How Democratic Societies Can Fight and Win Against Authoritarian Hybrid Onslaught

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SUMMARY

Putin’s Russia is waging populace-centric hybrid warfare against democratic societies. As such, effective counter-measures to this type of warfare must prominently involve a civilian population highly versed in civil resistance strategies and tactics. Key attributes of successful civil resistance that, in the past, made societies resilient and mobilized against authoritarian regimes are now indispensable for design and effective deployment of defensive and offensive strategies against the Kremlin’s efforts to bring down democracies.

Informed by the dynamics of civil resistance and practice of nonviolent movements and campaigns, national non-military strategies to counter the Russian hybrid onslaught must comprise of both defensive and offensive strategies, including:

- societal mobilization against disinformation to counter lies and identify truth;
- unified and mobilized grassroots groups;
- building infrastructure for civil engagement;
- educating population on civil resistance actions;
- reaching out and extending solidarity to the society of the aggressor state;
- utilizing domestic and international state and intergovernmental structures to establish and enhance readiness in civil resistance policy, planning and deployment;
- bringing many more nonviolent actors and actions to bear on the attacking regime.

Developing and deploying these strategies are seen as an important step in countering both domestic and externally-driven authoritarian onslaughts on democratic societies. The study concludes with general and specific recommendations to different international, state, media and civic actors on the actions to integrate and augment civil resistance capabilities and practices. It finally lists a number of benchmarks that can be used to measure the level of national preparedness, readiness and capacity development to effectively deploy civil resistance defensive and offensive strategies against hybrid threats and attacks.
Russia’s hybrid warfare – referred throughout this study as populace-centric warfare – attempts to tap into the kinetic power of a population and its protest potential, similar to ways in which nonviolent civil resistance movements draw their force. Like in the Star Wars universe, the force in the form of people power exists among us but remains dormant until awakened. It can be harnessed for both, propitious and nefarious ends.1 On the eve of their ascendance to power, the Nazis used tactically nonviolent grassroots mobilization for mass actions, such as boycotts of Jewish businesses, to galvanize supporters and advance their dark violent ideology. Just a few years later, in the midst of the ongoing World War II, the Danish people, united around the values of righteousness, life, and human solidarity, waged a nonviolent resistance in the form of noncooperation with the Nazi occupying forces. They sheltered, prevented the deportation of, and rescued several thousands of Jews.

Civil resistance movements harness altruistic energy and aspirations for nonviolent, rights-based, inclusive, non-discriminatory and life-affirming causes that underpin open and tolerant societies and healthy democracies. Populace-centric hybrid warfare relies on similar nonviolent tactics, but with the objective to degrade democracy. It manipulates civic grassroots’ potential to amplify social divisions, encourage exclusionary and discriminatory practices; and to advance covert objectives of violent conflict and dominance. It also aims to promote and buttress the idea of an efficient and stable system of a strongmen-based, authoritarian rule that, at its core, cannot be maintained in any other way than through lies, propaganda and political violence.

This study explores how civil resistance can be a counterforce to Russia’s populace-centric hybrid warfare in the ongoing battle to defend the truth, legitimacy, authentic representation and fundamental rights and principles of a democratic state. The underlying premise of this analysis is that civil resistance offers a set of defensive and offensive capabilities to counter the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare. Understanding why civil resistance is so pertinent to the effective response against Putin’s anti-democratic warfare requires:

- examining the origin, nature and manifestations of the populace-centric hybrid warfare that Russia currently wages against democracies; and
- assessing the characteristics of civil resistance directly relevant to making societies more resilient (a defensive strategy) and pro-active (an offensive strategy) against Russia’s populace-centric warfare.

Civil resistance is understood in this analysis as a type of struggle led by ordinary people that relies on bottom-up grassroots mobilization of civilians using a variety of nonviolent extra-institutional actions such as strikes, boycotts, marches, demonstrations, and noncooperation, in order to achieve a favorable balance of power and specific political objectives. Civil resistance is often adopted by people despite the risk of repressive punitive measures used by their opponents.

Consequently, this study puts forward a proposition that civil resistance is a suitable and useful means of fighting populace-centric warfare because of its non-military societal and political properties. The Kremlin has recognized the benefits of populace-focused warfare to achieve its political objectives. By the same token, an effective response to this type of challenge can be sought and found among socially-derived solutions, namely, in the form of a society mobilized and organized in civil resistance movements.

The subsequent sections outline the characteristics, evolution and documented instances of deployment of populace-centric warfare as currently waged by Russia. After explaining the societal dimension of Russia's hybrid warfare, this study introduces civil resistance as a viable counter-strategy, as well as identifies and describes in detail various civil resistance characteristics effective in countering Russia's populace-centric hybrid warfare.

**Populace-centric warfare** is understood as a type of hybrid warfare featuring extensive use of non-military means that target the opponent’s society and manipulate its protest potential. The goal is to sow public discord, widen partisanship, and exacerbate societal cleavages, often by bringing people to the streets and manufacturing protests around divisive issues. Such society-focused non-military threats and attacks render military countermeasures (such as deploying tanks, launching missiles, or scrambling fighter jets) irrelevant.
THE ORIGIN AND FIRST MANIFESTATIONS OF RUSSIAN POPULACE-CENTRIC WARFARE

The string of so-called color revolutions, first in Serbia (2000), then in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2005), culminating with the Arab Spring (2011) and then again in Ukraine (2013-2014), have utterly terrified the Kremlin and motivated it to study ways to coopt popular uprisings or what it refers to as “protest potential of population.”

Convinced that protest movements were devised and orchestrated by outside forces (namely Western countries), the Russian government embarked on manufacturing and perfecting their own protest movements, beginning with Nashi (Ours). This pro-government youth movement was set up in 2005 and marshaled by the Kremlin whenever there was a need to organize counter-protests against opposition demonstrations or to stage flash mobs in order to harass Russian human rights defenders or western diplomats. Established the same year, Molodaya Gvardia (Young Guard), affiliated with the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party, fields youth brigades to demonstrate against opposition. The Kremlin’s more recent stage mobilization of youth took the form of Yunarmiya (Youth Army), an organization whose aggressive ethos is fueled by Russia’s nationalist education system and the network of schools, militaristic associations, and martial art clubs curated by the Russian Ministry of Defense, to effectively threaten and in many cases depose Russia-friendly governments.

By then, the Kremlin had already tested its artificially engineered “protest potential” in Eastern Ukraine where, by mid-April 2014, several government, police, and security services buildings had been seized and occupied by organized groups of civilians in what looked like spontaneous local protests. Two months earlier, in Crimea, seemingly spontaneous demonstrations, led by tens and hundreds of civilians, surrounded and in some cases took over Ukrainian military bases, while “the little green men” (later confirmed by Putin to be Russian soldiers) stood behind, ready to wrestle the control of the peninsula from the Ukrainian army.

Tapped phone conversations of Sergey Glazyev, Putin’s close advisor on the issue of Eurasian integration offer an insight into the way manufactured civilian-led protests have become the hallmark of the Russian military strategy in Ukraine. In late February and March 2014, Glazyev instructed his associates on the ground in eastern Ukraine to seize city councils by getting people out to the streets: “people must gather on the square and call for Russia’s help … mass appeals directly to [Putin] with request to protect

Writing in winter 2013, Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, for the first time articulated Russia’s populace-centric warfare. He noted that the “role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness” and that the conflict shifted towards “nonmilitary measures … applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population.” A year later, in May 23, 2014, during the third Moscow Conference on International Security organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense, Gerasimov reiterated that nonviolent revolutions in the region were in reality “outside manipulation of the protest potential of the population” and they “allow the US and Europe to fight low cost wars” without the need to deploy militaries, to effectively threaten and in many cases depose Russia-friendly governments.

4 “В Северо-Западном федеральном округе насчитывается уже более 8,5 тыс. Юнармейцев” [More than 8,5 thousands youth people have enrolled for “Youth Army” in the North-West Federal District of Russia], Ministry of Defense of Russia, July 27 2017, http://mil.ru/youtharmy/newsomore.htm?id=12134985@egNews
Similarly, in April 2014, transcripts of directives purportedly issued by a Russian intelligence officer to pro-Russian insurgents in Ukraine stressed the importance of mobilized unarmed civilians in the Russian military campaign: “Special attention must be given to women, especially women with children as they are your voluntary shields. Those who will come after you will not shoot at women and children.” Russian President Vladimir Putin in his March 4, 2014 interview made a similar observation, revealing in a succinct manner a new Russian military strategy informed by the protest potential of the mobilized civilians, including women and children:

“Listen carefully. I want you to understand me clearly: if we make that decision [to send Russian troops to Ukraine], it will only be to protect Ukrainian citizens. And let’s see those [Ukrainian] troops try to shoot their own people, with us behind them – not in the front, but behind. Let them just try to shoot at women and children! I would like to see those who would give that order in Ukraine.”

By late 2014, the Security Council of the Russian Federation had codified protest potential strategy into Russia’s new military doctrine. According to this new doctrine, modern conflicts are based on “the use of indirect and asymmetric modes of actions” and “nonmilitary measures implemented with the extensive use of the protest potential of the population, [including]... political forces and social movements.”

The Kremlin continues its efforts to harness protest potential in democracies, particularly within the American public. In July 2018, it was uncovered that the Russians had set up a number of operational Facebook accounts, including an account called “Resisters.” The account had created and promoted a protest event “No Unite the Right 2 – DC” as a counter-demonstration to the white supremacist “United the Right II” rally in Washington D.C. scheduled for August 11-12, 2018. By the time the page was shut down by Facebook, approximately 2,600 users had expressed interest in the event and 600 users said they would attend it. A legitimate activist who got duped into co-hosting the protest noted that anti-fascist groups would protest the “Unite the Right II” rally regardless of whether the Resisters page would have called for it, as it indeed happened under a banner of Shut it Down DC, set up by a broad coalition of legitimate anti-racist organizations. Even though the actual impact made by the Russians was negligible in this case, it is nevertheless, a verifiable example of the populace-centric warfare that the Kremlin pursues against open societies.

The holy grail of hybrid warfare for the Kremlin is to tarnish and eventually destroy democratic societies and their representative institutions and establish regimes in the Kremlin’s own image or to its own liking. To advance this objective, the Kremlin aims to break centrist consensus in democracies, widening the gap between marginal extremes and driving a wedge through the center of moderate majority.

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11 Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine”, Administration of the President of Russia, March 4 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366
15 “Shut it Down” D.C. Coalition https://shutitdowndc.org/
WHY CIVIL RESISTANCE?
IT IS EFFECTIVE AND COMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRACY

Civil resistance is a powerful weapon against authoritarian regimes. Research on the subject demonstrates that civil resistance is more than twice as effective as violence in challenging repressive adversaries, three times faster at achieving its objectives than violent campaigns and mobilizes at least four times more people than its violent alternatives.

The likelihood of success of a nonviolent campaign increases considerably when people deploy a variety of nonviolent methods that differ in their purpose and form. In 1973, Gene Sharp identified 198 methods of nonviolent resistance used in struggles against repression throughout history. He grouped these methods into three broad categories: protest, demonstration, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention. Since then, more than 100 new resistance methods have been documented.

In civil resistance, one can attain a strategic advantage over an opponent by employing acts of commission, acts of omission or acts that combine both forms. Acts of commission are understood as doing something that an opponent does not want done, for example strikes, demonstrations, protests, and setting up alternative institutions. Acts of omission mean not doing something that an opponent wants done, for example, engaging in economic, social and political boycotts. An example of a combined commission-omission act would be withdrawing children from a public school to protest state’s curriculum (an act of omission) and setting up an alternative home education program (an act of commission).

In order to mitigate the threat of repression and thereby decrease the risks associated with challenging a more powerful opponent, activists may switch between concentration (e.g. convening protesters in a dramatic display of power) and dispersion (asking people to stay home and not show up at work in a less visible but no less powerful display of power).

The effectiveness of civil resistance against a repressive opponent is driven by a number of attributes internal to resistance. Key strategic attributes of successful civil resistance include:

1. unity:
   - unity around goals (agreement on what resistance wants to achieve);
   - unity around means (agreement on what kind of resistance methods to deploy); and
   - unity around leadership (agreement on who represents the movement and coordinates its activities);

2. capacity to engage in strategic planning essential for deployment of a diverse range of activities that are well-timed, sequenced and alternate strategically between different methods, including acts of omission, commission, dispersion and concentration;

3. nonviolent discipline that keeps a violent opponent off-balance while civil resistance challenges it nonviolently at its comparatively weakest point, —an inability of an authoritarian regime to harness popular and voluntary consent and legitimacy for its rule;

4. mass voluntary participation attained because population sees demands

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advanced by civil resistance as legitimate while diverse and nonviolent actions offer options compatible with a broad range of pragmatic and moral views and levels of risk-taking;

5. **defections when civil resistance** inspires shifts in loyalty among an opponent’s supporters;

6. **effective leveraging of repression** by increasing the likelihood that authoritarian’s measures backfire²⁴, when instead of subduing civil resistance they harm repressor and increase civil resistance momentum.

These strategic attributes are referred to, explicitly or implicitly, throughout the text to highlight many elements of civil resistance important for effective domestic mobilization, defense preparedness, and offensive, across-the-border, societal outreach as countermeasures against hybrid warfare.

Civil resistance is deployed not only because of strategic considerations and properties that make it effective. Its normative aspect, particularly in the context of fighting hybrid warfare, is no less important. Namely, civil resistance is compatible with democratic norms and offers a proportional response to non-military but still damaging actions undertaken by an adversary.

Authentic practice of civil resistance does not stray away from democratic norms that it aims to advance. Compatibility of means (nonviolent methods) and goals (democracy and human rights) in civil resistance are *sine qua non* of legitimacy that undergirds this type of struggle. This also presupposes that the way to defend fundamental freedoms, rights and the rule of law, particularly against non-military threats, cannot be violent, treacherous, or malicious. In that sense, actions must not only be proportionate to the threat, but should ideally reinforce positive societal values such as solidarity, empathy, justice, equality, tolerance, nondiscrimination, and non-repression.

A response to populace-centric hybrid warfare must rely on nonviolent means based on a strict nonviolent discipline as part of any grassroots mobilization. This nonviolent posture constitutes a proportionate response to non-military hybrid attacks and is compatible with political objectives of the struggle that aim to strengthen democracy, construct inclusive civil society and promote fundamental civic and political rights.

In that sense, civic organizing and mobilization aiming to fortify societal resilience against disinformation, polarization and outside manipulation must remain nonviolent and thus compatible with the fundamental principles of a democratic society.

The fight against authoritarian hybrid warfare means a simultaneous laborious practice of democracy by its defenders in each and every step of the struggle. To paraphrase Gandhi, “there is no road to democracy. Democracy is the road.” As a growing body of research demonstrates, civil resistance strengthens democratic norms at home and instills the practices that significantly increase the likelihood of democratization and democracy consolidation.²⁵

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NATIONAL NONVIOLENT DEFENSE AND OFFENSE

Civil resistance has been a common strategy used by unarmed populations against violent domestic authoritarians, as well as to thwart unconstitutional aggression. Some societies have relied on civil resistance, with a discernible degree of success, as a means to fend off foreign colonial domination, occupation, and aggression.

Historical experience suggests that open societies can utilize grassroots civil resistance methods as both, defensive and offensive capabilities. In the process of fending off foreign adversaries through civil resistance actions, societies have essentially developed and deployed nascent national non-military defensive and offensive capabilities that enabled them to remain free, guard against external interference, liberate themselves and protect their sovereignty from a foreign yoke at the lowest possible costs to their own societies.

Whether nonviolent resistance methods are offensive or defensive depends on their intended target. As such, civil resistance methods within a national non-military approach to dealing with external threats can be inward-oriented (defensive), —aiming to strengthen the resilience of the attacked civil society; or outward-driven (offensive), —extending a nonviolent battlefield beyond domestic borders and targeting power structures of a foreign opponent, including opponent’s society.

Defensive and offensive modes of civil resistance can be mutually reinforcing, as the best offense is often a good defense that bolsters the resilience of an attacked society. Effective defense can, in turn, be advanced by a strategic nonviolent offensive that targets societal vulnerabilities of the attacker, and, in the process, undermines the regime’s legitimacy, depriving it of supporters’ loyalties.

Goals of civil resistance in a national non-military strategy may include:

- inoculating and defending society against disinformation and propaganda;
- unifying and mobilizing grassroots groups;
- building infrastructure for civic engagement;
- educating population on civil resistance actions;
- reaching out and extending solidarity to the society of the aggressor state;
- utilizing existing domestic and international state and intergovernmental structures to advance readiness in civil resistance policy, planning and deployment;
- bringing many more nonviolent actors and actions to bear on the attacking regime.

Civil resistance actions for defensive and offensive purposes can also play a function of deterrence. A basic purpose of any deterrence is to discourage an opponent from attacking because the expected costs of an assault are likely to exceed possible benefits of such action. In other words, the goal of a deterrence strategy against populace-centric political warfare is to increase the costs of such warfare by:

- **defensive civil resistance**: making it obvious that such hybrid attacks, if implemented, would fail to reach their intended objectives due to

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civic mobilization, activism, societal cohesion, and civic education of the attacked society. For example, having devoted significant human and financial resources, the Kremlin ultimately decided to wind down its propaganda TV stations in the Nordic countries as they failed to pierce through the resilient social fabric of those nations, making the costs outweigh prospective benefits;

- **offensive civil resistance**: making it obvious that the attacked society is not only resilient enough to withstand an assault, but that it has significant capabilities to undertake its own creative grassroots, state, interagency and intergovernmental actions against the attacker and effective mechanisms to establish solidarity links with the attacker’s population and win its support and sympathy.

Even though the list is not exhaustive, this report identifies defensive and offensive methods derived from attributes of civil resistance and practices of pro-democracy and human rights-oriented nonviolent movements. These methods can turn civil resistance into a potent weapon as part of an effective national response to populace-centric warfare in general, and specifically Russia’s hybrid warfare.

**Defensive (inward-oriented) civil resistance that strengthens domestic societal fabric includes actions that:**

- impart truth-based practices;
- forge unity and nonviolent mobilization;
- establish civil resistance infrastructure and culture of civic engagement;
- advance civil resistance education.

**Offensive (outward-oriented) civil resistance that builds capacity or exerts direct pressure on the opponent includes actions that:**

- target the population of the attacking regime thereby threatening its own survival;
- increase the number of nonviolent actors and actions with which the attacking regime must contend;
- integrate civil resistance readiness into society and into domestic and international policy and defense structures.

The follow sections describe the civil resistance capabilities in greater detail and discuss ways in which they can counter populace-centric warfare.

### 1. TRUTH-BASED PRACTICE OF CIVIL RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

What does Putin’s Russia lack that democracies have at their disposal? The answer is an independent civil society with genuine voluntary participation and activism. Putin has to manufacture grassroots movements in his own country through nationalistic propaganda, misinformation, innuendos, conspiracy theories, and corruption. Lying is often an all-encompassing strategy for such a manufactured participation that helps the Russian regime keep the majority of its population loyal or silent and provides a fuel for its hybrid war abroad.

As part of its nonmilitary warfare with the West, the Kremlin has instituted a new post-truth ideology where everything is relative, and no objective truth exists. In fact, lying is not something that is odd and abnormal, but is a common and accepted part of political life. These days, the Kremlin’s lying seems to be a more sophisticated version of the Orwellian doublethink. In contrast to the Soviet times, the Russian regime does not claim to be truthful, which would place it in an indefensible position. Instead, the claim is laid to a lie itself. Namely, everyone is lying, and the Kremlin’s lies are no different than the lies of their opponents. Accordingly, falsehoods and hypocrisies are ubiquitous and characteristic for all societies, as are political and business corruption, violation of rights and abuse of democratic processes. There is nothing extraordinary about how the Kremlin does business; it is comparable to how the West conducts itself.

In promulgating its lies via state-controlled media as well as through its global brands like Sputnik or RT, the Kremlin aims to spread confusion and cynicism within its own population and among democratic societies globally. This is designed to instill a growing resignation that the truth and facts cannot be established or sought and nothing indeed can be changed. As a consequence, lying is the only (sensible) way in the world; it becomes the new reality. He who lies more convincingly, repeatedly and unabashedly, is the real political influencer and winner.

In such a post-truth world, it falls onto independent societies to fend off Russia’s info-war of distorted truths and outright lies. Vibrant, engaged and even rebellious civil societies that often take the form of civil resistance movements to defend and advance human rights, social justice, and fight corruption, are best positioned to face Kremlin-led political warfare.

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34 The Sputnik news agency, [https://sputniknews.com/](https://sputniknews.com/)
35 RT, a Russian international television network, [https://www.rt.com/news/](https://www.rt.com/news/)
Such societies are, arguably, much more resilient against hybrid attacks and more threatening to Putin's overall grip on power than societies with weaker, unorganized, withdrawn and apathetic population.

This is the reason why Putin and his inner circle have been so concerned about mobilized societies engaged in pro-democracy popular uprisings known as “color revolutions.” Their underlying goal was to reveal the truth about corrupt and repressive regimes in the region installed and supported by the Kremlin. This is why the two pro-Western pro-democracy uprisings in Ukraine – a country with strong ethnic, religious, linguistic and historical ties with Russia – were perceived by Putin’s regime as an existential threat to its own long-term survival. After all, Ukraine’s successful example of democratization and progress toward economic prosperity may inspire ordinary Russians to face the truth about their own corrupt system. This is also why Alexei Navalny’s anti-corruption campaigns, protests and demonstrations focusing on environmental degradation, as well as on health and safety of the population are considered a threat by the Kremlin. They expose corruption and lies that sustain the current regime; and are either met by government repression, or placated with limited concessions.

Past successful pro-democracy and human rights movements achieved their goals because, besides withstanding physical repression, they managed to weather sophisticated information warfare based on lies, conspiracy theories, fake news and hostile propaganda levied on them by powerful government opponents. In fact, nonviolent movements like the Polish Solidarity of the 1980s or the coalition of Protestant churches and civic forces in East Germany at the end of the same decade were successful against brutal and untruthful regimes propped up by an Orwellian doublethink state – the Soviet Union – precisely because they became a quintessence of reliable and truthful information on the communist repression, government lies, and life behind the Iron Curtain. Their voices were perceived by outsiders as authentic because they were coming from established and trusted sources. Long-term political dissidents and human rights defenders took on considerable personal risks to speak up and defend the truth. Ironically, members of East Germany’s feared secret service, the Stasi, were some of the “most dedicated listeners” of the news broadcasted by independent radio stations based in West Germany whose sources of information were East German dissidents.

To defeat the Kremlin’s lies, one has to mobilize the truth. Civil resistance movements are the best weapon to do so. Diverse and voluntary movements cannot be built on lies, misleading statements and declarations, or fake information. In their struggle for justice, democratic rule of law and human rights and facing different degrees and types of repression, movements have to become truth-seekers and fact-tellers critically examining and authenticating the information they share with their members and the general population. Movements win over at least the sympathy, if not the active support, of the majority of ordinary people because they present irrefutable facts about injustice and establish legitimacy in the eyes of the public as the purveyor of truth about political reality. To support their arguments, rights-based movements deploy reason, as well as evidence-based narratives. This is how they find their voice and grow trust with the society they defend. Through telling the truth these movements acquire their political power and advance their causes against the most powerful odds. Consequently, successful movements are the ones that manage to overcome repression, establish themselves as genuine voices of the repressed, and awake agency within people previously inured to constant lying and cynicism.

It is not a coincidence that Vaclav Havel, similarly to Mahatma Gandhi, wrote about the importance of “living within the truth” that must displace “living a lie” in the process of resistance against repressive regimes. Only the truth could truly liberate humans from the shackles of oppression. The truth could be practiced, according to Havel, through everyday actions based on “values like trust, openness, responsibility, solidarity, love” independently of and in parallel to the suffocating reality of the lying regime.

In the context of hybrid warfare, living within the truth
means critically evaluating information; checking its sources and origins; considering the motivation for placement of information in the news; its target audiences and possible aims; checking with trusted peers. In that sense, living within the truth means maintaining a heightened civic vigilance and intensified public scrutiny of information. This must be combined with a renewed sense of public responsibility for corroborating facts, verifying credibility of claims by authenticating their sources, and questioning reasons behind specific information that is in circulation at a given time. To paraphrase Havel, everyone engaged in this truth-seeking practice denies the system of lies and cynicism advanced by the Russian hybrid warfare and, in the process, reclaims his or her own information awareness and agency to resist disinformation while inspiring others to do the same. One illustration of how ordinary citizens can mobilize for truth and, consequently, become part of a civic campaign to strengthen societal resilience against both domestic and externally-driven misinformation is the Pro-Truth Pledge\textsuperscript{41} initiative by a group of U.S.-based academics.\textsuperscript{42} It now includes close to 8,800 signators, 88 organizations, 640 government officials, and 880 public figures who have pledged to share the truth, honor the truth and encourage the truth by practicing twelve specific actions, including verifying information and sources; differentiating facts from opinions; retracting information when it cannot be verified; educating others in sharing the truth and praising those who retract untruthful information.

Initially in this process, polarization might figure much more prominently than unity. In the beginning of the struggle, those who publicly engage in civil resistance are often in the minority. They pursue changes to the status quo and challenge existing norms and practices via escalating nonviolent actions. At the same time, the ones vested in the system push against the disobedient and seemingly weaker group. However, this is only a transitory state for civil resistance movements as they grow from a small number of fervent activists and supporters to eventually raise sympathy and harness participation of the broad majority.

In the long run, civil resistance movements would not aim to polarize, but rather unify a society, adopting strategies that build mutual understanding, diverse coalitions, and a sense of togetherness fostering a broad unity among societal actors around the movements’ goals and means of achieving them. In the past, civil resistance movements have transformed identity politics (e.g. U.S. Civil Rights Movement) and bridged divides such as gender (suffragette and women’s rights movement in Western countries), race (e.g. anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa), class (the Polish Solidarity movement) and ideology (anti-Pinochet resistance in Chile or anti-monarchy struggle in Nepal). They have made the movement’s demands mainstream, part of the increasingly acceptable behavior, and a new norm reflected by shifts in preferences of dominant groups.

Pro-democracy, social justice, anti-corruption and human rights movements with their rights-based goals are, by design, centrists. They integrate and promote standards on civility, human dignity and non-degrading treatment, that most people view as sensible or, at a minimum, do not reject. In that sense, such movements have to be reasonable, utilitarian and pragmatic in order to engage people with different interests and values to form a new majority consensus on the need for change in the society. In other words, movements take measurement of societal temperature toward various ills and public support for different collective responses to redress them. They also regulate societal temperature by bringing it up or down from its extremes toward the middle, where the resistance actions can only be nonviolent. It is there that moderate positions and sensible, specific goals attract a majority of the public.

Movements build unity around common grievances and demands, but also, positively, around common aspirations, inclusive identity, fundamental human rights values and democratic principles characteristic for open societies. This unity allows nations to be better prepared to face hybrid war threats.

The Kremlin’s efforts to manipulate protest potential

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\textsuperscript{41} The Pro-Truth Pledge, \url{https://www.protruthpledge.org/}

in the United States have been only partly successful online and largely unsuccessful on the ground. What the Kremlin’s interference in the U.S. proved is that a significant popular, mass-based discontent cannot be instigated on the streets without authentic grassroots drivers. If anything, the Kremlin interference revealed the lies within its own propaganda claiming that popular nonviolent resistance and revolutions with hundreds of thousands and millions of people on the streets can be manufactured and staged from abroad.

An instructive example is the attempt by the Russian regime, through the Internet Research Agency (a.k.a the troll farm) and as part of its influence operations leading up to the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, to instigate a rally in Baltimore in April 2016 to commemorate the first anniversary of Freddie Gray’s death. A Russian-controlled Facebook page Blacktivist called for the protest, but Baltimore activists quickly grew suspicious of the outsider.

Baltimore’s BLOC – a grassroots group that fights for racial equality – rejected the call by posting a response: “We don’t need people not from Baltimore using Freddie name. Are you working here to fix the issues?” The Russian Twitter campaign undertaken using @FreddieGrayAnn handle (later changed to @BlacktivistDave) was similarly unsuccessful in encouraging protests in the city. The Reverend Dr. Heber Brown, pastor of the Pleasant Hope Baptist Church in North Baltimore, grew apprehensive of the Blacktivist efforts and directed the following message to the account: “The way you’re going about this is deeply offensive to those of us who are from Baltimore and have been organizing here all our lives.” When Blacktivist awkwardly replied that “This must be really wrong. I feel ashamed,” the pastor responded: “Post a public apology. Cancel the event regardless of whether the Russians instigated it or not. Many participants at the protest had never heard of BlackMattersUS but went out to the streets because the cause resonated with them. As one New York demonstrator commented at an earlier protest: “I came out here to let go of a lot of fear that was sparked as soon as I saw the results.” This was just one of the many organic reasons that inspired people to go out on the streets independently of the protest calls issued by a fake Facebook page.

Attempts to manufacture protests failed miserably when specific issues promoted by Russian agents were not viewed by communities as amounting to a genuine grievance. For example, Russian-instigated dueling protests near the Islamic Da’wah Center of Houston, Texas on May 21, 2016 involving “Stop Islamification of Texas” and a counter demonstration “Save Islamic Knowledge” brought out, based on witness accounts, only a few participants: 10 and 50 respectively. This shows how difficult, if not impossible, it is to stage a mass protest from outside without tapping into an already existing sentiment and pre-existing readiness of a community to demonstrate for a specific galvanizing cause; and having no prior direct ties to and history with the targeted community. As such, it is barely possible for an outsider having no established legitimacy with local people and hiding behind Facebook or Twitter accounts to instigate what the Kremlin erroneously thought the West did in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere.

Where Russian trolls were more successful, though still fell short of making any type of revolutionary waves on the ground, was with earning thousands of “likes” under posts on their fake Facebook pages (this engagement did not translate into comparable levels of participation on the streets), in vulnerable and less organized communities, or when their call for protests essentially bandwagoned on already happening movements. For example, one of the largest protests took place after the Russian-affiliated Facebook page – BlackMattersUS – called on people to go out in New York City on November 12, 2016 and thousands responded. However, on the eve of Donald Trump’s surprising victory protests had been already spreading across the country. The wave of anti-Trump demonstrations began on November 9 and by November 11 protests had taken place in 25 U.S. cities, including three protest marches in New York. It is thus very likely that demonstration in New York on November 12 would have taken place regardless of whether the Russians instigated it or not. Many participants at the protest had never heard of BlackMattersUS but went out to the streets because the cause resonated with them. As one New York demonstrator commented at an earlier protest: “I came out here to let go of a lot of fear that was sparked as soon as I saw the results.” This was just one of the many organic reasons that inspired people to go out on the streets independently of the protest calls issued by a fake Facebook page.

Even though the existing fissures in the American society pose vulnerabilities that the Russian regime tried to exploit, the societal resilience of American communities served as a protective barrier. In fact, it was the resilience of the American civic activism, rooted in an extensive infrastructure of experienced activists and engaged organizations, together with the common history of organizing, and authentic and organic nature of mobilization that put up a strong rebuttal to Russia’s claim that ‘protest potential of the population’ could be faked, manufactured, and harnessed by foreigners to stir mass-based, million-strong revolutions.

Another example of how a mobilized community can defend itself against the Kremlin-instigated provocations and interference comes from Kharkiv, Ukraine. In late February of 2014, after Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted in a largely nonviolent anti-corruption and pro-European revolution led by millions of Ukrainians, Russia captured Crimea and its agents and propaganda machinery were deployed to Ukraine’s eastern territory to stir tensions. One of the cities that the Kremlin wanted to capture by directing activities of Russia-backed separatists was Kharkiv\textsuperscript{47}, the second largest city in Ukraine located in the north-east of the country. Kharkiv has had a strong culture of dissidence going back to the Soviet times; it is, for example, the home of one of the first human rights organizations in Ukraine, the Human Rights Protection Group, that dates back to late 1980s; and to the ‘Memorial’ – a human rights society. According to one of the leaders of the Maidan in Kharkiv, this dissident culture has played a role in derailing Russia’s post-Euromaidan plans for the city.\textsuperscript{48} Soon after Yanukovych’s departure, pro-Russian demonstrators came out to the streets of Kharkiv demanding “federalization,” temporarily seizing local administration buildings of Kharkiv and calling on Russia and Putin to intervene on behalf of an allegedly prosecuted Russian minority in the city and its vicinity. In contrast to the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk that remained for the most part indifferent to staged demonstrations by separatists, Kharkiv residents rose up to the occasion. They went out to the streets in thousands to counter pro-Russian demonstrations.\textsuperscript{49} The ongoing presence of pro-Ukrainian protesters on the streets of Kharkiv allowed city authorities to withstand the pressure of Russian proxies, conduct negotiations with the new government in Kyiv; stabilize the situation and align themselves firmly with the pro-Ukrainian mood dominant in the city. Eventually, Russia’s efforts to manufacture a separatist movement in Kharkiv failed as they had been met with a swift and decisive counter-mobilization of the pro-Ukrainian-minded community.

\textsuperscript{48} Author’s Conversation with an Ukrainian Activist from Kharkiv, Ukraine, July 29, 2018.
\textsuperscript{49} Lidia Kalinina, “Сторонники единства Украины собрались на митинг в Харькове” [Supporters of united Ukraine organized a rally in Kharkiv], Podrobnosti, April 12 2014, https://goo.gl/7kzj3t
3. BUILDING AND EXPANDING CIVIL RESISTANCE INFRASTRUCTURE AND CULTURE OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Historically, victorious nonviolent movements increased their odds of success by establishing infrastructure consisting of:

- Cohesive leadership and internalized nonviolent discipline;
- Domestic and international networks and allies;
- Capacity for tactical innovation manifested in diverse forms of tactics deployed and strategically sequenced at various stages of the struggle;
- Communication strategies generating clear and compelling messages and resonating with its goals, methods and mobilization efforts;
- Parallel tools in the form of alternative media, education and service delivery.

Recent research shows that presence of such civic infrastructure increases the likelihood of domestic mobilization in the face of repression by almost 85%, in comparison with situations when this infrastructure is lacking. Such infrastructure constitutes the basis for a self-organized independent society that is interwoven with a dense web of mutual aid and solidarity assistance, trusted information-sharing hubs, citizens' media and alternative grassroots service delivery systems. Only an empowered society, to some extent emancipated from its own government, though an equal partner with the state in addressing security challenges – can have enough internal strength to constitute a formidable force against hybrid warfare threats.

The minority report on the Russian interference in the U.S. Presidential Elections and hybrid war published by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted that the Nordic countries (e.g. Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark) are remarkably resilient against the Russian propaganda. The report stressed the importance of their education systems emphasizing critical thinking, as well as low levels of corruption, as reasons for such resilience.

What the report left out is the fact that active civic engagement, societal participation, and nonviolent community organizing have been prominently embedded in those societies for decades. In some of these countries, the tradition of independent and organized nonviolent activities led by civilians goes back to the foreign occupation and invasions: the Finnish popular resistance against the Tsarist Russia, Norwegians' nonviolent organizing led by teachers unions that prevented the Quisling regime from building a corporate fascist state, and the Danish nonviolent resistance against the Nazi occupation that, among other heroic achievements, saved thousands of Jews.

The Swedish civil society is generally organized around environmental, social justice, anti-military and pro-democracy causes and has a tradition of actively supporting nonviolent resistance movements abroad, including the Polish Solidarity and the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. During the Cold War, Sweden adopted a strategy of Total Defense that relied on harnessing the full power of the society. Unlike Finland that kept its Total Defense Strategy in place after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sweden abandoned it, only to now revive the concept and practice of a whole-of-society defense strategy with a specific goal of countering Russian non-military and military aggression. Its revived Total Defense Strategy relies, among others, on societal skills to set up alternative or parallel infrastructures for critical services, such as power generators and electricity delivery, commercial transactions and cash supply, and health and emergency services.

Recently, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has developed and disseminated an information

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pamphlet titled “If Crisis or War Comes”56 with the recommendations ranging from what citizens must do to identify and address spread of fake information, to how to plan for survival and total defense in case of a foreign attack. This brochure, the first of this kind since the end of the Cold War, has been distributed to almost 5 million households in the country.

The Nordic countries are consistently scoring very high among the Western democracies on V-Dem indices57 (e.g. engaged society; CSO participatory environment; civil society participation index; and common good), demonstrating an extraordinary level of societal cohesion and solidarity, as well as a participatory and mobilized nature of their societies.

Activated society —as manifested in civic campaigns and movements, strong labor unions, vibrant mutual-aid and solidarity associations, high degree of participation of women in public life, combined with the access to free public education at all levels— is highly conduciive to building stronger and more resilient societal fabric. This type of civic dynamics immunizes societies against outside propaganda and interference and builds on-demand rapid mobilization capacity. Such civic capability would have come handy, for example, on the eve of the Dutch referendum in April 2016, in which the voters rejected the E.U. trade deal with Ukraine. Prior to the vote, a Russian troll factory released a video of supposedly Ukrainian volunteer soldiers burning a Dutch flag.58 Only an engaged and watchful civil society would have the capacity and momentum to mobilize and react swiftly, deploying positive messages to counter fake, often negative, news. In this particular situation, Ukrainian citizens, without necessarily waiting for the confirmation that the video was indeed fake, could have launched a civic campaign to display a pro-Dutch public stance, including solidarity demonstrations in front of the Dutch embassy or sending open letters to the Dutch people. For this to take place, a vigilant and activated society must be present.

4. ADVANCING CIVIL RESISTANCE EDUCATION

Both the aforementioned Senate Committee report59 and the Atlantic Council study on Democratic Defense Against Disinformation60 point to the importance of public education, focused on digital and media literacy and critical thinking, that must be implemented to inoculate societies against hybrid warfare threats. Interestingly and conveniently enough, the field of civil resistance study and practice provides a unique gamut of structured learning, skills development, experiential learning and knowledge-based tools that can enrich civic and political education and make societies more resilient against populace-centric hybrid assaults.

Contemporary grant-based programs on civil resistance, such as the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC)’s Curriculum Fellowships on Civil Resistance61, could be expanded with the support of local and national education authorities and integrated into mandatory public school curricula. The civil resistance curriculum itself could be enhanced with strategy games62 on nonviolent organizing and mobilization; as well as with computer-based, strategic simulation on civil resistance campaigns, such as People Power. The Game of Civil Resistance.63 The game is available for free64 and has already been adapted for online and classroom-based instructions at different schooling levels around the world. Participants can choose to play four different civil resistance campaigns: anti-corruption, minority rights, anti-dictatorship and anti-occupation. These are, in

56 “If Crisis or War Comes”, Swedish Contingencies Agency, 2018 https://goo.gl/mxk7sC
59 “Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security”, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf
61 “ICNC offers Curriculum Fellowship programs to support teaching, course development and implementation of new curricular on civil resistance in universities and high schools around the world”, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict , https://goo.gl/1Uapha
64 The game can be accessed by registering for the ICNC Academic Online Curriculum (AOC) and accessing Module 40. Instruction how to register for AOC is available at: https://goo.gl/gff74B
essence, sophisticated analytical drills for nonviolent organizing and resistance. The game includes a scenario builder where a user can add specific local conditions, actors, institutions and other particularities, so that the consequent game could be executed with new variables. Additional game updates could include new scenarios resembling a hybrid warfare conflict against which an attacked population organizes and develops civil resistance strategies.

Curriculum fellowships, particularly if further refined and augmented to include interactive exercises and simulations, can help enhance and develop a set of skills and competences useful in fending off hybrid warfare threats, including:

- Operational or ‘battlefield’ awareness;
- Strategic planning skills and capabilities development;
- Rapid mobilization skills, including capabilities for fast material and human resource acquisition and deployment;
- Communication and literacy skills that help distinguish between reliable and non-reliable sources and cross-check information;
- Network building skills;
- Cybersecurity awareness and digital competence.

These civil resistance curricula can be implemented as part of high school and after-school programs,65 in colleges and at universities,66 as one-time intensive academic seminars67 and practice-oriented clinics,68 be offered via online education such as the ICNC Online Courses69 on civil resistance or the United States Institute of Peace self-paced courses70 on the dynamics of nonviolent movements; through workshops and trainings71 hosted at global72, regional73 and domestic74 institutes.

Such broadly-understood civil resistance education strengthens capacities, skills, instincts, processes, resources as well as local, national and transnational networks for nonviolent organizing. It can assist in setting up a sustainable civic infrastructure for future mobilization even under repressive conditions. Preliminary findings on the impact of the first Regional Institute for the Study and Practice of Strategic Nonviolent Action in the Americas show that in addition to serving as a space for knowledge and skills-sharing, the institute has also established a vibrant transnational network. This network is used by activists to disseminate information on “human rights violations and repression that they witnessed, to call on their friends in other countries to petition decision-makers to stop arbitrary arrests of social leaders …. and to establish other crucial connections that aided the work of grassroots activists.”75

Popular education on civil resistance can be further expanded by promoting applied research76, similar to the University of Denver’s Micro-Mobilization77 research project on the role and impact of women’s organizing and participation in mass protests; releasing special reports78 on the pedagogy and

70 “Civil Resistance 1: The Dynamics of Nonviolent Movements (Online Self-Paced Course)”, United States Institute of Peace Academy, https://goo.gl/pSiit2
71 Training for Change, https://www.trainingforchange.org/
72 The Inclusive Global Leadership Initiative (IGLI), https://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/igli.html
73 Regional Institutes on the Study and Practice of Strategic Nonviolent Action, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/regional-institutes/
74 The James Lawson Institute, http://jameslawsoninstitute.org/
76 “ICNC Doctoral, Post-Doctoral & Junior Faculty Research Fellowship on Civil Resistance”, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, https://goo.gl/q3GKPP
77 “Sié Center Research, Measuring the Micro-Dynamics of Women’s Mobilization and Its Impacts (MicroMob)”, https://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/micromob.html
78 United States Institute of Peace Publications (Special Reports), https://goo.gl/dYxhZ7
education in the field[79] and monographs[80] covering best practices on enhancing societal resilience and preparedness for nonviolent mobilization in the face of both violent and non-military interference. Works on civil resistance are already freely available in a multitude of languages[80] and more translations of relevant literature could be supported and expanded to reach new audiences.

Ironically, to become better inoculated against foreign-led populace-centric hybrid warfare, it takes measures of which governments might be wary — namely, grand-scale political education and skills-expansion in organizing, mobilizing and leading nonviolent movements and campaigns. They might serve as equally effective weapons against anti-democratic actions of their own governments as against external threats. Consequently, an independent and empowered civil society makes its government more accountable and responsive and, by extension, strengthens, not weakens, the state overall, both internally, against a possible democratic backsliding and externally, against hybrid assaults.

5. ENGAGING AND TARGETING THE SOCIETY OF THE ATTACKING STATE

A gamut of offensive instruments: economic, diplomatic, and even nonviolent military responses (e.g. troops' relocation or deployment) increases the cost of hybrid attacks. Another offensive method is to rely on civil resistance strategies and use them against the attacker's society and the pillars of support of the adversarial government. In fact, this is exactly what Mohandas Gandhi did in 1930 with the Salt March and subsequent actions[82] that reached out directly to the British society, over the heads of the intransigent British government officials, and won the British public sympathy for his nonviolent quest for India's self-rule.

One country vulnerable to Russian attacks has considered offensive capabilities of civil resistance as a potential strategy against hybrid assaults. In 2016, Lithuania's Ministry of Defense released a brochure “Prepare to Survive Emergencies and War: A Cheerful Take on Serious Recommendations”.[83]

Thousands of copies were distributed to Lithuanian educational institutions, libraries and public offices. With its light-hearted take on a serious issue of defense preparedness, the booklet informs Lithuanians on different elements of hybrid war that can be waged against their country. The manual also offers “modes and principles of civil resistance” that can be deployed against hybrid attacks, including “using every means available to inform the society of the aggressor state” about crimes and violations committed by its own government on a foreign territory. Such activities aim to accentuate internal divisions and pull the society away from the ruling elite of the aggressor regime. In other words, a society under a foreign hybrid attack may choose to build bridges with the society of the attacking state in order to generate domestic political pressure on the aggressor to change its course.

Offensive civil resistance does not have to be nefarious (e.g. manipulating information or spreading fake news). Instead, the outreach to individual members of the Russian society can be based on positive across-the-border socializing, solidarity and assistance, mutual understanding, and good will.

Despite Putin's claims that he is supported by the overwhelming majority of the Russian population, the Russian elite is far from monolithic. Especially among the educated, Russian professionals (doctors, students, workers, civil servants, military families and even employees of troll factories) it is possible to find those who are conflicted or, in fact, oppose Putin's policies. They can also be pro-Western in their views, as well as sympathetic to the plights of Russia's neighbors aggressed by the Kremlin's military escapades. Opportunities for grassroots citizen outreach based on professional, academic and personal interests and contacts, exist even vis-à-vis Russian citizens who are non-political. Such interactions can take form of simple exchange of views and observations; professional collaboration or advising efforts, resolution of smaller or larger personal difficulties or inconveniences.

In non-democracies, such citizen outreach as part of sustained nonviolent campaigns can be so effective that it frequently results in defections of

81 The ICNC website contains resources on civil resistance in over 65 languages, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resources-by-language/
government officials. Bureaucratic divisions within a corrupt system become particularly pronounced under duress. When loyalties are tested to their limits, people begin looking for ways out, as it was the case in the Russian doping scandal. In this case, a documentary film-maker Bryan Fogel, did not intend to solicit defections when he first reached out to Grigory Rodchenko, the head of the Russian anti-doping agency. Instead, he was looking for help with winning an amateur cycling race by doping to demonstrate how ineffective anti-doping rules in sport were. Having socialized with Rodchenko via frequent Skype chats, Fogel found himself in a unique position to help Rodchenko escape from Russia when the doping scandal involving the Russian national Olympic team broke out. This, in turn, helped secure Rodchenko’s extraordinary testimony that revealed the extent to which Putin himself and his security services enabled the state-wide doping and became a damning indictment of the Putin regime.

Free Russia Foundation through its regional office in Kyiv facilitates the dialogue between the Russian civil society and that in Ukraine. Soon after the Euromaidan revolution, it initiated the “Ukraine Through Your Own Eyes” project that brings Russians on study tours to different cities in Ukraine, including Kyiv, Odessa, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk. These visits help young people form more realistic views and objective opinions about Ukraine, meet and form friendships with its citizens, and thereby counter the anti-Ukrainian propaganda of the Russian state-controlled media.

The issue of political prisoners in Russia can be greatly advanced by solidarity campaigns. Hundreds of those currently prosecuted and jailed by Russian authorities on fabricated charges of terrorism and state subversion are Ukrainians (such as Ukrainian film director Oleg Sentsov). ‘Free political prisoners’ campaigns have taken place in the U.S. and throughout Europe, including Ukraine, and even in Russia. For example, Sentsov’s artist and movie-maker friends and colleagues have organized a solidarity concert in Moscow to remind Russians about his plight, including his then ongoing hunger strike, and highlight his demands to release all Ukrainian political prisoners in Russia.


86 Шrina Chevtaeva, “В Москве прошел концерт в поддержку Олега Сенцова” [The Concert in Support of Oleg Sentsov Staged in Moscow], DW, July 06, 2018, https://goo.gl/Kk3gNW

87 The Concert in Support of Oleg Sentsov, Moscow, July 06 2018, video: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=6iEh_lXSIPk

Source: commons.wikimedia.org
6. INCREASING THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF NONVIOLENT ACTORS AND ACTIONS CONFRONTING THE ATTACKING REGIME

What if individual social interactions between just a few citizens of democratic societies and Russia expanded considerably in scale and intensity, involving thousands of people, and gained a coordinated strategic focus and purpose in establishing channels for continuous communication with ordinary Russians? Civic groups, artistic associations, syndicates, trade unions and professional associations of lawyers, doctors, students from democratic countries are well-positioned to reach out directly to Russians, passing over the Kremlin. Such efforts would reduce the alienation between the Russian society and civic and professional groups from democracies, and, simultaneously, widen the schism between the Kremlin and ordinary Russian citizens.

A spontaneous yet powerful outreach effort, for example, was undertaken by Ukrainian groups and individuals on the eve of Russia’s stealthy takeover of Crimea and fomenting unrest in Donbas. At that time, Ukrainians of various professions made public appeals to their Russian counterparts. A letter from Ukrainian cinematographers to their Russian colleagues called for solidarity and prompted the latter to state publicly their opposition to the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Famous Russian rock stars called for peace and friendship between Russians and Ukrainians. Well-known Ukrainian actors and writers publicized their video appeals to Russians. Ukrainian scholars and academic institutions issued public appeals to their colleagues in Russia after the Russian parliament approved military invasion of Ukraine. They called on their Russian counterparts to lobby the Russian government to prevent war between the two nations. In response, representatives of Russian academic and education communities expressed their solidarity with their Ukrainian colleagues and offered their support to the Ukrainian people in their efforts to achieve “freedom, democracy and social justice.” They also called on all Russian scientists, scholars, students and teachers to sign the solidarity letter. Ukrainian students made video appeals to their Russian counterparts. Many responses from Russian students were critical, taking the Russian government’s side. But among these responses, there were also expressions of solidarity sent by Russian students to their Ukrainian peers. Ukrainian artists and intellectuals publicly appealed to members of the Russian arts and cultural community who backed Putin; and offered counter-arguments to the Kremlin’s propaganda on the violent Maidan, discrimination against Russian-speakers in Ukraine, and the legitimacy of the referendum in Crimea. Ukrainian retired

94 “Обращение студентов Украины к студентам России” [Appeal of the Ukrainian Students to the Russian Students], www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPB-sZ4sVss
95 “Студенты России - студентам Украины: “Нельзя быть не на стороне правды” [Russian Students to Ukrainian Students: “We Can’t be Not On the Side of the Truth”], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VklUdwiiuGE
96 Oleksiy Haran, “Обращение к деятелям культуры России, поддерживающим оккупацию Украины” [Appeal to the Russian Artists, who Supported Occupation of Ukraine], https://goo.gl/H5Yhu3
97 “Первый руководитель спецподразделения СБУ "Альфа" Василий Крутов обратился к российским коллегам с просьбой сойти с тропы войны” [The head of the special unit “Alpha” of the Ukraine’s Security Services Vasily Krutov appealed to his Russian colleagues to abandon the path to war], www.facenews.ua/news/2014/191534/
active military service members also reached out to Russian army officers with appeals to oppose military intervention in Ukraine. Ukrainian models from the city of Ternopil made a video appeal to Russian soldiers\(^98\) with signs that called on the soldiers to go home where their girlfriends, fiancées and wives waited for them.

This campaign has demonstrated an ability to mobilize Russian population. In the early spring of 2014 thousands of Russians took to the streets to protest the Kremlin’s intervention in Ukraine.\(^99\) However, the success was rather limited, as efforts to drive a wedge between the Russian people and the Kremlin on the issue of Ukraine had eventually failed. Arguably, it was not the weakness of the appeals themselves, as many generated the intended reaction of solidarity and sympathy from the other side, but rather their short-lived (most were issued in 2014 and stopped by the beginning of 2015), spontaneous and uncoordinated character.

The Ukrainian general attitude toward Russian aggression had changed radically by late spring of 2014 in favor of a fully-fledged military response. A more hostile stance overshadowed the earlier positive appeals to the Russian society. This development provided Putin with a useful propaganda tool to keep his own population on his side by depicting Ukrainians as violent, while the poorly-equipped ragtag insurgents in Donbas were presented as legitimate defenders of the Russian-speaking civilians in the region standing up bravely to the entire Ukrainian military. Similarly, in the occupied Crimea, the newly installed pro-Russian government used the war in Donbas to advance its propaganda directed at the population of the peninsula. Had it not been for Russia and its troops, the local propaganda said, the residents of Crimea could have met the same fate as the people of Donbas: violence and war. Outreach to neutral Russians in Crimea, Donbas and Russia itself became by then much more difficult.

The outreach to the Russian society, however, can be attempted again when the opportunity arises or when a tragedy strikes. This happened in March 2018, during the fire in the mall in the Russian city of Kemerovo that killed more than 60 people, many of them children.\(^100\) Throughout Ukraine people expressed condolences and brought flowers to the Russian embassy.\(^101\) It is not impossible to imagine that a more publicized and organized civic mobilization— beyond the Russian Orthodox Church networks abroad and the Russian diaspora—could

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98 Video was available on the Ternopil Information Bureau site in March 2014 but is no longer accessible: http://ternopilinfo.com/modeli-zvernulis-rosiyskih-voyakov-video/


101 “Kyivans bring flowers and toys to the Russian embassy in #Kyiv to condolence the deceased in the mall fire in Russian #KemerovoTragedy.” Twitter post with the image from @ Hromadske: https://goo.gl/LfIS9T
have fundraised and collected goods and delivered them to the families who lost their loved ones in a vivid demonstration of cross-border solidarity and empathy. From that bridge other cross-border bridges could have been built.

Anti-corruption campaigns in Russia and in the West could also serve as causes for civic solidarity and assistance action across the borders and increase pressure on the Kremlin. Illicit Russian wealth stashed in major European and North American cities could be investigated and publicized by grassroots activists. Such information could, in turn, be helpful for Russian activists who could amplify the issue, investigate local connections, and spread relevant news across the country. Russian activists could also provide leads to activists in Western countries about what information to collect or demand from their governments to help anti-corruption campaigns in Russia.

In fact, the Ukrainian and Russian anti-corruption activists could also begin coordinating their work and sharing information and best practices on how to challenge entrenched oligarchy and kleptocratic practices. They could highlight similarities and differences in terms of challenges and solutions needed. The Russian anti-corruption activists could also focus on accessing Russia’s occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas – that Ukrainian activists have limited or no entry to – and investigate and collect information about corruption that is rampant there. In turn, Ukrainian activists could shed more light on the corruption in their own country and involving their own citizens that stems directly from the war efforts and occupation.

Sometimes, as the case of a Tunisian blogger activist\textsuperscript{102} shows, anti-corruption efforts could be unexpectedly helped by odd networks of foreign observers. In this case it was the VIP plane hobbyists who collected information on locations of the Tunisian presidential plane. A Tunisian blogger asked them to send images of the presidential plane spotted at different airports across Europe between 2001 and 2007. Even though President Ben Ali made only three official trips to Europe during that time, the plane was spotted 13 times in cities such as Malaga, Malta, Geneva, Madrid and Paris. As it turned out, it was the president’s wife that was particularly fond of Europe-bound trips for private shopping sprees and leisure visits. The activist-blogger made a video\textsuperscript{103} that detailed this information and shed light on the high-level corruption in the country. It fueled the ire of ordinary Tunisians that few years later led the nonviolent revolution.

Yet another strategy for deploying different types of nonviolent actions that the attacking regime must contend with can be the use of humor, satire and mockery in the form of street actions, songs, music, online memes and other media. Autocrats in particular want to be feared, respected and taken seriously. They do not take jokes or mockery against them lightly. Sometimes, a humorous touch can create greater publicity and augment an authentic grassroots mobilization behind the efforts to counter the Kremlin’s hybrid war. In 2016, it was reported that the hundreds of citizens from Baltic states and Finland formed an elves online community because “we were fighting trolls…… Let’s be elves”, as one “elf activist” explained.\textsuperscript{104} Next to their clandestine work on the Internet to identify, reveal, and counter trolls, elves also organized counter-demonstrations against pro-Kremlin protests in Lithuania. They wore U.S. and E.U. flags and big smiles on their faces, ruining the Kremlin state media shoots with anti-Western protests.

### 7. BUILDING CIVIL RESISTANCE READINESS IN SOCIETAL AND STATE STRUCTURES AND ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

For civil resistance to become a national tool that is effectively used against hybrid war, it needs to be integrated into societal and state structures and propagated among the citizens. Fortunately, civil resistance seems to be a relatively amenable concept and practice for integration into security, political, social, cultural and institutional aspects of public life as the following examples and recommendations demonstrate.

On a state level, countries can augment their military doctrines to incorporate civil resistance ideas and practices. Lithuania has made the most advances in integrating civil resistance into its national defense

\textsuperscript{102} Tunisian presidential plane-spotting, a project of the Tactical Technology Collective, https://goo.gl/mwAqFv

\textsuperscript{103} Tunisie : Qui utilise l’avion de la présidence de la Rép [Tunisia: Who uses the presidential plane of the Republic of Tunisia], video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XRW2BJOewcc

strategies. Its most recent 2016 Military Strategy under “credible deterrence” lists “preparing citizens for state defence and nonviolent resistance… fostering [people] will and resilience to information attacks …” Next to acquiring skills for armed defense, the strategy calls for enabling the citizens to acquire and improve skills for … nonviolent resistance” as part of “a total resistance to an aggressor.” The 2017 National Security Strategy emphasizes “preparedness of the society” and promotion of “active citizenship” by “… providing the possibilities to acquire and enhance … skills to carry out nonviolent civil resistance.” After Russia initiated its hybrid war in Ukraine, the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense set up a Mobilization and Civil Resistance Department. In 2015 and 2016, the department published three manuals: “What we should know about preparing for emergency and war situations,” “Prepare to survive emergencies and war: a cheerful take on serious recommendations,” and “What we should know about resistance: the guidance for active actions.” The manuals looked into the role of nonviolent resistance in national defense and offered examples of such resistance. One of the studies stressed that “citizens can resist aggression against their country not only through armed [struggle]. Civilian-based defense or nonviolent civil resistance is another way for citizens’ resistance against aggression. (…) This method is especially important for threats of hybrid war.”

Another way to galvanize civil resistance and improve preparedness is through movies and documentaries on civil resistance. A year after Russia’s criminal invasion of Crimea, a TV series Occupied was released in Norway. Quickly going viral, this show involved the scenario of ‘velvet’ aggression by Russia that took over Norway’s oil and gas rigs (with the approval of the E.U.) and a political occupation of Norway that was formally executed by the Russian ambassador in the country. The movie explores the themes of collaboration and resistance, including limited civil resistance actions: a socio-cultural boycott of a Russia-held political event or public ostracism of domestic collaborators. Given its popularity in Norway and Europe, the series and its plot could have been recalibrated to accommodate far more sophisticated strategies of nonviolent resistance and a greater number of creative examples of nonviolent actions. The series could even explicitly tap into the history of successful civil resistance led by Norwegian teachers and teacher unions against Vidkung Quisling, the head of the Nazi puppet government in Norway. Other similarly popular series on national nonviolent resistance could be produced by individual countries or a consortium of countries to make people aware that armed defense is not the only available and by no means the most effective way of protecting the society. Such series could educate and inspire the population about the richness of civil resistance methods, their impact and role in the history of different nations, creative strategies behind nonviolent resistance and its relevance to the current political situation and to countering foreign hybrid threats.

Developing and conducting global and national surveys on preferences for specific types of resistance is another opportunity to introduce nonviolent means of resistance into the public forum, popularize discussion about them, and explore the possibility of integrating civil resistance into national arsenals of non-military strategies.

In 2014, Gallup International conducted a global survey on people’s preferences to defend their countries. People in more than 60 countries were...
asked “Would you fight for your country?” In general, 60% of the polled population were willing to fight, while 27% would not. However, the question did not make a distinction between nonviolent or unarmed and violent and armed fight for one’s country. “Fight” was understood by the survey interpreters as meaning “take up arms.” By default, the people that rejected to fight for their own country chose in that context a capitulation.

Similar surveys, but on national levels, have been conducted by the Nordic countries, including the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency and the Norwegian Folkeforsvar (People and Defence). Finland’s Advisory Board of Defence Information conducts a survey that includes a question that, if further modified, could yield more information about the type of nonviolent resistance methods Finns would be ready to undertake in case of a foreign attack: “If there was a military aggression against Finland would you be prepared to take part in different tasks of national defense according to your skills and competences?” Listing such tasks, and describing various civil resistance methods could help inform the respondents and yield important feedback.

Surveys of this nature should ask specifically for people’s preferences for either armed defense, nonviolent resistance or both. The results of the surveys that give people different options in terms of the methods they prefer to use to defend their nations show that ordinary people are ready to engage in nonviolent resistance actions during a conflict, even more so than in violence or withdrawal and passivity. A national survey in Poland in 2015, that asked Poles what they would do if their state faced armed invasion by another country showed that 37% of respondents – the equivalent of almost 12 million Polish adults – said they would resist foreign aggression “not by fighting with arms, but by engaging in other, non-military activities.” Only 27% percent declared that they would take up arms. The remaining opted to emigrate, surrender, or were undecided. Similarly, an even more sophisticated survey conducted at the beginning of fall 2015 in Ukraine showed that nonviolent resistance actions against foreign aggression and invasion were for Ukrainians the most preferred method of defending their homeland.

More of national surveys clearly distinguishing between armed and unarmed resistance, as well as identify different types of nonviolent resistance actions should be conducted in order to understand attitudes toward alternative methods of struggle. This would open conversations with policy and defense planners on the necessary steps to utilize the significant potential for nonviolent resistance that so far has been either completely ignored, left undiscovered or untapped. In general, such surveys could offer policy planners insights into the existing social capital for a specific repertoire of collective nonviolent actions and help start the discussion about what kind of infrastructure on national and local levels might be needed to prepare the society for a deployment of civil resistance as part of the national defense when needs arise.

Similarly to military recruitment centers, national and local authorities, in cooperation with local civic organizations, could set up communication and information centers on strategic nonviolent action that could become focal points for contacts, information sharing and communication regarding civic organizing, and mobilization for local civilians and groups. Local centers could employ full-time staff with specialized knowledge in civil resistance, civil resistance training and education, and communication strategies as part of nonviolent organizing and movements. These local centers could be tasked with planning defensive and offensive civil resistance contingencies, including how a population under attack could engage the population of the aggressor state and shape the latter’s perception on the actions of their own government that might not align with the values or long-term interests of the population.

High level of preparedness to launch an organized civil resistance in response to hybrid warfare is a basis for developing and ingraining within the civil society skills of strategic planning, capacity for autonomous actions and sustained resilience.

National government agencies should play key roles in civic preparedness. Ministries, taking the initiatives of the Lithuanian government as example, could augment their civil resistance capacities by setting up civic mobilization and resistance departments within ministries of defense or ministries of education.

114 Interview Survey by the Advisory Board of Defence Information [Direct link to an automatic download of the survey questions and results: https://goo.gl/2kxbxb]


and make them responsible for the development of general strategy and coordination in the area of civil resistance against hybrid warfare.

Democratic countries in specific regions could start closer collaboration with each other by setting up regional coordination teams on civil resistance. Such teams could bring experts and planners from civil society and governments to coordinate civil resistance campaigns across the region to prepare and defend societies against non-military interference, a limited invasion or occupation launched under a pretext of helping ethnic kin or sympathizers.

The European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, that was established by Finland in July 2017 and brought together 12 E.U. and NATO states, could serve as a suitable regional organization to integrate a civil resistance perspective into its work on hybrid challenges. The Center focuses on improving state readiness to respond to different unconventional threats and specializes in three work areas: hybrid influencing, terrorism and radicalism, and vulnerabilities and resilience. Each of these work areas could benefit from the integration of knowledge about dynamics and key lessons from civil resistance and nonviolent movements. Consequently, the Center could offer practical recommendations for civic and institutional actors on how to augment their relevant capabilities, skills and knowledge with civil resistance planning and strategies.

Finally, NATO could play a positive and even a decisive role in planning for, coordinating and advancing civil resistance strategies among its member states. This can include incentivizing national defense plans to focus not only on military readiness but also on social resilience, particularly in the absence of an open military conflict, as in case with hybrid warfare. NATO could set up a planning and policy unit responsible for popularizing civil resistance, ranging from publishing short manuals on nonviolent organizing and mobilization, similar to the ones published by the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense. It could also push for routine and extensive exercises with civilian populations and build skills and capacities for rapid deployment of mass number of unarmed civilian volunteers in case of externally-fueled domestic unrest or to protect public institutions, or to coordinate a strategic outreach to the population of the attacking state. Investment in pro-social activities to strengthen resilience and capacities of the societies of NATO member-states could be recognized on par with spending on military hardware. As observed by one of NATO military officials, “social infrastructure perspective” can be a foundational element and part of the required minimum of 2% of GDP that NATO member states committed themselves to spend annually on the military; no less important than spending on tanks and missiles.

118 Hybrid CoE, The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/


120 The information is based on the email exchange between the author and a NATO-affiliated military official, February 2017.
GENERAL TAKEAWAYS

THE KREMLIN SEIZES THE IDEA OF PEOPLE’S PROTEST POTENTIAL

The Kremlin’s populace-centric warfare against Western democracies is relatively low in cost, avoids direct military confrontation and, so far, has been nonviolent in character. It has been directed specifically against open societies and their dormant – until awakened – protest potential. Russia has drawn its own conclusions from global color revolutions, the Arab Spring and from political protests in Ukraine between 2013 and 2014. Genuinely believing that these revolutions were orchestrated by external forces, Putin’s government began planning ways to manufacture such revolutions and produce popular destabilizing forces in its immediate neighborhood and far abroad. At the same time, it took preventive measures by harnessing its own grassroots movements to thwart similar scenarios from happening in Russia.

CIVIC APATHY AND WITHDRAWAL HELP RUSSIA’S HYBRID WARFARE

Russia’s populace-centric warfare exploits societal vulnerabilities of its enemies. These vulnerabilities are not necessarily polarization and partisan divisions per se— they will always exist because of the nature of a democratic system— but rather a low level of civic mobilization, weak grassroots organizing and networking, and insufficient political education.

RUSSIA’S DESTABILIZING ATTEMPTS FAIL WHEN FACED WITH MOBILIZED AND VIGILANT COMMUNITIES

Russian efforts to manipulate protest potential in democracies were not entirely successful in situations where they were met by vigilant and mobilized communities. Because building genuine nonviolent movements requires face-to-face engagement and spending time in the community to develop an authentic representation and personal trust, Russia often tried to manipulate voluntary participation through bandwagoning – joining already scheduled demonstrations that would have taken place anyway. The Kremlin, contrary to its own propaganda about the West’s ability to manufacture color revolutions, has not been able to mobilize millions of Americans on the streets.

Movements and mobilized communities that stand up against economic, social or political status quo face opponents that are more often their own, domestic rather than foreign, governments. As such, they hone their skills of nonviolent organizing, often, against a powerful state system vested in protecting the current status quo and willing to deploy sophisticated, overt or covert, counter-measures to push against activists. Paradoxically, such engaged communities – as it was the case with the black community in Baltimore, in the U.S., commons.wikimedia.org/
or a local community in Kharkiv, Ukraine— are better prepared to remain resolute, vigilant and mobilize more effectively, but this time, against foreign-led hybrid threats and attacks.

**DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF CIVIL RESISTANCE IMPORTANT FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTERING OF THE KREMLIN’S POPULACE-CENTRIC WARFARE**

Societies can be further inoculated against hybrid warfare threats by strategically harnessing the power of civil resistance organizing, including its defensive and offensive capabilities. The potential of pro-democracy and human rights movements and civil resistance practitioners to deploy evidence-based and truth-promoting practices; forge unity, build coalitions across different groups, encourage nonviolent mobilization, establish mobilization infrastructure, strengthen a culture of civic engagement; as well as advance civil resistance education constitute a unique opportunity to enhance defensive capabilities against possible and real hybrid warfare threats. Furthermore, civil resistance methods and skills can be deployed strategically and offensively to help reach out to the population of the attacking state; increase the number of nonviolent actors and actions that the attacking regime must contend with, together with the augmented capacities of the open societies, as well as domestic and international policy and defense structures of democracies for civil resistance-based organizing, mobilization and actions.

**CIVIL RESISTANCE PREPAREDNESS EQUALLY BENEFICIAL FOR PRESERVING DEMOCRACY AGAINST BOTH, DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL THREATS**

Long-term benefits from the existence of defensive and offensive civil resistance capabilities rest not only in societal ability to provide a more robust response to potential threats and real attacks resulting from the populace-centric hybrid war. Organized independent civil society is also healthy for internal democracy and a check on domestic democratic backsliding. In other words, the greater a society’s capacity to counter populace-oriented hybrid warfare the more prepared and resilient such societies are both against domestic and foreign threats to their democracy.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RELEVANT CONSTITUENTS

Much can be improved in the overall preparedness of democratic societies for hybrid warfare. This study offers recommendations for how various constituents can increase civil resistance awareness, skills and capabilities that could enhance overall readiness of the society and the state to deploy various nonviolent actions to counter hybrid warfare.

FOR POLICY AND DEFENSE PLANNERS, INCLUDING STATE AGENCIES, AND INTERAGENCY AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL DEFENSE AND POLICY BODIES

Defense planners, security experts and policy makers may benefit from a more careful look at the civil resistance toolkit when they consider various strategies against Russia’s hybrid war. Long-lasting solutions against hybrid conflict and populace-centric warfare rooted in the Kremlin’s desire to harness “protest potential of the population” can be derived from the power, mobilization and self-organization of democratic societies.

At the national level, governments may choose to integrate civil resistance strategy development and planning processes into their annual military and defense plans and drills. Various inter-agency and intergovernmental bodies responsible for national defense and collective security, including dealing with hybrid warfare threats, could pull resources together and set up planning and operational groups that would work with civilian population to enhance societal resiliency and societies’ mobilization potentials and cultivate diverse collective and grassroots initiatives to counter foreign hybrid threats.

FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Because civil resistance is often practiced on local levels, and societal resiliency frequently starts and builds from mobilized local communities and because the Russian hybrid warfare is known to have targeted local communities121, local authorities have a particularly important role to play in civic defensive planning and preparation.

Local authorities could invest in communication and civic infrastructure, open information centers to increase awareness of civil resistance actions, augment capabilities and improve skills in civil resistance organizing and mobilization. Such centers could be tasked with crisis information management to counter fake news, rumors, or conspiracy theories that concern their municipality (similar to the Pizzagate incident122 that targeted a business in Washington D.C. on the eve of the U.S. presidential elections).

City authorities could also establish localized civic-public partnership networks to enhance civil resistance readiness and coordinate information sharing, public announcements and communication about hybrid threats and possible community responses that would involve local activists, local media outlets, schools, universities and other public institutions, including emergency services and local transportation network.

FOR PUBLIC MEDIA, CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY

Promoting civil resistance by media, cultural organizations and entertainment sector could take various forms, including producing movie series, news, features, and articles in local, regional or national press and media. Such news can highlight stories of nonviolent grassroots campaigns and their lessons learnt for civic mobilization, coalition-building and engagement by a general public in sustained resistance actions. The use of popular cultural symbols, music, arts, songs, public or street theater could propagate the importance of nonviolent and rights-based activism. It could also emphasize the significance of uncovering, often forgotten, national histories of nonviolent resistance actions, campaigns and movements and their continued relevance to building and defending democratic principles against both domestic and foreign threats.


Countries with expansive civic education and activated civil societies, such as the Nordic states, were found to be less vulnerable to populace-centric hybrid warfare and its tools of disinformation, conspiracy theories, and propaganda.

Civic organizations with their networks of trainers and educators, as well as public and private educational and academic institutions that can conduct or promote general and specialized education on civil resistance, play a particularly important role in strengthening civic capacities to push back against authoritarian hybrid warfare threats and attacks. Civic resistance education can provide a blueprint for increasing ‘literacy’ skills in battlefield mapping, strategizing resistance, communication, cybersecurity or general physical safety. Such education – be it in form of face-to-face interactions or online learning— can facilitate knowledge and skills-sharing as well as practical collaboration among activists at local, national and transnational levels.

State and non-state donors, including grant-making foundations, could help support civil resistance by adopting a movement-centered perspective or embracing a movement mindset. This will not only help to recognize that movements are key drivers of political and social change, but more importantly encourage development of more flexible funding mechanisms and other non-financial assistance that can benefit movements, and, by extension, support societal resiliency and civic capacity for collective independent actions.

Finally, civil society organizations can embark on explaining and popularizing civil resistance among repressed communities by methodically documenting nonviolent actions that some members of those communities participate in or undertake. They can publish civic manuals in local languages, particularly, directed to societies that remain highly vulnerable to or are under the attacks of hybrid warfare, such as Manual on Civil Resistance for Ukrainians. While it collects information about

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125 “Пособие по ненасильственному сопротивлению для украинцев” [A manual on nonviolent resistance for Ukrainians], Center of Strategic Research, August 15, 2016, https://goo.gl/fgYByc
nonviolent resistance actions against the Russian occupation in Crimea and Donbas, this manual can inform and inspire, and make others realize that alternatives other than violence to challenge seemingly powerful are indeed available to the oppressed.126

FOR CIVIL RESISTANCE ACTIVISTS AND CAMPAIGN ORGANIZERS IN DEMOCRACIES AND NON-DEMOCRACIES

Hybrid warfare led by authoritarian regimes is essentially designed to deepen societal divisions and undermine democracies. Activists and organizers traditionally are focused domestically, overlooking foreign threats that might often seem as distant, not relevant to the local context, or a matter of competition between foreign regimes and activists’ own government that they frequently disagree with or oppose.

However, activists and organizers that often wage struggles for rights of their repressed communities and, in principle, oppose injustice, discrimination and violence, can benefit from a broader perspective on their localized struggles. This more universal approach could be helpful to acknowledging the interconnectedness between, on the one hand, local and national causes, together with grassroots mobilizations on their behalf, and, on the other hand, authoritarian regimes’ nefarious hybrid warfare that aims to raise social tensions, provoke conflicts, undermine confidence in electoral processes and democratic rule of law.

Such acknowledgement can go a long way for local activists and organizers in recognizing a real danger posed by hybrid warfare to the rights and social justice of their own constituents and, ultimately, the democratic accountability. This, in turn, can help stimulate the work on suitable civil resistance strategies and tactics that can be implemented on the local level with local resources to counter threats of external hybrid warfare. It can also elevate public debate on the need to establish closer civic-state partnership in the area of civil resistance preparedness in the face of hybrid warfare, even though grassroots civil resistance does not align well with the government; in fact, it is often used against it.

In particular, in the United States more so than in other democracies, there is a high degree of cynicism and mistrust of the government among activists and mobilized minority communities. At the same time, the majority of Americans think they themselves “would do a better job of solving national problems”127 than their government. However, civil resistance actors and a state might find common ground in their desire to defend public good, including defending basic democratic values and principles against foreign interference. Activists often view their organizing and protests as a deeply patriotic act that, even if against a government of the day or its specific policies, is, in essence, directed toward the betterment of the state, its institutions, and society as a whole. This healthy pro-state attitude could be relied on and invoked to build a closer civic-government partnership in the area of national preparedness against foreign-inspired populace-centric threats regardless of the party in power.

Another important challenge for civil resistance organizers and pro-democracy activists is how to promote truth, human rights and democratic values at a time when liberal democracies are under attack from within. The spread of illiberal thoughts and practices in democracies helps Putin and his cronies legitimize their rule and wage hybrid warfare. On a level of public discourse, activists should emphasize the link between human rights and truth. State’s lies could be equated with repression and violation of rights. In other words, there is no public truth without respect for human rights and no human rights without state being truthful to its citizens. In practical terms, rights-based nonviolent movements that are grounded on principles of non-discrimination; non-repression and non-violent stance embody liberal values. Activists in such movements can advance causes that are shared by many people and are easily understood. In that sense, anti-corruption movements or campaigns (be it on the local or national levels) could be a unifying force for change. Such campaigns need to offer concrete illustrations of injustice that stem from corruption. Activists also need to be able to move beyond negative messages (e.g. a demand to fire a corruption official) and put forward positive visions of change (e.g. building a new system of transparency and public accountability by organized and mobilized citizens). Such grassroots anti-corruption actions, in their core, challenge the underlying non-transparent, fraudulent and centralized system of authoritarian


rule, demanding that a state shares political power with or shifts it toward a civil society.

Finally, in the fight against the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare, activists should always undertake precautionary measures similar to those used against a deceitful authoritarian regime at home. A relevant example is offered by the story of the now removed Facebook page of the group the “Resisters” that was believed to be set up by Russia’s Internet Research Agency\(^\text{128}\), the same entity that was indicted by Special Counsel Robert Mueller. Five legitimate activist groups joined The Resisters as co-hosts for the planned protest “No Unite the Right 2 – DC” against the “Unite the Right” event in Washington, D.C.\(^\text{129}\) The groups did not suspect any malicious intent from the owners of the “Resisters” page and failed to perform due diligence by putting forward the same queries they would have made had they met someone face-to-face for the first time who invited them to co-host a rally. Who are the people that are asking me to join them? Who do they represent? Where does their legitimacy come from? Who might have already met them in person and can vouch for them? What goals do they have? How do I know they are truly with me (aligned with my goals and values) and committed to the struggle long-term? Will they go out and join the protest as well? If not, why not? If yes, how will I recognize them? Can I expect solidarity from them and will they be there for me in case of repression? These are just a few basic precautionary questions that activist groups can ask themselves and by extension their digital anonymous interlocutors that attempt to co-opt them to seemingly relevant causes.

In other words, in digital space, activists must deploy the same or, if needed, modified and revamped anti-agent provocateur techniques used on the streets. In that sense, they must remain vigilant online—as they do offline—against possible provocations and set-ups by hostile (domestic or external) forces that pretend to fight for the same causes.

Once fully aware of possible deceit, activists can purposefully design a strategy of parallel constructive work whereby they capture the authoritarian tool and, rather than discard it, turn it into an instrument that advances their own goals and values. In the above cited case of fake online impersonation via a Facebook page, the boundary between fakeness and manipulation and the grassroots authentic and original behavior might have been crossed in favor of the latter, though with no strategic purpose on the part of activists. The grassroots actors, who did not want to create a duplicate or redundant page that would have risked fragmenting the campaign\(^\text{130}\), joined and eventually took over the fake page—without realizing its duplicitous nature—generating most of its content and turning it into a momentum for the protest that they wanted to have in the first place, regardless of who was the original initiator. By then, they owned it. Still, grassroots actors lost a degree of legitimacy precisely because they did not do their homework of vetting their partners. It was the process, not the end goal, that exposed their naivety and unpreparedness. Had they discovered the malicious intent of the page’s owners from the beginning and then, strategically and intentionally, taken steps to take over the page with their own original content, including their support for the call for the protest event but then exposed the external, even if still anonymous, ‘agent provocateur’ to the public, they would have been in a much stronger position to press ahead with the demonstration and legitimize their actions. Frequently, activists with limited resources leverage state infrastructure, be it state-controlled schools, factories, or universities by turning them into places of authentic grassroots resistance. The same can be done with online platforms originated by inauthentic users. Once activists, through the necessary vetting process, discover manipulation, they can seek to capture the resources initially built and deployed by the nefarious actors and instead use them to advance authentic and positive causes, as opposed to shying away from them.

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BENCHMARKS TO MEASURE CIVIL RESISTANCE PREPAREDNESS

Benchmarks should be established to gauge the level of national preparedness against hybrid threats and attacks. Civic and state actors may consider list of indicators as part of the process of civil resistance capabilities and readiness development, including:

1. a noticeable uptick in the level of local and national nonviolent activism and civic participation independent of the government and, challenging the status quo that a government might favor;
2. inclusion of explicit references to civil resistance strategies in national defense and security doctrines and policies;
3. institutionalization of civil resistance planning and mobilization against hybrid threats within select government agencies with assigned budget and staff;
4. state-supported curriculum development and education on civil resistance at all levels of public schooling reflected by an increase in a number of courses and experts and practitioners teaching the subject and students completing the courses;
5. development and execution of state and local drills simulating hybrid attacks and responses integrating civil resistance knowledge and practice;
6. state-supported popular media entertainment and movie series releases that feature historic narratives of civil resistance and nonviolent campaigns. Establishing a link between the tradition of nonviolent organizing and the contemporary scenarios where citizens do not respond to foreign stealth attacks with armed campaigns but rather with creative nonviolent campaigns using a wide arsenal of nonviolent resistance actions;
7. national, regional and global surveys that include questions on people’s readiness to partake in nonviolent resistance; and queries on preferences for specific nonviolent actions in response to specific types of hybrid attacks;
8. establishment of cross-border partnerships and regional centers on hybrid threats and anti-hybrid solutions that utilize civil resistance strategies and the knowledge of grassroots mobilization and organizing.

These implementation targets are useful for measuring how well civil resistance knowledge and practice have been adopted by the society, as well as in state and civic institutions. They offer helpful approaches to popularize and encourage civil resistance among the general public that, in turn, can inform design and deployment of appropriate public policies in their support.

An effective response to Russian hybrid warfare must prominently include civilian population. A society needed for this type of struggle must be highly versed in the dynamics of civil resistance and nonviolent movements. The knowledge and skills of nonviolent mobilization and civil resistance are indispensable for a powerful response to hybrid warfare and also are an important step in countering hidden and overt authoritarian onslaughts on open democratic societies.
This study is written by the author in his personal capacity. Opinions expressed are author’s own and do not reflect the views of any institutions with which he is affiliated.

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