief!” (in Tomsk), “Putin is a thief and a murderer!” (in St. Petersburg), “Putin, go away” (in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), and “Freedom for Navalny!” (in Vladivostok). The content of the graffiti in Vologda was obscene. These cases were brought under Article 214 and can result in up to three years in prison.

For repeated violation of the rules for participation at a protest

Three people have been accused under Article 212.1 for repeated violation of the rules for participation in protests and face up to two years in prison. These cases are a consequence of protests in support of the arrested governor of Khabarovsk Krai, Sergei Furgal.

Other cases

After January 23rd, criminal cases were also brought against protestors on the charges of insulting a government official in St. Petersburg, destruction of property in Moscow, and false reporting of a terrorist attack in Belgorod. The case in Belgorod is the most absurd—the activist was accused of posting a  comment, “It’s the bomb!” under the post about the January 23 rally in support of Alexei Navalny in a closed group on a social media platform VKontakte.

Detentions on April 21st, 2021

On April 21st, a second set of protests were held in support of Alexei Navalny. His Headquarters coordinator Leonid Volkov said he would announce a protest after half a million people registered as participants on the organization’s site. After Navalny went on a hunger strike in prison, it was decided to hold the protest ahead of schedule. Rallies were held in 109 cities and resulted in the detaining of 2,096 people, almost half of whom were in St. Petersburg. There were few arrests in Moscow—only 35. Some of the detainees were arrested and held for up to 15 days.

Criminal cases against Navalny’s associates

The coordinator of Navalny’s headquarters in Primorsky Krai, Andrei Borovikov, was accused of publishing pornographic materials. He made reposted a clip of the band Rammstein performing its song, “Pussy,” on his VK page. On July 15th, he was sentenced to two years and three months in prison. This clip has been published thousands of times by other users without repercussion.

In October 2020, Pavel Zelensky, videographer of the Anti-Corruption Foundation, posted a tweet accusing the authorities of driving Nizhny Novgorod activist Irina Slavina to suicide. For this tweet, he was taken into custody on April 16th, 2021, and was charged with public appeals to extremism under Article 280.2. Zelensky is currently serving a two-year sentence prison.

Restriction of the opportunity to participate in elections

A number of candidates were rejected after applying to participate in the State Duma elections. A criminal case was brought against Moscow District Deputy Ketevan Kharaidze, and Ilya Yashin was banned from participating in the elections. A number of activists left the country fearing for their safety .

The Case of Andrei Pivovarov

Andrei Pivovarov, the chairman of the public movement Open Russia, was also subjected to repression. After the dissolution of the organization, he was removed from a Moscow-Warsaw flight and detained in June 2021. A criminal case was brought against him under Article 284.1 for participating in the activities of an undesirable organization. Pivovarov is currently in custody.

The DOXA Magazine Case

Four editors of the DOXA student magazine of the Higher School of Economics have been accused of supporting the protests in Russia. Criminal cases were brought against them under Articles 151.2 (involvement of teenagers in dangerous actions) and 298.1 (libel). All four are currently under house arrest.

The Case of Nikolai Platoshkin

On May 19th, 2021, the candidate for the State Duma from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Nikolai Platoshkin Ph.D., was sentenced to five years of suspended sentence for publicly disseminating false information about COVID-19 and calling for riots. Platoshkin, during his communication with subscribers on social media platforms, reported that Moscow hospitals weren’t able to cope with the large number of patients—he did not publish any calls for riots. The case is politically motivated, and Platoshkin is barred from participating in the State Duma elections.

The Ingush Opposition Case

In March 2019 in the capital of Ingushetia, Magas, protests were held against the ceding of part of the republic’s territory to Chechnya. During the protests, criminal cases were brought against 51 protesters. In 2021, four participants were convicted, and an investigation was initiated against two more.

In 2021, more than 100 politically motivated criminal cases were brought against protestors, and around 13 thousand people were convicted for participating in protests. The number of people who left the country cannot be counted.


[1]Alexei Navalny, “Palace for Putin. The history of the biggest bribe,” accessed August 19, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipAnwilMncI.

[2]Наталия Зотова, Оксана Чиж, и Владимир Дергачев, “’Спичка в сухой траве.’ Почему протестуют российские регионы и что будет дальше,” BBC, accessed August 19, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-55893117.

[3]Data is taken from Memorial, accessed August 19, 2021, https://memohrc.org/ru/pzk-list.

Party approval ratings

The data below has been provided by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) and the National Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM).

Not much has changed in party approval ratings, though it is noteworthy that VTsIOM has recoded the approval for Putin’s United Russia at its lowest point in years, at 27.2%. The same polling service has recorded a slight uptick in the approval for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which is now at 16%, one of its best showings in years.

More interestingly, the combined approval for all of the parties that have been able to break the 5% barrier is higher than that for United Russia. The approval for CPRF, LDPR, and SR together is over 32%, compared to United Russia’s 27.2%. The approval for non-parliamentary parties is also at its highest point since the campaign period began in June of this year—14.2%.

Thus, we can conclude that majority of Russians who plan to vote in the upcoming elections will vote against United Russia.

Neither of Russia’s two major polling agencies gage party disapproval ratings. However, it has been done by the Social Research Foundation, which is close to the CPRF (and whose data reliability has been confirmed by a CPRF source).  The party disapproval ratings were as follows: United Russia–35%, Yabloko–24%, LDPR–20%, CPRF–15%. Disapproval ratings for other parties is below 10%.

Based on this, we can conclude the following:

  1. United Russia cannot improve its voter approval ratings before the end of elections.
  2. Yabloko cannot breach the 5% threshold.

Candidate Registration

1. United Russia’s federal candidate list was the last to be registered by the Russian Central Election Commission (CEC). This event has not been publicized on the CEC website or in any official CEC press releases. An official press statement announced that the second to last list from the New People party had been registered, and then that registration had concluded for all party lists. There was no additional statement on the number of United Russia candidates, or even what party was registered after New People. It seems that the CEC is attempting to keep the fact of the United Russia’s registration quiet, in order to avoid inciting people to head to the polls and vote against it in the elections (particularly within the context of scandals over opposition candidates being eliminated from the election).

2. Three highly-popular candidates continue challenging the refusal to register them in single-mandate districts. In Khabarovsk, Anton Furgal, the son of jailed governor Sergei Furgal, is contesting allegations of irregularities in voter signatures. The challenge is being reviewed by the Khabarovsk District Court, which is standard procedure for registration appeals in federal elections. Roman Yuneman (Moscow) and Lev Schlossberg (Yabloko) are also disputing rejection of their registration applications, which was based on ties to Alexei Navalny.

Election finance

The election financing data is available on the CEC website:

http://cikrf.ru/analog/ediny-den-golosovaniya-2021/kategorii-viborov/vibori-deputatov-gosdumi/finansirovanie-vyborov/svedeniya-o-postuplenii-sredstv-v-izbiratelnye-fondy-politicheskikh-partiy-i-raskhodovanii/

The biggest news here is that between August 5-12, four of Russia’s main parties did not deposit a single ruble into their campaign accounts!

Moreover, even the paltry sum received from sponsors prior to August 5 has not been spent. By August 12, United Russia had only spent 200 million out of its 700 million rubles; CPRF had spent 106 million out of 117 million; LDPR had spent 200 million out of 680 million; and A Just Russia had spent 115 out of 134 million.

If we divide the total amount spent by parties among Russia’s 104 million voters, that means that the four parliamentary parties have spent approximately 6 rubles (or USD 10 cents) per voter. This means that the campaigning during the early stages of the election season has been abysmal. Citizens have been exposed to no campaigning from the political parties running in the elections.

The fact that the parties have not been actively replenishing their accounts means that they have not been fundraising among their supporters, and only big business and prominent donors linked to the parties are actually providing financing. This is likely part of the plan to suppress voter turnout. Perhaps the greatest motivation to get out and vote is financial support for a party, but the parties do not need that support. The Kremlin strictly controls campaign fundraising to ensure that no one receives additional resources for campaigning or attracting new supporters.

Assessing the competition

The Golos movement has published a media monitoring report for the eighth week of the campaign. Media campaigning opens on the morning of August 20, so the report is primarily focused on news coverage of the campaign, which has not been funded by parties or candidates. The report is available on the Golos website:
https://www.golosinfo.org/articles/145391

The main takeaway from the eighth week of the campaign (August 9-15) is that the news coverage of the elections continues to grow, having reached a new peak of 288.8 minutes, though coverage of the parties and candidates made up less than 58% of that time— 166.5 minutes. Two-thirds of that coverage was dedicated to one party—United Russia. United Russia has been mentioned in the news more than all other parties combined and has received approximately twice the amount of coverage as others. 

The number of political parties represented on national television channels suddenly dropped this week. With the exception of a single report on Ren-TV about the Pensioners’ Party, TV audiences are only seeing the coverage of the “parliamentary four” and New People. Other parties were not mentioned at all.

The only party that received negative coverage during this period (approximately 35%, compared to 65% positive coverage) was, as usual, the CPRF. Other parties mentioned in the news received over 80% positive coverage. As a result, this week’s “positive rating” was the highest of the campaign.

Between August 9-15, nearly all messages related to the parties and elections in general were positive. CPRF was the stark exception to this, and approximately one-third of its coverage was negative. More specifically, that coverage, broadcast by Ren-TV, was devoted to the court case against a CPRF candidate Pavel Grudinin (party leader Gennady Zyuganov issued a statement that the CPRF would be appealing the decision).

Approximately 20% of coverage of A Just Russia—For Truth was neutral, and the rest was positive. Slightly less than 4% of the coverage of LDPR was neutral, as was about 2.5% of the coverage of United Russia. New People and the Pensioners’ Party were leading this week with a 100% positive coverage. This means that the “positive rating” has risen for the second week in a row, which is likely driven by the desire to avoid inciting protests and to ensure that citizens who are dissatisfied with the campaigns do not get extra motivation to go out and vote.

Campaign progress

During the past week, parties running in the campaign issued several statements which shed light on their electoral positions. The statements collected by the Petersburg Politics Foundation during the eighth week of the campaign include:

UNITED RUSSIA. Announced it was against mandatory vaccination for college students (Elena Shmeleva).

LDPR. Suggested auctioning off “vanity” license plates (Alexandr Sherin).

A JUST RUSSIA. Addressed Vladimir Putin and suggested firing Russia’s Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Alexandr Kozlov in connection to the widespread forest fires raging in Yakutia (Fedot Tumusov).

YABLOKO. In Ulan-Ude, announced nine proposals for saving Lake Baikal (Nikolai Rybakov).

NEW PEOPLE. Called for exempting businesses from taxes on profits, VAT, and insurance premiums, and instead introducing a flat tax rate of 5% (Alexei Nechaev).

GROWTH PARTY. Suggested creating a list of websites and services that cannot be blocked by the government, including YouTube, Google, Instagram, Facebook, Wikipedia, TikTok, Telegram, WhatsApp, Booking, Amazon, Twitter, Zoom, and Skype (Irina Mironova).

RUSSIAN PENSIONERS’ PARTY FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE. Held a symposium in Yaroslav to discuss ways to reduce rent (Andrei Shirokov).

RODINA. Expressed concern that the Russian language is being suppressed in Kazakhstan which is  “heading down the same dirty path as in Ukraine” (Alexei Zhuravlev).

GREENS. Proposed allowing electric and hybrid cars to use separate lanes, and to rent out new homes already equipped with electric chargers (Andrei Nagibin).

Overall, the various party initiatives are a pale imitation of what one would expect during campaign period; they do not earnestly seek to increase approval ratings or voter turnout.

“Smart Voting” Update

There have been three notable developments in the Smart Voting campaign.

  1. Alexei Navalny addressed voters on social media from his jail, urging them to join the Smart Voting campaign and explaining the reasons behind that campaign. Any statements from Navalny himself receive more views than those from Navalny’s organization FBK.
  2. FBK announced a new platform for donations. Within just a few days, the new site had approximately the same number of donors signed up as the “old” FBK site.
  3. A CPRF public opinion poll was published online (though the poll data was not published on the websites, CPRF sources confirm its authenticity) which, since April 2021, has included a column for a hypothetical “Navalny Party”. This “party” is popular with 10% of voters (the poll was conducted nationwide). Thus, we have a reliable, though indirect data on the potential numbers of Russian voters who support the Smart Voting campaign. Previously, we only had results from 2020 polls, based on mathematical analysis of local elections in St. Petersburg, which estimated Smart Voting can add a 7-9% boost in votes to certain candidates. This also leads us to conclude that the number of potential “smart voters” has grown over the last year.

Regional elections and other notable developments

Major background political events included: 1. forest fires in Yakutia, which have been finally recognized as a national disaster; 2. plane crashes—three Russian Air Force planes have crashed in the last two weeks; 3. the change of power in Afghanistan, and ensuing debates over the relationship between Russian leaders and the Taliban, which is simultaneously classified as an outlawed terrorist organization in Russia and is engaged in formal negotiations with the Russian Foreign Ministry. Additionally, the courts have begun announcing verdicts against Alexei Navalny supporters. Lyubov Sobol (who has recently left the country) and Kira Yarmish have been issued prison sentences. In the coming weeks, Alexei Vorsin and Oleg Stepanov are expected to be sentenced.

There has been a heavy media coverage of police showing up at the homes of approximately 500 Navalny supporters around the country and asking them to submit depositions against him, demanding that police investigate his alleged theft of funds donated by Russian citizens to FBK or Navalny’s headquarters.

Regional elections campaigns have not had any significant influence on the course of federal elections. One notable exception is the refusal to register Anton Furgal as a gubernatorial candidate in Khabarovsk. The younger Furgal stirs up local residents, and his running forces voters to remember what happened to his father, and think about how to vote in Khabarovsk gubernatorial elections.

Announcements for the next two weeks

Media campaigning begins on August 19.

Links to sources

https://media.fom.ru/fom-bd/d312021.pdf

https://wciom.ru/ratings/reiting-politicheskikh-partii/

https://www.golosinfo.org/articles/145391

The First Edition, July 7, 2021

Abbreviations:

FOM – Fond Obschestvenovo Mneniya – Public Opinion Foundation
VTsIOM – Vserossiyskiy Tsentr Izucheniya Obshesvenovo Mneniya – Russian Public Opinion Research Center
CPRF – The Communist Party of the Russian Federation
SR – Spravedlivaya Rossiya – The Just Russia Party
LDPR – the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
FSIN – Federalnaya Sluzhba Ispolneniya Nakazanii – Federal Penitentiary Service
PA – the Presidential Administration
CEC – the Central Election Commission

DYNAMICS OF PARTY RATINGS

Over the past week, FOM was the only one of Russia’s big three sociological services (which includes VTsIOM, FOM, and Levada) to have released new studies.

The most notable recorded data is the rating of the United Russia party which fell to 29% for the first time in four months. 28% is the lowest party rating recorded by the polls within the past year, so one can assert with confidence that the United Russia rating is fluctuating around its lowest values ​​in the entire history of the polls. This data should be considered within the context of the United Russia’s party convention, the announcement of the federal list, and the announcement of the regional lists of candidates approved by the convention.

All other parliamentary parties— CPRF, LDPR, SR—have seen their ratings increase

  • CPRF grew by 13% —around its highest ratings for the year;
  • LDPR grew by 11%, wavering near its average ratings;
  • JR grew by 8%, against the backdrop of numerous newsworthy announcements surrounding the party;
  • Cumulatively, the ratings of all non-parliamentary parties grew by 7%.

The share of respondents who said that they plan to spoil their ballot or not go to the polls at all has grown to 2% and 15%, respectively

The latest poll by VTsIOM from June 27, 2021, shows similar ratings of parliamentary parties, but shows an even higher percentage of votes for non-parliamentary parties – 13%.

Thus, the following conclusion can be drawn from the data of opinion polls:

  1. The rating of the ruling party is nearing its all-time lows.
  2. The ratings of other parliamentary parties are stable and have not absorbed the support of voters lost by the United Russia.
  3. The ratings of non-parliamentary parties are at levels ​​insufficient for concluding that even one of them would be able to gain 5%. However, according to VTsIOM, one or two such parties can pass the 3% barrier required to receive federal funding.
  4. There is no trend toward a high voter turnout, rather, the overwhelming political news of the last week (broad coverage of pre-election party conventions by the mass media) reflect the growing apathy among voters.

Russians perceive that the most important events of the last week were not political events, but events concerning the coronavirus pandemic and natural disasters— fires, floods and extraordinary heat waves. The events concerning the coronavirus pandemic are about three times more important to Russians (23%) than natural disasters (8%). For comparison, the meeting between Putin and Biden was deemed important only for 4% of Russians.

Over the second part of June, the anxiety among Russians has sharply spiked. For the first time in the past six months, the number of those who feels that the overall mood is more anxious than calm has increased – 47% versus 46% respectively. The highest level of anxiety was recorder by sociologists in the fall of 2020.

The political developments of recent weeks did not cause a sharp change in the attitude of Russians toward the State Duma elections. Large-scale party conventions did not produce any sensations that could dramatically change the ratings of the parties.

The list of United Russia ended up boring and predictable, consisting of candidates who personally do not intend to become deputies, the federal platform is completely made up of those who tow the party line.

According to Russian political scientist Alexander Kynev, the announcement of the United Russia’s main five candidates did not result in additional mobilization of new party supporters. The party has removed the unpopular Dmitry Medvedev from its list, but added Sergei Shoigu and Sergei Lavrov, whose ability to mobilize new supporters has already been exhausted. Dr. Dmitry Protsenko does not have a broad national recognition either and is not able to attract new supporters.

The Yabloko party convention is an event that has caused a passionate discourse online. The public has expressed strong opinions about the nominated candidates and those left off the lists. However, the soonest we will be able to see whether the party’s ratings have changed — is within a week’s time, and only via indirect indicators— none of the sociologists measure Yabloko’s rating separately.

Consistent with other moves, the party has released its regional electoral lists. They feature a couple of regional heavyweights, a local physician and a renowned cultural figure. Such lists do not help mobilize additional supporters. Moreover, the reaction to doctors as candidates has been uneven, to put it mildly, especially given the great criticism from the public toward the state medical system, which has shown unable to cope with yet another wave of the coronavirus infections. The national vaccination program has failed— vaccines are now in short supply, and one of the two Russian vaccines has now proven ineffective.

There is a notable relationship between the individual vaccination decision and political behavior.  Putin’s government has practically refused to introduce a full-fledged lockdown, shifting the introduction of quarantine measures to regional governors. As a result, there was a profound confusion and inconsistency with quarantine measures and mandatory vaccinations. Some regions introduced strict lockdowns but did not compensate small businesses and citizens for the economic loss that resulted from them. Some regions and municipalities took minimal measure, such as introducing operations restrictions for retail— restaurants and shopping centers. Others, through various approaches, attempted to increase vaccination rates among citizens.

There is a robust discussion on the legality of compulsory vaccination as well as the government refusal to import foreign vaccines to Russia, and the non-recognition of foreign vaccination certificates.

These issues have, most likely, also contributed to the drop in the rating of the ruling party, since the policy of the Russian government in relation to measures to combat the Coronavirus pandemic has been inconsistent. The government has consistently shifted the responsibility to regions who lack the resources for implementation of full-fledged quarantine measures. At the same time, in June 2021, as result of the third wave of the Coronavirus, hospital wards were close to 100% occupancy in Russia, and planned medical care for the population was practically suspended.

It is safe to assume that anti-COVID measures will continue affecting the rating of United Russia leading to the elections, especially with the third wave of the virus forecast to end in September-October 2021.

Candidate Nominations

The key development from early July 2021 is that all politicians who had a direct connection with Navalny’s foundation or Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s entities have dropped out, or were forcefully removed from the race:

  • Alexey Vorsin, Khabarovsk— refusal due to failure to reach an agreement with Yabloko
  • Oleg Stepanov, Moscow— not included in the Yabloko list, refusal to open an electoral account
  • Alexey Pivovarov, St. Petersburg— nominated by Yabloko in Krasnodar, FSIN actively opposes the collection of electoral documents.

It can be assumed, that, given the timing of the registration of candidates, the position of election commissions and courts, these candidates will not be registered.

Analysis of the candidates lists from parliamentary parties shows that a significant part of young and charismatic candidates from the CPRF and LDPR will not participate in the elections —for example, Bondarenko in Saratov and Lyubenkov in Bratsk.

The average profile of a candidate from parliamentary parties is a passive party functionary, taking cues from the Presidential Administration, one who does not engage in constituent work unless specifically funded by the party to do so.

The Competitive Field

Considering that government officials currently refuse to register candidates from the “non-systemic opposition”, the elections landscape will be dominated by lackluster officially-sanctioned politicians with slack agenda and avoidance of any criticism targeting the president, government officials, deputies and each other.

It can be expected that fringe parties will run active campaigns only in large Russian cities, where different support groups exist for niche interests. One should also expect that a certain number of active civic groups, in order to achieve their own goals, will try to increase the turnout of voters in the elections.

Systemic participants will operate within the framework of their respective agreements with the Presidential Administration. For example, in Irkutsk, a KPRF party deputy Mikhail Shchapov will face off an exceptionally weak rival representing the United Russia in his district —as part of an agreement with PA made a year ago during the election of the governor of the Irkutsk Oblast.

Campaign Progress

Last week’s party conventions and the filing of election registration applications to the Central Election Committee by candidates— are the defining events of the election season. In fact, prior to registration, an electoral campaign is not maintained in single-ballot districts; an informal tally of party lists is publicized by the news media.

Smart Voting Campaign

Over the past week, the Smart Voting campaign organizers have mailed out appeals to the addresses of those who had registered to vote urging them to spread the information about Smart Voting initiative and donate to its candidates. However, the Russian social media during this period was dominated by the discussion of the Smart Voting as it related to the publication of Yabloko and CPRF candidates lists. The main discussion themes included the prospect of voting for Stalinists and the changing view of Yabloko as it refused to include certain political activists into its list of candidates.

Voting Procedures

Last week, it was announced that e-voting procedures will not be consistent throughout the nation. In six regions, the e-voting will be conducted according to algorithms developed by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, implemented through the State Service system. In Moscow, it will be a system based on the algorithms of the Moscow City Hall. This directly contradicts the current legislation in terms of ensuring standardization of methods for counting votes and maintaining the voter list. As of now, there is no data on popular reaction to this violation.

Notable Regional Activities

  • In Moscow, candidate Roman Yunemann continues to collect signatures— one of the few who is attempting to register through signatures.
  • A double-ganger of Boris Vishnevsky has been put up for election in St. Petersburg.
  • In the Irkutsk Oblast, Evgeniy Yumashev has not been nominated by a single party( last year, during the gubernatorial elections he was the only one the in the nation to have passed the municipal barrier).
  • In Ingushetia, Ayup Gagiev represents Yabloko. He is an active participant in protests against changes to the republic’s borders.

Regional Elections and Their Political Context

On September 19, 2021, several elections will take place in Russia, which will affect the situation in the country.

Election of the governor of the Khabarovsk Krai: Formally, the Khabarovsk Krai is the most contested region in Russia— its governor Furgal and most of the deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the region are represented by LDPR and were elected as a result of a protest vote. After the arrest of Furgal, it was in Khabarovsk that the most massive political demonstrations took place in the country, which is notable— especially since the police was sent to disperse them only once.

The main intrigue of these elections will be who will support Smart Voting and how. Current acting Governor Degtyarev is also a member of LDPR.

United Russia did not nominate a candidate for these elections.

Supplementary elections for the Moscow City Duma in two districts: The well-known opposition politician Ilya Yashin, who was accused by the election commission of extremist activities, was disqualified from these elections. This is the first time a charge under the new legislation was applied. The legislation disqualifies candidates accused of extremism and “undesired” activities. Notably, Yashin has been removed precisely by the decision of the Election Commission, there are no court decisions restricting his rights, and no criminal charges were brought against him.

Elections for the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg: The main intrigue of the election in the country’s second largest city, centers on determining which of the independent candidates will be able to register. Irina Fatyanova, the former head of Navalny’s headquarters in St. Petersburg, is participating in the elections, and unlike Yashin, has been given the opportunity to collect signatures for her nomination.

Other elections: On September 19, 2021, elections will be held to fill governors posts in 12 Russian regions. These are the Republics of Dagestan, Ossetia, Karachay-Cherkessia, Chechnya, Tyva and Mordovia. The oblasts of Belgorod, Penza, Ulyanovsk, Tula and Tver regions and the aforementioned Khabarovsk Territory will also cast their votes.

Additionally, legislative bodies will be elected in 39 regions of Russia and for the first time in Russia the Council of the Federal Territory of Sirius will be elected.

Upcoming Announcements

Between July 7 and 14, we will see the registration of all party lists by the Central Election Commission of Russia.

Sources

Public Opinion Foundation. “Dominants. Opinion Field. 25th Edition – Results of Weekly All-Russian Polls by FOM.” Public Opinion Foundation, 1 July 2021, fom.ru/Dominanty/14602. 

Russian Public Opinion Research Center. “Rating of Political Parties.” VTsIOM, June-July 2021.

Second issue: https://www.4freerussia.org/monitoring-the-pre-election-situation-in-russia-second-edition/

On September 6, 2020, Salman Tepsurkaev, a 19-year-old Chechen native, was abducted from his workplace by two men who introduced themselves as Chechen law enforcement officers. When Salman’s family tried to report an abduction to the police, they were promised that their son would be back home in a week if they kept quiet. It’s been almost a year, and Salman is still being held hostage by the Chechen authorities.

Case Background

Salman Tepsurkaev lived with his parents and brother in a small Chechen village before moving to Gelendzhik to work as a waiter at a resort hotel. Along with this, he was secretly moderating the 1ADAT Telegram channel. Created in March 2020 to connect Chechen immigrants abroad, the channel gained thousands of followers in just six months. 1ADAT positions itself as a “civil movement against Ramzan Kadyrov’s dictatorship”.  1ADAT exposes government torture and repressions, gross human rights violations, mass corruption, secret prisons, and other illegal actions of Chechen officials and sheds light on  social inequality in Chechnya, documenting the incredible wealth and luxurious lifestyles of Chechen officials in contrast with the unemployment, corruption, and poverty that ordinary Chechens face daily.

In May of 2020, the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, appointed several journalists of the Grozny State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company to high level government jobs. Kadyrov was explicit about the mandate of these appointees— identifying and punishing his critics on the Internet. Seeing that the 1ADAT Telegram channel was one of the most influential outlets criticizing Kadyrov’s tyrant regime, the newly appointed officials immediately started the “hunt” on the channels’ activists. At their command, a few anonymous 1ADAT’s channel members sent $500 to Salman Tepsurkaev’s PayPal account under the pretext of donating. These transactions were made to identify Salman’s phone number and location. Obtaining such data would have been impossible without access to Tepsurkayev’s detailed phone billings, which are available only to law enforcement.

The Abduction

On September 6, 2020, two men dressed in black came to the Laguna resort hotel in Gelendzhik where Salman Tepsurkaev worked as a waiter. While one of the men guarded the front entrance, another went into the building and grabbed Salman. Salman tried to escape from the abductors, holding on to a column by the front desk and shouting “Call the police!” The hotel workers called security and tried to intervene, but one of the abductors showed them a law enforcement ID.

Salman was forced out of the hotel and his coworkers never saw him again.

For an entire day afterward, Salman’s phone was turned off and his location was unknown until it was turned back on briefly the next day. At that point, his family discovered that their son was kept at a police office in Grozny, Chechnya. That specific office is notorious for being the holding space for abducted Chechens and the location of many extrajudicial executions. Salman’s family quickly traveled to Grozny, but when they got to the location, they were told Salman was not there. The relatives tried to report the abduction to the police, but Grozny Investigative Department told the family to keep quiet and they would see their son in a week. A week later, Salman was not released.

Public Torture and Humiliation

On the day of the abduction, an anonymous member of the 1ADAT channel under the nickname “Hunter” published a video of a completely naked Chechen youth sitting on his knees with a glass bottle in front of him. In the video, a young man introduces himself as Salman Tepsurkayev, and states that he is 19 years old and is one of the administrators of 1ADAT. In a distraught and confused speech, he tries to explain what the channel is about, calling it a “dirty group”, in which the administrators “do disgusting things” that he is ashamed of. Salman also insults his mother and calls himself a bastard and a scum who was rejected by his father a long time ago. In the end, Tepsurkaev says he “punishes himself for a behavior inappropriate for a Chechen and passes the baton to other channel administrators and followers”.  He then attempts to sit down on a glass bottle. His face contorts in pain and the video cuts off. In the next few days, more videos of Salman were released by anonymous users both on Telegram and Instagram. In the videos, Salman continues to criticize the Chechen opposition and keeps cursing himself. In addition, the Chechen state-controlled TV channel published a video message from Salman’s father.  In which he states that he disowned his son years ago for “disobedience and terrible behavior”.

Case Proceedings

On September 8, 2020, the Memorial Human Rights Center (MHRC) filed a complaint with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic, demanding an investigation of the abduction and torture of Salman Tepsurkaev.

The Chechen Republic refused to open the case citing the absence of a crime.

On September 11, 2020, lawyers of the Committee Against Torture filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the violation of Salman’s rights under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: “Prohibition of torture” and “The right to personal inviolability.” The ECHR lodged an inquiry with the Russian government on what measures to release Tepsurkaev are being implemented on the national level. The ECHR has not received any response from the Chechen officials.

On October 15, investigators from Gelendzhik, where Salman’s workplace is located, transferred the materials they had collected to the Chechen Investigation Department since the car of Tepsurkaev’s alleged abductors had crossed the Chechen border.

The Chechen police refused to initiate a criminal case, citing the absence of a crime.

At this time, it is unknown where Salman is located or whether he is alive.

Why the Memorial Human Rights Center Recognizes Salman Tepsurkaev as a Political Prisoner

Involvement of the Chechen Special Services

The MHRC believes there are serious grounds to believe that the Chechen Special Services were involved in the kidnapping of Salman Tepsurkaev. Discovering Salman’s location required access to information from telecommunication networks.  This information is only available to law enforcement officials associated with the Chechen Special Services. Investigation has also revealed that at least one of the two vehicles involved in the abduction belonged to a current Chechen Interior Ministry employee.

Salman Tepsurkaev is a Victim of Kadyrov’s regime

As it has been documented by numerous sources, including Novaya Gazeta and Kavkaz Uzel, psychological pressure and torture are known methods of Chechen authorities.  These methods are used to punish those who criticized Ramzan Kadyrov and whose political beliefs differ from the government’s. The facility in Grozny where Salman was kept has become a place of detention, torture, and extrajudicial executions of illegally arrested residents of Chechnya.

The open approval of torture by Chechen officials

Several representatives of the Chechen top leadership including Adam Delimkhanov and Salakh Mezhiev, indirectly confirmed that they knew the identities of those behind the abduction of Tepsurkaev and had approved such actions. At the same time, the investigative authorities of the Chechen Republic refuse to investigate the abduction.

Violation of the right of freedom of expression

The MHRC asserts that although the current location of Salam Tepsurkaev is unknown, and information is lacking on the circumstances of his abduction, the MHRC considers him alive and illegally detained by Chechen officials. The MHRC claims that the video recordings with Salman’s participation were made under extreme pressure and are the result of torture. Salman’s persecution seeks to silence all public criticism of the Chechen authorities and terrorize the opposition with cruelty and public humiliation. Salman’s persecution violates his right to freedom and security, as well as freedom of expression. The Memorial Human Rights Center along with the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU demand that the Russian government takes immediate action to ensure the safety of Salman Tepsurkaev and investigate the illegal actions committed against him.

It was shocking for Western friends of Georgia, and supporters of Georgia’s bid for membership at NATO and the EU, to learn that an angry mob in Tbilisi stormed LGBTQ activists’ centers, attacking journalists and tourists. Yet, as we saw on July 5, 2021, this is precisely the reality on the ground in the Georgian capital.

On the day when Georgian LGBTQ community planned to hold its Dignity March, groups of angry men, including thousands of far-right radicals and priests, violently attacked people on the streets. Among the 55 people injured, there were journalists, activists and tourists. Earlier, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili called the Dignity March “inappropriate,” saying it is “unreasonable” to hold the demonstration in a public place that could lead to “civil confrontation.” NGO representatives evaluated statement made by Garibashvili as incitement to hatred. Organizers of the Dignity March, not willing to endanger participants, canceled the event. This, unfortunately, did not quell the homophobic violence of the right-wing mob.

This attack fits within the global trend of resurgent homophobia. Indeed, there are many countries where LGBTQ-organized events are met with violent opposition and hatred. There are some countries where you can’t even talk about the existence of LGBTQ persons. But the fact that Georgia has been vying for invitations from both the EU and NATO for years accords the homophobia in this South Caucasus post-Soviet country a very different context. A country is not ready for a NATO or EU membership if it fails to defend fundamental principles of the democratic community: the protection of human rights.

Without doubt, respect for human rights and the dignity of others is an area where Georgia is in desperate need of development. A significant part of Georgia’s population does not accept LGBTQ peoples’ right to exist authentically; and believes, more broadly, that Western democracy is a threat to Georgia’s traditions and values. Foreign propaganda and disinformation campaigns support and mobilize such views targeting the less educated and more radical segments of the population. These groups see that LGBTQ events present a threat to their religion, a narrative greatly strongly supported by the Church.

There are also less aggressive and non-violent groups who oppose LGBTQ rights due to their view that heterosexual orientation is at the center of the Caucasian masculine identity. In attacking LGBTQ rights, these groups often invoke the importance of Caucasus tradition.

What factors have made homophobia so defining to Georgian identity and in which way is Georgian homophobia different from other non-democratic countries? Why should NATO and the EU make special accommodation for an aspiring member where a significant part of population do not respect another part, even to the point of violence and terrorism?

Let us start with examining the key participants of last week’s attack, both internal and external. Evidence is emerging that many of those who took part in the July 5 assaults in Tbilisi were called to the streets by pro-Kremlin organizations and their allies in the Georgian Patriarchy, which is well-known for its close ties to Moscow. For example, one of the organizers of the violent mob is the founder of the new political party “Eri”, Mr. Levan Vasadze, who has emerged as one of the public faces of the anti-LGBTQ rally. Vasadze is a Georgian Orthodox Church-affiliated entrepreneur who made millions in Moscow. Since 1995, Vasadze has been conducting business in Russia. He is a close friend of Mr. Alexander Dugin who is a well-known supporter of Vladimir Putin, and a Russian political analyst and strategist known for his fascist views. Vasadze made his fortune working for Russian companies such as AFK Sistema and Rosno. AFK Sistema is a Russian conglomerate owned by an oligarch. It seems that the Kremlin deploys Vasadze to Georgia to execute special influence campaigns promoting radicalization and chaos. Within the last two years, Vasadze has initiated several violent protest rallies in Georgia. His efforts are always targeted against the West.

Most recently, Levan Vasadze was sent to Georgia after the failure of another Kremlin-backed Georgian political party Alliance of Patriots. The party was created in 2012. In 2016, it managed to garner 5% of vote in an election and the party’s chairperson became a vice-speaker of Georgian parliament. From its very first day Alliance of Patriots have engaged in vicious and continuous attacks on the West and democracy. In Georgian politics, the group is the purveyor of the Kremlin’s agenda. According to files distributed by the Dossier Center in August 2020, Alliance of Patriots was under the direct control of the Russian Presidential Administration and received large sums of money from Moscow during the elections of 2020. After the scandalous revelations, the party failed to get the percentage of votes required to enter the parliament (only 2%). This failure of the Kremlin’s malign influence operators in Georgia resulted in the need to create and grow a new movement, capable of securing at least 5% of votes during elections. Enter Vasadze.

The recent EU-mandated agreement between the Georgian ruling-party and opposition, and the increased involvement of NATO member Turkey in Georgia and South Caucasus, together with the recent successful attempt of the U.S. to become more engaged in the region by moderating a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, has pushed the Kremlin to become more aggressive in its campaigns throughout the South Caucasus. The “charismatic and eccentric knight in shining armor” Levan Vasadze was dispatched to promote chaos and instability in Georgia, attack Western values, undermine Georgian society and, in this way, demonstrate to the West that Georgia is not a reliable partner.

Moscow’s long-term goal here is clear: ensuring that Georgia will never be invited into the EU or NATO. The Kremlin sees the issue of LGBTQ rights as the perfect way to make the West distance itself from Georgia, because defending human rights (LGBTQ rights) is often seen as a litmus test for Western democracies.

Any investigation into Russia’s malign campaigns must be based on proper analysis of the target country, its society and vulnerabilities. So-called protection of traditions and religion are the two fundamental narratives promoted by the Kremlin’s propaganda and disinformation in Georgia and other post-Soviet countries. Throughout the post-Soviet space, the Kremlin backs Church clergy, journalists, NGOs and other operators, who help manipulate the less-educated segments of the population and make them believe that their way of life is threatened by the West. Common arguments include the narrative that LGBTQ events “will make them all ‘gays’,” “promote LGBTQ ideology among their children,” and “undermine their traditions, history and the memory of their grandfathers and grandmothers.” These narratives are being advanced during church sermons, protest rallies, by live broadcasts of Moscow-backed media outlets, etc. Kremlin-controlled opinion makers and bots promote these narratives on social media networks, leading to further incitement of hatred.

The Kremlin is also using Vasadze to counter Turkish expansion and to preserve the Kremlin’s regional influence. As soon as Vasadze returned to Georgia, he financed massive protest rallies targeting the newly improved Georgia-Turkey relations. Pro-Kremllin media outlets, both in Georgia and Russia, actively covered these rallies to promote hatred against Turkey in Georgia. Their goal was to alienate Georgia from Turkey, one of the rising powers in the South Caucasus in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Another organizer behind the July 5 attacks on LGBTQ activists is the radical group Georgian March. This group was established in 2016, when several right-wing activists visited Moscow in an attempt to solicit money for a new political party. At the time, the Kremlin supported two parties in Georgia and they did not see the need for a third one, so they declined to support new party. As a result, Gia Korkotashvili, Sandro Bregadze and their allies established the movement Georgian March to promote chaos and initiate aggressive anti-Western campaigns. Yet, it’s important to note, that their closest ally is Mr. Dmitry Lortkipanidze, who officially heads the Primakov Georgian-Russian Public Centre funded by Russian MFA through the Gorchakov fund.

The third Kremlin-aligned power that is promoting hatred and aggression against the LGBTQ community is the Georgian Patriarchy. The Patriarchy is a huge organization financed by the State. Each year, the government provides the church with new funds and lands. The Church is very popular in Georgia. Resultantly, the Georgian government uses the Church to secure votes during elections. Similarly, the Church uses the government to get more funds and grow its power. The current leadership of the Patriarchy has direct historical, business and political ties with Moscow. During its services, the Church supports pro-Kremlin or anti-Western politicians, laments “the threat from the West” and attacks liberal or democratic values.

Therefore, denying Georgian membership to NATO and the EU due to human rights violations against the LGBTQ community is not as straightforward as it might seem. Each participant of the attacks has done so at the instigation by Russian-backed politicians, groups and institutions.

This does not mean that there is no problem with homophobia in Georgia, and it is certainly true that some parts of Georgian society do not accept LGBTQ people. But what this analysis does reveal is that much of the incitement to hatred, and aggression has been artificially manufactured by the Russian presidential administration with the intent of alienating Georgia from the West, to Moscow’s strategic benefit. The Kremlin sees a vulnerable issue and chooses to promote radicalization and chaos.

Sadly, the Georgian government does not have effective tools to prevent or counter Russia’s influence campaigns targeted against its people. Over the past nine years, Georgia’s vulnerability has only grown, while the Kremlin’s attacks have increased in intensity, overtness, funding and scale.

In public statements, The Georgian government, including the ruling party Georgian Dream and its founding oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, has continued to assert their commitment to joining NATO and the EU. IN public statements, they admit that Russia is their biggest threat and that Moscow’s occupation of Georgia’s territories is unwanted and illegal.

However, in reality, the Georgian government has never taken concrete steps to counter the Kremlin’s influence, and in some cases it has actually helped Russia to achieve its goals . Among some of the most unfortunate recent examples is the case of the U.S.-backed deep-sea port Anaklia, a project, financed by U.S. companies, which was shut down by the current government. But there are countless others, such as the non-response policy towards the creeping Russian annexation of Georgian territory or inviting a Russian state Duma delegation to Georgian parliament. The will of the Georgian government to push back against Moscow’s influence is weak at best, and completely non-existent at worst.

The events of June 20, 2019 when the Georgian government ordered police to violently disperse a spontaneous anti-Kremlin rally offers some context on government capabilities to deal with mobs. Gas and rubber bullets were used by the police. Hundreds of people were injured, and several protestors even lost their eyes. Yet, on July 5, when pro-Russian radicals attacked 55 journalists, activists, and tourists. Eventually, eight people were detained. Radicals openly threatened organizers of the Dignity March, their allies and supporters for weeks. Organizers wrote letters to the Georgian police, asking to ensure their security. However, supposedly they still “were not ready” to defend their citizens.

Unfortunately, the EU- and U.S.-backed agreement signed between the government and opposition has not resulted in a long-term de-radicalization. The agreement stipulates that if the ruling party does not obtain at least 43% of votes in the upcoming local elections in 2021, snap elections will be announced automatically. For those in government, failure in these upcoming elections may result not only in the loss of power, but also prison terms in some cases. This incentivizes them to try anything possible (including bribes, usage of administrative resources, etc.) to get the needed result and stay in power. The personal risks of not succeeding in the elections for those in government are too high.

Therefore, it is unsurprising that the government decided not to alienate their core electorate and supporters by dispersing the anti-LGBTQ mob, encouraging them instead. That is why, on July 5, we all heard from the news broadcasts how the Georgian Prime Minister —the closest ally of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili and one of the major peddlers of Chinese economic influence in Georgia—Irakli Gharibashvili opined that the Dignity March is “inappropriate” and “should not be held.”

To sum it up, the July 5 attacks on Georgia’s LGBTQ community, and the attacks resultant impacts on the country’s path towards the Western community, is the result of joint efforts implemented by the Kremlin, the Georgian Patriarchy and the Georgian government. The only way to increase the security of the Georgian people and support country’s development is to build a resilient society, better protected against propaganda and manipulations, both domestic and foreign. It is impossible to help Georgia move forward, when government-affiliated people are deciding who to work with and which programs to schedule without the proper tools to combat disinformation. To do that, serious efforts must be made to develop prevention and response mechanisms to counter malign interference and propaganda campaigns. These must include large-scale educational programs and media campaigns, providing unbiased information to most vulnerable audiences; as well as establishing early-response mechanisms.

On July 2nd, Putin signed an updated version of the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation.” However, updated is only a technical term, merely characterizing the fact that the strategy is formally revised every six years (with the previous document adopted in 2015). By any other merit, the “strategy” is nothing less than completely outdated and offers a glimpse of a weird salad of conspiracies, prejudices and medieval worldviews that thrive in the minds of the Kremlin rulers.

Make no mistake, international attention to this document is hardly worth its actual practical importance, or lack thereof. Such “strategies” is a specific genre of the Russian bureaucracy – the purpose is to show themselves that “yes, we do have a plan” (to address the key challenges and issues Russia is confronting). But in the real world, these thick “strategic white papers” usually end up quickly forgotten and sidelined by tactical issues of the day. So was the fate of the “national security strategy” adopted in 2015 (and before that – in 2009), which had zero relevance over practical Russian policies and, inevitably, the current version will end up in the same historic trash dump.

What is interesting though, is that the document opens the door into the Kremlin’s strategic thinking, and allows a bit more understanding of how Putin and the top decision makers truly view the world. The National Security Council (NSC), which was responsible for preparing it, arguably became the top influential Russian authority presiding over decision-making both on domestic and international politics in the recent period. The meetings of the Permanent Members of the NSC happen in a weekly format, and it is there where key decisions on new domestic repressions and foreign policy adventures are being made. The NSC Permanent Members council includes 13 top officials in the country and can be easily considered a modern-day Politburo. Nikolay Patrushev, secretary of the NSC, has become Putin’s top policy adviser on strategic issues and a mouthpiece of the Kremlin’s worldview.

So, obviously, the main “strategic” document coming out of the NSC is somewhat interesting because it comes directly from the top folks defining the Kremlin’s strategy with the exact purpose to publicly outline one. And, demagoguery aside, it offers very important – and often scary – insight into the mindset of the current Russian rulers.

First and foremost, the document outlines multiple problems and challenges for Russia, but strikingly avoids any analysis of what went wrong in the past 20 years of Vladimir Putin’s rule. That’s a big contrast with any normal strategic policy concept paper – particularly the one which is re-adopted and adjusted every 5-6 years. Usually, such documents begin with a cross-check of which previous goals were achieved since the last adopted strategy, which were not, and why. That helps provide an understanding of the shortcomings and correct the mistakes.

Not in the case of Vladimir Putin – who, obviously, never makes any mistakes. This has become one of the most unquestioned narratives of Russian officials of late – be it speeches by Vladimir Putin, articles by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, or any other official documents. To these leaders ensconced in the Kremlin, they are always right. If something is wrong, it’s only someone else’s fault. The same is the case with the NSC strategy: you read it and wonder – wait, but extraordinary leader Putin is more than twenty years in power, and we still have to fight poverty (paragraph 32)? There’s still high crime (paragraph 42)? Still mounting social and economic problems (paragraph 45), etc., etc.? How could this be? Whatever happened to the $4.2 trillion that we received in revenues from exports of oil, gas and petroleum products from 2000-2021? What happened to that money? Some countries have managed to achieve a much better standard of living, security and prosperity with far, far less.

But no, $4.2 trillion in revenue is not mentioned in this “strategy” at all – almost as if it never arrived. Instead, the document puts forward the concept of “conservation of population” (paragraphs 28-33) as the key priority – like we, Russians, are an endangered species. The concept of “conservation of the population” goes back to the ideas of conservative writer Alexandr Solzhenitsyn – who had many questionable ideas about Russia and its future, but that “conservation” theme was promoted when Russia was really in dire straits at the time of the collapse of communism and the beginning of difficult reforms.

However, that was three decades ago, and Russia has enjoyed more than 20 years of Putin’s governance genius and a $4.2 trillion paycheck – so why is “conservation” still so hot on the agenda? What predators dare to endanger that vulnerable species? In early 2000s, Putin’s speeches and strategic documents were all about development and positive prospects – life was good, the worst was over, we were rapidly integrating into the world, and his administration had launched many reforms to solve the remaining problems. There was much more optimism and forward thinking in the Russian government’s rhetoric back then. But now we’re in 2021, and the key task seems to be “conserving the population” on the background of poverty, crime, various social, economic and environmental problems, among others. What happened?

The strategy gives a straightforward hint: it is predatory, hostile foreign powers that can’t hold back the multiple crises of a liberal system, yet are still hungry for destabilizing others and , therefore, are to blame for everything. There is no mention of Chinese ballistic missiles at our borders or a North Korean projectile falling in the sea a short distance from the Russian city of Nakhodka. Of course these are not mentioned as security threats because we’re all friends, you know? It is the West, with its immoral decaying liberal values, that is the biggest threat – using the Russian “objective social-economic difficulties,” in the phraseology of paragraph 44 that the West is launching an information war against young, unstable Russian minds only but to destroy and conquer our proud sovereign state. Objective difficulties? after $4 trillion in oil export windfall? This isn’t a strategy written by serious people other than to shift blame from their own incompetence. Perhaps it’s better to ask, where’s the money, Putin?.

The treatment of “sovereignty” question by the Kremlin’s thinkers is also very interesting. In the official Russian rhetoric of the recent period the issue of “sovereignty” is always central. But in reality, the Kremlin has a very special, medieval view on sovereignty; more like a sultan’s right to do what he will once he’s in the monarchic chair. The Russian Constitution and Criminal Code both envisage a very different concept of sovereignty – as the right of the Russian people to freely choose their rulers through democratic procedures. Anyone who interferes with that right (i.e. kills opposition leaders or jails them, prevents freedom of speech, free assembly, bans candidates with opposition views from running in elections) is seen as a criminal, subject for up to 20 years in prison (article 278 of the Russian Criminal Code “Illegal seizure of power”).

The Kremlin nominally repeats that Constitutional definition of sovereignty as a “power of the people” in paragraph 28 of the “national security strategy” – but otherwise, throughout the document, treats the Russian people as stupid, unable to solve their own problems, prone to degrading foreign influence, and therefore subject to guardianship and “conservation efforts” by the Big Brother state, which reserves the right to dictate every aspects of peoples’ life, from access to information to culture and moral values.

To drive attention away from that clear aim at total control over society, NSC thinkers portray the modern-day reality not as a postwar and post-communist democratic rules-based order challenged by autocrats and dictatorships for their selfish purposes, but as a medieval dog-eat-dog world, where people need a strong Big Brother guardian to be “conserved.” Without such protections, the Russian people will be wiped away by a shockwave of “Western liberal values” – obviously the utmost threat in the history of mankind. How Western nations achieved the outstanding living standards for their citizens that Russians can only dream of remains an open question. 

The medieval reference is also interesting. On one hand, Russian leadership is blaming the West for a return of the medieval “might is right” principle into international relations – as directly said in one of the Patrushev’s speeches right before the adoption of the “national security strategy”. On the other hand, they seem to be fascinated both with “traditional and historic values” – which can’t be translated other than medieval, particularly when contraposed against “Western liberal values” – as well as with the concept of making Russia a “strong power” (“сильная держава”) at any cost, central to the “national security strategy.”

The “strong power” concept brings us to the “Back to the Concert of Nations” trope, put forward earlier by Vyacheslav Nikonov, a powerful foreign policy thinker under Putin, and the grandson of ex-Stalin’s foreign minister Molotov, Ribbentrop’s counterpart in the infamous Soviet-Nazi pact of 1939. Nikonov argues that the Twenty First Century style “concert of nations,”  when strong powers have decided the world’s fate on a transactional basis without any liberal rules-based order getting in the way – is a much better alternative to the world where strong democratic powers keep asking Russia about its constant violations of human rights and international law. Make no mistake: that dream of return to pre-democratic world order is what is hidden behind a “strong power” paradigm. Putin wants a stake at the roundtable of global powers and is ready to sacrifice a lot for it.

Generally, reading through all these descriptions of Russia as a “besieged fortress surrounded by enemies” and “chaotic world undermined by Western liberal powers” can’t help but make you sick. Twenty years ago, when Putin just came to power, he talked about democracy, integrating Russia into the world, enjoying the benefits of globalization and international division of labor but you won’t find these words in this “security concept” now. Foreign investment? Forget it, we put an emphasis on “internal potential” in the North-Korean juche style (paragraph 65). Threats, enemies, an unstable world rattled by the Western powers, traditional values, total mobilization, endangered population in need of “conservation” – makes one think you’re reading a Warcraft game scenario, not a description of a Twenty-First Century world.

All this is beyond archaic. It doesn’t reflect the current global realities even to a smallest bit. If only the humanity wasn’t held back by greedy dictatorships who would go to great lengths to oppress, disrupt, obstruct, and corrupt in order to preserve their power, the world – and Russia – would have been a totally different place by now. Needless to say, none of Putin’s archaic views reflect the aspirations of Russians – not only those who took to the streets in recent months to protest against Putin’s oppression, but more generally: according to recent Levada Center opinion poll, there’s a clear majority of Russians aged 40 or younger who simply don’t want to see Putin in power beyond 2024. They want modernity and global integration, not isolation and backwardness. More and more people feel how obsolete Putin and his system are, and what a source of insecurity the Kremlin’s policies have become for Russia. They understand that Putin’s “security strategy” in reality is all about preserving and “conserving” himself and his grip on power, and has nothing to do with the interests of the country.

Listen, Putin and Patrushev – I, Vladimir Milov, am one of the Russian people, and I don’t need any “conservation” efforts from you. You are as good at “conserving” as a poacher with a gun looking to hunt down an endangered animal and to sell its horn to China for a bargain price. I, among many forward-looking and truly patriotic Russians, need you gone for good – the faster, the better. You have wasted all the chances that the history have given you – and, instead of development, have thrown Russia into endless economic stagnation and decline, rampant corruption, vassal dependency on China, and international isolation. We are paying this price for your limitless hunger for power and stolen billions – and that is the one and only threat that stands in the way between Russia and prosperity. You bring insecurity to Russia – and double down on it with your medieval, dog-eat-dog worldviews. The Twenty First Century has no place for backward so-called leaders like you. Be gone – that’s the least you can do to make Russia secure, once and for all.

“I came out to the street to express my solidarity with Alexei Navalny and support the Russian people. I just wanted to help an innocent kid when I saw he was brutally mishandled by the police. I never wanted to cause any harm or humiliate anyone, especially the security officers.”
Valeriy Yevsin during his court hearing on April 7, 2021

Case Background

On January 23, 2021, mass protests broke out in almost 100 cities across Russia and internationally. Thousands of peaceful protesters came out to support Alexei Navalny, a prominent ant-corruption politician and Putin’s top political rival, who was illegally arrested by the Russian government on January 17. People who have participated in these protests are now facing the most brutal repression in the history of modern Russia. Hundreds of people were assaulted on the streets by the police, and in the months since, more still have faced interrogations, house raids, psychological abuse, and illegal incarcerations at the hands of law enforcement– all because they peacefully exercised their legal right to protest.

Though the intensity of these repressions has certainly increased since the spring of 2020, the approach and schemes used by law enforcement to crack down on protestors, are not new. Indeed, after an earlier wave of mass protests in Russia took place in July of 2019, dozens of people faced criminal charges for allegedly “causing harm to the health of the police officers.” This particular criminal charge has emerged a frequently-used government method for prosecuting protestors. The most notorious example is the “Moscow case,” opened on July 27, 2019, in which 13 protesters received anywhere from two to four years in prison for merely “pushing a government official,” “touching the arm of a government official,” or “slapping a government official’s helmet.” Beyond the disproportionate punishment for such actions even theoretically-speaking, these charges were made without any supporting evidence (read more on the “Moscow case” in our report). No matter their validity, these cases have established a new avenue for the government to silence opposition: prosecuting the innocent for supposedly endangering police officers and making it clear that anything that is ever said or done against the police will result in a prison sentence.

The 2021 protests in support of Alexei Navalny have deployed this mechanism en masse, with dozens charged with “causing grievous bodily harm to the police.”In reality, these brave Russians exercised their constitutionally-guaranteed rights and stood up to the government oppression.

Case Defendant

Valeriy Yevsin came to Moscow from the Pskov Oblast to work as a taxi driver. He is married and is a doting father to two small boys. His social media pages used to consists mainly of family photos and reposts of content from opposition politicians and activists. But now his account has been flooded with “pro-Kremlin” trolls barraging him for his criticism of the government and divulging personal information about his life: “Pal, are you not satisfied with your life? You have kids, a car, you go on vacations. What else do you need?”

On April 7, after two months in detention without seeing his wife and kids, Mr. Yevsin was found guilty by the court and sent to prison for two years. The supposed crime he committed: “pushing a metal street closure barricade in the direction of a police officer” during the protest on January 23. These charges fall under Part 1, Art. 318 of the Criminal Code of Russia – “The use of violence, not dangerous to life or health, against a government official on duty”.

Events preceding Mr. Yevsin’s arrest

According to Mr. Yevsin, on January 23, he was walking down the Sretenskiy Boulevard in Moscow with a group of protesters when he heard someone from the crowd scream that the police was assaulting a teenage boy. Valeriy said that he saw the police grabbing a skinny-looking teenager and dragging him away. Mr. Yevsin felt he simply could not just walk away and he felt the responsibility to help the boy. He confornted the police and asked them to release the innocent kid. The crowd supported Mr. Yevsin and started screaming “Let him go! Let him go!,” a plea which the police ignored, continuing to drag the boy away . Furious, Mr. Yevsin and a few other protesters pushed a metal barrier toward one of the police officers, which lightly brushed one of the officer’s chest. The officer wielded his baton to hit Mr. Yevsin, but Valeriy managed to duck the hit.

Later, during his interrogation, Mr. Yevsin said: “I saw that the police had finally released the boy, and I shouted to the crowd that we could leave and that the conflict was resolved. Everyone started applauding and we left.”

A few days later, the police found Mr. Yevsin by tracking his car’s license plate number, arrested him, and brought him to the detention center. The police officer brushed by the metal barrier against claimed that Mr. Yevsin was aggressive, that he tried to grab his baton, and that he deliberately lifted the metal barrier with the intent of hitting the officer in the chest and the stomach. The officer maintained that the incident caused him great physical pain.

According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, this claim was intentionally exaggerated to make it seem like Valeriy Yevsin had caused damage to the health of the police officer which in reality did not happen.

 Speaking in his own defense, Mr. Yevsin said he never wanted to cause harm or humiliate a police officer and that all he wanted was to help a child in danger. He said he was sorry that this situation took place and he later admitted his guilt hoping that the court would reduce his punishment. Nevertheless, on April 7, the court sentenced him to two years in prison.

Why does the Memorial Human Rights Center consider Valery Yevsin a political prisoner?

Politicized context

The Memorial Human Rights Center asserts that to understand the nature of a person’s detention it is important to consider the context of the event, as well as the reactions of the law enforcement and judicial systems to it.

 In this case, the important elemnt of the context is that Valeriy Yevsin was taking part in a peaceful protest that constituted a legitimate expression of public outrage at the Putin government’s repressive actions. Yet, in spite of the legal nature of this protest,, law enforcement agents used extreme violence towards protesters trying to silence them and end their completely legitimate activity.

 Mr. Yevsin’s arrest is political in that it seeks to scare activists and silence voices of dissent. Furthermore, Russian law enforcement have already violated people’s right to protest, by brutally and illegally beating up protestors each time they take to the streets. The police officer identified as the victim in Yevsin’s case declared that he ‘experienced great pain’ from the push. Yet, at the time of the incident, he was wearing full body armor and could not have possibly suffered any physical injuries from such an insignificant push. In contrast, on the same day of the incident with Mr. Yevsin, the police seriously injured dozens of protesters and have gone unpunished for their violence. This is in spite of the fact that their actions were recorded in photos and videos and that the protesters’ injuries have been confirmed by medical records. The Memorial Center claims that such a selective use of criminal prosecution is evidence of a clear bias of the Russian authorities on who deserves punishment and who does not. Thus, Mr. Yevsin must be considered a political prisoner.

Biased legislation

Common punishments based on Article 318.1 (the statute under which Mr. Yevsin was charged) imposed on people in non-political cases are far less severe than those imposed on protesters. For example, outside of the context of a protest, for punching a police officer in the jaw, one could get fined for 50 thousand rubles (approximately $680), and for swinging at a police officer with an ax one could get six months in a penal colony. Yet, while at a political protest, if one touches the helmet of a police officer, a person could receive a three-year prison sentence.

The Memorial Center believes that such blatant disparities prove the unjust selectivity of persecution of this particular law. Through prosecutions like that of Mr. Yevsin, the police and the National Guard are transmitting a clear message to the public: the police are allowed to commit any act of violence with impunity, while ordinary citizens who dare to disagree with the government will be punished as severely as possible.

The Memorial Human Rights Center considers Valeriy Yevsin a political prisoner and demands that he and other victims of the regime arrested and jailed during peaceful protests are released and the persecution against them is stopped immediately.

“Wow, what a situation. I did not expect that at all. I wanted to go on vacation, and then this happens: the police enter the plane and tell me: “You are on the federal wanted list.” What a crazy special operation, I was escorted from the plane minutes from take-off and arrested. What was the reason? I planned to run in the State Duma elections. That’s all. The case was fabricated in two days. Except for the immense desire of the Russian government to restrict political activity and silence the opposition, I see no other reasons.”

-Andrei Pivovarov in court on June 2, 2021

Case Background

In 2015, the Russian government created a new law on “undesirable organizations”. According to this law, any organization that, in the view of the Kremlin, “undermines the safety, security, and the constitutional order” of the country can be declared undesirable. The law, however, is unconstitutional, as it encroaches on the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the Russian constitution.

Organizations that have so far been targeted by this regulation, work in international education and cultural exchange, or advance political and economic development of Russia. All of them do so by peaceful, non-violent and legal means. Currently, there are 35 undesirable organizations both in Russia and abroad, and the list will likely keep growing. The law has unleashed a new wave of oppression against these groups, with their employees and even volunteers facing home raids, interrogation, and incarcerations.

Case defendant

Since 2018, Andrei Pivovarov, one of the most prominent leaders of the democratic opposition in Russia, has served as the Executive Director of the Open Russia.

The goals of this organization included “strengthening relations between the state and society in Russia, promoting free and fair elections, and ensuring rights and freedoms of the Russian citizens.” Such activities are lawful and common in any democratic society. Open Russia activities and methods have always been peaceful and never supported destructive methods of building democracy in the country. Nevertheless, for the past 5-6 years, Open Russia’s staff members, such as like Yana Antonova, Anastasia Shevchenko, and Mikhail Iosilevich, have been harassed by the officials, interrogated, and prosecuted on false charges.

Since 2015, Andrei Pivovarov has faced four administrative and criminal charges ostensibly due to his affiliation with Open Russia. The Memorial Human Rights Center has concluded that all of the charges against Mr. Pivovarov c are baseless, have no constructive evidence, and were imposed on him solely because Putin’s regime feels threatened by him. Charges against Mr. Pivovarov are nothing but the Kremlin’s attempt to silence this activist and stop his legal political and social activities. Pivovarov has already been recognized as a political prisoner by the Memorial Center in 2015, when he was falsely accused of bribery and abuse of authority. A few weeks ago, he was granted this status again.

On May 27, 2021, Andrei Pivovarov publicly announced the dissolution of Open Russia. He did so preemptively— as the organization had not yet been declared undesirable. However, Mr. Pivovarov anticipated that, in light of increased political repressions, it was forthcoming. He did not want to put his people at risk of being thrown in prison at Putin’s command for trying to restore democracy in Russia. In his video address publicized on May 27, as well as in his media interviews that followed the announcement, he explained the rationale behind this decision.

On May 31, Mr. Pivovarov was getting ready to fly to Poland for vacation. Minutes before his plane’s take off, the police stormed the plane, arrested Andrei and hauled him away. He was taken to the Investigation Committee where he learned he was being charged for cooperation with an undesirable organization (under Article 284.1 of the Criminal Code of Russia).

A few days later, the police raided Pivovarov’s  house in St. Petersburg.  Mr. Pivovarov was transported to Krasnodar for trial. This was when he was informed that he was facing six years of prison for a repost on Facebook from the “United Democrats” page made a year ago about supporting candidates on municipal elections.

According to Andrei Pivovarov’s lawyer, the post in question was not even published by him.  Anna Kuznetsova, one of Mr. Pivovarov’s page administrators, admitted to publishing the post which was also certified by a notarized technical expertise. Andrei’s lawyer filed an appeal citing Ms. Kuznetsova and the conclusion of the expertise demanding the immediate release of Andrei Pivovarov, but the court ignored his petition. On June 2, after a court hearing, Mr. Pivovarov’s detention was extended to two months.

The Memorial Center believes the persecution of Andrei Pivovarov is directly related to Mr. Pivovarov’s announcement to run for the State Duma as an independent opposition candidate in September of this year. His arrest is a part of the Kremlin’s efforts to clear the political field before the elections, eliminating all independent candidates and viable competitors.

Why the Memorial Human Rights Center recognizes Andrei Pivovarov as a political prisoner?

  1. The law on undesirable organizations is unconstitutional — it contradicts the right to freedom of expression enshrined in the constitution of the Russian Federation. The definition of an “undesirable” organization is vague and allows for arbitrary interpretation, and the fact that the organizations are recognized as undesirable without any trial and behind closed doors is outrageous. It assumes the absolute subjectivity and groundlessness of such decisions with the complete absence of evidence-based argumentation and transparency of the procedure. In the case of Open Russia, the organization does not in any way fall under these vague criteria, and there is no reason to assert that it poses a threat to the country.
  1. The law on undesirable organizations is unconstitutional — it contradicts the right to freedom of expression enshrined in the constitution of the Russian Federation. The definition of an “undesirable” organization is vague and allows for arbitrary interpretation, and the fact that the organizations are recognized as undesirable without any trial and behind closed doors is outrageous. It assumes the absolute subjectivity and groundlessness of such decisions with the complete absence of evidence-based argumentation and transparency of the procedure. In the case of Open Russia, the organization does not in any way fall under these vague criteria, and there is no reason to assert that it poses a threat to the country.
    Consequently, when the case against Pivovarov was opened, the charges against him included leading the undesirable organization registered in the UK rather than the one in Russia. Unsurprisingly, no objective evidence was presented to support this claim. Moreover, a study of public registry indicates that British organizations that were declared undesirable in 2017 never, in fact, existed. Therefore, it allows one to assume that all these manipulations were done to target Open Russia led by Pivovarov at some point in time.
  1. Andrei Pivovarov’s prosecution even contradicts the undesirable organizations law itself. Mr. Pivovarov was detained three days after he announced the dissolution of Open Russia. The law states that “a person who voluntarily stopped participating in the activities of an undesirable organization is exempt from criminal liability.”
  1. Andrei Pivovarov’s prosecution even contradicts the undesirable organizations law itself. Mr. Pivovarov was detained three days after he announced the dissolution of Open Russia. The law states that “a person who voluntarily stopped participating in the activities of an undesirable organization is exempt from criminal liability.”

The Memorial Center asserts that the criminal charges against Andrei Pivovarov are part of the massive campaign of political repressions, and demands that they are dropped immediately, and the persecution and pressuring of the independent candidates and their lawful activities are stopped at once.

Until 2020, Vadim Bektemirov led a quiet life in his native Crimea. He was a family man, a father of two young daughters, and a loving husband to his wife who was expecting their third child. He made his living as a translator, though his dream was to become an Imam.

In July of 2020, his life was brutally turned upside down when Russian security officials raided his house. He was arrested and charged under Part 2, Art. 205.5 of the Criminal Code of Russia —participating in a terrorist organization. He remains in illegal captivity to this day. Following the sudden arrest of his son, Vadim’s father suffered a heart attack and died. Vadim was not allowed to attend his father’s funeral and was denied the opportunity to say goodbye. Vadim has not been allowed to welcome his new baby boy or support his wife through her pregnancy and postpartum recovery. Rather, he is languishing in prison, and his family deprived of its breadwinner.

What was the crime committed by Vadim? At his first court hearing on May 26, 2021, Vadim Bektemirov stated: “I just followed my religion. This is a continuation of the genocide that began under Stalin. These are repressions against my people. I am facing charges only because I am a Muslim and a Crimean Tatar.” The Memorial Center which documents political prosecutions in Russia agrees with his assessment.

Case Background

In 2014, Russia invaded and illegally annexed Crimea. Crimean Tatars, an ethnic group indigenous to the region were vocal in their opposition to the peninsula’s annexation and as a result, have faced Kremlin repression. Putin’s government views Crimean Tatars as a political threat because of their opposition to his aggressions in Ukraine, as well as their tightly-knit and well-organized communities. In fact, Putin has been so threatened by this group that the Russian government targeted their executive-representative body, the Mejlis, declaring it an extremist organization and banning it in 2016.

Recent Russian criminal cases against the Crimean Tatars are mainly based on their affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an international Islamist party which the Kremlin designated a terrorist organization in 2003. Yet, HT’s members in Russia have never promoted violence or organized terrorist acts. Nevertheless, Russian security forces regularly raid the Crimean Tatars’ homes, interrogate and torture them, and place them in detention, claiming to be defending against the supposed threat of HT. Furthermore, those community members who dare to come out and support neighbors during a raid are frequently detained by the police.

In 2013, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ruled that the government was no longer required to prove that someone accused of terrorism was plotting or committing terrorist acts for that person to be found guilty of the crime. As a result, the mere joining HT or participating in its activities is now sufficient for convicting a person of terrorism. The simplification of the investigation process has allowed Russian security forces to falsify the statistics, claiming an artificially inflated rate of terrorist plot prevention and misleadingly demonstrating high performance to their superiors.

According to the Memorial Center, as of June 15, 2021, 326 people have faced persecution for their affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir. Over 210 of them have been incarcerated, serving sentences of at least ten years.

Case proceedings

The evidence of Bektemirov’s participation in terrorist activities is based on the testimony of two anonymous witnesses who claim that from 2015 to 2018 Bektemirov took them to secret HT meetings in Simferopol. According to their testimony, Bektemirov discussed the need to follow the HT’s ideas, attract new supporters to the organization, and publicize the facts of oppression of Muslims in Crimea. The case file also mentions a video recording in which Bektemirov allegedly defended the activities of HT “in front of other people present in the room.” Another piece of supposed evidence of Bektemirov’s guilt, according to the investigation, is the Islamist literature seized from his house during the raid. Finally, they cite as evidence the fact that Bektemirov constantly supported his coreligionists, attended their trials, helped those imprisoned, and advocated for the Crimean Tatars’ rights.

Why does the Memorial Human Right Center consider Vadim Bektemirov a political prisoner?

1.         Bektemirov is facing charges without corpus delicti.

The “evidence” of his crime includes meetings of other HT followers, discussion of religious topics, and reading Islamic literature. These actions are absolutely legal in Russia. Indeed, Freedom of expression, conscience, and assembly are guaranteed by the Russian Constitution.

2.         Bektemirov’s charges violate international law.

According to Amnesty International, post-annexation Crimea constitutes an occupied territory in international humanitarian law. In this situation, therefore, Russia has no right, under any circumstances, to eliminate the previously existing system of government and its criminal legislation. Under Ukrainian law, Hizb ut-Tahrir is a legal organization. Therefore, the persecution of HT’s members in Crimea is inherently illegal. The Memorial Human Rights Center demands Vadim Bektemirov’s immediate release and the complete termination of all criminal prosecution against Crimean Tatars and members of Hizb ut-Tahrir.

“Everyone is guaranteed freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, including the right to profess, individually or jointly with others, any religion or not to profess any religion at all, to freely choose, have and disseminate religious and other beliefs and to act in accordance with them.”

Article 28 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation

Case overview

On April 10, 2018, the police arrested Anatoly Vilitkevich, a member of Jehova’s Witnesses, recognized as an extremist religious group in Russia, for organizing the activities of the said organization (Art. 282.2, Section 2 of the Criminal Code of Russia). Vilitkevich now faces up to 10 years of deprivation of liberty. After spending two months in a detention facility and eight months under house arrest, Vilitkevich was asked to sign an undertaking not to leave town on February 28, 2019.

Court proceedings

The hearings on the case were resumed in February 2021, when Vilitkevich discovered that in 2017, a year before his arrest, the police secretly installed wiretapping and cameras in his rented apartment to monitor his and his wife’s daily activities. The apartment’s landlord permitted to install the surveillance and signed the acknowledgment that he had no complaints against the police. By infringing the Vilitkevichs privacy, the police collected the alleged evidence that Anatoly Vilitkevich ran a branch of Jehova’s Witnesses in Ufa. By evidence, the police consider Anatoly and his wife Alyona inviting other Jehovah’s Witnesses to their apartment, dining with them, singing religious songs, watching movies on religious topics, and discussing the spread of their faith among other people. During hearings, the prosecutor was reading out the verbatim transcript of the recorded conversations for over an hour, including the following remarks: “Anatoly and Alyona are in the common room,” “Alyona is cleaning, then the music starts playing loudly,” “Alyona laughs,” “Baby, when we sing songs, the door needs to be closed.” The transcripts were also accompanied by an explanation of what styles and colors of clothes the couple were wearing at the time of the recording.

Why does the Memorial Human Rights Center consider him a political prisoner?

In Memorial’s view, the charges against Vilitkevich are based solely on the fact that he is a Jehovah’s Witness. The government’s actions are discriminatory and violate international law, particularly the right to freedom of religion. Moreover, it contradicts Article 28 of the Russian Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religion. The case of Anatoly Vilitkevich is part of an extensive campaign of persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses that started in 2017 and took on fresh vigor in 2018. Each year, the Russian government arrests and prosecutes hundreds of Jehova’s Witnesses. Among those who have spoken out against this campaign of persecution of a whole religious group are the Delegation of the European Union to the OSCE, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and Russian and foreign human rights defenders. Memorial Human Rights Center demands that charges against Anatoly Vilitkevich and other Jehovah’s Witnesses, prosecuted solely for their religious beliefs, are immediately dropped.

The profound and longstanding negligence which characterize Moscow’s attitude toward the Far East as Russia’s extractive colony and periphery is most clearly manifested in environmental disasters continuously ravishing the region.

In the past two centuries, the Far East has figured in the designs of the Russian government only in its role as a military outpost and a geostrategic junction. Indeed, almost all significant projects implemented in the Far East have been of a military or paramilitary nature, conducted at the expense of the needs of the local population and the region’s socio-economic development.       

During the Soviet era, when the Far East functioned as a military fortress, the economy of the region became heavily dependent on housing the Pacific Fleet and the economic activity generated by the Far Eastern Military District.[1]

While very little thought was given to the environmental situation at that time, without a doubt, environmental disasters plagued the region even then.

The most infamous of these incidents was the August 1985 radioactive pollution disaster involving the nuclear-powered submarine K-431 of the Pacific Fleet. This accident occurred at the Chazhma Bay naval facility in Primorsky Krai. A violation of tech protocols during a planned refueling of the two submarine reactors’ resulted in a spontaneous uranium fission reaction leading to a thermal explosion. This was followed by a fire resulting in the release of powerful radioactive dust and steam emissions. The disaster claimed the lives of ten naval personnel, and hundreds of people were harmed by the radiation.[2]

The water and the surrounding territory were contaminated with dangerous, long-lasting radiation. The incident, just one example of the incompetence of the Soviet Navy, was kept secret until the collapse of the Soviet Union. In total, there were ten known accidents that involved Soviet nuclear submarines.[3]

A similarly devastating military activity in the Russian Far East, was a routine planned disposal of radioactive waste by the Pacific Fleet into the Sea of Japan which continued until the mid-90s. The catastrophic effects of this radioactive discharge are still felt to this day.

The Russian government went to great lengths to cover up these military-caused environmental disasters. Military journalist Grigory Pasko, who published investigations about this and other environmental incidents stemming from the operation of the Pacific Fleet, was convicted of treason in the late 90s. He was the first and, for many years, the only Russian journalist convicted for disclosing state secrets.[4]

After the release of Pasko’s film High-Risk Zone depicting a Russian tanker dumping radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan, the Japanese government allocated money to sponsor the construction of a liquid radioactive waste disposal plant in Russia.[5] 

More recently, another major environmental disaster took place on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the autumn of 2020. In early October, the public learned of the mass death of sea creatures off the coast of Kamchatka Krai near the Avacha Bay’s beaches. Thousands of dead marine animals and invertebrates washed up on the coast of the Pacific Ocean. Further, surfers reported eye pain and skin irritation after contact with the water.

Although the Russian Academy of Sciences has issued a public statement asserting that the cause of the environmental disaster in Kamchatka was a blooming of algae, the government decision to create the Center for the Study of the World Ocean in Kamchatka in 2021 points to severe human-made environmental threats to the entire region.[6]

The environmental disaster that occurred in Kamchatka likely resulted from the uncontrolled activities of the military on the peninsula. The most likely pollutants include rocket fuel, disposal of toxic chemicals in the sea, and other pollutants from Navy ships, or nuclear submarines. Indeed, containers with rocket fuel were stored just over 6 miles away from the contamination area, holding up to several hundred tons of toxic rocket fuel.[7]

This helps to demonstrate Kamchatka, like the entire Far East, is treated as one large military base. The military controls the area, and their activities are unregulated when it comes to the environment and the local population, often leading to disaster.

However, Russian militarization is not the only cause of environmental crisis in the region. Another serious problem in Russia’s Far East is the cross-border pollution of the Amur River by industrial production located in Northeast China. An example of this can be seen in 2005 when a large amount of a toxic fuel benzene flowed from the Amur’s Chinese tributary, the Songhua River, into the Russian Amur after explosions at a petrochemical plant in China’s Jilin province. It is important to note that Benzene is a potent carcinogen that is toxic to humans even in small quantities.[8]

The authorities of the Chinese province where the pollution originated attempted to conceal the catastrophic effect of toxic emissions spilled into the Songhua River from both Moscow and Beijing.

By the end of 2005, this pollution threatened the water supply of Khabarovsk and other cities and towns in the lower reaches of the Amur River. It also severely damaged the overall quality of the Amur’s water resources.

Another man-made accident with severe cross-border environmental consequences occurred in the Amur River basin (on China’s territory) in March 2020, fifteen      years later. Emergency disposal of waste from Heilongjian province molybdenum mine, owned by Yichun Luming Mining Co., Ltd. resulted in the contamination of the Yijimi River. 2.53 million cubic meters of tailings started a cross-border reaction as the waste flowed from the Yijimi River into the Hulan River, which in turn flowed into the Songhua River – China’s largest tributary of the Amur River.

The mine waste products contained, in addition to the molybdenum, various heavy metals, petroleum products, and chemicals used in the molybdenum mining process, many of which are toxic to humans.[9]     

China has to undertake significant mitigation activities to prevent further pollution of the Amur basin.

Deterioration of the Amur basin habitat has increased dramatically since the mid-1990s, due to both natural and man-made factors including repeated pollution of the water, abnormally low water levels in the early 2000s, the catastrophic floods of 2013 and 2019, industrial accidents in China, a significant rise of water level in the lake Khanka, accelerated soil erosion, degradation of riparian ecosystems, reducing fish stocks and many other processes and phenomena.

Industrial accidents, along with regular man-made pollution pose a dire threat to the water supply for the population of the Amur region, both in Chinese and Russian territory and in. It spans close to 1300 km and affects the vast water areas in the Amur Liman and the Sakhalin Gulf. The water quality studies conducted by the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences indicate that heavy metals and organochlorine compounds, which are particularly dangerous for the Amur river water ecosystems, mainly come from China.[10] 

This is not merely a problem of the past. Indeed, the year 2020 was marked by a number of severe environmental emergencies in Russia’s Far East, most notable among these were disasters in the Amur basin and Kamchatka, oil spills from the Okha—Komsomolsk-on-Amur main oil pipeline, catastrophic forest fires, etc.

Forest fires in Russia often provide a cover for illegal logging operations. Among all Russian regions, the illegal logging problem is most acute in the Far East. Specifically, it is the worst in Primorsky Krai.                

At the beginning of 2019, Yandex revealed the smuggling and exportation to China of valuable wood. 15 thousand cubic meters and 691.5 million rubles’ worth of Mongolian oak and Manchurian ash sawn timber had been exported to China.[11]

It should be pointed out that the real volume of logged wood products in the Far East is twice as large as the officially permitted amount. This is likely a result of low domestic demand for lumber products and growing interest from Asian countries, shifting the orientation of the Far East’s forest sector toward export. Indeed, up to 95% of the lumber logged in the region is exported.      

A related issue is illegal timber trafficking and export with valuable wood varieties (oak, beech, ash, cedar). According to the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), half a million cubic meters of oak and ash are illegally logged in the Far East every year. Simultaneously, in the Primorsky and Khabarovsk Krai, the volume of illegal timber has been, on average, twice as high as permitted amount for decades.

Before 2000, the bulk of illegal timber entered the market due to unauthorized and undocumented logging. Today, the primary source of such wood is unsupervised logging (over-cutting) under the cover of an official license.

A significant part of rare wood appears on the market due to forest fires organized by “shadow” lumberjacks.[12]

The fires of recent years have pointed to the likely involvement of “shadow” lumberjacks in illegal activities.

“There are several possible options. The first one is that ‘shadow’ lumberjacks cover up the traces of illegal logging starting a fire; that is, it is not the forests that are burning, but what is left of them. The second option is that the interested parties deliberately set fire to the forests, while the tree trunks are almost not damaged. They need it to get a contract for the sanitary felling of ‘burned’ trees at a lower price, but in reality, they export the undamaged wood to China at the same price.”

Today, the logging industry in the Far East is under the near-complete control of Chinese corporations. They buy wood, oversee the logging, and perform quality control before sending it to the PRC. It is impossible to sell timber to China without intermediaries. The sale of round logs is the most profitable, even considering the dealers’ share. Hence, Chinese businesses have no incentive to develop deep processing of wood in Russia. Furthermore, China is not interested in buying processed products since border provinces have an abundance of enterprises to process round logs imported from Russia.[13]      

This has led experts to assert that Chinese business directly or indirectly controls Russian forest and wood processing enterprises.[14]      

However, the profit from the export of treated wood and raw timber to China is almost entirely received by large Moscow businesses represented by Russian billionaires. The residents of the eastern regions, left without forests, are increasingly at risk of catastrophic fires and floods and, what’s more, given no compensation for the destruction of their lands.

Among the owners of logging companies are the top Russian billionaires. Roman Abramovich, Alexander Abramov, and Alexander Frolov control RFP, the largest timber holding in the Far East; these billionaires own 58% of the company while the Russian-Chinese Investment Fund own the other 42% of the RFP Group. To these corporations and billionaires, the Far East is a raw materials colony.[15]

In recent years, environmental issues have led to many mass protest movements   in Russia. Indeed, environmental crises emerged as the driving force of demonstrations starting in 2018when the stubborn resistance to constructing the ‘Shies’ landfill in the Arkhangelsk region drew a wide response. The month-long confrontation, accompanied by attacks from security forces and retaliatory actions by activists, ended with the closure of the disputed facility.

Similarly in 2019, 482 environmental and city protection protests were reported in the Russian Federation (most associated with the protection of parks and squares). This is double the corresponding figure of environmental protests from 2018.[16]   

Dissatisfaction with the state of environmental protection and quality of air and water is the second reason for engaging in opposition activity by Russians, after the infringement of political and civil rights.

The COVID-19 pandemic has temporarily made it impossible to hold protests, including environmental ones. However, with the weakening of the quarantine measures, the fight for a better environment has returned to the top of many activists’ agenda.

New hot spots have appeared in Bashkortostan and Kuzbass, where residents’ interests clashed with the plans of mining companies. Both conflicts have followed the ‘Shies’ pattern: the deployment of construction workers, the appearance of a protest camp, the mobilization of local and visiting volunteers, physical confrontation, and a detente when the head of the region comes up with a compromise between activists and the corporation. 

The decisive factor in Bashkortostan (Kushtau) was the willingness of the protesters for violent clashes.

In Kuzbass (Cheremza), there were not many protesters, and the confrontation was less acute. Still, protests united residents of many cities and villages who have their own issues with mining companies. 

It is possible that the escalation of the conflict in Kushtau led the local or federal authorities to eliminate that potentially dangerous hotbed of discontent in Kuzbass. The authorities’ responsiveness may also be explained by fears that environmental protests will escalate into internal unrest.

Local and national movements are emerging throughout Russia as local  populations are forced to defend their land from large companies. Locals often perceive these companies as greedy newcomers supported by Moscow.[17]      

The fact that the Kremlin is afraid of such trends is confirmed by the recent increasing penalties for separatist appeals. However, the policy of removing environmental barriers to business increases the potential for new hot spots to appear in the near future.[18]

Given the accumulated environmental problems in Russia’s Far East and the extremely high level of dissatisfaction with Moscow’s openly colonial and predatory policy, confirmed by the month-long protests in Khabarovsk, mass protests over environmental issues and anti-Moscow sentiments in the region are likely to escalate soon.


[1] Yuri Moskalenko, Why does the Far East need the Vostochny cosmodrome?, Novaya Gazeta, April 27, 2016, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/04/27/68407-zachem-dalnemu-vostoku-kosmodrom-vostochnyy.

[2]Alexander Khrolenko, Secrets of the radiation accident in the Chazhma Bay, RIA Novosti, August 10, 2017, https://ria.ru/20170810/1500109220.html.

[3] Kyle Mizokami, In 1985, a Russian nuclear submarine exploded in an accident (radiation is still present). And its consequences are still felt, InoSMI, July 12, 2016, https://inosmi.ru/social/20161207/238353490.html.

[4] Maria Litvinova, I told you, and I did the right thing.” Russian journalist Grigory Pasko, who served time for treason, told Kommersant why he does not admit his guilt, Kommersant, September 7, 2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4407980.

[5] The journalist publicized military secrets now he faces 20 years in prison, Kommersant, January 2, 1999, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/211529.

[6] The RAS said that the cause of the ecological catastrophe in Kamchatka was algal bloom, Tass, December 18, 2020, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/10294213; The Center for the Study of the World Ocean will be created in Kamchatka in 2021 with the participation of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Tass, December 29, 2020, https://nauka.tass.ru/nauka/10382603.

[7] Nikolay Nelyubin,“This is definitely not oil. We need to look deeper. ” Scientist – about the disaster in Kamchatka, Fontanka, October 5, 2020, https://www.fontanka.ru/2020/10/05/69493179/.

[8] Irina Petrakova, Amur waves are poisoned, Bellona, November 24, 2005, https://bellona.ru/2005/11/24/amurskie-volny-otravleny/.

[9] A chemical slick approaches Amur after an accident at a mine in China, DVHAB, April 9, 2020, https://www.dvnovosti.ru/khab/2020/04/09/112956/.

[10] Alexey Makhinov, Cupid needs help, Far Eastern Scientist, December 12, 2019, http://debri-dv.com/article/23681/amur_nuzhdaetsya_v_pomoshchi.

[11] Daria Voznesenskaya, Fires provide cover for illegal logging in Siberia and the Far East, Novye Izvestia, September 9, 2020, https://newizv.ru/news/economy/09-09-2020/pozhary-sluzhat-prikrytiem-dlya-nezakonnyh-vyrubok-lesov-v-sibiri-i-na-dalnem-vostoke.

[12] Elena Berezina, Do you hear, they are chopping:The real volume of harvesting of valuable species of trees is twice the permitted, Rossiyskaya gazeta, September 5, 2017, https://rg.ru/2017/09/05/reg-dfo/eksportnye-poshliny-na-dalnevostochnyj-krugliak-mogut-podniat-v-2017-godu.html.

[13] Ivan Zuenko, Investment battles in the Far East. What’s happening with Chinese and other investments in the region, Carnegie Moscow Center, March, 13, 2020, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81181.

[14] Stanislav Kuvaldin, Is China destroying the Russian taiga… Continuation of the cycle “What’s going on in the Russian forest”, Snob Media, August 6, 2019, https://snob.ru/entry/180933/.

[15] RFP is the largest timber industry holding in the Far East, RFP Group, https://www.rfpgroup.ru/holding; Krestova Darina Sergeevna, Who owns large forestry enterprises in Russia: what do the extracts from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities say?, Moneymaker Factory Magazine, June 8, 2019, https://moneymakerfactory.ru/spravochnik/lesopromyishlennyie-predpriyatiya-rossii.

[16] How do they protest Russians Monitoring results protest activity in the fourth quarter of 2019, Center for Social and Labor Rights, http://trudprava.ru/images/content/Monitoring_4_Quart_2019.pdf.

[17] This is the land of our ancestors – they stand and look at us Anti-garbage protests at the Shies station led to the rise of nationalists in the Komi Republic. They are unhappy with the “colonial policy”, Meduza, December 12, 2019, https://meduza.io/feature/2019/12/12/eto-zemlya-nashih-predkov-oni-stoyat-i-smotryat-na-nas; Andrey Kolesnikov, Politicization, regionalization, shiesization, vedomosti, April 10, 2019, https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/columns/2019/04/10/798740-politizatsiya-regionalizatsiya-shiesizatsiya

[18] Ivan Alexandrov, Russia: will the authorities’ eco-policy lead to an increase in the number of protests?, Eurasianet, August 31, 2020, https://russian.eurasianet.org/%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%82-%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%8D%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%B9-%D0%BA-%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%83-%D1%87%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B2.

Over the past several decades, the economy of the Russian Far East has become increasingly oriented toward serving China.

In March 2021, Vladimir Putin approved a new large-scale project for the Russian Railways to build hundreds of kilometers of rail tracks for exporting coal from Yakutia to China. The project will cost 700 billion rubles (around $9.5 billion) and additional money is needed to provide a power supply to the Tynda-Komsomolsk section of the railway and to develop the ports of the Vanino-Sovgavansky junction. Further, in April 2021, Russian Railways started the 340 km construction of second rail tracks on the Ulak-Fevralsk section of the Baikal-Amur Mainline. The Ulak station gives access to export markets for coal from the Elginsky Coal Mine in Yakutia.

Amur Oblast is crucial for China. Besides coal mining, the Amur region holds the Power of Siberia gas pipeline and the Eastern Siberia -Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, both of which run to China. The Amur region also houses the Zeiskaya, Bureyskaya, and Nizhne-Bureyskaya hydroelectric power plants which provide electricity both to the Amur region and the adjacent territories in China. Finally, another strategically important infrastructure project to Beijing is the Amur Blagoveshchensk-Heihe road bridge. In the future, Russia plans to build a railway bridge in the same direction. The governor of the Amur Oblast, Vasily Orlov, is actively promoting this project as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative that will primarily serve China’s interests.

The influence exerted by China on the economy of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and Primorsky Krai is also notable. The agricultural sector of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast is almost entirely focused on producing soybeans for China. The railway bridge across the Amur Tongjiang-Nizhneleninskoye in the oblast allows for efficient export of this lucrative crop. Similarly, in the Primorsky Krai, the seaports, the agricultural sector, the logging industry, and the fishing industry are critical for the PRC.

China seeks to control the extraction and export of natural resources in the region. This can be seen prominently in the Far East’s logging industry, a sector that is under complete control of Chinese businesses. Chinese companies buy wood, primitively saw it, and control the wood quality before sending it to the PRC. The sales of round timber are the most profitable even with the intermediaries’ share, so China has no incentives to develop deep wood processing in Russia. In addition, China is not interested in purchasing processed products since it has plenty of timber processing plants in the border provinces.

The infrastructure of the Far East

The construction of a road bridge across the Amur River between Russia and China in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast is almost complete. Around six million tons of cargo are expected to pass through the bridge annually, and the flow of passengers should be approximately 3 million people per year. The length of the bridge is a little over a kilometer, and the total length of the crossing is 20 km (6 km of roads in China and 14 km of roads in Russia). The cost of the project is about 18.8 billion rubles ($256.6 million). Instead of budget funds, a concession model was used to finance the project. This provides for the construction and operation of the bridge on a commercial basis during the first 20-year billing period of the bridge’s existence. After a three-year construction period an enterprise will be permitted to collect tolls on the bridge for the first sixteen years of operation.

In Amur Oblast, Blagoveshchensk is the only regional center in Russia located on the Chinese border. The Amur River separates Blagoveshchensk and the Chinese city of Heihe. The construction of the first cross-border road bridge in the Blagoveshchensk region was completed in December 2019. Now, Russia and China are considering constructing a railway bridge in the same direction. The decision on this will be made after evaluating the economic efficiency of the road bridge. Overall, the construction of these bridge crossings will tie the transport infrastructure of the Russian Far East to China. However, China will be the one to benefit from these projects primarily.

A similarly asymmetric interaction between Russia and China can be seen in how China stands to receive economic benefits from the Power of Siberia gas pipeline and the ESPO oil pipeline for many years to come. The agreement on the oil export which established this relationship was signed in 2009. In exchange for $15 billion and $10 billion loans from the China Development Bank for Rosneft and Transneft respectively, the Russian state-owned companies pledged to supply China with 15 million tons of oil annually through the ESPO from 2011 to 2030.

Moreover, Rosneft and Transneft have provided the Chinese company CNPC with a discount of $1.5 per barrel causing Rosneft to lose about $3 billion. Therefore, it was clear from the start that China was dictating the terms under which these pipelines would operate.

As for the gas export to China, the experts say that the Power of Siberia will not pay off for its Russian creators until 2030. According to RusEnergy’s calculations, the total costs of the Power of Siberia, including the development of fields, the construction of pipelines and gas processing plants in wild taiga, the crossing near the Amur River, etc., will amount to about $100 billion. This will be almost double Gazprom’s $55 billion cost estimate. When it comes to natural gas, China is a unique consumer – it is not a “monopoly” but rather a “monopsony,” meaning that the PRC as the sole buyer in the market sets its own terms.

The Power of Siberia, which is about three thousand kilometers in length, transports gas from the Irkutsk and Yakutsk gas production centers to Russian consumers in the Far East and, crucially, to China. The parties determined the terms of the partnership in an intergovernmental agreement in October 2014, and the gas supplies started flowing in December 2019. Russia is the second biggest gas supplier to China after Turkmenistan. Gas exports to China via this pipeline in 2020 amounted to 4.1 billion cubic meters. In 2021, the supplies are expected to double. The planned level of supplies for the Power of Siberia is 38 billion cubic meters per year. Still, China and Russia are discussing the possibility of increasing the maximum supply volume by another 6 billion cubic meters.

In the first quarter of 2020, the price for a thousand cubic meters was $202. In January 2021, the price fell significantly and is now below $120. Of all pipeline gas suppliers, Russia exports gas to China at the lowest price. In comparison, in January 2021, Turkmenistan received $187 per thousand cubic meters for its gas, Kazakhstan for $162, Uzbekistan for $151, and Myanmar for $352.

Additionally, the Amur Gas Processing Plant (GPP) is one of Gazprom’s most significant infrastructure projects in the Russian Far East. This plant will process multicomponent natural gas from the Yakutsk and Irkutsk gas production centers supplied through the Power of Siberia gas pipeline. Valuable components extracted during processing will become raw materials for enterprises in the gas, chemical, and other industries. The capacity of the plant will be 42 billion cubic meters of gas per year. The GPP will also include the world’s largest helium production venue, producing up to 60 million cubic meters per year. In addition to natural gas and helium, the plant’s commercial products will include ethane, propane, butane, and pentane-hexane fraction. The plant will consist of six processing lines, and the launch of the first two is scheduled for 2021. Gazprom will be gradually introducing the rest of the lines in the next four years. Thus, the plant will start working at its total capacity by the end of 2025.

In 2020, Russian company SIBUR and Chinese company Sinopec signed an agreement on creating a joint venture on the Amur Gas and Chemical Complex (AGCC). It is one of the world’s largest plants producing base polymers with a total capacity of 2.7 million tons per year. Russian’s share in the deal will be 60%, and Chinese will be 40%. The construction of the complex will be synchronized with Gazprom’s Amur GPP, so that both reach full capacity by 2025. The supply of ethane and liquefied hydrocarbon gas from Amur GPP will provide the AGCC with raw materials for further processing into high-value-added products. Due to the geographic location of the complex, the AGCC’s products will be focused primarily on the PRC market, the largest consumer of polymers in the world. The budget of the Amur Gas Chemical Complex is estimated at $10-11 billion.

Timeline: Export of electricity to China

1992 A 110 kV transmission line “Blagoveshchensk-Heihe,” connecting the power systems of Russia and China, was built. Electricity exports to China began at 30-160 million kWh per year.

2005  A long-term cooperation agreement was signed between the Unified Energy Systems (UES) of Russia and the State Grid Corporation of China.

2007  Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a joint declaration “Supporting Major Energy Projects.” This document outlined Russian-Chinese energy cooperation’s fundamental principles and approaches.

2009 Russian Eastern Energy Company (EEC) and the State Grid Corporation of China signed a contract to supply China with electricity via the existing 220 kV Blagoveshchenskaya-Aigun and 110 kV Blagoveshchensk-Heihe transmission lines. The total volume of annual electricity supplies that year amounted to 854 million kWh.

2011 Russian company EEC built a 500-kV power transmission line, “Amurskaya-Heihe,” which connected the Amur Region of Russia and the north-eastern regions of the PRC with an interstate ultrahigh voltage power transmission line. The project made it possible to significantly increase the export of electricity to China, which amounted to 1.24 billion kWh that year.

2012 A 25-year contract was signed to supply China with electricity in a total volume of 100 billion kWh. In June, the State Electric Grid Corporation of China and Inter RAO signed a memorandum on expanding electric power cooperation. Electricity exports to China in 2012 amounted to 2.63 billion kWh.

2013 An agreement to expand Russian-Chinese electricity cooperation was signed. The document envisages the complex projects for the development of coal resources in the Russian regions of the Far East, the construction of large thermal power plants, and ultra-high voltage power lines to increase the volume of electricity supplies to China. Electricity exports in 2013 amounted to 3.495 billion kWh.

Ou Xiaoming, the representative of the Russian branch of the State Grid Corporation of China, said at the Russian Energy Week international forum that in the future, the volume of electricity imports from Russia to China would not change.

Chinese investments in the economy of the Russian Far East

The Russian Central Bank (CB) publishes official statistics on foreign investments in Russia. According to the CB, the presence of Chinese capital in the economy of the Far East is surprisingly negligible. As of July 2019, China’s share in the total accumulated foreign investment in the region was only 0.8% ($530 million). For reference, Cyprus’s investments in the Far East amounted to $4.1 billion.

The specifics of the CB’s calculations explain this seeming absence of Chinese investment. The CB does not take small business investments and informal business activity into account. In addition, the Central Bank’s data does not trace the investors in offshore schemes, which account for up to 95% of foreign investments in the Far East region. As a result, many Chinese enterprises appear in the official data as Russian or, for example, Bahamian.

However, the data of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East tell a very different story. According to the Ministry, at the end of 2019, China’s share in the total volume of foreign direct investment in the region was 63% (45 projects worth $2.6 billion). In 2017, the investments were $4 billion.

 This large difference can perhaps be explained by the fact that the Ministry simply summed up the announced project estimates without investigating how much money actually got into the region. In other words, it is impossible to know precisely how significant the Chinese investment in the Far East of Russia actually is. Yet, it can be claimed with some certainty that the real numbers are higher than the official ones but less than those publicly announced by Chinese and Russian officials.

Agriculture, forestry, and construction are the three pillars of Chinese capital in the Far East. Small and medium-sized Chinese companies in the Far East have extensive experience doing business and supporting informal relations with their Russian counterpart s. Many Russian and Chinese entrepreneurs are family friends who send their children to study with each other. As a result, a solid foundation for cross-border investment has been formed.

Chinese migration

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, for the first half of 2019, one in every ten foreigners coming to Russia were Chinese citizens. During this time, 863, 000 Chinese citizens were registered for migration, which was 30% more than in the first half of 2018.

The informational and analytical agency “East of Russia” analyzed the Ministry of Internal Affairs data and discovered that there are more Chinese people among the foreign employees who got work quotas than those from other nations. Indeed, the Ministry of Labor issued more than half of all quotas for this region to Chinese citizens, but the actual numbers are relatively modest – 27.8 thousand people. Overall, at the end of the first half of 2019, 39.8 thousand Chinese had a valid work permit in Russia. These documents are usually valid for a few months.

Russians’ attitudes towards the Chinese migration is generally negative. According to the Levada Center poll published in September 2019, more than half of Russians (53%) favored limiting Chinese migration. 28% of those surveyed were ready to let Chinese people in the Russian Federation only temporarily, and 25% were in favor of a complete ban on the arrival of Chinese citizens in the country. Only 19% of the respondents were ready to see immigrants from China among the residents of Russia.

The main risk of the Chinese migration in the Far East is that the number of Chinese people permanently living in the region can increase due to their shared border of the Amur River. This could happen quickly with the construction of two bridges across the Amur in the Amur Oblast and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. Most importantly, the Chinese (both who live in the Russian Far East and those who live in the border provinces of China) consider the Russian Far East to be historically Chinese land.

Yuri Moskalenko

Case Overview

On 7 November 2019, 27-year-old Artyom Zagrebelny was detained by three Federal Security Service (FSB) officers in the entrance hall of this apartment building. The officers attempted to detain Zagrebelny using physical force to search his apartment, but he resisted and sprayed pepper spray in the officers’ direction. The spray got into the eyes of two of them, and after a brief struggle, the officers finally detained Zagrebelny.

According to the investigation, Artyom Zagrebelny knowingly used violence against the two FSB officers on duty and deliberately pepper-sprayed them, ‘being dissatisfied that he was being detained and wishing to flee.’ The two officers testified in court that they told Zagrebelny they were from the FSB, and one of them showed his official ID. Based on the conclusions of forensic expertise, the court charged Zagrebelny based on Article 318, Part 2 of the Criminal Code of Russia (“Use of violence dangerous to life or health of a government official”).

The Description of the Events

However, according to Zagrebelny, he did not know they were FSB officers because they wore civilian clothes, did not introduce themselves, and did not show any ID. The officers simply forced Zagrebelny out of the elevator of his apartment building, after which he used pepper spray against them as self-defense. As soon as one of the officers shouted he was from the FSB, Zagrebelny immediately stopped resisting and using the pepper spray.

According to the human rights center Otkrytki, Zagrebelny shared that after he was detained, the officers put him in a car and beat him up: “They started asking questions like ‘you, pravosek [member of the Right Sector, a far-right Ukrainian nationalist party], came from Khokhlyandiya [a derogatory name for Ukraine], right?’ Then someone burst into the car and started kicking me in the back with their legs. Then they grabbed me by the neck and lifted me.”

After that, the officers interrogated Zagrebelny and demanded that he confess to trying to kill a government employee (Article 317, Part 2 of the Criminal Code), all while beating Zagrebelny up and threatening to rape his wife, Margarita. On November 10, 2019, Zagrebelny went to the doctor and was found to have multiple bruises all over his body and a broken rib.

Also, according to Zagrebelny, one of the FSB officers Aleksandr Akhmetov, came up to his wife and started forcing her to commit an administrative crime. “He told her to find the Third Reich’s symbolism on the Internet, post it in some group on social media and send it to the officer on WhatsApp so he could charge her for an administrative offense, fine her for 1,000 rubles, and let her free. She asked him why she would do that, and he said it was revenge for the pepper spray. Another officer told her earlier they would keep taking revenge on her in many different ways, including the “not-so-legal” ones. Later in the day, Akhmatov messaged her on WhatsApp, saying, ‘Margarita, are you forgetting something?’ I told her not to post anything.”

Current State of the Case

Zagrebelny is currently in prison. The Prosecutor’s Office was initially asking to give Zagrebelny nine years in prison. The court of the original jurisdiction gave him five years, and after the appeal on April 22, 2021, the sentence was reduced to three years and ten months.

Why has the Memorial Human Rights Center recognized Zagrebelny as a political prisoner?

Based on the case materials, Memorial has concluded that Artyom Zagrebelny did not exceed the limits of reasonable self-defense while using pepper spray on his attackers. It was not apparent to him that the men belonged to law enforcement agencies or that their actions were lawful.

CCTV footage from the entrance hall and the elevator in Zagrebelny’s apartment building confirm his version of the events. The footage clearly shows that none of the officers showed any ID or introduced themselves. It is also doubtful that the officers suffered any injuries. The examinations carried out the day after the incident found no evidence of any injury. However, they were established during subsequent tests carried out three weeks later. The context of Zagrebelny’s case is also essential. The day Zagrebelny was detained, the FSB officers went to his home on the minor matter of checking his correspondence on the VKontakte social media site for extremism. No criminal case was opened regarding the correspondence. As described above, once in detention, Zagrebelny and his wife were subjected to extreme intimidation (forcing to confess to a nonexistent crime arrest under threat of his wife getting raped). The Memorial Human Rights Center believes that this case is strictly politically motivated, and Artyom Zagrebelny is being held in prison illegally. The Memorial demands his immediate release.

The forced diversion and landing in Minsk of a May 23, 2021 Ryanair flight en route from Greece to Lithuania, and the subsequent arrest of dissident Roman Protasevich who was aboard the flight, by the illegitimate Lukashenka regime pose an overt political and military challenge to Europe, NATO and the broad global community.  NATO members must respond forcefully by demanding (1) the immediate release of Protasevich and other political prisoners in Belarus, and (2) a prompt transition to a government that represents the will of the people of Belarus. 

The West’s passivity in the face of massive, continuous and growing oppression of the Belarusian people since summer 2020 has emboldened Lukashenka to commit what some European leaders have appropriately termed an act of “state terrorism.”

The West has shown a manifest disposition to appease Putin’s regime —Lukashenka’s sole security guarantor. It has made inappropriate overtures for a Putin-Biden summit and waived  Nord Stream 2 sanctions mandated by Congress. These actions and signals have come against the backdrop of the 2020 Russian constitutional coup, the assassination attempt against Navalny and his subsequent imprisonment on patently bogus charges, the arrests of close to 13,000 Russian activists, and the outlawing of all opposition movements and activities. All this has led Putin and Lukashenka to conclude that they eliminate their political opponents with impunity.  

Today’s state-ordered hijacking of an international passenger airplane—employing intelligence agents aboard the flight,  and accomplished via an advanced fighter-interceptor—to apprehend an exiled activist, underscores that violation of human rights is not only a domestic issue, but a matter of international safety and security.  Western governments unwilling to stand up for the victims of Putin’s and Lukashenka’s regimes are inviting future crimes against their own citizens. 

Absent a meaningful and swift response, the escalation of violence and intensity of international crimes committed  by Lukashenka’s and Putin’s regime will continue, destabilizing the world and discrediting the Western democratic institutions. 

In March 2020, under the pretense of battling the coronavirus epidemic, federal and regional authorities of Russia adopted repressive legal norms and vague, potentially dangerous criminal articles that attack constitutional rights and freedoms. Unsurprisingly, in January 2021, the adoption of these repressive norms led to a political case. 

Case overview 

On January 23, 2021, mass protests supporting Alexey Navalny, fueled by horrendous police brutality, were held in 198 Russian cities and 95 cities abroad. The next day, the Investigative Committee of Russia opened a criminal case against ten opposition activists and politicians for calling people to a peaceful protest on January 23. The criminal charge is based on Article 236 of Part 1 of the Criminal Code of Russia (envisaging a prison sentence of up to 2 years), indicatingthe incitement to violate sanitary and epidemiological rules which, by negligence, entailed a mass illness or poisoning of people, or created a threat of the onset of such consequences.” 

According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, this criminal case is politically motivated and is related to the defendants’ political beliefs violating their right to freedom of expression and the right to protest. The persecution is carried out in violation of the right to a fair trial and aims to forcibly end opposition activities and intimidate Alexey Navalny’s supporters.

Illegally prosecuted case defendants 

While awaiting trial, the case defendants are either banned from performing specific actions or are held under house arrest. House arrest implies the inability to leave the house, communicate with certain people (often, the communication is limited to the relatives living in the same house), send and receive letters, and use the phone and the Internet. 

Maria Alyokhina – activist and member of a feminist music band “Pussy Riot”. She was previously recognized by the Memorial Human Rights Center as a political prisoner and already spent two years in prison. Alyokhina is once again a victim of the repressive system and has been under strict house arrest since January 29, 2021, as part of the “Sanitary” case. 

Nikolai Lyaskin – an oppositionist who was also recognized as a political prisoner by the Memorial Human Rights Center before. Just like Maria Alyokhina, he is once again a victim of the repressive system and has been under house arrest since January 29, 2021, as part of the “Sanitary” case. On April 26, the court allowed him to leave the house for 12 hours instead of the 2 hours permitted initially. 

Oleg Navalny – Alexey Navalny’s brother, another previously recognized political prisoner who already served a sentence of almost 4 years. On April 7, 2021, as part of the “Sanitary” case, he was released from house arrest but is still banned from leaving the house at night, communicating with other case defendants, and using mail and the Internet. 

Lyubov Sobol – opposition politician and the Anti-corruption Foundation’s lawyer who was put under house arrest on January 29, 2021. She was not allowed to go to church on Sundays or take her daughter to school. 40 NGOs appealed to the United Nations to release Lyubov Sobol, stating in a joint appeal that “Sobol has been condemned to total isolation under house arrest awaiting trial on two fake criminal charges. Her only crime was peacefully calling for a more fair, free, and democratic Russia. The arbitrary arrest and detention of Sobol are a blatant violation of human rights. She must be released immediately.” On April 7, 2021, she was released from house arrest but just like Oleg Navalny Sobol is still not allowed to leave the house after 8 PM, communicate with other defendants, write letters and use the Internet. 

Konstantinas Yankauskas – municipal deputy of the Zyuzino district in Moscow. He has now been recognized by the Memorial Human Rights Center as a political prisoner twice. He has been under house arrest for two months and was released on April 7, 2021, with a ban on performing specific actions along with Lyubov Sobol. 

Dmitriy Baranovskiy – municipal deputy of the Northern Izmailovo district in Moscow, was arrested on February 1, 2021, and has been under house arrest ever since.

Anastasiya Vasilyeva – an ophthalmologist, leader of the independent labor union “Alliance of Doctors,” has spent a month under house arrest and was released on April 7, 2021, but is still banned from leaving the house at night. 

Lyudmila (Lyusya) Shtein – municipal deputy of the Basmanny district in Moscow. She has been under house arrest for two months and was released on April 7, 2021, but along with other case defendants, she is also not allowed to perform specific actions. 

Oleg Stepanov – the former coordinator of Alexey Navalny’s Headquarters in Moscow, was arrested on January 29, 2021, and has been under house arrest ever since. 

Kira Yarmysh – Alexey Navalny’s press secretary, has been under strict house arrest since January 29, 2021. As mentioned above, on April 7, 2021, the court released a few case defendants from house arrest but refused to release Kira Yarmysh. 

Six reasons why the Memorial Human Rights Center considers 10 case defendants political prisoners 

1. The restrictive measures taken to combat the spread of the coronavirus are not sufficient grounds to unconditionally ban public events and grossly violate the right to freedom of assembly, enshrined in Art. 31 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 

2. Almost all restrictions on cultural and entertainment events in Moscow were lifted before the protests. 

3. The case defendants did not know and could not know if people who were on self-isolation would respond to their calls to protest on social media. 

4. The defendants’ actions do not constitute corpus delicti as they should not be held responsible for the irresponsible behavior of others. 

5. There is no conclusive evidence that public events, carried out with the necessary precautions in the open air, can seriously increase the spread of coronavirus infection compared to attending cultural and recreational events or using public transport. 

6. Prosecuting thousands of peaceful protesters based on the violation of sanitary and epidemiological restrictions is especially cynical given that the protesters were being transported in cramped police vans, held in police departments and special detention centers in conditions that are much more conducive to the further spread of the disease.

A group of deputies from the Russian State Duma, members of the notorious “Commission to Investigate Outside Interference,” established by the Federation Council, has presented a package of new bills for consideration in Parliament. The bills’ objective is to limit rights and harness the Russian criminal justice system to persecute members of the opposition, thereby building a foundation for yet another cycle of repressions against Putin’s adversaries.
The first bill toughens criminal penalties for participating in or leading foreign nongovernmental organizations deemed undesirable by Russia. It proposes sentences of one to four years of imprisonment for participating in these organizations’ activities, and from two to six years for leading them. The bill’s authors have also sought to include punishments for working with “undesirable” organizations for the Russian citizens abroad. Upon returning to Russia, they might face criminal punishment. If adopted, this bill would also significantly increase the definition of “undesirable” organizations to include any foreign or international NGOs acting as intermediaries for monetary transactions on behalf of the organizations already deemed “undesirable” in Russia.

On May 4, the same group of deputies presented another bill. It would ban anyone who ever worked, donated, or was in any way involved with an extremist organization (the text from the State Duma uses the word “consulting”.) Given the practices of Russian courts, this definition would likely be interpreted as broadly as possible against anyone charged. The most outrageous fact is that the bill would violate the Russian Constitution and apply to anyone who ever donated money to Aleksei Navalny’s activities even before they were declared “extremist.” Navalny’s team has already calculated that this ban would affect over 200,000 people who sent donations to one of Navalny’s organizations at some point in time.

Given that any organization, particularly the opposition ones, can be declared undesirable or extremist in Russia, the motive behind these bills is clear. In anticipation of State Duma election campaigns, the Russian government seeks legal means to ban anyone inconvenient for the Kremlin from taking part in politics for years to come.

Unfortunately, there is no doubt that these bills will be adopted either in their current form or even in a more severe form. The bills most likely come from President Putin’s inner circle, and the deputies are fulfilling his wishes, like the obedient servants they are. They are not trying to hide that they are criminalizing the fight against Putin’s dictatorship. It is time to acknowledge the involvement in adopting these laws harmful and destructing. Even though many of those who participated in crimes against freedom and democracy in Russia are already subject to Western sanctions, it is important to understand that most of those crimes would not have been possible without the laws that intensify repressions against the opposition.

State Duma’s deputies are guilty of the latest attempts to entrench Putin’s dictatorship. However, when discussing sanctions against Russian oligarchs, officials, security officers, and departments, the matter of sanctions against members of Putin’s parliament is never raised. It is possible that Western parliamentarians still view them as colleagues who were elected by the Russian people, but their politics have nothing in common with Western values.

Additionally, in recent years, the Presidential Administration approved future candidates for State Duma. This applies not only to political parties allowed to be elected but also to elections in single-mandate districts. To ensure the approved candidates’ victories in their constituencies, no effort or administrative resource is spared, and “dangerous” candidates are either removed from elections or not allowed to take part in them at all. Since the deputies are prechosen, it explains the overrepresentation of former officials and members of law enforcement. Nothing could be further from democracy and transparent elections. It is not possible to respect these individuals or consider them legal representatives reflecting the will of the Russian people. The State Duma and the Federation Council represent and carry out the will of one man – Vladimir Putin. Each new law has one objective: to deny Russian citizens the ability to change the state of affairs in the country.

Russia’s parliament comprised of the State Duma and the Federation Council is the most important component of Putin’s dictatorial machinery. Neither the State Duma’s nor the Federation Council’s members are officially elected by citizens’ vote, yet they are responsible for everything happening in Russia. It is hardly possible to consider it a parliament when Andrei Lugovoi, a person accused of poisoning Aleksandr Litvinenko, is a State Duma member (all criminal charges against Lugovoi have been removed). It will not come as a surprise if following the fall State Duma elections, a whole new faction of saboteurs and poisoners will take office and start adopting new destructive laws.

Putin’s parliamentarians are silencing Russian people’s voices. There is hope that Western sanctions might force them to reconsider their actions. Those behind the most shocking and repressive laws, and those who voted for their approval, deserve the most severe sanctions.

On May 6, 2020, at least five YouTube channels belonging to key Russian opposition leaders and platforms received notifications from YouTube that some of their content had been removed due to its being qualified as “spam, deceptive practices and scams”. 

They included: 

Ilya Yashin (343k YouTube subscribers)

Vladimir Milov (218k YouTube subscribers) 

Leonid Volkov (117k YouTube subscribers)

Novaya Gazeta (277k YouTube Subscribers) 

Sota Vision (248k YouTube Subscribers)

Most likely, there are other Russian pro-democracy channels that have received similar notifications at the same time, and we are putting together the list of all affected by this censorship campaign. 

The identical letters received from YouTube by the five account holders stated:

“Our team has reviewed your content, and, unfortunately, we think it violates our spam, deceptive practices and scams policy. We’ve removed the following content from YouTube:

URL: https://votesmart.appspot.com/

YouTube has removed urls from descriptions of videos posted on these accounts that linked to Alexey Navalny’s Smart Voting website (votesmart.appspot.com).

By doing this, and to our great shock and disbelief, YouTube has acted to enforce the Kremlin’s policies by qualifying Alexey Navalny’s Smart Voting system and its website as “spam, deceptive practices and scams”. 

This action has not only technically disrupted communication for the Russian civil society which is now under a deadly siege by Putin’s regime, but it has rendered a serious and lasting damage to its reputation and legitimacy of Smart Voting approach. 

In reality, Smart Voting system is not a spam, scam or a “deceptive practice”, but instead it’s a fully legitimate system of choosing and supporting candidates in Russian elections who have a chance of winning against the ruling “United Russia” party candidates. There’s absolutely nothing illegal, deceptive or fraudulent about the Smart Voting or any materials on its website.

We don’t know the reasons behind such YouTube actions, but they are an unacceptable suppression of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the Russian people and help the Kremlin’s suppression of civil rights and freedoms by banning the Smart Voting system and not allowing free political competition with the ruling “United Russia” party. 

This is an extremely dangerous precedent in an environment where opposition activities in Russia are being literally outlawed;  key opposition figures are jailed, exiled, arrested and attacked with criminal investigations; independent election campaigning is prohibited; and social media networks remain among the very few channels still available to the Russian opposition to communicate with the ordinary Russians.

We demand a  swift and decisive action on this matter from the international community, to make sure that YouTube corrects its stance toward Russian opposition channels, and ensures that such suppression of peaceful, legal  pro-democracy voices does not happen again. 

The new round of sanctions against Russia’s authorities naturally begs the question: will they simply backfire, rallying Russia’s citizens around Putin and worsening the already-negative perception of the West? The answer depends on how tangible and bold those sanctions actually are. It also depends on how they are presented to Russian society – not only through state propaganda, but from the West as well, which has various means of conveying its own opinion to Russia’s population.

The key to understanding the true feelings of Russian society and its potential reactions to new sanctions might be found in Putin’s recent address to the Federal Assembly and his nearly simultaneous statements about de-escalating tensions on the Ukrainian border. It is important to not lose sight of the fact that since the early 2010s, Putin has not made a single effort to satisfy Russians who identify with the opposition. He prefers ignoring or intimidating anyone who expresses dissatisfaction with his politics. That is why he first and foremost addresses his base, and focuses on smoothing over his relationship with them and them alone.

The very fact that most of Putin’s address was dedicated to the social problems Russia face and promises to provide all kinds of payments and benefits, whereas the traditional threats to the West and foreign policy and ideology in general were a distant second and presented in a far more peaceful tone speaks volumes about the radical shifts taking place, not only in Putin’s head, but in Russian society as a whole.

First of all, the issue of confrontation with the West, the situation in Ukraine, and international policy are not interesting to Putin’s target audience, and may even annoy them. By all accounts, the night before his address, Putin received reliable information that Russian citizens do not want war on any scale. Not only that, they are so strongly and clearly against the idea, that they can no longer be ignored.

Secondly, Putin’s electorate is poor and does not enjoy a high quality of life. They are becoming increasingly disgruntled. Thus, Putin found himself forced to focus on promises for social assistance for the people, specifically some form of direct payments. He has now tied his own political prospects to his regime’s ability to satisfy growing social obligations in a context of increasing problems on the Russian economy.

Russian domestic politics have now been reduced to the most primitive formula: on the eve of the elections, Putin gives his electorate additional money from the budget, thereby buying their votes and general loyalty. He simply does not have any inspirational slogans or ideology to mobilize society.

As a result, international sanctions designed to hit at the Russian economy and state revenues will also strike a blow to the Putin regime. The minute he is unable to fulfill all of his obligations to the citizens, violence will be the only means left for him to hold onto power. But this time, things will be different – Putin will not just be fighting against the political opposition, but rather the vast swathes of society on which he has relied for the past two decades.

There is no doubt that Putin and his propaganda will attempt to blame the West for all of the trouble, but that approach is already starting to raise some eyebrows.

To begin with, the very idea that the West is capable of inflicting serious damage on the Russian economy through sanctions has broken down some of the peoples’ trust in Putin: it means he is not quite as all-powerful as he claims, and his reassurances that Russia is a strong, independent economy with no fear of any sanctions is nothing more than a lie. What’s more, the people will inevitably start to demand a normalization of relations with the West. Sociologists have already begun to note this phenomenon – if the sanctions are such a burden for Russia to bear, isn’t it time to start seeking paths toward reconciliation with the rest of the world? The ultimate goal of confrontation is inexplicable given that Russian society is decidedly not willing to engage in any wars. 

It is important to note that the West has not yet pulled the lever that the Russian opposition has been offering it for many years – large-scale personal sanctions against Putin’s inner circle – Russia’s richest and most influential families, including that of the Russian President himself.

Striking such a blow to the main beneficiaries of the current Russian regime would resolve several issues at once. It would force oligarchs under sanctions to consider decisive steps aimed at removing Putin – if only to save their own capital and international businesses. It would also make it very difficult for Putin’s propaganda to leverage the sanctions to consolidate the electorate. Paradoxically, those who most support the capitalist economy are the same people who oppose Putin, as he relies on poor, embittered people with nostalgia for the USSR, who believe that capitalism and capitalists are evil. Harsh sanctions against the billionaires in Putin’s entourage will arouse nothing but Schadenfreude among these sectors of society, and any appeals for sympathy from the authorities will likely not go down well among those who are mainly concerned with simple survival. The effect will in fact be quite the opposite, once they begin to wonder why the authorities are suddenly so concerned about the very richest, while seemingly unbothered by the problems of the very poorest.

It is important to note that “sanctions against Russia” is a very unfortunate turn of phrase, which is often heard in official statements. This is a gift for Putin’s propaganda machine, and feeds fears about “Russophobia” in the West. In the context of today’s Russia, it would make more sense to talk about “sanctions against Putin,” or “sanctions against the Putin regime,” focusing on the fact that the West, its leaders, and people have nothing against Russia or its citizens, and that a free, democratic Russia and its people would be accepted as friends, partners, and allies. That kind of a shift in focus would make it easier to disseminate the idea in the widest sectors of the population and the administrative and economic elite that Putin is Russia’s problem, and denying him power is the quickest, and in fact the only path toward normalizing all areas of life in Russia.

Speaking at a climate summit of the world leaders organized by the United States, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, for the first time in history, discussed environmental challenges the way leaders of the developed world discuss the issue. Not only did he recognize the need for urgent action to reduce emissions, but he also vocalized a number of concrete steps to be taken by Russia and called for broad international cooperation. However, taking his statements as a cause for celebration would premature, as they will not result in a major shift in policy.

In order to understand the meaning of Vladimir Putin’s message, one needs to take a close look at the energy policies and energy strategy currently governing Russia’s approach to the issue. The statements made by the Russian president are clearly aimed at two goals. The first goal is to convince the global community that Russia is not an irresponsible polluter unconcerned about the climate crisis, but one of the global leaders in combatting climate change. The second one is attracting foreign investments into climate-beneficial projects in Russia by pretending to be genuinely interested in joining the efforts of the global community to address environmental challenges.

Vladimir Putin began his speech at the summit by restating the line long used by the Russian diplomats at the UN climate talks: Russia’s emissions have declined since 1990 from 3.1 billion to 1.6 billion tons of CO2 equivalent due to Russia’s efforts in “restructuring” its industry and its energy sector.

In reality, the drop in emissions did not happen as a result of the concerted efforts by the Russian authorities, but because of the breakup of the Soviet Union, when one country with its many polluters has split into many.

More important than the validity of historic claims, however, is what Russia intends to do to reduce emissions moving forward. According to the Presidential Decree No. 666 signed in November 2020, Russia’s greenhouse gas emissions are in fact expected to rise by almost 40% by 2030 (VTimes; in Russian). Putin might as well have said at the summit: those tons of carbon dioxide that you won’t be emitting, Russia will gladly emit for you.

Today, about 60% of Russia’s energy needs is satisfied by natural gas, 16% by coal, around 13% by oil, 8% by nuclear energy, and 3% by large hydropower (VTimes; in Russian). When the Russian president says at the global climate summit that 45% of Russia’s energy is produced from low-carbon energy sources, he apparently means not the entire energy sector, but only that generating electricity. But Russia is a northern country. A considerable portion of the energy it produces and consumed is thermal energy and not electricity.

Adopted in 2020, Russia’s Energy Strategy 2035 is unambiguous about the development priorities it lays out for the next decade and a half. At a time when the global community is undertaking sweeping measures to cut its use of fossil fuels and reach carbon neutrality, Russia is planning to ramp up fossil fuel production. In the next 15 years, according to the Strategy’s rather optimistic scenario, coalmining is set to increase by about 50% and gas-drilling — by almost 40%, while oil production is expected to remain at today’s levels.

For all its booming development around the globe, renewable energy, plays a negligible role in Russia. In 2020, its share in Russia’s energy mix was about 1%, and no serious steps to stimulate its growth are envisaged in government plans. Energy efficiency, which could become one of the major areas of climate work, is all but ignored in the Energy Strategy. Today, Russia uses twice as much energy per unit of GDP as the global average, and three times as much as in the European Union.

No efforts are planned by Russia in the foreseeable future to phase out fossil fuels – on the contrary, production and exports are only set to rise. How, then, is Russia planning to curb its emissions?

In his statements at the climate summit, Vladimir Putin spoke about how Russia’s forests absorb large amounts of carbon dioxide – another point stressed repeatedly by Russia’s representatives at the UN climate talks, much like the position that this absorbing capacity is underestimated by the West. In essence, rather than reducing actual emissions, the proposal Russia routinely makes at the climate conferences boils down to simply changing calculation methods to evaluate its forests’ carbon-absorption capacity. However, there is a problem with that approach: as the UN data shows, the capacity of Russian forests to absorb carbon emissions is rapidly depleting due to aging, fires, deforestation, and other factors (VTimes; in Russian). The most pessimistic forecasts anticipate that by mid-century, carbon dioxide absorption by Russian forests will shrink from 700 million tons in СО2 equivalent per year to a mere 100 million. In other words, Russia cannot hide behind its forests anymore.

The Russian president proposes to increase international cooperation to combat climate change and, speaking of climate solutions, mentions specifically carbon-capture technology, nuclear energy, and hydrogen production. Therefore, when Vladimir Putin speaks of providing incentives for foreign investors willing to participate in climate projects in Russia, the audience is led to assume that he speaks of projects in these areas and not just climate projects in general. Such an assumption is erroneous, unfortunately.

There is a prescient term with established international usage to characterize the technologies mentioned by Putin, and that term is “false solutions.” Nuclear generation, for instance, is too expensive and too time-consuming to establish to efficiently bring down emissions, and, furthermore, it entails risks of nuclear proliferation and large-scale accidents.

The real reason Vladimir Putin is promoting nuclear energy is that reactor export projects are used to increase his political influence in other countries. The loans issued by Russia and backed by the Russian budget for the construction of nuclear power plants abroad amount to about $100 billion, yet no investors unaffiliated with the Russian government are willing to participate in these projects (Vedomosti; in Russian).

Within Russia itself, however, nuclear energy development plans are rather modest: fewer reactors are currently expected to be built than are needed to replace the old units scheduled for decommissioning in the coming 10 years. (Heinrich Böll Stiftung; in German).

Russia has designed a floating nuclear power plant that it plans to export to other countries, which means a rather significant nuclear proliferation risk due to the high level of enrichment of the fuel used. Taking into account the extremely underwhelming potential for emissions reduction that nuclear technology can offer, are we prepared to accept the risk of proliferation of nuclear materials all over the planet?

Hydrogen production is a promising direction – but only if this is green hydrogen, that is hydrogen produced using renewable energy. What Russia has in view is producing hydrogen primarily for the purpose of exporting to Europe – and doing so by using fossil fuels (gas) and nuclear energy. The export potential of such very ungreen hydrogen is quite dubious, since, in contrast to Russia, the rest of the world intends to stop using fossil fuels.

And as for carbon capture, the technology behind the idea is nowhere near as developed or effective as it needs to be to help avert the worst consequences of climate change in the foreseeable future. There are indications that it may be possible to trap some of the emitted carbon dioxide, but no clarity exists as to whether it could be stored for long periods of time with no risk of leakage. And let’s not forget, that carbon capture is deemed a false solution precisely because, while diverting attention from the pressing energy transition needs, it lulls one into a hopeful expectation of continuing to burn fossil fuels for as long as the fuels are there to burn.

As one evaluates all the points made by the Russian president in his speech at the summit, the following troubling picture emerges:

  • In the next 10 to 15 years, Russia will ratchet up its production and exports of fossil fuels, increasing global greenhouse gas emissions.
  • Russia is somewhat open to technologies that may help it put a green sheen on its policies while concealing its contribution to the growing emissions.
  • No development of technologies that could lead to real emissions reductions – those in the fields of renewable energy or energy efficiency – are likely.
  • And if one sets aside Vladimir Putin’s climate rhetoric and takes a hard look at the real situation at hand, it becomes very clear that Russia’s climate action is only possible to the extent that it is dictated by Moscow’s export considerations. Within the country, the dirtiest sources of energy will still be in use, while the export shipping routes will carry what will be in demand abroad.

The only real way to decrease Russia’s contribution to the global climate burden, therefore, is to stop importing any fossil fuels Russia has to offer.

The events of the past few days have clearly demonstrated that Putin and his regime perceive Russia’s youth, especially its most active and politicized members, as the biggest enemy.

The Kremlin’s attacks on Aleksei Navalny and his movement, attacks on the Internet, attacks on the student-ran magazine DOXA, attacks on education, targeted repressions throughout Russia — all of them in one way or another target youth, more than any other group.

This comes as no surprise. After all, young people are most active online, they are the backbone of Navalny’s movement, they take part in protest rallies, attend all kinds of lectures and discussions, create and consume independent media, travel abroad, and participate in volunteer and crowdfunding projects. Moreover, they share the same information space as their peers around the world — they listen to the same music, play the same video games, follow the same fashion trends, watch the same shows, and generally view the world through the same lense as young people in Western Europe and North America.

Certainly, in each demographic group of Russia’s population there are people who subscribe to Western values; conversely, there are young people in Russia who support Putin. But young Russians generally lead lives and are steeped in values that make them organic opponents of the conservative, backward-looking, retrograde, and xenophobic Putin establishment.

Putin has focused his wrath on Aleksei Navalny precisely because by 44, Navalny has managed to find an approach that appealed to Russian citizens 10, 20, and even 30 years his junior. In contrast, Putin, who has no plans to step down any time in the foreseeable future, simply does not have the creativity, tools, or even desire to reach younger generations of Russians. This makes perfect sense — Vladimir Putin’s electorate base is the older generation, and he is concentrating his efforts on pleasing them, pandering to them, and manipulating their emotions — the most prominent of which is a nostalgia for the days of the Soviet Union.

Had Putin come to power democratically, had he actually faced serious criticism from opponents, and had he gotten used to fighting for every electoral vote, perhaps he would make at least a cursory attempt at appealing to younger voters. But Putin is a product of the KGB and the bureaucratic apparatus. He has never taken part in any free elections, and therefore has no intentions of trying to win over any naysayers.

Outside observers need to keep in mind that when Putin speaks about the Russian people or on their behalf, he is only referring to those who support him. He views anyone who does not support him as a traitor, who should, and in fact must be denied any political standing or representation.

Last week’s story of repressions against the editorial board of a student magazine DOXA is very telling. DOXA gained prominence among the general public in 2019, against the backdrop of protests in response to the Kremlin’s refusal to allow opposition candidates to run for the Moscow City Duma. College students from various Moscow universities took part in the protests, and DOXA threw its support behind them. The publication and its editorial office have been watched by security agencies since then, and by 2021, the surveillance was in full force, culminating in a series of searches, interrogations, and an investigation, resulting in DOXA employees placed under house arrest and officially banned from engaging in any journalistic activity.

It would be absurd to claim that DOXA had any real ability to influence the political situation in Russia or any significant groups of the population. After all, this is a specialized publication for students, graduates, and professors from Moscow’s most prestigious universities. But it is for this exact reason that the magazine has been so closely watched, and reprisals against the editorial staff have been so over-the-top, despite the outpour of support from professors, students, journalists, and members of the creative intelligentsia. The politicization of young people in Moscow is extremely concerning to the Russian authorities. Widespread street protests in the capital have been a nightmare for Putin for years. That is why any approval of protests, taking part in them, or calling on others to join them, particularly among youth, are punished with an increasing severity.

The persecution of DOXA sends a clear and powerful message to all you people in — if the authorities are not afraid to carry out public reprisals against youth in Moscow — in the plain view of the domestic and international public — then no one else can expect any mercy or indulgence, either. Like many other activists in today’s Russia, DOXA’s editorial board is accused of inciting people to take part in unsanctioned rallies expressing solidarity with Aleksei Navalny last January. The video that landed the students in court is entitled They Cannot Defeat the Youth. It was released following Navalny’s arrest, and contains the following words:

“Universities, colleges, and schools intimidate students, threatening them with expulsion or other sanctions. We demand an end to the destruction of education, which our generation has yet to rebuild. The authorities have declared a war on youth, but we are the youth. And we are sure to win.”

The mere mention of schoolchildren in the video has been taken by the authorities as pretext to file the same charges against DOXA’s editorial board as those filed against the head of Navalny’s headquarters, Leonid Volkov — i.e. involving minors in unlawful activities. This includes participation in banned protest rallies.

The video’s description of what is happening in Russia is, in fact, spot on — Putin has, indeed, declared war on youth, and his regime is spending most of its efforts on repressing and intimidating young Russian citizens, effectively subordinating the entire education system to the security apparatus, and preserving the current regime at any cost — robbing entire generations of Russian citizens of their future, condemning them to either leave their own country, or live isolated and in fear of the world.

Putin’s main opposition in Russia today is not the handful of dissidents or political activists who have stood in the streets for decades. It is the vast majority of the Russian youth that is on the rise. The leaders of the opposition today are whoever the youth hold in such regard. For this reason, anyone who is willing and able to support resistance to Putin’s regime would do well to focus their efforts on the younger segments audience. Sooner or later, the youth will inevitably win. And even a mighty dictator such as Vladimir Putin can escape the passage of time and death.

On April 15, 2021,  President Biden signed new sanctions against a number of officials and agents of the Russian Federation in connection with malign international activities conducted by the Russian government.

The list of individuals sanctioned by the new law includes Leonid Mikhalyuk, director of the Federal Security Service in the Russian-occupied Crimea.

A report issued by Free Russia Foundation, Media Initiative for Human Rights and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union in December 202, identified 16 officials from Russian law enforcement and security agencies as well as the judiciary operating on the territory of the Ukrainian Crimean Peninsula currently occupied by the Russian Federation. These individuals have been either directly involved or have overseen political persecution of three prominent Crimean human rights defenders – Emir-Usein Kuku, Sever Mustafayev and Emil Kurbedinov.

Leonid Mikhailiuk is one of these officials. He has been directly involved and directed the repressive campaign in the occupied Crimea, including persecution of innocent people on terrorism charges and massive illegal searches. The persecution of Server Mustafayev was conducted under his supervision. As the head of the FSB branch in Crimea, he is in charge of its operation and all operatives working on politically motivated cases are his subordinates. 

Within the extremely centralized system of the Russian security services, Mikhailiuk is clearly at the top rank of organized political persecution and human rights violations.

Free Russia Foundation welcomes the new sanctions and hopes that all other individuals identified in the report will also be held accountable.

Things are heating up on the Ukrainian border right now. To the casual observer, it might look like a repeat of what we saw in 2014. In fact, what we are seeing in 2021 is the exact opposite of 2014, and something far more sinister is afoot.

2014’s attack on Ukraine was a rude awakening for everyone — for Ukraine itself, for Russian society, and for the West. Putin managed to leverage the element of surprise and achieve victory in Crimea. In Donbass, things were not so easy — in part because Ukraine had begun to resist and had time to repel attacks of the Russian-backed separatists.

In 2021, the landscape has turned upside down. Today, no one questions whether Putin is capable of aggression. That reputation for treacherous opportunism has become his trump card in geopolitical games. By all accounts, Putin is convinced that the West will blink first and make concessions, no matter what. This belief lies beneath his increasingly aggressive rhetoric and conspicuous concentration of troops along the Ukrainian border.

While military hostilities could break out at any moment, starting a war is not Putin’s real goal. War, after all, is unpredictable. The Crimean adventure was a success for Putin precisely because it was quick, bloodless, and victorious. If his next war becomes protracted and bloody, Putin will face serious problems with his own nuclear electorate, as well as his elites who would never forgive him for the defeat, and possibly would go even further and attempt to oust him in retribution.

Putin’s goal is not to start a conflict. Instead, he aims to achieve his goals by scaring the Western elites with the very prospect of war. In an extraordinary situation, no doubt, he would be prepared to fight, but only with Ukraine, and only with guarantees that Ukraine would receive no meaningful assistance from the outside. Putin can afford only victory, and he will shy away from any hostilities if failure is in the realm of possibilities.

So, what does Putin really want from Ukraine? Let’s start with the basics: due to a variety of circumstances, Crimea, annexed by Russia, is suffering from water shortages. Prior to the occupation, mainland Ukraine supplied the peninsula with water. In part, Putin’s current theatrics may be aimed at forcing Ukraine to resume supplying Crimea with water. This could easily be “sold” to the Western public as a humanitarian mandate without forcing Putin to renegotiate any key issues. Naturally, to the Russian audiences, it would be presented as a major victory for Putin, and to a large extent, it would be — the water issue would have been resolved, and Ukraine would have made concessions, including indirect recognition of the new Crimean status.

The water issue is just one part of the larger problem. Putin does not need Ukraine as much as he needs to legalize the annexation of Crimea. There are two ways for him to do this. First, he could strongarm the West to start suggesting to Ukraine that it better accept Crimea as part of Russia. Alternatively, he could try to pressure the Ukrainian government directly to recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea, which would immediately render any Western sanctions moot.

Despite the fact that Russia has dedicated considerable efforts on shaping the public opinion in Western countries, it is Ukraine that the Kremlin views as the weak link — and rightly so. In its current state, the Ukrainian government is unwilling to recognize Crimea as part of Russia, just as it is unwilling to acquiesce to being within the Russian sphere of influence. This means that Russia would need to bring down the current Ukrainian government, and then negotiate with its new authorities on more favorable terms. In this sense, the Kremlin may view the threat of war, and military operations in particular, as a pragmatic attempt to resolve this matter.

But in addition to these goals, there is another, far more sinister and far-reaching goal behind the current escalations. Putin wants the West, and specifically the United States, to recognize him not only as an equal player on the world stage, but also as that free to do whatever he pleases both within Russia and any countries that he considers within its sphere of influence.

In Putin’s dream world, the West would not only stop asking him uncomfortable questions about his repressions on the political opposition or the state of human rights inside Russia but would also actively muzzle his critics around the world, so as not to provoke the dangerous tyrant in the Kremlin who is ready for war at any moment. He clearly views Ukraine and other countries bordering Russia, particularly those that were once republics of the former USSR, as those belonging to Russia’s zone of influence, where no change of government should take place without the approval of the Kremlin. That is why his antics are not just about Ukraine. Unfortunately for Ukraine, it has been used as a convenient testing ground for Putin’s techniques for pressuring the West and intimidating Western political elites with his audacity and willingness to trample on all principles of contemporary international politics.

All of this aside, we can’t lose sight of the fact that Putin’s main goal has always been holding onto power in Russia. People’s lives, the future of entire countries and nations, including that of Russia itself, only concern him in the context of achieving that goal. Just as annexing Crimea in 2014 helped Putin rebrand his regime domestically, becoming significantly more brutal, current situation with Ukraine is likely to lead to similar outcome — Putin’s regime in Russia will become more ruthless, punishing anyone who dares resist him.

For this reason, as tensions rise along the Ukrainian border, the level of police terror is also growing inside Russia. The leader of the Russian opposition, Alexey Navalny, is being held illegally in prison with the treatment amounting to torture, and all critics of the regime are subjected to brutal reprisals. The Kremlin propaganda portraits anyone dissatisfied with the Putin regime as a Western agent, and the authorities have proposed prosecuting them “under wartime laws”.

Putin’s adventurism abroad may indeed lead to war in the near future. Even if we dodge a bullet this time, Western elites need to understand that as long as Putin is Russia’s leader, global tensions will continue to grow, and any concessions made to him will be interpreted as proof that he has chosen the right strategy.

On April 7, well-known Russian opposition politician and Council chairman, Ilya Yashin, a deputy of the Krasnoselsky municipal district, received an electronic notification that a court sentenced him to a fine of approximately 15,000 rubles for taking part in a municipal deputy congress that was later broken up by the authorities. Neither the fact that the congress was broken up nor the fine itself were any surprise in today’s Russia. What is surprising is that Yashin’s trial had been set for the day after, April 8.

Several media outlets picked up the strange notice after Yashin published it on social media. However, on April 8, this did nothing to stop the judge from issuing the same sentence, which had audaciously been sent a day earlier. This was no shock to anyone, least of all Ilya Yashin. Shocking would have been if the judge’s sentence had differed from the one Yashin was notified of in advance. This is how things work in Putin’s court system: After widespread protests, the courts systematically issue the same verdicts and sentences. This is clear proof of what everyone already knows – the courts are biased, and decisions are made in advance of any actual proceedings.

A great deal of criticism has been lodged against Russian courts, but this issue is too serious to simply look away. As a player on the global economy and world stage, the Russian Federation demands that the rest of the world recognize its courts’ decisions. That is to say, an individual who has been convicted of a crime by a Russian court should be recognized as a criminal by the entire world.

To many, this is already misleading. For example, what does it actually mean if someone has been convicted in a Russian court of political extremism or even terrorism? Does it mean that he aided and abetted or actually carried out a criminal act? That he actually killed or was planning on killing peaceful citizens and law enforcement officers? That he held criminal opinions? And if all sentences for these types of convictions are in fact politicized, does it mean that there are no terrorists in Russia?

Problems like these will only grow more complicated. The more politicized court decisions are, and the more examples we have of the courts’ hand in political repression, the less trust there will be in any rulings or sentences from Russian courts. It’s not difficult to imagine where this will lead in the foreseeable future.

There are already many complaints about Russian courts, whether criminal or economic – and in many cases, they are less-than-impartial in these matters. But when it comes to politics, the Russian justice system is irrefutably an instrument of punitive power, with no regard at all for the presumption of innocence or the supposedly adversarial nature of any proceeding.

As in the Soviet Union, political cases are not necessarily tried in political courts. The Russian authorities are in a campaign to paint any critics as common criminals, as if their legal troubles stemmed from their own criminal activities. For this reason, a political trial in today’s Russia is any trial in which the defendant is a political or civil activist, journalist, publisher, politician, or even just a passerby accused by the authorities of taking part in some kind of political activism. The charges themselves in these cases are of little importance, as is any evidence, or lack thereof. For example, historian Yuri Dmitriev, who was researching mass executions in Karelia under Stalin, was charged with pedophilia.

For some time now, the most important evidence in Putin’s courts is the opinion of an expert witness brought on by the investigation or a certificate issued by the intelligence services. In Stalin’s day, investigators would torture their victims in order to extract a confession. Putin’s courts need no such formalities, as they unconditionally trust whatever the investigator has to say, as well as any statements made by experts involved in the case, no matter how biased or unsubstantiated.

All of Alexey Navalny’s court proceedings are the most shameless example of what Putin has done to the Russian court system. Navalny has been tried for stealing timber, commercial fraud, insulting a war veteran, and violating the terms of a suspended sentence. And yet, to any casual observer, it is obvious that in each case the judges were not only biased, but openly working in the interest of the authorities, as part of Vladimir Putin’s punitive system.

Alexey Navalny and Ilya Yashin are no ordinary Russian citizens. But their lot is in no way extraordinary. Because of the publicity that surrounds them, it is easy for anyone to closely follow the workings of the Russian justice system through their cases. Many lesser-known political activists and ordinary citizens have also been tried and convicted for trumped-up charges as they fall victim to Putin’s punitive machine in retaliation for hasty posts on social media. However, as many human rights defenders say, in cases that have nothing to do with politics, the courts nearly always take the side of the investigator. Again, this is no surprise. This is not an issue affecting individual judges, but the system as a whole.

What has happened to Russia’s courts is a feature, not a bug in Putin’s dictatorship. Under Putin’s leadership, Russia’s justice system has been methodically twisted to the point of becoming a targeted instrument of political oppression and justification for any decision made at the very top.

In order to ensure that anyone who is deemed inconvenient is guaranteed the ruling and sentence that best serves the authorities’ needs, officially, all Russian citizens have the right to a fair trial. After all, there can be no court system in which some cases are decided fairly and others are not.

When Russia returns to the democratic path of development, its new leadership will have to put in herculean efforts in order to overhaul the entire justice system. We want to believe that the errors of Boris Yeltsin and his team will not be repeated, and that any judges who have taken part in the system of repression will be dismissed and answer for their crimes. Thousands of cases will have to be reviewed, sentences will need to be overturned, and the very notion of the judiciary’s makeup will need to be reformed. It will take years to return any sense of authority to Russia’s courts in the eyes of Russian citizens and the international community.

In the meantime, it is important to remember that right now, Russian courts and Russian judges are just one more part of Putin’s machine. The judiciary as an institution as it is known in the civilized world has been destroyed in the Russian Federation, and any verdicts or sentences should be seriously questioned in Russia, and especially beyond its borders.

April 8, 2021

We, the undersigned, are shocked and troubled by the most recent news of Alexei Navalny’s condition in prison. 

Russia’s leading opposition figure is reported to suffer severe back pain with losing sensitivity in parts of his legs. It is no more than six months since he survived a vicious poisoning attack with a nerve agent that has long-term crippling effects on his health. In prison, he is systematically denied any medical treatment. On top, prison guards wake him up every hour at night, a practice amounting to torture by sleep deprivation according to his lawyers. This is why medical experts called on the Russian authorities to allow Mr. Navalny’s treatment and why he himself now resorted to a hunger strike. Let’s not forget: Mr. Navalny’s incarceration itself is a travesty of justice – he was formally sent to prison for not checking in with Russian authorities on a fabricated case (as confirmed by European Court of Human Rights) when he was recuperating in Germany from poisoning and subsequent coma.

Russian authorities with its secret services tried to kill Alexei Navalny last August, they may now be attempting the same, in a slower, even more cynical way. 

Europe has offered Alexei Navalny a place to recover from the attempt at his life. Specialized labs in Germany, France and Sweden confirmed the assassination attempt used Novichok, an internationally banned chemical weapon. Angela Merkel personally met Mr Navalny in hospital and many other Western leaders expressed their solidarity after the poisoning attack. We need to intervene again. 

We urge Russia to immediately allow medical treatment of Alexei Navalny and release him from prison. We call on the EU Council as well as EU member states’ leaders to reach out to Russian authorities to request the immediate release of Alexei Navalny, which was mandated by European Court of Human Rights’ decision in February 2021. In addition, we demand the EU Council task EU ambassador to Russia to conduct, together partners from the UK, Canada and the US, a visit of the prison facility and meet Alexei Navalny. It is critical now that Alexei Navalny’s fate became the symbol of injustice many thousands face because of increasing brutality of Russian regime against its own citizens. 

In December 2020, the EU launched its Global Human Rights Sanction Regime modelled on so-called Magnitsky Act. This law has been inspired by one Sergei Magnitsky, a brave Russian lawyer who was tortured to death in prison in 2009 – he was systematically denied treatment when he developed a serious medical condition. We still can act now in case of Alexei Navalny so we avoid commemorating later.

Marek HILSER, Senator, Czech Republic

Andrius KUBILIUS, MEP, EPP, Lithuania

Lukas WAGENKNECHT, Senator, Czech Republic

Žygimantas PAVILIONIS, MP, Lithuania

Miroslav BALATKA, Senator, Czech Republic

André GATTOLIN, Senator, France

Mikulas BEK, Senator, Czech Republic 

Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, MEP, Renew, Romania

David SMOLJAK, Senator, Czech Republic 

Petras AUŠTREVIČIUS, MEP, Renew, Lithuania

Tomas FIALA, Senator, Czech Republic 

Liudas MAŽYLIS, MEP, EPP Lithuania

Zdenek NYTRA, Senator, Czech Republic 

Dace MELBĀRDE, MEP, ECR, Latvia

Jan SOBOTKA, Senator, Czech Republic 

Matas MALDEIKIS, MP, Lithuania

Jiri RUZICKA, Senator, Czech Republic 

Bernard GUETTA, MEP, Renew, France

Jaromira VITKOVA, Senator, Czech Republic 

Rasa JUKNEVIČIENĖ, MEP, EPP, Lithuania

Petr OREL, Senator, Czech Republic 

Tomasz FRANKOWSKI, MEP, EPP, Poland 

Miroslava NEMCOVA, Senator, Czech Republic

Hermann TERTSCH, MEP, ECR, Spain

Premysl RABAS, Senator, Czech Republic 

Aušra MALDEIKIENĖ, MEP, EPP, Lithuania

Ladislav KOS, Senator, Czech Republic 

Attila ARA-KOVÁCS, MEP, S&D, Hungary

Sarka JELINKOVA, Senator, Czech Republic

Erik MARQUARDT, MEP, Greens, Germany

Pavel FISCHER, Senator, Czech Republic

Pernille WEISS, MEP, EPP, Denmark

Helena LANGSADLOVA, MP, Czech Republic

Roberts ZĪLE, MEP, ECR, Latvia

Jan LIPAVSKY, MP, Czech Republic

Klemen GROŠELJ, MEP, Renew, Slovenia

Pavel ZACEK, MP, Czech Republic

Riho TERRAS, MEP, EPP, Estonia

Ondrej BENESIK, MP, Czech Republic 

Miriam LEXMANN, MEP, EPP, Slovakia

Frantisek KOPRIVA, MP, Czech Republic 

Sandra KALNIETE, MEP, EPP, Latvia

Petr GAZDIK, MP, Czech Republic 

Jerzy BUZEK, MEP, EPP, Poland

Tomas MARTINEK, MP, Czech Republic 

Janina OCHOJSKA, MEP, EPP, Poland

Jan BARTOSEK, MP, Czech Republic

Eugen TOMAC, MEP, EPP, Romania

Jan FARSKY, MP, Czech Republic

Ivan ŠTEFANEC, MEP, EPP, Slovakia

Roman SKLENAK, MP, Czech Republic

Krzysztof HETMAN, MEP, EPP, Poland

Frantisek VACHA, MP, Czech Republic

Ivars IJABS, MEP, Renew, Latvia

Marek VYBORNY, MP, Czech Republic

Franc BOGOVIČ, MEP, EPP, Slovenia

Zbynek STANJURA, MP, Czech Republic

Radvilė MORKŪNAITĖ-MIKULĖNIENĖ, MP, Lithuania

Petr FIALA, MP, Czech Republic

Raphaël GLUCKSMANN, MEP, S&D, France

Vít RAKUSAN, MP, Czech Republic

Juozas OLEKAS, MEP, S&D, Lithuania

Jaroslav VYMAZAL, MP, Czech Republic

Assita KANKO, MEP, ECR, Belgium

Adela SIPOVA, Senator, Czech Republic

Radosław SIKORSKI, MEP, EPP, Poland

Róża THUN UND HOHENSTEIN, MEP, EPP, Poland

Javier NART, MEP, Renew, Spain

Andrzej HALICKI, MEP, EPP, Poland

Alexander ALEXANDROV YORDANOV, MEP, EPP, Bulgaria

Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, MEP, Renew, Czech Republic

Andreas SCHIEDER, MEP, S&D, Austria

Leopoldo LÓPEZ GIL, MEP, EPP, Spain

Sergey LAGODINSKY, MEP, Greens, Germany

Antonio LÓPEZ-ISTÚRIZ WHITE, MEP, EPP, Spain

Marketa GREGOROVA, MEP, Greens, Czech Republic

Lolita ČIGĀNE, MP, Latvia

Marko MIHKELSON, MP, Estonia

Renata CHMELOVA, Czech Republic

Bogdan KLICH, Senator, Republic of Poland

In 2021, Alexei Navalny, the main opponent of the unchanging head of state Vladimir Putin, is being tortured and unlawfully held in prison in Russia, a nuclear state and member of the UN Security Council, aspiring to the role of a center of modern civilization and world politics. Moreover, Alexei Navalny found himself in jail following the Russian secret services’ failed attempt to poison him with a banned chemical weapon. Although this may sound like dystopian fiction, a scenario of a Bond movie or a dark comic, this is not a make-believe story – this is reality.

Many people living in Russia or closely following the events there cannot understand why Western countries have been so lenient towards Vladimir Putin all these years. After all, Putin has been in power for over 20 years now, and Alexei Navalny is not the first opponent of the Putin regime who has been subject to persecution for his views. Vladimir Putin has the blood of Boris Nemtsov on his hands, as well as of many other men and women who tried to oppose him at different times and for different reasons, not to mention the victims of his foreign policy adventures from Georgia to Crimea, from Syria to the Central African Republic. How many more political assassinations will be carried out before the Western political elite finally realizes what Russia has become under Putin and what regime he has built in the country?

Stronger language could become a big step toward fully grasping the nightmare that Russia is facing. Calling the Putin regime authoritarian or hybrid plays into Putin’s hands. Of course, researchers and politicians who grew up in free societies find these words strong enough. However, they all make the Putin regime look more decent than it actually is and allow the Russian government to avoid unpleasant questions and tough sanctions for years.

Time has come to call a spade a spade: the regime built by Putin in Russia can and should be called fascism. In this case, the term “fascism” would not be a label used for publicity purposes but a statement of fact. Suffice it to recall Umberto Eco’s “Eternal Fascism” essay to realize that the system built by Putin fully meets the criteria described by the author.

Particularly cynical is the behavior of fans of the Putin regime, who like to talk about fascism while attacking their opponents and critics in and outside of Russia. Meanwhile, they consciously juggle with concepts equating fascism with Nazism. This wordplay is not coincidental.

In the modern world, Nazism has become the synonym of absolute evil – and for very good reason. Mass culture has reduced its well-known external attributes to comics-like straightforwardness: antisemitism, racism, uniforms, swastika, a leader in a military jacket making speeches, and death camps. This allows Putin’s propagandists to claim that today’s Russia is not a fascist state since it does not display any of those characteristics.

The Putin regime is in fact not a Nazi one. Indeed, it officially denounces racism and antisemitism. However, even though free of theatrics and straightforwardness of the 1920s and 1930s, the political regime in today’s Russia is a form of modern fascism that inherited the most gruesome traits of its 20th century counterpart. Putin does not have any “death camps,” but the number of people subject to different forms of criminal and administrative sanctions for their political activities in Russia is growing and their treatment is getting increasingly harsh. The case of Alexei Navalny, who was not just thrown in jail but is being systematically tortured there through sleep deprivation and denial of medical care, proves this point.

Beside political terror, Putin is no stranger to the use of political assassinations as a means of intimidating enemies of the regime and taking revenge on people he dislikes in Russia and all over the world. It is the Putin regime’s reliance on physical elimination of its opponents, the criminalization of any opposition and protest activities, and the stigmatization of pro-Western, pro-democracy, and liberal thinkers that give reason to believe that we’re dealing with a modern version of fascism.

Russia has been transformed into a fascist police state the unchangeable leader of which maintains his power through repression, violence, and endless persecution of all those disobedient and opposed to his rule. Human rights are being trampled upon and violated whenever it suits the regime, and citizens have no means of making sure their rights are respected. Constitutional guarantees of respect for human rights and freedoms have become a fantastic notion, and the judicial system serves as an appendix to the punitive one. Russian courts fine and send to prison political opponents of the current government just as readily and ruthlessly as they jail Jehovah’s Witnesses which proves yet again that the Putin regime does not persecute real or even potential extremists but anyone whom it dislikes – sometimes completely irrationally.

There is no reason to believe that a few polite reprimands and symbolic acts will put an end to Putin’s interfering in conflicts all over the world and sending assassins to deal with his enemies and critics of his regime. Such instances will probably increase in number since in the context of the country’s deteriorating domestic problems the regime’s real or alleged successes in its confrontation with the West, and particularly with the United States, remain virtually the only trump cards used for propaganda purposes and to satisfy the ambitions of Putin who still believes himself to be the most influential politician of modern times.

Putin has long ceased to be Russia’s domestic concern – he bids defiance to the entire world order. Moreover, the existence of the Putin regime and the West’s permissive attitude toward it serve as a bad example for the multitude of smaller autocracies and dictatorships from Myanmar to Venezuela. If Putin can disregard the international law, wage wars against neighboring countries, send his assassins all over the world, and keep his critics in prison, why cannot other regimes do the same? This is why the fight with Putin and his regime is very important not just for Russia but for the entire world, and Western leaders should be more confident both in their opinion of Putin and his system and in measures aimed at containing the current Russian regime.

It is in fact absolutely unimportant what US and European politicians publicly call Putin and his regime. It is, however, important for them to admit it at least to themselves that they are dealing with an established fascist regime and his creator and leader.

Photo: Kremlin.ru

On March 31, it was reported that Aleksei Navalny, who is currently imprisoned in a penal colony, began a hunger strike to protest prison officials’ abuse and the refusal to provide him with critical medical care. No one goes on a hunger strike unless they truly have nothing left to lose and no other means to fight for their rights.

The news should alarm anyone concerned about the fate of Navalny or, for that matter, Russia’s fate. If Putin’s government is prepared to go to such drastic lengths to silence Navalny, it is frightening to imagine what it is prepared to do in terms of its domestic and foreign policy.

We can’t lose sight of the fact that Aleksei Navalny’s life is now solely in the hands of one man — Vladimir Putin. The Russian President himself is Navalny’s judge, jailer and executioner. Anyone who claims otherwise has a poor grasp of how the Russian regime is structured, or is simply lying.

Without a direct order from Putin himself, or at least his approval, the FSB would not have spent years stalking members of the opposition, much less have made such a high-profile attempt on the life of Putin’s most prominent critic.

Putin himself has admitted that he gave personal authorization for Navalny to be flown to Germany for medical treatment. It is crystal clear that Putin was also behind Navalny’s outrageous arrest upon his inspirationally courageous return to Russia in January.

The actions of the Russian authorities, and that of Putin himself, in the aftermath of their failed attempt to kill Navalny, drive home the ugly reality that the Kremlin’s sole regret is that Navalny did not die on the spot after they poisoned him. Should we be surprised that those directly responsible for this crime and those who took part in the cover-up are now even more emboldened?

Despite the demands of the European Court of Human Rights for Navalny’s immediate release, he continues to be held in a penal colony in the city of Pokrov in Vladimir Oblast, where investigators, police officers, judges, and prison staff merely follow orders from the very top. Navalny is trapped in a penal colony with no medical assistance worthy of the term, where he is subjected to continuous abuse, not against the wishes of Putin or unbeknownst to him but rather because this is exactly what Putin wants.

No one is surprised to hear that no-holds-barred repression has been unleashed against the Russian opposition. But Navalny’s case is exceptional. There are not many Russians whose name is regularly raised in conversations with Putin by world leaders.  And in Russia, there is certainly no other person whose plight brings out hundreds of thousands to the streets in a show of support – while risking their own freedom, health, and well-being. This is what sets Aleksei Navalny apart from so many Soviet-era dissidents, contemporary opposition figures and fearless investigative journalists, whose persecution and even murder never prompted sustained reverberations within Russia, let alone abroad.

While the Russian authorities persecute Navalny, they are also terrified of him. They are trying to destroy him, not as an individual or even as the leader of a handful of dissidents, but as the founder and leader of a powerful opposition movement that Putin has every reason to dread.

The authorities are clearly petrified. Otherwise, they would have no reason to continue intensifying their crackdown on Navalny’s associates and allies, or the thousands of ordinary citizens who took part in the protests they organized. Not a day goes by without someone being sentenced for taking part in January’s nationwide demonstrations of solidarity with Navalny. The closer we get to new protests, the more arrests and politically-motivated persecution we will see.

This is why it comes as no shock to learn that nearly all of Navalny’s inner circle in Russia find themselves under house arrest or in formal detention. Some whose actions offer no grounds for formal prosecution are nonetheless made targets of despicable attacks. The elderly parents of Leonid Volkov, who heads Navalny’s network headquarters, had their apartment searched. Just a few days ago, the 66-year-old father of the FBK Director Ivan Zhdanov was thrown into a pretrial detention center for far-fetched reasons. It is hard to say whether the Kremlin has any specific plan in mind vis-à-vis Ivan Zhdanov, or whether its actions are driven by pure revenge or Stalinesque terror. In either case, the Russian government’s actions evoke only the most profound alarm and sensation of disgust. It goes without saying that confinement of an elderly and not particularly healthy man to a Russian jail cell with four beds for five people is torture by any definition.  Moreover, and this surely accounts for such action, the son will suffer anguish – psychological torture – in knowing that his father is suffering and he is powerless to do anything to help. 

History has shown that regimes that terrorize their own citizens and critics are prone to start wars of aggression against other nations. The events of 2014 made it clear that Putin’s regime is already there. Since then, Russia’s domestic situation has become more dire, while the terror against critics of the regime has grown more brazen and cruel.

Right now, Navalny and his protest movement in Russia urgently need a demonstration of international solidarity, not only for the sake of noble ideals like freedom, democracy and justice, but to protect global security, as well. The international community has stood by passively for too long, allowing Putin to go too far, both domestically and abroad. Backing down even more or stopping at toothless statements of concern will only make things worse. Without meaningful external pressure, Putin will never stop his aggression. To him, each concession, each instance of eyes delicately averted, each failure to back words with deeds is a new victory, proof that he is untouchable, has chosen the right path, and may act with impunity.

The fight for Aleksei Navalny’s freedom, against political repression, and for free elections in Russia is much more than a moral imperative for honest people everywhere. It is the fundamental duty of all responsible democratic politicians.

Paying a heavy price with his own suffering and the unmistakable threat to his life, Aleksei Navalny is unmasking for all to witness the extent of the Putin regime’s depravity, cruelty, and crimes. Over the last 20 years, thousands of Russian citizens have suffered for their beliefs, and their numbers are growing. Do they need to number in the millions, with Russia’s aggression concurrently spilling out in all directions before the civilized world finally grasps the true scale of the problem and delivers an appropriate response?

According to official Central Election Commission data, in September 2020, Ivan Belozertsev, member of the United Russia party nominated by Putin, won an amazing 78.8 percent of the vote in the first round of the gubernatorial election in Penza Oblast.   The results of the election were certified despite the fact that many pro-opposition observers voiced their skepticism about their veracity. Belozertsev occupied the gubernatorial chair until he was arrested in March 2021 on bribe-taking charges and dismissed by the president’s decree.

Despite Belozertsev’s recent electoral triumph and seeming resulting popularity, not one rally in support of the governor has been held. Moreover, no one has even tried to organize one. 

Of course, it’s possible one could say that Belozertsev’s voters were completely disappointed in him after learning about the charges. This version, however, is rather questionable.  Russian citizens have no trust in the law enforcement services, and there is overwhelming evidence to support this. For instance, the authorities’ official charges against Navalny did not convince his supporters that they were rallying around a criminal.  There is an even more powerful example: the arrest and dismissal of Khabarovsk region’s governor Sergei Furgal provoked months-long protests across the region despite the fact that he was being accused of committing different crimes. 

So why didn’t the residents of the Khabarovsk region believe the charges against Sergei Furgal and instead rallied and fought for him, while residents of the Penza region behaved the exact opposite?  Also, if they suspected Belozertsev of dishonesty, why did they actively vote for him only six months earlier?

The answer is simple. Sergei Furgal is a rare exception to the rule according to which the entire Russian system of government operates. He won as an opposition candidate in a tough struggle against a candidate who was supported by Putin and the entire federal government.   This means that all the votes he received had been casted consciously. 

Belozertsev’s case is rather typical for today’s Russia though.  A former member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and ex-military, Belozertsev went into politics under Putin when elections lost their competitive character.  Someone so uncharismatic and with such a mediocre background could not obviously be elected to any key position even in the 1990s. However, in Putin’s Russia, it’s not about candidates like by voters who win elections but about those preferred by the authorities. The reason Ivan Belozertsev won his most recent election is not because he had the support of almost 80 percent of his region’s population but that his candidature had been approved by the presidential administration.  As a result, he faced no real competition while all administrative resource mechanisms, including mobilization, manipulation, and sheer fraud worked in his favor. This was officially admitted, even though implicitly. Right after the governor’s arrest, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation initiated a case about election fraud at one of the polling places where Belozertsev had allegedly won 85 percent of the vote.

The population’s complete indifference with regard to governors’ dismissals despite the seemingly high support during elections is quite natural for Putin’s regime.  Thus, former governor of Russia’s Komi Republic Vyacheslav Gaizer was arrested on bribery charges in September 2015, just one year after having received 78.97 percent of the vote thanks to the support of President Putin and the United Russia party.  No rallies in his support were held in the Komi Republic following his arrest. In April 2017, Aleksandr Solovyov, the head of Russia’s Udmurtia Region, who had allegedly won the sensational 84.85 percent of the vote in the 2014 gubernatorial election, was removed from office and arrested which, again, did not provoke any support rallies or waves of public outrage across Udmurtia. 

All this makes one doubt that the results of gubernatorial elections in Russia reflect the real sentiment of voters, and, naturally, makes one question the population’s support of the current Russian authorities’ policy based on official election results. The cases of Belozertsev, Solovyov, and Gaizer should be brought to mind every time there is talk about Vladimir Putin’s high approval rating, the population’s incredibly strong support of him or his new electoral victories. One should ask oneself whether these numbers actually mean anything and whether those millions of alleged supporters are willing to do anything for their leaders.  

The political system built by Putin is not based on the population’s true support but rather on police violence, administrative resource and propaganda-enforced polling and voting results, the authenticity of which is more than questionable.  In many respects, Putin copied the Soviet political system that had for many years appeared to be solid and supported by the majority of the population.   However, when the Soviet regime collapsed in 1991, no one anywhere went out in the streets in its support. Millions of Communist party members, law enforcement operatives, state servants, and employees of the budget sector not only just passively watched the regime crumble but often welcomed the collapse themselves.    

The arrest of Penza governor Ivan Belozertsev has once again demonstrated that in today’s Russia the percentage of the vote received by pro-regime candidates in the elections that they themselves hold has nothing to do with these people’s actual popularity. There is no reason to think that Vladimir Putin’s official approval rating or his election results are any more authentic than the former Penza governor’s questionable electoral achievements. 

Even though this may seem incredible today, a day may very well come when Vladimir Putin’s removal from office will not provoke any indignation of the Russian population and his popularity will prove to be nothing but a propaganda myth and a result of election fraud and vote rigging on all levels.

For the past few years, the Russians have been living in an atmosphere of growing political repression. The more things soured for Putin domestically and internationally, the larger the scale of repression grew.

While individual opposition activists have been targeted by this repression for years, its full scale became apparent only in 2021, when winter street protests in support of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny were met with the simultaneous detention of over ten thousand people throughout Russia.  Over 90 criminal cases were initiated, and thousands of administrative penalties imposed as a result of these protests. Even though months have passed since the January protests, their participants are still having their homes searched, summoned for questioning by the police, and arrested.

The Kremlin widely publicizes these acts of repression in order to intimidate the population. The rationale behind this publicity must be kept in mind while evaluating the mass character and the scale of future protests in Russia. The number of Russians who are unhappy about the current developments in the country is much bigger than the number of protest participants. However, not every Russian is prepared to risk freedom, health, and wellbeing for the sake of expressing their political stance toward the regime, and they cannot be blamed for that.

One should not mistakenly assume that repression is the government’s reaction to protests. Political repression began to escalate last year — approximately 12 to 18 months before the start of the election campaign to the State Duma. The January 2021 protests came as a result of the government’s repressive policy brought into sharp focus by the attempt on the life of Alexei Navalny who, following his return from life-saving medical attention in Germany, was arrested, quickly tried and sent to prison.

The purpose of the government’s efforts is quite obvious: to make it impossible for the most active and widely-known critics of the regime to participate in the upcoming elections due to criminal cases, forced immigration or fear. Unfortunately, in some cases, the regime’s pressure has proven too intense which resulted in tragedies. This was the case when, unable to face further harassment, Nizhny Novgorod journalist and activist Irina Slavina died after setting herself on fire in front of the local branch of the Interior Ministry, a day after her apartment had yet again been searched by the police.

Alexei Navalny’s poisoning or, more specifically, the timing of this assassination attempt can also be explained by the election calendar. Even though Navalny has, for a long time, been a thorn in the Kremlin’s side, it was his open preparations for the upcoming election that moved the government to take drastic action. It is worth remembering that Boris Nemtsov was killed 18 months before the 2016 election to the State Duma for an obvious reason: had he lived to see it, opposition forces could have run a well-organized campaign and would have probably made it into the Parliament. Hence, the conclusion here is that the murder of Boris Nemtsov, the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, and many other similar government acts of repression were not by chance but an integral part of the Putin team’s consistent approach aimed at physically eliminating its opponents in the lead up to important elections.

It would seem that Putin should have no reason to be concerned about the elections since it is the government itself that administers them, and the Russian voting system has long been notorious for its lack of fairness and transparency. Even fraud, however, has its limits.

Both Vladimir Putin’s popularity and the United Russia party’s approval rating have been in a steady decline. Between a fourth and a third of the population remains entirely loyal to Putin: those are the beneficiaries of the regime, the siloviki, state servants, employees of state- and oligarch-owned companies, members of their families, and a considerable number of retirees and representatives of older generations.

This category is flanked by the so-called conformist part of Russian society. Russian conformists support the government per se – not specifically Putin or his regime. However, these people are socially disengaged, and in order to secure their active support in elections, the government has to make a considerable effort to mobilize them through bribery or intimidation.

Another third of the population, which includes young city residents, entrepreneurs, and educated critical thinkers of all ages, is already either opposed to or disapproves of Putin and his regime.

While over-simplified, the matrix described above offers a general sense as to why Putin needs repression and why this approach will keep on gathering steam.

First of all, Putin needs to demoralize and intimidate his critics and opponents the best he can, as well as all Russians who are speaking out against his policies and against him personally. This is why, before any major election, the government turns up its pressure on this segment of the population in order to minimize the role of protest votes.

Second, political assassinations, perpetual harassment of dissatisfied people by state-owned media, street violence, administrative measures and criminal sanctions are meant to make these people look like outcasts in the eyes of the rest of the public. Average citizens need daily proof that, even if they do not like what is happening around them, it is better to remain silent and tough it out. Otherwise, they too will face searches, trials, prison sentences, unemployment, and poverty. Moreover, the repressive machine occasionally devours random people, which can also be considered part of the government’s deliberate policy. Thus, it is hinted to the Russian citizens that even if they just happen to be seen around protesters as bystanders, or if they are suspected of empathizing with them, it still would be enough to ruin their lives — so it is better to stay away from all of this and avoid any opposition-related subjects even online.

Third, repression against the opposition remains virtually the only proof of strength and determination that the government is able to demonstrate to its supporters. By the same token, it serves to underscore to adversaries outside Russia that Putin has infinite resolve, unlimited capabilities, and a categorical refusal to be bound by international law.

It is hard to imagine what measures Putin could now embrace in order to restore his popularity among all segments of the Russian population. Moreover, time is obviously working against him: while the public’s fatigue with Putin’s rule is growing exponentially, the government faces growing economic, social and infrastructure problems that have been further exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic.

Putin and his closest circle are quite aware that they have neither any attractive mobilizing ideology to offer to the population nor any resources to further bribe it. The only thing they do have is a thriving, well-financed and disciplined repressive machine that will carry out any orders from the top. So, there can be little mystery about why the Putin regime employs repression with conspicuously increasing zeal and on an ever-growing scale. Unfortunately, one must anticipate a further strengthening of this trend since Putin lacks legitimacy with growing segments of the population and lacks any other reliable means of retaining his hold on power.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

March 25, 2021

Contacts:
Honourable Irwin Cotler, PC, OC, OQ, Raoul Wallenberg Center for Human Rights
+1 514.735.8778
Natalia Arno, Free Russia Foundation
+1 202.549.2417

TRANSATLANTIC INTERPARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT
On unprecedented mass arrest of Russian pro-democracy leaders on March 13, 2021

“We, the undersigned members of the foreign affairs committees of legislatures around the world – the duly elected democratic voices of our constituents and countries – unreservedly condemn the unprecedented mass arrest of Russian pro-democracy leaders. 

A violation of the Russian constitution and of the country’s international legal obligations, these unjust and arbitrary arrests are an assault on the last bastion of the Russian democratic movement. United in common cause, we call for an end to Putin’s punitive persecution and prosecutions of Russian civil society leaders, the release of all political prisoners, and the imposition of targeted Magnitsky sanctions against Russia’s architects of repression.

The crimes perpetrated by Putin’s regime against the Russian people and against the international community have been deadly and are well-documented. Left unchecked, its internal repression has often morphed into external aggression. Wars, murders, theft, embezzlement, nuclear blackmail, disinformation, election interference — they are so numerous and now so well-known, that we feel no need to enumerate all of them in this letter. Under the cover of Covid restrictions, we have seen a further intensification of these trends.

Last year, Putin’s regime illegally amended the Russian constitution, executing a constitutional coup, allowing Putin to stay in power indefinitely and thereby formalizing the Russian transition to authoritarianism. 

In January, he arrested Aleksey Navalny, who was punished with a nearly three-year prison term for not meeting his parole obligations because he was out of the country convalescing from a state-sponsored assassination attempt. Putin then brutally suppressed the nation-wide protests that emerged in Navalny’s support, arbitrarily arresting thousands, and launching criminal prosecutions against them.

On March 13th, security services entered a perfectly lawful Congress of elected municipal deputies and detained nearly 200 people for not adhering to the Kremlin’s command of how to interact with local constituents. In today’s Russia, disagreeing with Putin is not tolerated, and those who do find themselves in jail or worse.

Some of those detained included elected leaders like Ilya Yashin and Maxim Reznik, pro-democracy reformers Andrey Pivovarov and Anastasia Burakova, and popular politician Vladimir Kara-Murza. Mr. Kara-Murza is a top public intellectual and opposition leader whose transformative work on behalf of the Russian people has had a global resonance. His vision and values – eloquently conveyed with a uniquely compelling moral clarity and commitment, often before our respective legislatures – led to his earlier being targeted by the regime for assassination, attempts on his life that he survived twice. The work of such courageous leaders continues to be a source of inspiration in our pursuit of collective peace, security, and dignity for all.

For a society to succeed it must have a set of principles and values that guides it. Most notably, this includes a legal system that honors the rights of all its people and not solely for those who deem themselves leaders and the sycophants who profit from them.

Sadly, these recent developments demonstrate yet again that only Putin’s criminality and impunity prevail in Russia today. The way the regime runs its politics is indistinguishable from the way it runs its foreign policy and its business dealings. To indulge such malign behavior by the Kremlin toward those it disagrees with is to encourage its corrosive behavior in all these other areas.

The democracies of the world have a choice: maintain a normal relationship with a rogue state, continuing to send the message that its treatment of its own citizens is to be overlooked, and its malicious activities are to be condoned. Or, sending a clear and compelling message: that until the Kremlin reverses its troubling trajectory, the current status quo will be unacceptable. This includes targeted sanctions against Putin and his corrupt and criminal cronies – such as canceling access to our banking system, business ties, and safe harbor in our best neighborhoods and schools – ensuring that they cannot enjoy the liberties in our countries that they deny their compatriots in theirs. 

For the sake of a free Russia and a free world, we trust democracies will make the right choice.”

Rasa Jukneviciene, Member of the European Parliament

Andrius Kubilius, Member of the European Parliament

Miriam Lexmann, Member of the European Parliament

Pavel Fischer, Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the Senate of the Czech Republic

Marko Mihkelson, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Estonia

Richards Kols, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Seimas of the Republic of Latvia

Žygimantas Pavilions, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania

Bogdan Klich, Senator, Chairman of the Foreign and European Union Committee of the Senate of the Republic of Poland

Eerik Niiles Kross, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Estonia

Emanuelis Zingeris, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania

Benjamin L. Cardin, Member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation; Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission)

Bill Keating, Member of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Relations and Chair of the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment

Brian Fitzpatrick, Member of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Relations

Kimberley Kitching, Senator, Chair of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Deputy Chair of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia

Chris Bryant, Member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the UK Parliament

Bob Seely, Member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the UK Parliament

In order to ensure his dominance in the media space on the eve of a new electoral cycle, Putin is willing to use any means including the blocking in Russia of the world’s major social media, including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Despite the fact that it will be extremely hard to carry this out, and that the regime itself will likely suffer the most negative impact of such decisions, their potential costs do not scare the Kremlin nearly as much as the continuously growing influence of social media on Russia’s political life.   

Trojan Horse of the West

For Putin, the Internet is the embodiment of not just everything Western but especially of everything American. He has repeatedly called the Internet a “CIA project.” As a matter of fact, this thesis is key to understanding Putin’s entire policy with regard to the Internet. 

In his eyes, the global Internet system is above all enemy technology that brings nothing but trouble to either Russia or to him personally.  

It is possible that this perception of the Internet explains the current Russian government’s shameful penchant for hacking attacks on the United States and Western countries. If the Internet is a “CIA project,” then cyber attacks are nothing but an attempt at fighting the enemy with its own weapons. Moreover, these are not even attacks but rather self-defense actions because, in the Kremlin’s logic, the attack on Russia is perpetrated by the West through the means of a global communication network under its control. 

Thus, in Putin’s eyes, the Internet is a Trojan horse that the West uses to control the world, Russia, and, in practical terms, to deprive Putin himself of power.  

Everything He Hates

Beside the Internet’s questionable origins and de facto control, Putin also sees it as the hub of all things contradicting his political experience and his understanding of politics in general. First of all, at the time when Putin came of age, became a politician, and, most importantly, came to power in Russia, the Internet played no role in social life. 

For an insignificant KGB officer in the 1980s and 1990s, a career in politics, his anointing as Russia’s president and his retention and consolidation of power – all of this was only possible in the context of minimal visibility and transparency of political decision-making along with the dominant role of traditional media under the Kremlin’s increasingly tough control since the Yeltsin times. 

And suddenly, the Internet gave back to Russian citizens all the things that Putin had been so laboriously taking away from them: free information exchange, the possibility of discussion, and opportunities to work together and raise funds to achieve goals, all of this while avoiding the government’s control and restrictions.    

It is important to mention that the Internet became a political factor only after the emergence of social media that facilitated the exchange of information between people to the fullest degree while providing everyone not just with access to any information but also with opportunities to share it.

The first wave of the Russian government’s interest toward the Internet was prompted by the Arab Spring. After the Russian street protests of 2011 and 2012, the Kremlin became firmly convinced that the Internet was becoming a factor supportive of political struggle. 

Two Russias

Putin and his close circle confuse cause and effect: they believe that Russian citizens do not turn of their own volition to the Internet to express their discontent with current developments in their country because they basically have no other options available, but rather that the West uses the CIA-made Internet and US social media companies to “muddy the waters” in an effort to change the regime. This is why any measures aimed at restricting Internet access and the activity of major social media companies in Russia – even imposing a total ban on them – should not come as a surprise. In his efforts to retain his hold on power, Putin does not deem any measures excessive or superfluous. 

These are not the only reasons why the Russian authorities are concerned with the Internet. Today, the attitude toward the Internet represents the main divide in Russian society. Putin’s core electorate and people who continue to be deeply influenced by state propaganda are primarily older generations of Russians who either do not use the Internet at all or use it to a limited extent as a supplement to more traditional forms of acquiring information – television, radio, printed media, or, in other words, state-controlled resources that broadcast state propaganda.

On the other end of the spectrum, there are people who have thoroughly familiarized themselves with the Internet and are able to utilize effectively its potential as a resource. These are primarily younger generations of Russians. Despite demographic problems, Putin is growing increasingly concerned with Russia’s youth because he is not as popular among young people as he is among older generations. Meanwhile, he has no means of reaching young people.   Attempts at spreading state propaganda online have not proved very successful:  key topics of propaganda – nostalgia for the Soviet Union, hatred for the West, and endless celebrations to mark Russia’s victory in WWII – are met by younger Russians with neither interest nor understanding.

Fight over the Internet

Putin’s critics have a diametrically opposite attitude toward and relationship with the Internet: having no access to nationwide media, they are popular and active online and on social networks.  

For instance, Alexei Navalny owes his career and popularity to the Internet that has become his political pulpit, his media resource, a means to raise money to finance his activity, and has helped form the movement of his supporters. It is quite logical that, having authorized reprisals against his main opponent on the eve of a new electoral cycle, Putin is prepared to eliminate the possibility of anyone emulating Navalny’s path.  

The fight over the Internet is becoming a fight for survival of Putin’s regime. The threat to block major social media companies in Russia and the imposition of stiff fines to put pressure on them represent regime attempts to blackmail them into submissiveness and cooperation.  In this way, the Kremlin aims to assert full control over their activities in Russia and to oblige them to help Putin fight against any political opposition.  

The attack on Twitter is a test, the opening shot of a big war. It is obvious that, being the source of uncensored information including about the Russian President and the methods he and his close circle are using to govern Russia, YouTube has become Putin’s main concern. Although even the Russian President has not dared thus far to pick an outright fight with Google, he is certainly getting ready for it.

Hopefully, social media giants will not give in to blackmail and turn into obedient instruments of the Russian government’s repressive policies. Together with American society, they should realize that the Internet today is the field of battle between freedom and its antithesis, between authoritarianism and democracy, and not just in Russia.

Vladimir Kara-Murza, a prominent Russian pro-democracy advocate, was closely tracked by an FSB assassination squad when he suffered perplexing and near-fatal medical emergencies that sent him into coma in 2015 and 2017, establishes a new investigation by the Bellingcat group

Documents uncovered by Bellingcat show that this is the same assassination squad implicated in the August 2020 assassination attempt on Alexey Navalny and whose member has inadvertently confirmed the operation in a phone call with Navalny.   

Bellingcat has also established the FSB unit’s involvement in the murder of three Russian activists, all of whom died under unusual but similar circumstances. 

Taken together, these independent nongovernment investigations establish the fact of systemic, large-scale extrajudicial assassinations carried out by Putin’s government against its critics inside and outside of Russia, including with chemical weapons banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

Free Russia Foundation calls on the international community to formally investigate and prosecute Putin’s government for these crimes. 

Free Russia Foundation calls on the Biden Administration to direct the FBI to release investigation materials surrounding the assassination attempts against Vladimir Kara-Murza that have been denied to him thus far. 

Free Russia Foundation calls on the international community to articulate measures to compel Russia to free Alexey Navalny from his illegal incarceration where his life remains in dire danger. 

The Kremlin’s Social Media Influence inside the United States: A Moving Target is a report co-authored by Maria Snegovaya and Kohei Watanabe summarizing key insights of their analysis of social media behavior on Twitter during the 2020 US Presidential elections. 

The study scopes out the Kremlin’s malign social media operations in the United States, their key purveyors, platforms and enablers. It analyzes how the Russian approach to conducting social media campaigns targeting domestic audiences in the US has evolved since 2016 and whether its efforts can be deemed successful or effective. 

Snegovaya and Watanabe attempt to determine what demographic characteristics make specific members and segments of the US audience more susceptible to the Russian disinformation campaigns and how that impacts their voting behavior. The report articulates a list of policy recommendations for improving the US society’s resilience to the Russian malign influence campaigns. 

On February 11, 2021, the DFR Lab at the Atlantic Council hosted a discussion of the report. You may view the recording of the event here: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/foreign-interference-us-politics-kremlin/

While 2020 gave us unprecedented challenges, it created transformative changes in the way we work and communicate. The hours of Zoom calls seemingly brought us all closer together as we got a glimpse into each other’s makeshift home offices along with interruption by kids and the family pets. Remote work also made us appreciate human interactions, in-person events and trips much more!

As 2020 comes to an end, we want to especially thank our supporters who continued to believe in our mission and the value of our hard work, and we hope the coming year brings all of us progress and growth for democracy throughout the world. We’d also like to thank our partners and staff in the U.S. and abroad, and we know how hard everyone has worked under difficult world changes to achieve so many of our objectives this year.

We send our best wishes to all who have stayed in the fight for democratic reforms and for the values of basic human rights. We look forward to a new year with the hope of many positive changes to come.

– Natalia Arno and the Free Russia Foundation team.

On December 11, 2020, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Fatou Bensouda, issued a statement on the preliminary examination of the situation in Ukraine by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor.

According to the findings of the examination, the situation in Ukraine meets the statutory criteria to launch an investigation. The preliminary examination of the situation in Ukraine was opened on 24 April 2014.

Specifically, and without prejudice to any other crimes which may be identified during the course of an investigation, Office of the Prosecutor has concluded that there is a reasonable basis at this time to believe that a broad range of conduct constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed in the context of the situation in Ukraine.

These findings will be spelled out in more detail in the annual Report on Preliminary Examination Activities issued by the Office and include three broad clusters of victimization:

1.     crimes committed in the context of the conduct of hostilities;

2.     crimes committed during detentions;

3.     crimes committed in Crimea.

These crimes, committed by the different parties to the conflict, were sufficiently grave to warrant investigation by Office of the Prosecutor, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.

Having examined the information available, the Prosecutor concluded that the competent authorities in Ukraine and/or in the Russian Federation are either inactive in relation to the alleged perpetrators, or do not have access to them.

The next step will be to request authorization from the Judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court to open investigations.

The Prosecutor urges the international community, including the governments of Ukraine and Russia, to cooperate. This will determine how justice will be served both on domestic and the international level.

We remind you that on September 21, 2020, Free Russia Foundation sent a special Communication to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (the Hague, the Netherlands) asking to bring Crimean and Russian authorities to justice for international crimes committed during the Russian occupation of Crimea.

Comment by Scott Martin (Global Rights Compliance LLP):

As Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda reaches the end of her tenure as Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, she announced yesterday that a reasonable basis existed to believe that a broad range of conduct constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in relation to the situation in Ukraine. One of the most consequential preliminary examinations in the court’s short history, the Prosecutor will now request authorization from the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber to open a full investigation into the situation.

Anticipating that the Prosecutor’s request will be granted, the ICC Prosecutor’s office will be investigating the second group of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Russian Federation (the situation in Georgia being the other). This would make Russia the only country in the world facing two separate investigations at the ICC for crimes under its jurisdiction.

In this exclusive and groundbreaking report, Free Russia Foundation has translated and published five documents from the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency.

The documents, obtained and analyzed by Free Russia Foundation’s Director of Special Investigations Michael Weiss, details the GRU’s modern psychological warfare program and are dated from within the last decade. The documents include the memoir of a former colonel in the Soviet Unions’s Special Propaganda Directorate who explains how psychological and information operations were conducted at the tail-end of the Cold War, and then adapted for the post-Soviet era. The documents also include the organization of psychological warfare, down to the military unit, as well as the theory and practice of working over targets in the West.

In this September 2020 analysis, Free Russia Foundation’s Fellow Alexander Morozov chronicles the unraveling of the political crisis in Belarus unleashed by Lukashenka’s illegal efforts to hold on to power despite a broad national demand for change.

Morozov describes the growth of the Belarus protest movement and traces the emergence and evolution of the Coordinating Council, its strategy, key positions and figures.

The report then delineates the positions of important stakeholders, the response of the European Union, and of various national European governments; and the U.S.

Morozov dedicates a special focus to the role of Russia in the crisis in Belarus; discussing how the protracted standoff between Lukashenka and Putin had shaped the 2020 Belarusian presidential elections and how the Kremlin’s regional objectives are framing Lukashenko’s emerging options and choices.

Morozov offers a near-term forecast and policy options for democratic countries and international organizations for resolving the political crisis in Belarus.

The second issue of The Kremlins Influence Quarterly continues investigating the malign influence of Putin’s Russia in the areas of the economy, media, religion, civil society, politics, and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Following his essay on the Russian coronavirus-related aid to Italy published in the first issue of this journal, Dr. Anton Shekhovtsov looks at the developments around the Russian aid to Serbia. He argues that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić used the pandemic to attack the EU in order to advance his own domestic agenda and praised China for being the only friend of Serbia as it agreed to deliver aid to fight COVID-19. Moscow joined Belgrade in its anti-EU and pro-Beijing propaganda, but failed to follow up quickly with its own medical, financial, and expert assistance to “the brotherly Serbian people,” and, consequently, was unsuccessful to benefit directly from the situation in the country.

In the second and final part of his essay on Austrian-Russian business relations, Dr. Martin Malek focuses on their political framework conditions, as well as side effects and consequences over the past two decades. The author writes that, due to the increasing dependence of Austria and the EU on energy source supplies from Russia, Austrian politicians and managers find it difficult to find critical words about Russia’s domestic, foreign, security, and foreign trade policies. There is a belief among Viennese politicians and businessmen that Russia is “too important” as a power—and especially as a supplier of energy resources—so relations must not be “spoiled” under any circumstances.

Sergiu Tofilat and Victor Parlicov explore how Putin’s Russia uses gas supplies to wield malign influence in Moldova. They argue that, by exercising its monopolistic position as a natural anti-dumping gas supplier to Moldova and by loyalizing corrupt political elites from Chișinău, Russian energy giant Gazprom serves as the main instrument of financing the Russian foreign policy agenda in Moldova. The authors assert that consolidation of Moldova’s energy security by diversification of energy supply options and integration into European energy markets is not only vital for countering Russian malign influence in Moldova, but also key to solving the Transnistrian conflict, which affects regional security.

In her essay on the French editions of Russian international media, Anastasia Kirilenko discusses the question of how these media manage to impose themselves in the media landscape of France. She demonstrates that Russian media in France polarize the French society by advancing racist narratives, undermine trust towards the ruling elites by supporting anti-establishment movements, and discourage critics of the Kremlin’s politics by filing lawsuits against them. Ironically, however, the journalistic community defends RT France and Sputnik in the name of the freedom of speech.

Georgy Chizhov exposes the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) as one of the most effective instruments and mechanisms of Moscow’s malign influence on Ukrainian society. He argues that the UOC MP is an organization dependent on the Russian Orthodox Church on all ideological and political matters, and supports in its followers the identity of “the united people” (with Russians), a negative attitude toward democratic values, and a cautious perception of their own Ukrainian state.

Alexandra Yatsyk’s chapter focuses on the Russian government’s agents of influence in Estonia after 2014. She identifies three clusters of agents of Russian influence. The first group is represented by the Russian state institutions and Estonian entities supported by the Russian government. The second group consists of local activists who harshly criticize Estonia as allegedly systematically violating the very principles of liberal democracy. The third group incorporates those local agents who spread pro-Russian and anti-Estonian messages via mass media.

In her turn, Alisa Volkova analyzes a variety of methods used by Russian-affiliated forces to influence public opinion and politics in North Macedonia. The author asserts that Russia attempts – sometimes successfully – to penetrate the country’s economy and politics spreading its malign way of doing business, but the volume of resources, people involved, and lack of significant economic interest show that this Balkan country does not seem to be a priority for Russia for maintaining its influence.

Melissa Hooper explores how Moscow can indirectly spread malign influence in Europe by looking at the developments in Poland. She argues that Russian influence schemes in Poland are generally weak and ineffective because of the long tradition of Polish skepticism towards Russia. However, the Law and Justice government has borrowed laws, methods, and messaging from the Kremlin. In particular, the government waged war on meritocracy in ministries, the military, and the judiciary; routed critics from institutions such as free media and civil society; fanned the flames of conspiracy theories; and increased polarization and tensions in the country.

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The Memorial Human Rights Center recognized Ivan Lyubshin, a resident of Kaluga, as a political prisoner. The criminal case against him should be closed, he should be immediately released, and his allegations of torture should be objectively investigated.

Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: The Case of Ivan Lyubshin

Today, the German government has announced that Russian pro-democracy leader Alexey Navalny was poisoned by Novichok. Novichok is a deadly nerve agent developed by the Soviet government chemical weapons program and used on several occasions by the Russian government to kill its critics in the recent years.

To restate the obvious, Novichok is a poison that can only be accessed with the authority of the Kremlin. Therefore, today’s announcement by German officials  directly implicates the Kremlin and Putin in the high-profile assassination attempt on Navalny.

The choice of Novichok was not just a means  to silence Mr. Navalny, but a loud, brazen and menacing message sent by Putin to the world: dare to criticize me, and you may lose your life.

The announcement by the German government of its intent to formally notify the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (‘OPCW’) of the use of Novichok against Navalny is a meek bureaucratic half-measure that fails to acknowledge the extraordinary threat to human life posed by Putin’s regime everywhere. Taken together with Angela Merkel’s promise earlier this week to help Putin finish his Nord Stream 2 pipeline despite an international outcry amounts to condoning the poisoning and normalizing it into a new modus operandi where Putin’s murders go unpunished. Free Russia Foundation urges the leaders of the EU, its Member States and the U.S. Government to take an urgent and drastic action to punish the perpetrators of this heinous crime not only to serve justice, but to establish a powerful deterrent against new attacks by Putin’s regime globally.

Case Update:

Despite of the obvious political motivation of the criminal charges against Airat, on August 24, 2020, the Central District Military Court sentenced Airat Dilmukhametov to 9 years in a strict regime colony. He was found guilty on four counts: public calls for separatism, public justification of terrorism, public calls for extremism and its financing. Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: The Case of Airat Dilmukhametov

We are deeply concerned with information recently distributed by the well-respected authoritative source Center “Dossier.” According to “Dossier,” the Kremlin is using Russian political expert Sergey Mikheev and consulting company “Politsecrets” to manipulate Georgian society, distribute disinformation and anti-democratic narratives, undermine Georgia’s Western aspirations, and interfere in free and fair elections in Georgia scheduled for October 2020.

Continue reading Free Russia Foundation Statement on Kremlin’s Interference in Elections in Georgia

Free Russia Foundation is gravely concerned about the life and safety of Alexey Navalny. Continue reading Free Russia Foundation Calls for Investigation into Alexey Navalny’s Poisoning

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD REACT IMMEDIATELY AND STRONGLY TO RIGGED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND MASSIVE VIOLENCE OF SECURITY FORCES AGAINST PEACEFUL PROTESTORS IN BELARUS Continue reading Civic Solidarity Platform Appeal with Regard to the Recent Events in Belarus

Free Russia Foundation stands in staunch solidarity with the People of Belarus. Continue reading Free Russia Foundation Statement on the Crisis in Belarus

On June 06, 2020, Pskov City Court sentenced Gennady Shpakovsky, 61-year-old Jehovah’s Witness and a political prisoner from Pskov, western Russia, to six and a half years’ imprisonment for his faith. Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: The Case of Gennady Shpakovsky

In accordance with international guidelines defining the term, Memorial Human Rights Center recognized Alexander Gabyshev, a shaman from a Siberian region of Yakutia, as a political prisoner. Deprivation of liberty was applied to him solely because of his political and religious beliefs, as well as a non-violent exercise of freedom of movement, expression, peaceful assembly, conscience, and religion. We urge for the immediate and unconditional release of Gabyshev and his full rehabilitation with redress. Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: The Case of Alexander Gabyshev

The coronavirus pandemic has continued to have an effect on numerous aspects of our lives. A large number of NGOs have also been affected by it.  A significant number of processes have gone online – seminars, conferences and presentations have been cancelled, postponed, or reformatted taking into account the new realities. A number of NGOs were practically forced to cease their work; others, on the contrary, successfully learned or developed new technological approaches and continued their activity in new formats.

Many NGOs are successfully overcoming technical difficulties and the pause in travel. Some of them are beginning to work with new topics – for example, human rights under pandemic conditions or the NGO’s digital transition. Changes in approaches to strategy, planning and communications are being discussed actively.  All this has yet to be comprehended in detail, so this study is intended to provide a preliminary overview of the current state and possible topics for future research.

More than 100 NGO representatives were interviewed in the process of this research both through surveys (a survey with 27 questions and more than 100 options for answers), as well as through interviews of leaders and representatives of NGOs (10 questions in each). More than 50 publications were monitored devoted to the problems NGOs faced in the pandemic. Thus, the methods of monitoring, survey and expert interviews were used. NGOs from Germany, Czech Republic, Lithuania, the USA, Russia (more than 30%), Ukraine and Kazakhstan took part in the research.

In accordance with international guidelines defining the term, Memorial Human Rights Center considers Aleksandr Atamanov, a resident of Pyatigorsk, a political prisoner. Aleksandr was charged with recruiting people into the Ukrainian Right Sector and possessing drugs. The guilt of Aleksandr Atamanov has not been proved and key pieces of evidence in the case were fabricated. Aleksand repeatedly said that violence was used against him in pre-trial custody and threats were made against his relatives. Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: The Case of Aleksandr Atamanov

According with international guidelines and definitions, Memorial Human Rights Center considers two residents of Sevastopol, Crimea Aleksei Bessarabov and Vladimir Dudka political prisoners. Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: The Case of Aleksei Bessarabov and Vladimir Dudka

On June 2, 2020, Free Russia Foundation hosted a congressional discussion on the Fate of Crimean Tatars in the Aftermath of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Continue reading The Fate of Crimean Tatars in the Aftermath of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

On May 28, 2020, Russian civil and human rights activist Sergei Mokhnatkin died at the age of 66. Mokhnatkin died in a hospital suffering from complications from a spinal injury received in prison.

Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: The Case of Sergei Mokhnatkin

The Crimean Tatars are a Muslim ethnic minority indigenous to the Crimean Peninsula. They have been among the most vocal critics of the Russian occupation of Crimea, and as a result, the Russian authorities have relentlessly persecuted them.

Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: Prosecution of Crimean Tatars

On Thursday, May 21, 2020, at 16:00 (Kyiv time) / 9:00 AM (Washington, DC) an international online forum will be held with the participation of human rights activists and scholars from Kyiv, Simferopol, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, and Washington DC.

Forum participants will talk about the Kremlin’s implementation of hybrid deportation of Crimean Tatars and public activists on the peninsula, for which a whole system of political repression has been launched. The issue of defining the criteria for the status of a “political prisoner” will be raised and lists will be formed. The participants of the online forum will also announce the work on the introduction of new international sanctions against Russian officials who are directly involved in the organization of political persecution. Human rights activists will spread the awareness of the global petition to the UN, the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the OSCE to save the lives of thousands of illegally detained in Russia, the Russian-occupied Crimea, and part of the Donbas from the threat of COVID-19 infection in prisons. The petition can be signed by following the link.

Speakers:

Oleksandra Matviychuk, Chairwoman of the Center for Civil Liberties NGO (Kyiv);
Sergey Davidis, Head of the Political Prisoners Support Program, Member of the Council at the Memorial Human Rights Center (Moscow);
Natalia Arno, President and Founder of the Free Russia Foundation (Washington);
Ilya Nuzov, Head of the Eastern Europe-Central Asia Desk at the International Federation for Human Rights (Paris);
Lilia Hemedzhy, a lawyer of the Crimean Solidarity initiative (Simferopol);
Wilfried Jilge, a historian of Eastern-Central Europe and Ukraine (Berlin);
Simon Papuashvili, Programme Director of the International Partnership for Human Rights (Brussels).

Event languages: Ukrainian and Russian.

The international online forum will be held on the second anniversary of the arrest of Server Mustafayev, coordinators of the Crimean Solidarity, which has united the relatives of political prisoners and activists in the occupied Crimea. According to his colleagues, he was the engine that drove the association. Since May 2018, Server has been held behind bars.
The event is organized by the global campaign #PrisonersVoise (formerly #SaveOlegSentsov) as part of the Week of Solidarity with the Crimean Tatars “Common Pain. Common History.” Informational support was provided by the PR agency KRASNI.

Live broadcast is available at the link.

Memorial Human Rights Center recognized Oleg Dmitriev, Oleg Ivanov, and Sergei Ozerov, supporters of a group called Artpodgotovka, convicted of preparing a terrorist act in the center of Moscow on November 5, 2017, as political prisoners.

Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: The Case of Artpodgotovka

Despite numerous initiatives to amnesty prisoners, including political prisoners, ahead of the 75th anniversary of the Victory Day, commemorating the victory of the Soviet Union and the Allies over Nazi Germany, the State Duma refused to give amnesty this year. Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: Victory Day’s Amnesty Cancelled

Earlier this week The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) released a new annual report on the state of religious freedoms across the globe. According to the report, religious freedom conditions in Russia deteriorated in 2019. Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: Prosecution of Religious Minorities in Russia in April 2020

Dear friend,

Please join us in signing this petition to help end the illegal detention of Yury Dmitriev, a 64-year old historian and a political prisoner, whose deteriorating health is now gravely endangered by the coronavirus pandemic. Continue reading Sign a Petition to Save Yury Dmitriev

Gennady Kravtsov is a radio engineer who was sentenced to six years in prison in a maximum-security colony on charges of committing a crime under Article 275 of the Russian Criminal Code (‘High Treason’). He has been in custody since May 27, 2014. Memorial Human Rights Center has recognized Gennady Kravtsov as a political prisoner because the actions he was accused of never took place and his right to a fair trial was violated. Continue reading The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: The Case of Gennady Kravtsov

Interview with Denis Sokolov conducted by Lidia Mikhalchenko.

On April 20, 2020, a spontaneous protest took place in North Ossetia. Official statements by the government described them as violation of public order aimed to subvert the quarantine measures. Is this an accurate description?

– Well, the protest was not so spontaneous in reality. Vladimir Cheldiev, an opera singer usually residing in St. Petersburg, published a call to the residents of Vladikavkaz to gather and protest quarantine.

Vadim has recently returned to Ossetia to tend to family matters and over the past few months has emerged as the face of protests in Ossetia. Two days prior to the protest, he was detained on charges of either “willingly spreading false information on the coronavirus”, or for “exerting physical violence against law enforcement representatives.” (Cheldiev is now facing charges under part 1 of article 381 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, use of mild violence against a government representative).

Vadim Cheldiev rose to fame in 2018, in the aftermath of a fire at the Elektrotsink (Электроцинк) factory. Using his social media accounts, he issued calls to close the factory, started conducted negotiations with the Region’s Head Bitarov, criticized local officials as being “anti-people” and vented about global consipracies.

Vadim Cheldiev’s videos resonate with a widespread folk mythology that all evils (from environmental degradation, loss of respect for elders, dishonorable conduct by women) stem from departure from the original “Indo-European” traditions.  Cheldiev’s accounts in Telegram and Instagram have tens of thousands of subscribers and readers. Cheldiev has an incredible charisma. During protests, one of the demands voiced by the crowds was Cheldiev’s release from detention.

This activist and defender of traditional values believes that there is no pandemic; that Covid-19 is a conspiracy concocted to enslave simple people; that the Russian government has turned the country into a colony for the West.

What’s different about the Ossetian protests is that here, out of the blue, a deeply traditional ethnos, whose worldviews and believes have been long overlooked and dismissed by officials, experts and journalists – started a riot. This is an ethnos living in a harsh reality, full of inconvenient and even outlawed beliefs: extremism, conspiracy theories, inciting hate toward other social and ethnic groups, condoning Stalinism, hatred of the elites. Of note, Russian riot police from OMON, Rossgvardiya, FSB operatives and many other officials live in the same exact world. If you pose a question on fears of having a microchip implanted during vaccination, the percentage of affirmative responses among the protesters and among those dispersing the protest, both on the streets and by issuing decrees from cushy offices, would be about the same.

The coronavirus quarantine measures and the accompanying administrative chaos have achieved something that opposition politicians and civil activists had failed to achieve 20 years ago, – they have awakened and mobilized the people.  Of course, this didn’t happen overnight. The incomes have been falling for several years straight; the quality of governance has been declining for several decades; regional officials, local businesses and even criminal networks have degraded. All of these factors have contributed to the shrinking opportunities for social advancement for ambitious youth.

Financial flows and oil exports, that have previously supported the system, have collapsed.  Cab drivers, small business owners, their employees, all those who had been living hand-to-mouth, are now left without any means to support themselves. All of this is happening against the backdrop of two restaurants that continued their operation even during quarantine, and both, not surprisingly, belong to the head of the Republic.

The Vladikavkaz protest is a protest against the elite and against modernization (as modernization in the minds of the people aims to advance the elites’ interests).  This is an uprising not only against the region’s head Vyacheslav Bitarov, but also against the current system as a whole.

This protest cannot be stopped by arrests (according to the official statistics, 69 people have been detained at the April 20, 2020 protest), puny handouts (159 families have reportedly received cash aid the day after the protest). Such half-measures only further enrage the people. It is possible, however, that rescinding the quarantine measures would temporarily dampen the wave of dissatisfaction.

The police, Rossgvardiya and the Cossacks that can be successfully unleashed against “foreign agents” and “unhappy urban dwellers” are not effective against a people’s uprising. One of the Rossgvardiya divisions from the Krasnodar Kray outright refused to dispatch units for the dispersal of the Ossetia protest; and after their shifts ended, the Vladikavkaz OMON had to be transported from the protest square to the barracks and not their homes, out of fear that they might  join the protesters.

Are any influential political leaders directing the protests or emerging from them?

– There were no influential political leaders among the protesters in Vladikavkaz. Of course, there are many politicians who overtly or secretly oppose Bitarov inside the Republic’s parliament, and at various municipal government offices, and among Ossetia’s representatives in the Russian State Duma and in the Federation Council. Most regional influencers and opinion-leaders are also in opposition to the head of the Republic. However, this protest is against all elites. So, the political intrigue is focused on discrediting potential candidates that may vie for the post of the head of the region whenever it becomes vacant. Ossetian legislators in Moscow have taken a huge political hit for their vote for (or not voting against) the initiative to move the Victory Day parade to September 3, which is not only the end of the World War II but is also the day of mourning for the Beslan tragedy victims.  However, all of these political games have lost their relevance for the time being. If the protest continues to grow, someone may attempt to reign it in, but that’s a different topic for discussion.

Is it fair to say that small businesses have taken the biggest hit from the quarantine?

– Yes, it is fair to say so. Small business is the source of sustenance for many in Ossetia. Small private cattle farms, vegetable gardens, orchards; and in urban areas – hair salons, markets, shops, restaurants, coffee shops. Protection racket income from these small businesses also supported criminal groups and the law enforcement. So those two groups are now in total alignment with the people.

Here, we have a situation where supposedly everything was shut down to fight the virus. At the same time, the restaurants owned by President Bitarov continue to operate.

Those with access to the administrative resource, levers, connections, take as much as they can without thinking twice. Federal chains such as “Pyatyorochka” or “Magnit” continue to operate; federal home goods stores remain open. Such businesses, by the way, are also perceived as part of the elite conspiracy against the people.

Why has Ossetia spawned so many coronavirus-deniers and corona-skeptics?

– The opera singer Cheldiev, whom we have discussed earlier, uncovered a story about a woman who died in a hospital from causes not related to the pandemic. The hospital administrators attempted to falsify the cause of death, even offered a bribe to the family of the deceased for their silence. Region’s doctors and health care workers are severely underpaid, the entire system is very corrupt, and in this situation they anticipated a direct benefit: 50,000 roubles for working with a coronavirus patient for the nurse, double that sum for the doctor, and there have been several nurses and doctors who have been handling the patient. But it’s a small city, so the ruse was debunked.

But that’s not all. The Kremlin propaganda can say what it wants on Russia Today. It can discuss how Russia is better than Europe and America in addressing the coronavirus; it can send formidable anti-virus dispatches to Italy and Serbia; it can sound outrage about the mass graves in Brooklyn; it can show the nightmare of the pandemic in the United Kingdom. But none of this would turn Russia into a developed country. None of this would restore the health care system that has been destroyed. Virus is a great fact-checker. The Russian government is unable to control the pandemic in our country or the number of victims neither organizationally, nor technologically. It is more likely to exacerbate the situation with sawing panic, or banning planned surgeries and providing health care to non-coronavirus patiens.

Russia is oftentimes favorably compared to Italy where there is a great proportion of recorded deaths. But in Italy, an average life expectancy is 85 years, and the average age of those perished from the virus is 82. In Russia, an average life expectancy is 72, so the majority of the Russian citizens die even before becoming a risk group for the virus at the age of 65-70.

North Ossetia, by the way, has the lowest life expectancy in the Northern Caucasus- 75 years. Therefore, Russia as a whole, and North Ossetia specifically, lack a real social infrastructure to impose strict quarantine measures. This is in contrast to the developed countries, where hundreds of millions of socially active citizens find themselves in the prime risk category. In Ossetia, sustaining a household economy is a much more acute of a problem than an abstract risk to die from pneumonia with lethality rate of 0.22%, if one goes by the estimates from the Bonn University. So, corona-skepticism fits within the anti-elite and even anti-Western narratives in Ossetia. And this can quickly spread throughout other regions of Russia.

How would you interpret the demand of Vladikavkaz protesters to appoint a new temporary government headed by Vitaly Kaloev? (Kaloev is an architect, a deputy in the Vladikavkaz Council of Representatives. He came to fame in 2004, when he murdered a swiss air controller whom he thought responsible for the plane crash that killed his wife and two children.)

– Again, this is consistent with the anti-elite nature of this movement. Kaloev is perceived as a people’s person.  This is also consistent with the anti-Western and anti-modernization tendency of the protest. Kaloev has punished those responsible for the death of his loved once in accordance with the tradition, while breaking the laws of a European country and then had to serve a prison term for it. In the spirit of ethnic traditions, he did the right thing, prioritizing vendetta over the law. So, in essence, he purveys the spirit of the riot even better than Vadim Cheldiev.

Kaloev himself did not support this demand. Was he pressured by someone?

–  I don’t want to speculate on his motives, you should ask him personally. But he is more of a symbol of the anti-elite movement and not a bureaucrat. He belongs to the streets and not at an office.

What specific initiatives of the federal government evoked such a explosive response from the people?

– The Russian government response to the pandemic has been inadequate and inconsistent.  By default, they tried to emulate European initiatives. However, in Europe, the government provides support to people who lose their jobs. Russia, currently, is suffering severe financial losses due to the drop in energy prices and an unfortunate attempt by Igor Sechin to play poker with the Saudis. While I think it is too early to proclaim the end of the Putin’s era, it is definitely the beginning of the end. This is the end of the time when Putin was extolled as national leader, when he functioned as an effective arbiter for competing elite clans and groups, when he was in charge of doling out and distributing the oil rent, the times when power and money contributed to his charisma. All of that is over, along with the oil revenues and the love of the people. He is a scared and confused 67-year old, disconnected from reality retired colonel, who is in fact in the main group for dying from Covid-19.

The fact that this truth has become so exposed, is not so much a mistake, but an insurmountable challenge for the Kremlin. The people stopped seeing the great leader in Putin; now they see a helpless crook. People, of course, knew all of this before, but their optics were different. All of this “unitarian federation” is crumbling down, the regions are forced to improvise, without direction, funding or experience. And this time it’s impossible to simply throw money at the problem, since there is no money left.

Putin announced that he has granted discretion to governors in addressing the threat of the pandemic, since, according to him, everyone knows better what is going on in their own regions.

– This crisis has exposed just how rotten and insolvent is the Russian power vertical. Previously, there was an illusion of a powerful state. But the inside is rotten through and through. The pandemic is a tough test for the regime. Similar to a war that demonstrates what is the potential of a military force, this pandemic shows the potential of the Russian state. Of course, this is not a problem just for Russia; other weak states throughout the post-Soviet space are going through the same challenge.

So, Russia is in the midst of a constitutional crisis, an oil crisis and now the coronavirus pandemic. It’s a triple hit.

– Yes, this has amounted to the perfect storm. Even somehow the federal government could come up with money for social relief, they would not be able to get to the people. This is because the entire bureaucracy understands that the material wealth of the state is depleted, and they would pillage and syphon off whatever comes their way. The situation would be similar to that during the collapse of the Soviet Union, when funds are disbursed, but “the soil does not hit the bottom of the pit”- it is stolen mid-fall. We can anticipate that officials will start stealing all they can, without any limitations. Together with those who are supposed to catch them.

Ossetia has more monuments to Stalin than other regions. It is a region with many supporters of communism. It is not rare to see the red Soviet flag or seal on houses or as car stickers. Is there a possibility that the protesters would espouse this ideology?

– I think it will remain as it is now.  It will be a hodgepodge of traditionalism, communism, anticommunism,  anti-globalism, Stalinism and anti-Stalinism, because severe hardship is experienced by people of many different worldviews. And those worldviews are not so important. Again, I would like to stress that this is an anti-elite protest in its essence. The mythology behind is secondary. The people don’t trust local authorities and the current state system. Entrepreneurs whose revenues used to be supported by good relationships with government officials, have lost them. They are aggressively crowded out by large players and chain retail, including by taking away the land. This is a situation similar to what has happened in Kislovodsk. Three thousand cab drivers have been quarantined, and two hundred of “insiders” continue to drive, with a special dispensation from the regional administration. And the situation is the same in almost all of the Russian regions.

Do you anticipate that the Ossetian protest will grow? What is your prognosis?

– I don’t think that it will grow, but it won’t die out either. Protest sentiments will grow.  People’s incomes have been taken away, government showed their ineptitude. Other regions also feature protest sentiments. Local authorities are not in a position to rescind the quarantine, they are not so brave. However, we should anticipate the weakening of the quarantine measures, otherwise there will be an explosion.

Is there a protest potential in Chechnya?

– Absolutely, there is; but it has not manifested yet. The head of Chechnya Kadyrov has its own military and several hundreds of people embedded throughout various divisions of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. His people understand fully well why he is holding his position, and anyone from Kadyrov’s inner circle can be easily arrested. The Chechen leadership has a very fine infrastructure which controls financial flows through support network created by Kadyrov Sr. This not a state structure, but a criminal one. It controls the money flows, state institutes and public figures.

What we have ahead of us are huge budget losses. This summer, tens of thousands of Chechens living in Europe come to Chechnya for traditional vacations, but this time, they won’t bring their usual remittances. Kadyrov is also in a more precarious position in Moscow, where he is involved in a skirmish brewing against the backdrop of the “perfect storm”.

So you think all those who have been forced to publicly apologize under Kadyrov would go to the streets with new messages and attitudes?

– Those who had to apologize would probably be more radical. This would not be tomorrow but can happen at any time. And I don’t think a mass protest in Chechnya will be peaceful.

In Dagestan, using quarantine violation as an excuse, authorities have detained an activist and broke his nose, which was even video recorded. Why has this abuse not caused any protests?

– The political and civil society field has been “mopped up”. The people are not prepared to defend activists, activists are not perceived as “of the people”. It is very unfortunate.  If, in the near future, a mass protest takes place in Dagestan or another Russian region, it will not be one similar to the peaceful marches through the Bolotnaya or Sakharov Squares, it will look more like the April 20 protest in Vladikavkaz. It will not be about democratic values, but about revenge and about redistribution, sadly.

Events in Vladikavkaz can be described as mass unrest. What would you call other similar events throughout the Caucasus?

– In Russia, by and large, there are no riots, there are only civil and corporate peaceful protests. In the North Caucasus, each of such events has a regional flavor. Street rallies in Ingushetia, protests in Dagestan, Cherkessian marches, congress in Ossetia.

Ingushetia used to have a group of civil activists, all of whom were detained; the leaders were put in prison with long terms, with the exceptions who has managed to immigrate. Such people are not under the control of the government, and the government does not understand how to interact with them. They express their civic positions.

Protests in Kabardino-Balkaria and Ossetia are very archaic, they include historic myths, the agenda is different there. At the same time, in Kabardino-Balkaria a year ago we didn’t see the same level of anti-elitism that we observe in Ossetia today. Traditionalism serves different purposes.

What options does the Russian government have for solving this problem?

– I don’t think the government has any options. It has deprived itself of a maneuver space. The bureaucracy has degenerated to the point where it’s not able to solve any political problems.  Moscow can try to end quarantine very quickly. This may give the government some time. The transformation of the Russian political system is unavoidable, but Putin and his circles decided to fortify their grip on power by force, so they don’t have anywhere to retreat. They won’t give up without a fight. The big question is what would come out of this storm.

How can the civil society provide support?

– With solidarity. For example, the activists in St. Petersburg and Moscow should not view so negatively the differences between them and civil activists from the Caucuses. Maybe it makes sense, by using Caucasus as a case study to perform some self-assessment, — what’s going on in our own regions, what key agendas and interests are behind the leaders and people in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Now is a good time for such evaluation. And, of coutse, some of the civil society activists should be prepared to transform into politicians.

What can the West do to help activists in Russia?

– Perhaps by supporting the “new urbanites”, which are now present not only in cities but also in rural areas due to social media and access to smartphones and internet connection. This is a fairly new social group. It has already brought to power Nikola Pashinyan in Armenia and continues to support him through very challenging circumstances. They were also a critical part of the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity.

The Summer 2019 protests in Moscow have scared and paralyzed the government. “New urbanites” value independence from corporations and the corporate state, they want to be in charge of their own lives, they already are a part of the globalized world, they don’t want to work in the government, because they don’t see any politics, just a very depressing bureaucracy.

The new urbanites are at the same time the commissioner and the executor of constructive societal changes. They are the main lever which can organize the deeply post-Soviet ethnos with all of their phobias and conspiracy theories, into a modern state. No Putin with his technocrats and bureaucrats can do such a thing.

In 2018-2019, the Ingush people have demonstrate quite well the creative potential of youth incorporated into the modern globalized world. There, civil society activists managed to transform into an alternative political elite.

I recommend we pay close attention to these people. They have not gone through the enlightenment programs of the 90’s and 00’s, they were just born then, and they are have only recently become adults. But they don’t want to remain in the passenger seat, they want to steer. They are not content with repeating the lives of their parents. We have to find new ways to work with this new cohort, as well as for the new circumstances that we are finding ourselves.

International aid in response to natural and manmade emergencies is a well-established practice. It demonstrates good will and solidarity, and helps victims overcome hardships. However, it can also be used to flaunt power, wealth and advanced technologies for political purposes.

Aid provided by Russia internationally, frequently amounts to nothing more than a demonstration of power, with materiel being of little practical use to the recipient. What is worse, the Russian government sends help to other countries without regard for the desperate need of its own people. This is, sadly, the case with the current Russian international coronavirus aid initiatives. In the past few weeks, Russia has dispatched and promoted its aid to the US, Italy, Serbia and other countries, as tragedy unravels throughout its own regions whose medical infrastructure is clearly not ready to effectively fight with the virus Covid-19.

On April 3 and 4, 2020, Russia sent eleven planes with 87 military officers including military medical personnel, special equipment and military transport for disinfection to  Serbia from to confront the spread of the virus Covid-19. The value of aid delivered to a country with about 7 million inhabitants was just below to what Russia sent weeks prior to Italy, a country with 60 million people. With this help, Russia sent a strong message on how important Serbia was. With a message posted on his twitter account, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic profusely thanked Putin for the help: “Very good conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Confirmed friendship, and significant help will arrive in Serbia. Thank you, Vladimir Putin and the Russian people!”

The contents of the dispatch were the same as those shipped to Italy. “It seems to me to be the same package that it was for Italy, and it requires our full gratitude to Russia because it shows how much they care about Serbia when it is not easy for them either”, Vucic said. Russian effort backfired when public reports emerged that help sent to Italy was not really useful, with its equipment designed for chemical attacks and not viral outbreaks. One can presume that the delivery to Serbia  also turned out to be more of a symbolic act.

Russia is not the only country taking advantage of the coronavirus pandemic for political purposes. China has also been very public with its relief efforts, sending help internationally. On March 21, 2020, for example, a Chinese medical team arrived in Serbia to join the fight against the virus. They brought six medical professionals, ventilators, medical masks, test kits and other medical supplies. China has also provided financial support to Serbia for building test labs and other medical facilities. Two labs, – one in Belgrade and one in Nis, are expected to be ready by mid-April.

For the Serbian government, Russian and Chinese help is useful both, economically and politically. Dimitar Bechev, Director of the European Policy Institute, feels that the Serbian government is leveraging Russian and Chinese attention to advance its own standing within the EU. Alarmed by the prospect of Serbia falling under the influence of these authoritarian regimes, the EU may feel the urge to prioritize Serbia in exchange for its loyalty to the “European family”.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the March coronavirus aid dispatch from China,  the European Union announced a 93 million euros worth of support to Serbia. Even after this announcement, President Vucic continued his negotiations with Emanuel Macron for additional help from France.

Located midway from Asia to Europe, Serbia is strategic locale for both Russia and China. By becoming a part of the Chinese Belt and Road initiative, Serbia has secured over $4 billion in direct investments from China and another $5 billion through loans and infrastructure projects. Serbia and China have also moved to deepen their security cooperation and have agreed on a technological partnership with a Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei.

Russian influence is historically strong in Serbia. Russia dominates the Serbian energy sector and seeks tirelessly to strengthen its position in the region even more. 80% of natural gas and 70% of crude oil imported to Serbia comes from Russia.  Gazprom owns 56.15% of NIS, the largest oil and gas company in Serbia. One of the legs of the TurkStream pipeline is planned to go through Serbian territory.

Sustaining political support among Serbian authorities is of critical importance to the Kremlin, which sees it as a zero-sum game. Seeking to preserve this support, the Kremlin attempts to retard and derail the Serbian integration into the EU and minimize the NATO influence on the country. Russia works to deepen its bilateral military relations through joint training and military sales to the Serbian Army; it is aggressive in its support for pro-Russian politicians and disinformation campaigns. Media outlets financed by pro-Kremlin forces spreads