The First Edition, July 7, 2021
FOM – Fond Obschestvenovo Mneniya – Public Opinion Foundation
VTsIOM – Vserossiyskiy Tsentr Izucheniya Obshesvenovo Mneniya – Russian Public Opinion Research Center
CPRF – The Communist Party of the Russian Federation
SR – Spravedlivaya Rossiya – The Just Russia Party
LDPR – the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
FSIN – Federalnaya Sluzhba Ispolneniya Nakazanii – Federal Penitentiary Service
PA – the Presidential Administration
CEC – the Central Election Commission
DYNAMICS OF PARTY RATINGS
Over the past week, FOM was the only one of Russia’s big three sociological services (which includes VTsIOM, FOM, and Levada) to have released new studies.
The most notable recorded data is the rating of the United Russia party which fell to 29% for the first time in four months. 28% is the lowest party rating recorded by the polls within the past year, so one can assert with confidence that the United Russia rating is fluctuating around its lowest values in the entire history of the polls. This data should be considered within the context of the United Russia’s party convention, the announcement of the federal list, and the announcement of the regional lists of candidates approved by the convention.
All other parliamentary parties— CPRF, LDPR, SR—have seen their ratings increase:
- CPRF grew by 13% —around its highest ratings for the year;
- LDPR grew by 11%, wavering near its average ratings;
- JR grew by 8%, against the backdrop of numerous newsworthy announcements surrounding the party;
- Cumulatively, the ratings of all non-parliamentary parties grew by 7%.
The share of respondents who said that they plan to spoil their ballot or not go to the polls at all has grown to 2% and 15%, respectively
The latest poll by VTsIOM from June 27, 2021, shows similar ratings of parliamentary parties, but shows an even higher percentage of votes for non-parliamentary parties – 13%.
Thus, the following conclusion can be drawn from the data of opinion polls:
- The rating of the ruling party is nearing its all-time lows.
- The ratings of other parliamentary parties are stable and have not absorbed the support of voters lost by the United Russia.
- The ratings of non-parliamentary parties are at levels insufficient for concluding that even one of them would be able to gain 5%. However, according to VTsIOM, one or two such parties can pass the 3% barrier required to receive federal funding.
- There is no trend toward a high voter turnout, rather, the overwhelming political news of the last week (broad coverage of pre-election party conventions by the mass media) reflect the growing apathy among voters.
Russians perceive that the most important events of the last week were not political events, but events concerning the coronavirus pandemic and natural disasters— fires, floods and extraordinary heat waves. The events concerning the coronavirus pandemic are about three times more important to Russians (23%) than natural disasters (8%). For comparison, the meeting between Putin and Biden was deemed important only for 4% of Russians.
Over the second part of June, the anxiety among Russians has sharply spiked. For the first time in the past six months, the number of those who feels that the overall mood is more anxious than calm has increased – 47% versus 46% respectively. The highest level of anxiety was recorder by sociologists in the fall of 2020.
The political developments of recent weeks did not cause a sharp change in the attitude of Russians toward the State Duma elections. Large-scale party conventions did not produce any sensations that could dramatically change the ratings of the parties.
The list of United Russia ended up boring and predictable, consisting of candidates who personally do not intend to become deputies, the federal platform is completely made up of those who tow the party line.
According to Russian political scientist Alexander Kynev, the announcement of the United Russia’s main five candidates did not result in additional mobilization of new party supporters. The party has removed the unpopular Dmitry Medvedev from its list, but added Sergei Shoigu and Sergei Lavrov, whose ability to mobilize new supporters has already been exhausted. Dr. Dmitry Protsenko does not have a broad national recognition either and is not able to attract new supporters.
The Yabloko party convention is an event that has caused a passionate discourse online. The public has expressed strong opinions about the nominated candidates and those left off the lists. However, the soonest we will be able to see whether the party’s ratings have changed — is within a week’s time, and only via indirect indicators— none of the sociologists measure Yabloko’s rating separately.
Consistent with other moves, the party has released its regional electoral lists. They feature a couple of regional heavyweights, a local physician and a renowned cultural figure. Such lists do not help mobilize additional supporters. Moreover, the reaction to doctors as candidates has been uneven, to put it mildly, especially given the great criticism from the public toward the state medical system, which has shown unable to cope with yet another wave of the coronavirus infections. The national vaccination program has failed— vaccines are now in short supply, and one of the two Russian vaccines has now proven ineffective.
There is a notable relationship between the individual vaccination decision and political behavior. Putin’s government has practically refused to introduce a full-fledged lockdown, shifting the introduction of quarantine measures to regional governors. As a result, there was a profound confusion and inconsistency with quarantine measures and mandatory vaccinations. Some regions introduced strict lockdowns but did not compensate small businesses and citizens for the economic loss that resulted from them. Some regions and municipalities took minimal measure, such as introducing operations restrictions for retail— restaurants and shopping centers. Others, through various approaches, attempted to increase vaccination rates among citizens.
There is a robust discussion on the legality of compulsory vaccination as well as the government refusal to import foreign vaccines to Russia, and the non-recognition of foreign vaccination certificates.
These issues have, most likely, also contributed to the drop in the rating of the ruling party, since the policy of the Russian government in relation to measures to combat the Coronavirus pandemic has been inconsistent. The government has consistently shifted the responsibility to regions who lack the resources for implementation of full-fledged quarantine measures. At the same time, in June 2021, as result of the third wave of the Coronavirus, hospital wards were close to 100% occupancy in Russia, and planned medical care for the population was practically suspended.
It is safe to assume that anti-COVID measures will continue affecting the rating of United Russia leading to the elections, especially with the third wave of the virus forecast to end in September-October 2021.
The key development from early July 2021 is that all politicians who had a direct connection with Navalny’s foundation or Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s entities have dropped out, or were forcefully removed from the race:
- Alexey Vorsin, Khabarovsk— refusal due to failure to reach an agreement with Yabloko
- Oleg Stepanov, Moscow— not included in the Yabloko list, refusal to open an electoral account
- Alexey Pivovarov, St. Petersburg— nominated by Yabloko in Krasnodar, FSIN actively opposes the collection of electoral documents.
It can be assumed, that, given the timing of the registration of candidates, the position of election commissions and courts, these candidates will not be registered.
Analysis of the candidates lists from parliamentary parties shows that a significant part of young and charismatic candidates from the CPRF and LDPR will not participate in the elections —for example, Bondarenko in Saratov and Lyubenkov in Bratsk.
The average profile of a candidate from parliamentary parties is a passive party functionary, taking cues from the Presidential Administration, one who does not engage in constituent work unless specifically funded by the party to do so.
The Competitive Field
Considering that government officials currently refuse to register candidates from the “non-systemic opposition”, the elections landscape will be dominated by lackluster officially-sanctioned politicians with slack agenda and avoidance of any criticism targeting the president, government officials, deputies and each other.
It can be expected that fringe parties will run active campaigns only in large Russian cities, where different support groups exist for niche interests. One should also expect that a certain number of active civic groups, in order to achieve their own goals, will try to increase the turnout of voters in the elections.
Systemic participants will operate within the framework of their respective agreements with the Presidential Administration. For example, in Irkutsk, a KPRF party deputy Mikhail Shchapov will face off an exceptionally weak rival representing the United Russia in his district —as part of an agreement with PA made a year ago during the election of the governor of the Irkutsk Oblast.
Last week’s party conventions and the filing of election registration applications to the Central Election Committee by candidates— are the defining events of the election season. In fact, prior to registration, an electoral campaign is not maintained in single-ballot districts; an informal tally of party lists is publicized by the news media.
Smart Voting Campaign
Over the past week, the Smart Voting campaign organizers have mailed out appeals to the addresses of those who had registered to vote urging them to spread the information about Smart Voting initiative and donate to its candidates. However, the Russian social media during this period was dominated by the discussion of the Smart Voting as it related to the publication of Yabloko and CPRF candidates lists. The main discussion themes included the prospect of voting for Stalinists and the changing view of Yabloko as it refused to include certain political activists into its list of candidates.
Last week, it was announced that e-voting procedures will not be consistent throughout the nation. In six regions, the e-voting will be conducted according to algorithms developed by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, implemented through the State Service system. In Moscow, it will be a system based on the algorithms of the Moscow City Hall. This directly contradicts the current legislation in terms of ensuring standardization of methods for counting votes and maintaining the voter list. As of now, there is no data on popular reaction to this violation.
Notable Regional Activities
- In Moscow, candidate Roman Yunemann continues to collect signatures— one of the few who is attempting to register through signatures.
- A double-ganger of Boris Vishnevsky has been put up for election in St. Petersburg.
- In the Irkutsk Oblast, Evgeniy Yumashev has not been nominated by a single party( last year, during the gubernatorial elections he was the only one the in the nation to have passed the municipal barrier).
- In Ingushetia, Ayup Gagiev represents Yabloko. He is an active participant in protests against changes to the republic’s borders.
Regional Elections and Their Political Context
On September 19, 2021, several elections will take place in Russia, which will affect the situation in the country.
Election of the governor of the Khabarovsk Krai: Formally, the Khabarovsk Krai is the most contested region in Russia— its governor Furgal and most of the deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the region are represented by LDPR and were elected as a result of a protest vote. After the arrest of Furgal, it was in Khabarovsk that the most massive political demonstrations took place in the country, which is notable— especially since the police was sent to disperse them only once.
The main intrigue of these elections will be who will support Smart Voting and how. Current acting Governor Degtyarev is also a member of LDPR.
United Russia did not nominate a candidate for these elections.
Supplementary elections for the Moscow City Duma in two districts: The well-known opposition politician Ilya Yashin, who was accused by the election commission of extremist activities, was disqualified from these elections. This is the first time a charge under the new legislation was applied. The legislation disqualifies candidates accused of extremism and “undesired” activities. Notably, Yashin has been removed precisely by the decision of the Election Commission, there are no court decisions restricting his rights, and no criminal charges were brought against him.
Elections for the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg: The main intrigue of the election in the country’s second largest city, centers on determining which of the independent candidates will be able to register. Irina Fatyanova, the former head of Navalny’s headquarters in St. Petersburg, is participating in the elections, and unlike Yashin, has been given the opportunity to collect signatures for her nomination.
Other elections: On September 19, 2021, elections will be held to fill governors posts in 12 Russian regions. These are the Republics of Dagestan, Ossetia, Karachay-Cherkessia, Chechnya, Tyva and Mordovia. The oblasts of Belgorod, Penza, Ulyanovsk, Tula and Tver regions and the aforementioned Khabarovsk Territory will also cast their votes.
Additionally, legislative bodies will be elected in 39 regions of Russia and for the first time in Russia the Council of the Federal Territory of Sirius will be elected.
Between July 7 and 14, we will see the registration of all party lists by the Central Election Commission of Russia.
Public Opinion Foundation. “Dominants. Opinion Field. 25th Edition – Results of Weekly All-Russian Polls by FOM.” Public Opinion Foundation, 1 July 2021, fom.ru/Dominanty/14602.
Russian Public Opinion Research Center. “Rating of Political Parties.” VTsIOM, June-July 2021.