

EDITED AND CURATED BY
MICHAEL WEISS



AQUARIUM
LEAKS

INSIDE THE GRU'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE PROGRAM

FREE RUSSIA FOUNDATION
WASHINGTON, DC
2020

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INTRODUCTION

Inside Russia's Secret Propaganda Unit

By Andrei Soldatov and Michael Weiss

In the late 2000s, former deputy head of Moscow's spy station in New York Sergei Tretyakov, who defected, was explaining how Russia's foreign intelligence, or SVR, handled propaganda and disinformation. "Look, the department responsible for running active measures," he told Andrei, referring to the term of art used for influence operations, "was given a new name, but the methods, structure, and employees were retained." When asked about specific operations, Tretyakov indicated Russian photo exhibits at the United Nations headquarters in Turtle Bay, a shocking collage depicting alleged

atrocities committed by Chechen separatist militants. He also noted screenings before U.S. and NATO officials of state-produced documentaries purporting to show that Russia in Chechnya and the United States in the Middle East were fighting a common jihadist enemy, just on different fronts. The objective, Tretyakov continued, was to signal to Washington that it would be morally hypocritical to kick up a fuss about Russian human rights abuses in the Caucasus. It was part of concerted effort by the Kremlin government to pitch itself as America's indispensable ally in the nascent war on terrorism.

Back then, Tretyakov did not volunteer (and may not have even known) the provenance of these exhibits and films, but now, thanks to a tranche of documents obtained by Michael from within Russia's military intelligence agency, or GRU, we can finally answer that question. The Chechnya propaganda was manufactured by a secret section of the GRU known as Unit 54777 in a remarkable period of collaboration between two Russian spy agencies.

One of those documents is the personal memoir of Col. Aleksandr Viktorovich Golyev, a psyops and propaganda specialist in the GRU who began his career in the early 1980s and was active in chronicling and trying to suppress various anti-Communist movements sweeping the Warsaw Pact nations. Golyev was sent to Poland at the start of Solidarity; then to Lithuania in 1990 after the storming of the Vilnius television center, whereupon he launched a regime-loyalist newspaper, *Soviet Lithuania*, which was actually printed in Minsk. His final foreign posting as a Soviet special propagandist was East Germany, just as Russian troops began withdrawing from the German Democratic Republic. When the first Chechen war broke out, Golyev was seconded into the newly created Unit 54777 and, as he writes, had a hand in the manufacture of "Dogs of War" and "Werewolves," the anti-Chechen films to which Tretyakov referred.

His memoir is part of a remarkable collection of GRU texts – never before seen out-

side of the agency's rarefied circles – which the Free Russia Foundation is releasing under the title, "Aquarium Leaks: Inside the GRU's Psychological Warfare Program." The collection also includes two long lectures delivered within the last decade by GRU faculty at the Military University (not to be confused with the Military-Diplomatic Academy, where GRU operatives are trained), a definition of terms used in one of those lectures, even a set of exam questions put to cadets at the university.

The authenticity of these documents has been corroborated by a Western intelligence agency Michael consulted. And the story they tell will be of great use to historians of the Cold War and analysts and scholars trying to understand how Unit 54777's ongoing influence operations are waged, not only against NATO, the United States, and Europe, but against the Russian people.

* * *

To understand Unit 54777's remit, it's first necessary to understand its provenance.

In the Soviet Union, psyops were conducted by the Special Propaganda Directorate, incorporated in the massive directorate of the army, GLAVPUR (*Glavnoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie*, or the Main Political Department). GLAVPUR was a powerful testimony to Bolsheviks' constant fear of the army going rogue or mutinying. In 2019 the Russian army proudly celebrated the centenary

of GLAVPUR, established by the Revolutionary Military Council of Bolsheviks a year and a half after the October Revolution as the political department to supervise thousands of commissars, Communists attached to military units to spy on and oversee their commanders (the commissars had the final word in military operational planning).

The Communists never fully trusted their soldiers since soldiers had played a decisive role in all attempted or successful seizures of state power in Russian history. It was the commissars who kept the Red Army loyal to the regime even during the first two disastrous years of war with Nazi Germany, when millions had been killed or captured, thanks to the incompetence of the officers' corps, which had been hollowed by Stalin's purges. (Hitler, inspired by Soviet experience, had his own commissars and version of GLAVPUR called the National Socialist Leadership Office, or NSFO, whose officers embedded with the Wehrmacht to kindle a fighting spirit at the late stage of World War II.)

After the war, ideological overseers in the Soviet military proliferated. By the late 1980s, there were 20,000 political departments with 80,000 "political workers" – the new designation for commissars – and all were supervised by the ubiquitous and all-powerful GLAVPUR. The Special Propaganda Directorate was part of that empire. Then, in the early 1970s, the Soviet military established special propaganda training facilities in the Military Institute of Foreign

Languages, where Golyev studied, and for the faculty of Journalism at Moscow State University, the goals being to train officers in psyops and create a reserve of Soviet journalists in the event of war mobilization, respectively.

The fidelity of the Soviet army remained a primary objective of GLAVPUR. The Special Propaganda Directorate was, in theory, busy developing methods of subverting the hostile armies' morale but was mostly focused on its own military personnel rather than on Western soldiers. It was the body that played a largely defensive, not offensive, role.

Unless, of course, actual war broke out again. "As for special propaganda," Arsen Kasyuk, one of the top authorities on Soviet-era special propaganda, told official Russian Defense Ministry newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* in June 2011, "it is present wherever there is a conflict, where active hostilities begin. Prior to that, the special propaganda bodies are, so to speak, in a waiting-preparatory mode, they assess the situation, improve their methods, their technical base."

Whether by accident or design, this exact doctrine was articulated in a slightly more excitable fashion by Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of RT, the Kremlin's English-language propaganda channel. "Right now, we're not fighting anyone," Simonyan told the Russian newspaper *Kommersant* in a 2012 interview. "But in 2008 we were fighting. The Defense Ministry was fighting with

Georgia, but we were conducting the information war, and what's more, against the whole Western world. It's impossible to start making a weapon only when the war [has] already started! That's why the Defense Ministry isn't fighting anyone at the moment, but it's ready for defense. So are we."

Except "Aquarium Leaks" definitively shows that the distinction between war and peace was completely elided after 1991.

Golyev observes in his memoir that when the Soviet Union collapsed, the new Russian army, which was still very much the same as the old Red Army, was undergoing the trauma of depoliticization. With the almighty Party gone, GLAVPUR was destined to follow it into oblivion. And yet, according to Golyev, the army wanted to salvage at least some parts of GLAVPUR, especially the Special Propaganda Directorate. Where might it find a powerful and permanent new patron? It was a difficult question for the military bureaucracy to answer, although they finally did by transferring the directorate to the GRU – to the second floor of the Aquarium, as the service's Moscow headquarters is colloquially known, where it was rebranded Unit 54777 in 1994. (Vladimir Putin restored GLAVPUR in 2018, but Unit 54777 remains under GRU control.)

That bureaucratic reshuffle, as "Aquarium Leaks" further demonstrates, had far-reaching consequences.

Since its founding in 1918, the GRU has

always been a full-scale intelligence service, running operations all over the world. Unlike the KGB, which was dissolved and then refashioned into several separate agencies, the GRU has remained a constant institution throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. It has recruited spies and run "illegals" from Manhattan to Tokyo; it's stolen industrial, military, and atomic secrets; it's attempted coups and assassinations; it's propped up disinformation portals masquerading as "news" agencies; and, as we've been amply informed over the last five years of government reports and legitimate news investigations, it's run ambitious cyber operations that have inveigled or damaged democratic electorates, shut down national power grids, and temporarily halted international commerce to the cost of billions of dollars. Unit 54777 has provided plausible deniability or shaped the narrative of many of these more recent interventions, most spectacularly the GRU-led invasion and occupation of Crimea in 2014.

The encompassing of military psyops by military intelligence forever changed the nature, scope and character of the former. The "waiting-preparatory mode," to use Kasyuk's formulation, gave way to permanent "active hostilities." To quote from the second and third paragraphs of "Study of Targets of Psychological Warfare in the Interests of Conducting PSYOP," one of the lectures from the Military University:

Psychological warfare is conducted

constantly, in peacetime and wartime, by the intelligence agencies of the Armed Forces. The chief feature of psywar in peacetime is that it is organized and conducted both from the territory of Russia as well as the territories of the target countries, but the main targets of information and psychological influence are defined as the military and political leadership, the staff of the armed forces and the population of foreign states.

During this period, psywar may be conducted at the strategic and operational level in cooperation with the forces and means of other [Russian Federation] executive branch federal agencies, state, civic, and religious organizations.

Consider the irony. Just as the Soviet Union was disintegrating and its armored columns receding from half the continent, the military transferred its psyops unit into the GRU, which made it far more aggressive than it had ever been under Communist rule. Now it was never-ending and total, "in peace time and war time." Moreover, Unit 54777 could second any government body or public or religious institution. The Orthodox Church, state-run newspapers and television channels, athletic clubs, tourist agencies, cultural outreach or exchange programs, and their constituent personnel are all hypothetical

conduits for the GRU's prosecution of information warfare.

If that sounds slightly totalitarian, it's because it was borne of the espionage of totalitarianism.

* * *

According to "The Use of the Soviet Culture Committee for Cultural Ties with Compatriots Abroad in Intelligence Activity," a KGB training manual written in 1968 that Michael obtained a few years ago and analyzed in *The Daily Beast*, the "main operational task for our intelligence to conduct through the Soviet Committee is to use the official work, propaganda, and other means of influencing compatriots to prepare the grounds for the deployment of recruitment and other intelligence and counterintelligence measures ..." The Kremlin has always considered the presence of Russians in Western countries, particularly those in the United States, as either its most serious threats or its greatest opportunities for co-optation, as Andrei and Irina Borogan argue in their recent book "The Compatriots¹."

The SVR, the successor of the KGB's First Chief Directorate or foreign branch, certainly honors that Chekist tradition. In October 2013, the magazine *Mother Jones* broke a story² about the FBI's investigation of the

1 <https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07QQCSZ3Y/>

2 <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/10/fbi-investigating-yury-zaytsev-russian-diplomat-spy/>

head of the Russian Cultural Center in Washington, D.C. Yury Zaytsev was suspected of keeping files on young Americans the center had sent on all-expenses-paid trips to Russia, assessing each as a potential spy. The center was part of the *Rossotrudnichestvo*, the Russian agency run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which acts as an umbrella body overseeing a host of foundations claiming to foster compatriots abroad and provide funding for Russian-speaking media.

The GRU got up to much the same thing. In 2018, the Washington Post reported³ on two ostensible public diplomacy organizations targeting Russian expatriates, but really run by Unit 54777 and financed through Russian government grants. The first is InfoRos, which “launched an appeal, purportedly on behalf of Russian organizations in Ukraine,

calling on Putin to intervene in the brewing crisis,” the Post stated, citing an unnamed Western intelligence officer. The second is the Institute of the Russian Diaspora, which maintains the websites of other commonly themed organizations such as the World Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad⁴ and the Foundation for Supporting and Protecting the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad⁵, which Putin singled out in an October 2018 speech⁶ before the World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad for its “legal aid” work in 20 countries, including Syria, Yemen and Libya, as well as its “courses for young human rights advocates.” As if to prove that “Aquarium Leaks” is no mere theoretical exercise, the Foundation was created by executive order in 2011 and founded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and *Rossotrudnichestvo*.

3 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-russias-military-intelligence-agency-became-the-covert-muscle-in-putins-duels-with-the-west/2018/12/27/2736bbe2-fb2d-11e8-8c9a-860ce2a8148f_story.html

4 <https://www.vksrs.com/>

5 <https://www.pravfond.ru/>

6 <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59003>

My Life as a Propagandist: The Memoirs of Col. Aleksandr Golyev

Col. Aleksandr Viktorovich Golyev recounts his education and service in the Directorate of Special Propaganda of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Russian Navy (GLAVPUR) and his personal role in overseeing psychological and influence operations in East Germany, Poland and Lithuania in the 1980s. Golyev also discloses that GLAVPUR, previously controlled by the Soviet military, fell under the purview of Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU, in 1991, and was rebranded three years later as Unit 54777. This unit played a crucial role in shaping the disinformation and propaganda that attended Russia's war against Chechen separatists in the mid-1990s, as well as Russia's invasion and occupation of Ukraine's Crimea and Donbas in 2014.



Col. Aleksandr Viktorovich Golyev

The School Years

I was born on June 30, 1959 in the village of Karl Libnecht in the Lgov District of Kursk Region. Another ancient name for this village was Pena. Historically, it originated on the Seym River at the confluence of the little Reut River. The village was located on an ancient trail leading from Kursk straight west through the ancient Russian towns of Lgov and Rylsk. Pena could be reached either by highway or railroad. Curiously, the railroad station is called "Blokhino." It was at this station, connected to the Kursk Department of the Moscow Railroad, where my father and mother worked for a long time. There was also an older daughter, Natasha, and a younger one, Olya, in our family.

In those days, the village was growing rapidly – the sugar and machine-building plants needed workers, so housing was quickly built, and social infrastructure created. One school was clearly insufficient. As a result, in this village of 11,000 residents, the Pena Technical Training College opened, and in 1965, a second secondary school was built.

It was the threshold of that brand-new school that I crossed in 1966 when I entered first grade. There was a boarding house at the school, where children from socially disadvantaged families studied in the elementary classes and at the same time lived on a full subsidy. The boarders and the ordinary students never crossed paths at their studies; they had different classes and teachers, but officially the school was called Pena Middle Boarding School No. 2.

I was fortunate to study for the whole ten years in the same school with the same comrades. To be sure, in the senior classes, several newbies joined us from the surrounding towns and villages where there was no opportunity to finish elementary school. This circumstance only brought us closer together, however, and expanded the circle of acquaintances. I maintain good relations with many of them to this day.

The happy school years flew by unnoticed. It could be no other way, since the lessons were easy, and the numerous social burdens (beet weeding, scrap metal collection or going out to pick potatoes) were seen

as fun adventures. Various clubs, after-school classes in math, physics, the Russian language, and literature helped us to master the material. I was particularly fascinated with the study of the French language, which opened up an enormous new world related to the life of another people, the great French culture.

It was in these years that I got the idea to perfectly master this foreign language. When I won prizes at regional competitions, especially first place in the regional competition in the French language in 1976, my wish was only strengthened.

A worker at the Lgov District Draft Committee, after reviewing the results of my study and the references from the school, tried for a long time to talk me into entering an ordinary military academy. In fact, he himself was a tank driver, and his assignment from the region for recruitment to the tank academy was not yet filled. When his remonstrances were not successful, however, he sympathized with my stubborn wish and gave his approval to register at the “Moscow Military Academy of Foreign Languages.” The Military Institute of Foreign Languages (MIFL) was not widely known then since it did not publish announcements about applications. Nevertheless, there were plenty of rumors about MIFL.

This was the best advertisement, because there were plenty of people who wanted to study to be a “military translator.”

Military Academy Years

The entrance exams for the Military Institute were not held in Moscow but in the village of Sverdlovsky in Moscow Region, where the training center is located. It was here that both conscripts and civilian youth came to try their luck. It must be noted that the competition was relatively small – somewhere around three people per place. Before calling the applicants to an exam, there was a strict selection on the basis of documents and forms submitted. As a result, there was serious competition among the candidates for the coveted place of a cadet.

Those who arrived were enlisted in training companies and placed in a tent city. From that moment, all movements were made in formation: to the cafeteria, to the bath house, and to the exams. They were commanded by enlisted sergeants, who came in on par with everyone else.

The first exam was an essay. After its results, about half of the applicants packed their things and went home. Among those who remained, the main grade was “satisfactory”; for some it was “good”; and for just a few it was “excellent.” Therefore, not surprisingly, after I got a B, I was not worried at all about passing all the exams and believed all the more in my powers. Moreover, fate itself had led me to special propaganda.

Приваленному Гулеву Алексу
Александровичу
Проживающему ул. Свободы 36

ПОВЕСТКА

В соответствии с Законом СССР «О всеобщей воинской обязанности» Вам надлежит явиться к 9 часам 29. августа 1976 года в военный комиссариат (военно-учетный стол Совета) по адресу ул. Новоборовская, 15/16

для явиться с собой приписочной
целью исполнения

С собой иметь свидетельство

Военный комиссар

РАСПИСКА

Повестку на имя _____
получил _____ 197 г.

ПРОСМ

Лист 1436

Summons to the draft board

In early July 1976, after graduating from middle school with a Gold Medal, I headed to Moscow to enter the Military Institute of Foreign Languages. Youth knows no fear of the future. I saw my trip to the capital as a desire to see the world, show myself, and test my powers and knowledge. If I failed, there was still the opportunity to try to enter a civilian university, since the entrance exams for them took place in August. Furthermore, an invitation to Kursk Pedagogical Institute was still valid, where I had been enrolled without exams as winner of a competition.



Examination form with the "autograph" of S.N. Zimin

In fact, the second exam was "History of the USSR." Among the members of the admissions commission was a youngish, stocky colonel with a smiling face. For some reason, he liked my answers to the questions on the ticket. After putting "excellent" on the exam paper, which I have saved to this day like a precious relic, he looked for me among the applicants for a thorough conversation. The former examiner introduced himself as Col. Sergei Nikolayevich Zimin, deputy head of political affairs of the Faculty of Special Propaganda.

To be honest, neither his position nor his rank especially impressed me. His description of the Faculty and the unique profession which its graduates acquire interested me, or rather, intrigued me. After that thorough conversation, I rewrote my application for acceptance to the Military Institute, indicating in it my wish to study at the Faculty of Spe-

cial Propaganda. To this day, I do not regret that for a minute. Furthermore, I am grateful to fate for the fact that at a critical moment, I encountered on my path such an enthusiastic person as Col. S. N. Zimin, who was rooting for his cause.

After successfully passing all the remaining exams in Russian language and literature and the French language, I was registered for the first year. This was the third recruitment of cadets. Before this, only officers were recruited for the Faculty. In 1976, the last officers' class was completed.

At first, there were 33 of us "lucky fellows," which clearly exceeded the demand. By comparison: in the third year, there were 23 cadets and in the second, 21. The calculation was that not all would endure the "hardships and deprivations of military studies." In reality, four from the Examination Paper with the "autograph" of Col. S.N. Zimin were

removed to younger classes for various reasons; from the English-Greek group, Khvat-
alov (for theft); A. Sergeyev (for illness); F.
Konkov (at his own wish) and for the same
reason from the Chinese-English group, O.
Steshenko. Surprisingly, the largest group,
the German-Polish group, retained all 12
people.

At the training camp, the first-year ca-
dets spent all of August at the "Young War-
rior Course" and on September 1, began our
studies. Only on the eve of the oath-taking,
which took place on September 12, did we
come to Moscow. Since the barracks were
under repair, all three cadet years were
housed on the fourth floor of a dormitory
which was unofficially called "the Hilton."
The officer students of the Faculty were also
billeted there. But we crossed paths with them
only when they were put in charge of holi-
days and weekends.

In the summer of 1976, the Faculty was
headed by Col. Vitaly Trofimovich Priymak,
who had come from the Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany with the position of head
of the Office of Special Propaganda of the
Political Department of one of the associa-
tions. Besides him and the zampolit Col. S.N.
Zimin, the class heads were members of the
Faculty command.



Dress uniform. Running the obstacle course

It should be noted that all the officers of
the faculty were special propagandists. After
graduating from the faculty, they served in
the special propaganda agencies. Only af-
ter obtaining practical experience were the
more competent of them appointed to com-
mand positions at the Institute. Thus, Sr. Lt.
Viktor Ivanovich Marinyuk became the head
of our class after service in the Central Group
of Forces in 1976. In 1968, as a student at
the Military Institute of Foreign Languages,
studying the Czech and Spanish languages,
he had taken part in the events related to the
entry of Soviet forces to Czechoslovakia.

V.I. Marinyuk was head of the third year
as well. Literally a year and a half later, hav-
ing received his next military rank, Capt. V.I.
Marinyuk left for the position of instructor at
the military training section of the Depart-
ment of Special Propaganda at the M.V.
Lomonosov Moscow State University. The
heads of the second year were Capt. Kon-
stantin Konstantinovich Khronusov, who had
previously served in the Southern Group of
Forces.

The Faculty of Special Propaganda was also small in number but made up of experienced professionals. It was headed by Col. Andrei Filippovich Bobikov who ran the Anglo-American area. His assistant was Capt. Valery Ivanovich Pogrebenkov, a young teacher who already had his scholarly degree of candidate of philological sciences. Lt. Col. Yury Nikolayevich Zvorykin covered the most important German area. After defense of his candidate's dissertation, Lt. Yury N. Zvorykin replaced A. F. Bobikov, who went into the reserves. Capt. Aleksandr Nikolaevich taught those studying Chinese the basics of the profession, and Capt. Leonid Alekseyevich Karmazin taught Japanese. They taught subjects in their areas with the preface "special": "Special Country Studies," "Special Journalism," and "Foundations of Theory and Practice of Special Propaganda."

Aside from the lectures, seminars and practical lessons, other forms of education were widely applied. Thus, each month, the "Propagandist's Oral Journal" was held. Veterans of special propaganda, prominent scholars, the command, and officers from the Directorate of Special Propaganda of the Main Political Directorate (GlavPU) of the Soviet Army and Russian Navy were invited. The lectures of Yu. A. Sherkovin, Ph.D. in psychology; O.N. Rzheshhevsky, Ph.D. in history; directorate heads Lt. Gen. A.M. Shevchenko and Lt. Gen. D.A. Volkogonov; Maj. Gen. Ye. I. Dolgoplov and Col. A.N. Ratnikov, deputy heads of the directorate; Maj. Gen.

Burtsev and Col. N.N. Bernikov, patriarchs of special propaganda were memorable.

In addition, the cadets were actively brought into the work of lecturing. The "Young Lecturer's School" was created at the initiative of the political section of the Institute at the Kalinin District Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth, known as the Komsomol. Cadets with permits for it gave lectures to youth collectives of Moscow plants on current problems of the international situation. In fact, the topics came from the District Committee of the Komsomol. For example, the results of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979 in Iran, and the consequences of the rule of the anti-popular regime of Pol Pot in Kampuchea had to be thoroughly studied in the process of preparing for the lectures. The cadets would fight for the lecturer permits. The lectures enabled one to gain not only professional skills, but the coveted "Leave of Absence" for a trip to the city (the cadets called it the fishka [chip] for short).



Leave of Absence, with the signature of Capt. V.I. Marinyuk, head of the class

Foreign languages constituted the basis of the training for the special propaganda cadets. This was study not only of the applied aspects (conversation practice, military translation) but the theory as well enabled the graduates to obtain a classical philological education. Consequently, this enabled us not only to study more deeply the nuances of the profession but also to do scholarship, teaching, and translation, especially after service in the army.

No less attention was devoted to political sciences. Our faculty was openly called "military-political" for good reason (the very term "special propaganda" was classified). The chief disciplines were "History of the CPSU," "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy," "Scientific Communism," "Political Economy of Capitalism and Socialism," "Party and Political Work in the Armed Forces of the USSR," "Fundamentals of Soviet Oratory."

A diploma from the Military Institute to this day serves as a "seal of quality" for the education received within its walls. The following notations were made on the diploma with honors: "...in 1976, entered the Military Institute and in 1981 graduated the complete course of this institute, now the Military Red Banner Institute, with the specialty of 'military-political, foreign languages (German, Polish).' By decision of the State Accreditation Commission...was awarded the qualification of 'officer with higher military-political education, translator-advisor in the German language and translator in the Polish language.'"

THE MEMOIRS OF COL. ALEKSANDR GOLYEV

During the period of my studies, a significant event took place at the Faculty – the 40th anniversary of the day of the Institute's founding (February 1, 1940). In honor of this event, and also to mark its achievements in preparing unique specialists for the Army and Navy, the Military Institute was awarded the Order of the Red Banner; therefore, it received the honorable name of "Red Banner."



After passing the test on Weapons of Mass Destruction: cadets Yu.P. Danilov, A.V. Golyev, Sgts. V.G. Shibkov, cadets A.O. Didusev and Yu.D. Khrenikov (1978)

The cadets of the Faculty of Special Propaganda not only crammed languages and "gnawed the granite of science," they went on sentry duty, and had the opportunity to apply the knowledge they had gained in practice. The senior cadets took part for a year as military translators in combat actions in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea or as flight interpreters providing deliveries of military foreign aid to the numerous friends of the

Soviet Union fighting for their independence. They were also in the limited contingent of Soviet forces which entered Afghanistan in December 1979 to provide international aid. A compulsory condition for taking part in such activities was knowledge of the English language. We who were studying German and Polish who also were raring to go into combat were categorically "out of luck."

A kind of consolation for us were the Summer Olympic Games which took place in Moscow in the summer of 1980. Along with cadets from the Faculties of Western and Oriental Languages, we worked as translators in providing service for events at the Olympics. These were the first Olympic Games in history on the territory of Eastern Europe, and also the first Games held in a socialist country. The ideological confrontation between socialism and capitalism in the years of the "Cold War" reached its height, therefore many Western countries, led by the United States, boycotted them in order to "punish" the Soviet Union for the entry of troops into Afghanistan.

But it was not the Olympic Games that were fated to abruptly change the fate of the cadets of the German-Polish Group of the Faculty of Special Propaganda. The year 1980 was known for the creation of the Polish independent trade union Solidarity. The situation in the Polish People's Republic had become so aggravated, that the question of an entry into the country of Warsaw Pact troops for its stabilization was seriously be-

ing reviewed. Fortunately, the leadership of the Soviet Union had sufficient political wisdom not to do this. Therefore, we had the opportunity for another happy year of study at the Faculty of Special Propaganda. Nevertheless, in 1981, practically the entire German-Polish Group, without the leave expected after studies, was seconded to deploy the special propaganda organs to the Northern Group of Forces. Only Lt. M.E. Torkan did not go to Poland but was appointed to the political section of the compound of ships in the city of Baltiysk, strengthening the Polish area of the special propaganda of the Baltic Navy.



1981 Graduates: Lieutenants A.E. Avramenko, A.V. Golyev, and Yu.P. Danilov

Since the Faculty trained 12 people for a planned relief in 1981 of a large group of special propaganda officers who had served the established terms in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the leadership of the special directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy decided to

call up from the reserve the graduates of the Minsk Pedagogical Institute. Having graduated from the military faculty with a major in "special propaganda," they honorably filled the "personnel gap" that had formed. Col. Nikolai Trofimovich Uvaysky, one of the authors of this idea, loved to reminisce about it. Thus, Czeslaw Mikhailovich Germanovich, Vasily Nesulo, Vladimir Vladimirovich Zmitrovich and other Belarusian officers wound up in real armed service, contributing an honorable page in the history of special propaganda.

The Years of Polish Solidarity

On July 5, 1981, at a railroad station in Legnica, Col. Yury Petrovich Gusev met the young graduates of the Faculty of Special Propaganda. He was one of the most experienced special propagandists who took part in the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and the entry of Soviet Forces to Czechoslovakia in 1968. He had served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany when the Polish crisis broke out. For the purposes of reacting appropriately to it, the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces decided to launch an editorial Office of Special Propaganda in the Northern Group of Forces. Yury P. Gusev was appointed managing editor.

To meet the 11 lieutenants, he had ordered an army PAZik midibus which took

everyone to a transit center. There it was announced that four of our colleagues were to immediately leave for their compounds. Aleksei Yevgenyevich Avramenko and Yury Pavlovich Danilov were assigned to the political sections of the air divisions; Vladimir Grigoryevich Shibkov was sent to the tank division; and Yury Nikolayevich Zhelomsky was sent to the communications brigade.

The remaining lieutenants were invited for a talk with the political directorate of the Northern Group of Forces. For some reason, Col. Vyacheslav Vladislavovich Aksyonov, head of the Department of Special Propaganda was not at his post, therefore our deployment was delegated to Maj. Yevgeny Ivanovich Vasilko, senior instructor.

By that time, the special propaganda section was reinforced with such experienced special propagandists as Col. Ivan Yulyanovich Chebrovsky; Maj. Yury Timofeyevich Samylkin; Maj. Mikhail Ivanovich Onishchuk, and Maj. Viktor Leonidovich Tsimring. The only advantage of E.I. Vasilko compared to them was the fact that they had just arrived in Poland, but he was finishing up a five-year term of service in the Northern Group of Forces.

After the talk with Maj. Vasilko, the young lieutenants Andrei Leonidovich Yegorin, Radik Zagidovich Khayrutdinov, Aleksei Yakovlevich Farin and Vladimir Kimovich Yusov were assigned to further service in the agitation squad of the Northern Group of

Forces. This division was headed by Vladimir Grigoryevich Dzhuman at that time.

Nikolai Grigoryevich Rudenko and Aleksei Vyacheslavovich Shakhov were fated to begin service in the position of instructor-editor in the Department of Radio Propaganda of the Special Propaganda Office of the Northern Group of Forces, and I was assigned to be an instructor-editor for the Department of Print Propaganda at the Editorial Board.

With our arrival, the staffing of the editorial office was complete. Credit must be given to the organizational capabilities and initiative of Gusev. Within a short time, he had selected spaces in the semibasement and basement floor of the building of the Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces and organized their repair. Therefore, we started work in offices that smelled of fresh paint.

The main accomplishment of the managing editor, however, was the rapid and skilled selection of cadres. The Department of Radio Propaganda was headed by Capt. Sergei Yuryevich Chuprov, who had come together with Gusev from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Five years before us, Chuprov had graduated from the Faculty of Western Languages of the Military Institute with the German and Polish languages.

Maj. Vyacheslav Pchelkin, former teacher at the military faculty of Lviv University was the head of the Department of Print Propaganda.

My colleague in the department was Sr. Lt. Stanislav Ivanovich Snisarenko. He had studied the German language at the Kyiv Combined Arms Command School. After his studies, he landed to serve in the intelligence company of one of the units of the Southern Group of Forces, where he independently learned the Polish language. During the escalation of the situation in Poland, this knowledge came in very handy, which is why he was transferred to one of the creative positions in the agitation squad, which, in the absence of special propaganda in the editorial office, had fulfilled its function. Therefore, with the creation of this important subdivision, his appointment to the Department of Print Propaganda was quite logical.

After Maj. Pchelkin was killed in an air crash, Maj. Konstantin Konstantinovich arrived to take his place. He had studied in one of the language groups with Marinyuk, the former head of our class, and had taken part in the entry of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia in 1968. After completing his studies at the Military Institute for Foreign Languages, he had served in the special propaganda agencies of the Central Group of Forces, and then at one of the Moscow draft boards. Despite the fact that he had studied the Czech and Spanish languages, literally within a mere 9 months of serving in Poland, Karavaev already spoke Polish fluently and easily translated articles from Polish media. This yet again underscores the validity of language skills obtained in the years of study at the

special faculty.

The Polish People's Republic, which gave the name of its capital to the military and political bloc of the socialist countries, nevertheless was never at the advanced guard of the building of socialism. Periodically, spontaneous unrest arose among the Poles, which official propaganda explained by the mistakes of Polish leaders. The mistakes were quickly fixed, and this in no way reflected on the rather high standard of living of the population. That was how it was in 1956, 1968 and 1976. Therefore, at first, everyone calmly regarded the unrest on the Polish ship-building wharfs and the emergence there in July 1980 of the independent trade union Solidarity as the latest whim of the obstinate Poles.

Poland, unlike the GDR, was not a "front state." To express it in military language, it was in the second strategic echelon of the participating states of the Warsaw Pact.

Therefore, the Northern Group of Forces was relatively small in number. Service in it was considered honorific and not burdensome. Only this can explain the fact that Col. Vyacheslav Vladislavovich Aksyonov, a Sinologist by training, who had long served in the Far East, was in the post of head of the Department of Special Propaganda of the Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces. Needless to say, the organization of work under conditions of an abrupt escalation of the situation in Poland was incred-

ibly difficult for him. His lack of knowledge of the Polish language and the national and psychological features, history, and culture of the Poles, as well as his lack of experience working in the Western area took its toll.

Therefore, the decision of the leadership of the Directorate of Special Propaganda of the Main Political Directorate regarding his rotation, as it is now customary to say, was quite consistent. Aksyonov was sent to Riga to the Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District in the post of head of the Department of Special Propaganda, and Maj. Valery Pavlovich Buravchenko, who held this post, in September 1981 arrived at the Northern Group of Forces for further service. It must be emphasized that for the Soviet Armed Forces, it was typical to appoint only officers with a long period of service to leadership positions in the political directorates of types of the Armed Forces and Military Districts. As a rule, the position of department head becomes the "crown" in a career of experienced special propagandists. From that perspective, the appointment in peace time of Maj. V.P. Buravchenko to a "colonel's" position as head of the Department of Special Propaganda in a border military district such as the Baltic Military District, was a unique case. In the history of special propaganda, he became the youngest head of such a rank. Another peculiar "record" was set by Buravchenko – he served more than 20 years in positions as head of departments of special propaganda in political directorates

at various levels.

With the arrival of a new director of the department, the special propaganda in the Northern Group of Forces picked up speed. This emphasizes once again the importance of a well-conceived personnel policy. A unique ratio between experienced and young officers was formed in the special propaganda agencies of the Northern Group of Forces, which enabled many complicated tasks to be resolved quickly and qualitatively, and for new directions of work to be developed.

Buravchenko did not have to take long to "grow into" the setting. It helped that after graduating from the Faculty of Special Propaganda with the German and Polish languages, he had served in Poland, and then as liaison at the Main Political Directorate to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, known as the *Wojsko Polskie*. The first thing he did was establish monitoring of changes in the military and political situation in the Polish People's Republic. With that aim, a round-the-clock news watch was organized. The duty room had the most modern reception and recording equipment of the day: 10 Integral radio receivers, Tembr-2 reel-to-reel tape recorders and VM cassette recorders, two color television sets, and Yatran electric typing machines.

At first, experienced officers were appointed as heads of the duty roster: Col. I. Yu. Chebrovsky, Maj. M.I. Onishchuk, Maj. Yu. T. Samylkin and Maj. V.L. Tsimring. They rapidly prepared a replacement for themselves in the person of young officers, while they themselves performed more difficult and responsible assignments.

Usually two news bulletins were published every 24 hours, which reached all the members of the Military Council of the Southern Group of Forces. In the first half of the day, there was a News Bulletin with Reports from Polish Newspapers and Radios and in the evening, there was a News Bulletin with Reports from Polish Television. Emergency reports were translated and reported outside of the schedule.

The next step in this direction was the receiving and processing of internal information on the situation in the country from the Voivodship Committee of Polish United Workers' Party and the Voivodship Committee of the Directorate of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland [PRP].

Officers were actively recruited to provide official and unofficial contacts with the Party and military leadership of Poland, and numerous activities were conducted along the lines of so-called Soviet-Polish Friendship, state holidays, and memorial dates of the USSR and PRP.



Officers of the unified field newspaper at the Druzhba-82 [Friendship 1982] Soviet-Polish-German exercises: Lt. A. V. Golyev and Lt. N.G. Rudenko (left and right), officers of the special propaganda editorial office of the Northern Group of Forces, 1982, town of Czarne

The Special Propaganda Editorial Office of the Northern Group of Forces began issuing monthly reviews. The Department for Print Propaganda was responsible for preparing brochures on "the Military and Political Situation in the NATO Countries" and the Department of Radio Propaganda, "On Events in the PRP." This and other print products were published on the stationary printer of the editorial office, which was equipped with a Czech-made Romayor offset print-

ing machine. The head of the printing plant was Ensign Oleg Serafimovich Gusev, who had served in the cartographic unit before that. A Robotron copying machine, the most modern at that time, manufactured in the GDR, served the purpose of rapid printing. This rather cumbersome machine stuck in my memory thanks to its capriciousness. This primeval Xerox could break down at the most critical moment. Only Sr. Lt. S.I. Snisarenko could cope with it, as he possessed a diabolical super-patience and unbeatable tenacity. The chief method of fixing it consisted of taking apart the machine, cleaning its corotron wires and selenium drum, and then assembling it in reverse order. Amazingly, this magical ritual often helped. There was yet another amazing duplicating device in the editorial office – the rotoprinter. It used a special paper for its matrix called "the wax paper," and required an incredible amount of the purest alcohol, cranking out only a few dozen low-quality copies. In order to economize on "liquid currency," the rotoprinter was used extremely rarely, although it enjoyed honor and respect.

Thus, the special propaganda agencies organized the gathering and processing of diverse information about events in Poland. Being quite well informed, we understood that some sort of important events was coming to a head in the country. Nevertheless, the declaration of martial law on the night of December 12-13, 1981, was unexpected for the majority. On that Sunday, I was on news

duty and was preparing a brief, routine bulletin. There was so little information of value in the media, that I had to use some stock materials to “stretch” the bulletin to one-and-a-half typed pages.

When late at night, I was distributing the news bulletin to its regular addressees, to my surprise I discovered that despite the weekend day, all the command of the Northern Group of Forces was at their workplaces. I was given the task of closely monitoring reports from the Western subversive radio stations – Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, BBC, Deutsche Welle and other “voices” (as the special propagandists called them among themselves for the sake of brevity). But they “slept through” the imposition of martial law, and “awoke” only on the morning of December 13, when at 6:00 a.m., Army Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski made a speech to Poles on Polish television.

From that moment, the volume of work increased significantly, but no nervousness or alarm was sensed. On the contrary, a certainty appeared in the development of the situation. The well-coordinated collective of the department, editorial office and agitation squad began even more responsibly to approach the performance of their official duties. None of the officers even fell sick, although the winter that year with its frost and snow tested not only the Poles for endurance.

The entire weight of the organization and implementation of the measures flowing from

the very fact of the imposition of martial law lay on the shoulders of the military personnel of the Wojsko Polskie. The Soviet officers did not interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state but were prepared at any moment to come to the aid of their allies. But I think for the Poles at that moment the moral support was more important, and the awareness that they themselves, without external interference, were resolving the problems of their country.

Life did not stay in place, and the personnel of the special propaganda agencies of the Northern Group of Forces gradually changed. The first to leave was Col. Gusev, who was appointed as a teacher at the Faculty of Special Propaganda at the Military Institute; Col. I. Yu. Chebrovsky headed up the editorial office, and in his place Lt. Col. Leonid Dmitrievich Grenkevich came from the Soviet Union. In the place of Capt. Chuprov, who was admitted to the postgraduate school of the V.I. Lenin Military Political Academy, Maj. Valery Nikolayevich Volostnykh, an officer of the Group’s newspaper *Znamya pobedy* [Banner of Victory] was appointed to the post of head of the Department of Radio Propaganda. Lt. Aleksandr Anatolyevich Abramkin became my colleague at the editorial office’s Department of Print Propaganda, who took the place of Capt. Snisarenko who went to the political directorate of the Kyiv Military District. Instead of Abramkin, Yu. N. Zhelomsky was sent to the position of senior instructor of the Political Department of

the division in Świętoszów, and his position in the Political Department of the communications brigade in Kęszyce was filled by A. Ya. Farin, who had served as an announcer and translator in the agitation squad.

In 1984, at the base of the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces in Legnica, the High Command of Western Forces was created, where Lt. Col. V.P. Buravchenko, head of the Special Propaganda Division of the Political Directorate, was appointed. The Northern Group of Forces' headquarters was redeployed in full force to Świdnica, and Lt. Col. M.I. Onishchuk became the head of the Special Propaganda Department of the Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces. Other changes occurred in the department, for example, Lt. Col. Yu. T. Samylkin was transferred to the GDR to the position of deputy head of the Department of Special Propaganda of the Political Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

But I did not manage to move with the special propaganda editorial collective to Świdnica, located 70 kilometers from Legnica. I was fated to take a much longer route to Moscow; in November 1984, I was appointed senior editor of the West European Languages Editorial Department of the Foreign Languages Division at the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Main Political Directorate School

Service in the Directorate of Special Propaganda of the Main Political Directorate was a real school of life for a young person. The Main Political Directorate operated as the military department of the Central Committee of the CPSU – the main leadership core of the entire Soviet system. This alone placed enormous responsibility.

At that time, the most outstanding Soviet political workers were at the head of the Main Political Directorate. Thus, Army Gen. Aleksei Alekseyevich Yepishev was the head, and the first deputy was Navy Admiral Aleksei Ivanovich Sorokin.

The bulk of the Main Political Directorate staff were officers and generals who had traveled a long path in life. Those among them with the greatest respect were veterans of the Great Fatherland War. There were quite a few of them in the Special Propaganda Directorate. I had a real feeling of pride to work alongside Lt. Gen. Nikolai Ivanovich Smorigo, Maj. Gen. Yevgeny Ivanovich Dolgoplov, Lt. Nikolai Trofimovich Uvaysky, Lt. Pyotr Petrovich Tarutta, Lt. Aleksei Vasilyevich Nesterov, Lt. Nadif Sbirovich Sabirov, and Lt. Viktor Vasilyevich Tarasov

The Seventh Directorate, as it was then called, was unique among the structures of political agencies. They were intended for

the instruction and political education of Soviet military personnel, where the Special Propaganda Directorate was aimed at political work primarily among foreigners; preparation for launching political work among the troops and population of an enemy; strengthening of friendship with the soldiers of socialist armies; development of cooperation with the armed forces of states embarking on the socialist path of development and indoctrination of foreign military personnel studying in the military schools of the Soviet Union.

But most likely it was not this, but the people working in the Special Propaganda Directorate who created its indisputable authority and respect. It was just such a serious attitude that I, a senior lieutenant, sense toward myself on the part of the other, more mature Main Directorate staff. In such an atmosphere, there is only one wish: to justify the trust and prove your professionalism indeed.

The Editorial Department for Foreign Languages, consisting of several editorial offices, was part of the seventh directorate. However, it was formed as an independent division only during the reforms of the political bodies that had begun in the Armed Forces of the USSR. Before this, all editorial section positions were equally distributed among departments of the directorate. Essentially, it was created in order to strengthen the directorate in connection with the expansion of our assigned tasks. So, Col. Nikolai Nikoforovich Yerashov was listed as the head of the editorial department; he was on the staff

of the First Department which was involved in issues of special propaganda.

Formally holding the post of senior editor of the editorial office (for West European languages) at the editorial section for foreign languages, he performed 13 functional duties as an officer of the Second Department, which was responsible for strengthening international ties with the armies of the Warsaw Pact and other socialist countries. In those years, Lt. Aleksei Vasilyevich Nesterov, Lt. Pavel Ivanovich Topolev, Lt. Yury Ivanovich Skotnikov, Lt. Col. Nikolai Ivanovich Andreyev, Lt. Col. Yury Leonidovich Knyasev, and Lt. Col. Aleksandr Alekseyevich Nikulchenkov were staff officers of the Department of Socialist Countries. My colleague at the editorial department, Capt. Yevgeny Vyacheslavovich Yozhikov and I felt ourselves to be members of one, friendly team, and the rest devoted a little more attention and concern to us because of our youth.

The department was headed by Col. Anatoly Dmitrievich Verbitsky, who had graduated from the Military Institute of Foreign Languages with German and Polish. His informal approach to his subordinates was proven by the fact that he personally brought my report of appointment to the position to the Central Financial Directorate of the Armed Services, and went to a number of offices in order to get it signed by the very head of the Financial Directorate. The problem is that I was appointed to a major's position, which had a "diverse" salary, from

130 to 150 rubles. At the Special Propaganda editorial office at the Northern Group of Forces in Legnica, a similar position was valued at 130 rubles. So, I was expecting to get as much without any problem in Moscow as well. Verbitsky not only insisted on an actual raise of my salary, but he also made sure to get it implemented.

I constantly sensed paternal care on the part of the department head. As soon as there was an order from the USSR Ministry of Defense about my appointment, Anatoly Dmitrievich proposed that I immediately write a request for an apartment. This was December 20, 1984. Why did this date stick in my mind? Because on that day, Soviet Marshal Dmitry Fyodorovich Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, and member of the Politburo of

the Central Committee of the CPSU passed away, and mourning was declared in the country. When I absolutely sincerely stated that the moment for a request was not entirely appropriate in the political sense, Verbitsky simply and clearly explained to me: "Write it up, you and the Marshal are different levels of people!" As a result, I got into the housing line that same year of 1984 (this was monitored by the department head himself), and I received an apartment in Moscow on Pobeda [Victory] Square, at building 2, block 2 already by the next year. But this is another story, a decisive role in which was played by Maj. Gen. Ye. I. Dolgopolov, head of the directorate, who was a member of the Main Political Directorate Housing Commission from the directorate.



Reception of a delegation of Polish special propagandists at the Special Propaganda Directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: Lt. B. V. Khilko, Lt. A. E. Ivanov, Maj. Gen. V. F. Molchanov, Capt. V. G. Shibkov and Capt. A. V. Golyev.

In the second department, I was responsible for developing relations with the political agencies of the Wojsko Polskie. The practical experience gained during service in the Northern Group of Forces came in very handy. Many a time I recalled with a kind word the master class on service in special propaganda, given in his day by Buravchenko, the department head. Not sparing effort and time, he scrupulously and methodically worked with each of his young subordinates. Likely, this knowledge and skill was the greatest capital that we managed to take away from Poland.

Our relations with the countries of the Warsaw Pact were built on the basis of an annual plan which counted hundreds of activities. Just with the Wojsko Polskie alone, there were 30 mutual visits, starting with trips by heads of political bodies at all levels and ending with an exchange of delegations of military journalists and battle artists. Aside from the drafting of such plans, the officers of the Department of Socialist Countries staffed the joint exercises and maneuvers, the study of the military and political situation in the countries of responsibility, preparation of articles and materials for the press, organization of various exhibits and numerous other activities. All of this was called "international friendship" for short.

My baptism by fire was the organization of a reception in Moscow for Polish colleagues – a delegation of the Main Political Directorate of the Wojsko Polskie led by Commander Zbigniew Czechkowski, the head of the Special Propaganda Department. After the first trial, the rest of the events did not seem so difficult, even if it were a question of visits from the heads of the Main Political Directorates of our armies, for example, General of Arms Józef Baryła, General of Arms Tadeusz Shachilo, or General of the Army Aleksei Dmitrievich Lizichev.

The regular conferences on special propaganda of the armies of the participating countries of the Warsaw Pact were very interesting. They convened every two years by turn in one of the countries. I took part in the organization of such a conference in 1987 in Moscow. It took place in the building of the Headquarters of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact on Leningradsky Prospekt [Avenue]. Its participants were received by Soviet Marshal Viktor Georgievich Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and Army General Anatoly Ivanovich Gribkov, Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, and also they awarded a group of Soviet special propagandists with the quite deserved medal, "For Strengthening Brotherhood of Arms."



Heads of special propaganda agencies of the armies of the Warsaw Pact after received medals for "Brotherhood at Arms," at the building of the Headquarters of the Joint Armed Forces, Moscow, May 1988.

The political bodies of the fraternal armies had a practice of exchanging lecturers, who spoke on the topics of the day regarding the internal political life of their countries. At the initiative of N.I. Andreyev, an officer of our department, special propagandists who were fluent in the language of the host country began to be included in the Soviet lecturers' groups. In 1989, in my capacity as a lecturer of the Main Political Directorate, I was able to speak before Polish military personnel from several garrisons of the Warsaw Military District. It would seem that the ordinary topic of perestroika in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Armed Forces aroused genuine interest from the Poles, and a lively and candid discussion on the fate of socialism and the prospects for cooperation between the USSR and PRP followed.

After the dismissal of Yu. I. Skotnikov, his duties regarding development of ties with the political bodies of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic were transferred to me. These were the last years of the existence of East Germany as an independent state. The Soviet leadership headed by Mikhail Gorbachev had already promised the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl not to interfere in the process of absorbing the GDR in exchange for purely symbolic financial aid in withdrawing Soviet forces from German territory. The main thing was that the USSR did not demand to stipulate any military and political conditions or agreements for the unification of Germany. Thus, it was offensive in a human way and it was difficult to talk with colleagues from the National People's Army of the GDR who saw

that their former allies were leaving them to the whim of fate. From outside, the impression was created that Gorbachev, who had been awarded the honorary title of "German of the year" in West Germany, was getting revenge against Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and all the East Germans for not supporting his "perestroika" and "policy for disarmament."

Perestroika brought quite a few ills to the Soviet Union as well. The impression is created that profound transformations of the Soviet system announced at the April Plenary of the Central Committee of the CPSU in April 1985 were not well-conceived and planned, and did not have a clear end goal, but mainly, were not calculated and bolstered economically. The political uncertainties, the campaigns against alcoholism, the implementation of the food program or providing every Soviet family with an apartment amid increasing economic hardships and pressure from the West led to loss of the country's governability. At the same time, these conditions enabled the growth of political activism and the public's self-awareness. Unfortunately, the Soviet Party and state leadership, which lost authority, was not able to correctly evaluate these developments and guide them into a positive channel. Interethnic conflicts broke out in the Soviet Union, and the centrifugal trends increased. Under these conditions, the only healthy force was the armed forces.

In the absence of a coherent policy from the leadership, Soviet military personnel performed functions they ordinarily did not, separated the warring sides, and often took the fire on themselves.

Officers of the Special Propaganda Directorate took part in settling the situations in Sumgait, Nagorno Karabakh, the Ferghana Valley and other places. I personally had the opportunity to take part in the spring of 1990 in formation work in Lithuania after the so-called events around the storming of the television center in Vilnius. The Central Committee's decision about the creation in Vilnius of a joint press center of representatives of the power ministries was followed only by the Ministry of Defense, which seconded officers to the center's staff from the Special Propaganda Directorate and the Press Department of the Main Political Directorate. The Department of Special Propaganda of the Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District, headed by Col. Yury Grigoryevich Podolnitsky, was also involved in this work. We managed to set up the printing and distribution of a weekly newspaper, *Sovetskaya Litva*, printed in Minsk. Television broadcasting was restored in Lithuania thanks to the courageous act of Col. Edmundus Vintsovičius Kasperavicius, a cadre special propagandist. At a critical moment during the boycott of the television by Lithuanian TV journalists under the influences of Sjqūdis' nationalist ideas, he led the work of the news service and personally ran the broadcasts as an an-

nouncer.

By 1990, during the perestroika reforms, the political bodies were turned into military-political bodies, and the Special Propaganda Directorate simply became the Special Directorate. It was headed by Lt. Gen. Vladimir Fyodorovich Molchanov. He came to us from the position of department head at the Institute of Military History. Prior to that, for a long time he had headed a department of the Agitation and Propaganda Directorate of the Main Political Directorate. After the dismissal of Maj. Gen. Leonid Ivanovich Shershnev, Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Yegorovich Ivanov became the deputy head of the Special Directorate.

Col. Anatoly Aleksandrovich Chekulayev was appointed head of the Editorial Department for Foreign Languages, who managed to get the Department out of the Special Directorate and made an independent division. After a successful business trip to Vilnius in May 1990, I was appointed to the position of managing editor of the editorial office of the (special) Editorial Department (for Foreign Languages) at the Main Political Directorate. For a major, this was a big career post, since the staff category of the new position was "lieutenant colonel."

Under the new military and political conditions, the tasks of the Special Directorate changed. Thus, with the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the mutual contacts among its armies became history. The Soviet Union,

which was going through not the best of times, reduced its military aid to developing countries, and that meant the number of foreign military personnel studying in our country was drastically reduced.

Meanwhile, the volume of tasks significantly increased which involved keeping the command informed on changes in the military and political situation both at the borders of the country and in the zone of interethnic conflicts. In connection with the reforms conducted, the command of the Armed Forces of the USSR became interested in foreign experience on resolving analogous problems. For the purposes of the propaganda of its achievements, and also of the progressive Soviet military traditions, a Department of Souvenir and Advertising Production was created in the Special Directorate, which was headed by the energetic Col. Nikolai Ivanovich Kharchenko.

Approximately at the same time, at the Novosti Press Agency, a military editorial office was formed, and at Foreign Broadcasting, an editorial office for military commentators. These important divisions of Soviet military and political propaganda for foreign countries was headed respectively by Col. Valery Ivanovich Pogrebenkov and Col. Vadim Anatolyevich Solovyev.

The acquiring of independence by the editorial Department for Foreign Languages significantly strengthened and activated the information work of the Special Directorate

and strategically, justified itself. The correctness of this step was soon proven by the war in the Persian Gulf. Col. A. A. Chekulayev established the printing of a daily news bulletin of military and political information, regular roundups of events and thematic anthologies. Furthermore, translations in the Russian language of important military documents, articles from the foreign media, and annotations of foreign publications were rapidly prepared.

The new head of the editorial department held staff training camps, during which the department was deployed to wartime staff levels (increased approximately 10 times over). This activity was important for us cadre officers, especially those recently assigned to positions of managing editors at editorial offices: Lt. Col. Yury Andreyevich Galushko, Lt. Col. Alexander Vasilyevich Filimonov, and 3rd-rank Capt. Mikhail Ivanovich Bolshakov. For the first time we saw with our own eyes the scale of the tasks assigned to us and become acquainted with subordinates who, in the event of the escalation of the situation, would have to perform these tasks. In a word, Chekulayev, under conditions of a total deficit and total organizational confusion managed to conduct a complicated activity which served to bring together the collective of the editorial department. Subsequently this had a positive effect on relations of camaraderie and mutual help among the officers of the department.

The precise and coordinated actions of the Soviet Army, its active involvement in settling interethnic conflicts, could not stop the slide of the Soviet party and state system into chaos. The last convulsion of the ruling elite was August 19, 1991, when the creation of a State Committee for the State of Emergency (the GKChP) was announced. The absurdity and crudeness of this step was proven if by nothing else the fact that the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy – one of the key organs of military governance – was not notified in advance of the impending events. Officers were not called to service, and not brought back from vacations.

On the morning of August 19, which was a Monday, I was going to work on the trolleybus, past the White House (the Russian Federation government building) and the building of the Council on Economic Mutual Aid (Comecon), which was surrounded by tanks, and I did not understand what had happened. No one could clarify anything at the Special Directorate. Lt. Gen. Molchanov, head of the Special Directorate, excuse me for the pun, was silent and invited all those officers who were not busy with service to come into his office, where there was a color TV. Tchaikovsky's ballet, "Swan Lake," was playing on central television. Suddenly, the broadcast was interrupted, and the whole country learned who their "heroes" were – the members of the GKChP.

Next, the events took an even more absurd turn. The head of the department left for a meeting, after which he warned us that he would summon whom he needed. Most of the young officers thus understood that their services were not needed.

How can anyone speak of a "coup," if there was no coup, but only a total farce?! Apparently, someone needed to do this. Thus, on August 19, 1991, the history of a great country called the Soviet Union came to an end. Without exaggeration, it can be stated that this event reflected on the destiny of each of its citizens.

Along with the liquidation of the Main Political Directorate (GlavPU), the Special Propaganda Directorate ceased to exist. A struggle then began for many months to preserve in the structures of the Armed Forces the structures so necessary to it under the new historical conditions. As a result, in November 1991, the fateful decision was made to transfer it to the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU GSh). The Editorial Department for Foreign Languages was transferred there and given the number "91." Thus, I became the managing editor of the (special) Editorial Office 91 of the Editorial Department.

Who Would You Go Scouting With?

At the Main Directorate of the General Staff, the former officers of Special Propaganda were appointed not automatically, but through dismissal from their former posts. In doing so, the General Staff personnel directors were guided by criteria and clear instructions from the command. It was not hard to guess what these instructions were in a period of permanent reduction of the number of managing agencies of the Armed Forces.

Therefore, all the positions were accepted but not all the specialist propagandist officers. The vacant positions were immediately cut. Nevertheless, practically all the officers selected and recommended by the new head of the service, Boris Vitalyevich Khilko, were appointed to the Main Directorate of the General Staff.

As a result, the cadre service potential, the experience, and traditions accumulated by the previous generations of special propagandists managed to be preserved. How great and extensive they are, we young officers sensed physically when we hauled the archives of the Special Directorate, the materials of the special office and library, to the new space on the second floor of the main building of the "Aquarium."

I was not based there for long. In June 1992, I departed for Wünsdorf, where I had

been appointed editor of radio broadcasting for the Department of Propaganda (Radio) Special Propaganda Editorial Office, of the Western Group of Forces. Former Soviet forces rapidly left the territory of the unified Germany; therefore, specialists were needed with knowledge of the German language and the country to ensure this process. Col. N.I. Andreyev, an experienced Germanist, headed the Department for Liaison with the local population at the headquarters of the Western Group of Forces, who replaced the no less experienced special propagandist

Col. Yu. T. Samylkin. Col. Yevgeny Georgievich Torsukov, managing editor, who had come to Wünsdorf also in June 1992, had defended his candidate's degree in German philosophy. His deputy was Col. Yu. G. Podolnitsky, appointed from the position of head of the Department of Special Propaganda of the Baltic Military District. The heads of the editorial departments were Col. N.I. Kharchenko and Lt. Col. Czeslaw Mikhailovich Germanovich. The latter was from the "Minsk draft" I mentioned earlier and completed his second tour of duty in Germany.



Delegation of the headquarters of the Western Group of Forces to the headquarters of NATO, Brussels, 1992

After Col. L. G. Palaguta left for the Kyiv Military District in March 1993, I was appointed the head of the Department of Propaganda (Radio) at the Special Propaganda Editorial Office at the Western Group of Forces. Nevertheless, from the beginning to the end of my stay at Wünsdorf, I had to occupy myself with already familiar news and analysis work. It was impossible to get adjusted to the fact, however, that as the number of Russian forces were reduced, the volume of work constantly grew.

Moreover, we had to keep to the usual Army routine as well – taking part in exercises, numerous inspections, and trainings. The broadband radio station Burya [Storm] M-245 was transferred to the staff of the editorial office. It was part of the staff communications of a separate brigade at the rear of the Western Group of Forces and broadcast the group radio station, Volga. As the head of the Department of Propaganda (Radio), I was assigned to accept and master the new staff equipment.

Our Special Propaganda Editorial Office prepared for withdrawal. Tver was to be the place of new deployment. In the interests of informational and psychological support for the withdrawal of Russian forces, it was planned so that the Editorial Office was among the last to leave German territory, in June 1994. A train with the equipment and vehicles and property of the Editorial Office, numbering 12 cars, and a platform, was led by Col. Yu. G. Podolnitsky.

In order to meet it, that is, to prepare well in advance for the unloading and placement of the equipment, property, and personnel of the Editorial Office, I was assigned to Tver in May 1994 to the 166th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Moscow Military District. By an irony of fate, it had come from Poland several years previously, where it was part of the Northern Group of Forces, deployed at Borne Sulinowo and named the 90th Guard Tank Division. In fact, all of its quite modern tanks were preserved and are located on an enormous field on the outskirts of Tver. It is just that the personnel in the brigade were barely sufficient to guard all of that former Soviet might.

After the Editorial Office was settled into the new place in the autumn of 1994, I returned to the 91st Editorial Department (for Foreign Languages) of the Main Directorate of the General Staff in the position of deputy head. I had numerous duties, but the very first was to prepare a set of documents on the combat and mobilization readiness of the department, which had just received the conditional name "Military Unit 54777."

Literally a month later, however, at the end of November, the first Chechen campaign began, called "the operation to restore the Constitutional order in the Chechen Republic." The Editorial Department, headed by Lt. Col. Sergei Stanislavovich Sekanov got to work performing its combat missions for its intended purpose: the preparation, publication, and distribution of printed materials.

The first such document was the Appeal of the President of the RF to participants in the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic on November 29, 1994.

The officers of the Editorial Department prepared informational and reference materials (fact sheets, bulletins, reviews, reports, annotations, memos, and so on) and materials for informational and psychological influence (leaflets, posters, calendars, etc.) During the first Chechen campaign we designed and printed about a hundred such materials for informational and psychological influence. A separate line of activity was delivering them to Chechnya. This operation was repeated weekly, but sometimes even twice a week, and therefore was performed with filigree precision without breakdowns or overlaps. The officers knew the procedure for making flight manifests, the schedule of flights of planes to Mozdok, the features of work at the Chkalovsky Airport, the personal qualities of several members of the crews and the main commanders of the flights. The military pilots should be given credit for treating our leaflets as "Freight No. 1" and always meeting us halfway.

An important component of the work on the line and in the department were trips to the combat zone. At first only line officers were assigned to the operations group of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. The first to go to Mozdok in November 1994 was Maj. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Yepi-

fanov; in December he was relieved by Col. Yury Andreyevich Galushko. Then Col. Vladimir Nikolayevich Shaparsky and Col. Andrei Nikolayevich Borodin went there. After the redeployment of the operational group to the Khankala Airfield (a suburb of Grozny), its staff was increased by taking an officer from the editorial department. This enabled the operational group of the Main Directorate of the General Staff to be involved not only in organizational issues but also to design materials for informational and psychological influence on the spot. In October-November 1994, I was fortunate to be on a trip together with Lt. Col. Sergei Nikolayevich Stetsun. In order to repair the printing equipment, an employee of the editorial department's printing press, Ensign Ildar Rifatovich Aymasov was flown in. From the results of the trip to Chechnya, the command of the Service recommended me for the assignment of the new military rank of "colonel" ahead of schedule.

One of the results of the first Chechen campaign was the decision of the command of the Main Directorate of the General Staff to expand the Service. On January 15, 1996, a Center was created on the basis of the line of the 14th Directorate and the 91st Editorial Department (for Foreign Languages). Its conditional name was inherited from the Editorial Department – "Military Unit 54777." I was assigned from the moment the Center was formed to be the head of the group of Department 2 (Information and Analysis) of that military unit.



Among the UN observers at the location of a Russian peacekeeping battalion in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict: Maj. Gen. Yu. N. Naumov, head of the staff of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces and Col. A. V. Golyev, head of the operational group of the Main Directorate of the General Staff, town of Urta (Georgia), June 2004

With the active participation of 1st-rank Capt. M.I. Bolshakov and other officers, the Directive of the Chief of the General Staff was prepared, according to which the Center was openly named the "Center for Foreign Military Information and Communication" (TsZVIK). Col. Boris Vitalyevich Khilko was appointed head of the Center. There were about 100 military personnel at the Center, and several different civilian employees. It had its own printing press for foreign languages and was outfitted with the most modern printing equipment. The newest video and computer technology were purchased. All of this enabled us to create news and propaganda production at the level of

world standards.

The video films "Dogs of War" and "Werewolves," which exposed the atrocities of the Chechen fighters, have been etched in my memory. Likely not only because I took part in creating them. They were dubbed into English and repeatedly shown at NATO headquarters and the capitals of Western states. The films inevitably left a deep mark on people's souls for the truthfulness and emotionality of the documentary scenes. In fact, many of them had been filmed by our officers during trips to Chechnya or were obtained as "trophies" during combat operations.

I served in the News and Analysis Department for a long time. I went through a good school of news work under the leadership of Col. Yury Andreyevich Galushko, head of that department, and also Col. Nikolai Ivanovich Andreyev, head of the service. A most experienced analyst, Nikolai Ivanovich was always distinguished by his nonstandard approach to the solving of difficult problems, by scrupulous organization and careful thinking through of all activities. Behind the seeming casualness and simplicity of his actions there was always a major preliminary preparation. His talent as an analyst was displayed especially when it was required to briefly outline the core of a confused problem on a tight deadline, clearly and logically, or to prepare an important document.

Col. N.I. Andreyev made a particularly notable contribution to the search and mastery of new channels of informational and psychological influence. In that connection, it is worth noting the numerous activities of our Service in the development of connections and contacts with the Bundeswehr and the West German public.

During these activities, we were able to rapidly convey to the military-political leadership of Germany and NATO the perspective of the command of the Armed Forces of

the Russian Federation to current problems, and to influence the formation of public opinion in the West.

And important factor was that the officers of the Service obtained the unique opportunity to go abroad, where they honed their professional skill in practice, improved their language skills, and studied everyday life, morals, and customs. In particular, I managed to take part in such activities several times.



Joint seminar by cadets of the Military University and the Bundeswehr in Wiesbaden, FRG), 1997

In January 1999, Col. Galushko resigned upon reaching the age limit for military service, and in his position was appointed 1st-rank Capt. Mikhail Ivanovich Bolshakov, and I, correspondingly, as his deputy. However, in connection with NATO's war against Yugoslavia, he went on a trip to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I had to perform the duties of the department head. When in December 2002, 1st-rank Capt. Bolshakov made the unexpected decision to go into the reserves ahead of schedule, the experience I had of leading the news and analytical work turned out to be sufficient to calmly regard appointment to that responsible post.

At that time, the Service was already headed by Col. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kostyukhin. Practically all my service in managerial positions in the Service took place under his leadership. A very experienced officer and analyst, he made a great contribution to the further development of the Service and its integration into the Main Directorate. In particular, at his initiative, all the units and divisions of the Main Directorate began to perform a very important state task in the informational and psychological sphere, and the Service gained the status of a division to evaluate this task.

The very difficult trials of the second Chechen Campaign fall into this period, out of which the Service emerged with strengthened authority. The lines changed and the content of its activity, which was the dictates of the times, and this created a good foun-

ation of stability for the future. All of this enabled the Service to pass through with honor the very difficult stage of the next reforms of the Armed Services in 2008-2010.

In 2002, I underwent training at the faculty for retraining and professional development of the Military Academy of the General Staff majoring in "military and civilian administration." I took part in peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia (2004), Tajikistan (2006), and Southern Ossetia (2006).

In December 2006, I was appointed head of the department and deputy head of the Service.



During work at the State Accreditation Commission at the Military University: Col. A. Yu. Golubev, Col. A.V. Golyev, and Col. Yu.D. Khrenikov, 2008

In June 2010, upon reaching the age limit for military service, my army career was finished. I had continued my training and pedagogical activity at the faculty of Foreign Military Information of the Military University, where in September 2006, I had transmitted my knowledge and experience to future

officers of the Service.

At the same time, starting in July 2010, I worked as a senior science officer at the scientific research department and teacher at the Faculty of Country Studies and Military Diplomatic Service of the Military Academy of the Minister of Defense (VDA). My academic courses for senior staff in 1997 at the VDA in the major of "command and staff" came in handy. On November 26, 2010, as a candidate for the scholarly degree of candidate in military sciences, I defended my dissertation at the Dissertation Council at the Military Academy of the Ministry of Defense,

on problems of informational and psychological support of the activity of the Armed Forces of the FRG.

In 2007, I underwent professional retraining at the Faculty of Retraining and Professional Development of the Military University, in the program of professional retraining for specialists to perform a new type of professional activity in the area of higher education pedagogy (teaching of foreign languages). Starting in September 2011, I began teaching at Moscow State Linguistics University.

Veteran of Military Service.

Russian Dolls: How the GRU's Psychological Warfare is Organized

Features of Organization and Introduction of PSYOP in Peace Time and in a Threat Period

While not exactly page-turning in its literary flair, this document served as the basis for a lecture delivered within the last decade to cadets studying psychological warfare at Russia's Military Institute. This lecture provides an illuminating order of battle as to how the prosecution of such warfare, which is directed by the GRU, is organized and operationalized — even during peacetime — right down to the individual formations of the different branches of the Russian Armed Forces and their interactions with other Russian government agencies.

1. Managing PSYOP Forces and Resources

- Requirements for governance;
- PSYOP governing bodies and their chief duties: General Staff, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), the PSYOP Service of the GRU of the General Staff, the command, the chief of staff, the chief of intelligence, the department head (section) – senior officer, PSYOP unit commander.

2. PSYOP planning: future (in the event of war) and current (for a year ahead)

- Psychological Warfare Plan;
- Planning Specific PSYOP (measures, PSYOP actions);
- Order (combat order) for PSYOP.

3. Procedure for Organizing Co-operation with:

- operations directorate (department);
- directorate (department) of the head of communications troops;
- air force staff (frontline, long-range aviation, military-transport aviation);
- directorate (section) of front aviation (army);
- headquarters of rocket forces and artillery;
- directorate (department) of education;
- section (department) of radio-electronic warfare;
- headquarters of branches of troops (forces), special forces (services);
- headquarters of the rear and armament;

- with headquarters of neighboring (interactive) groups (formations);
 - directorate (department) of military counterintelligence.
- 4. PSYOP in Conditions of Peacetime**
- 5. PSYOP in Prewar (Threat) Period**

Literature

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2. **Sharavov, I.** *Psikhologicheskoye vozdeystviye na voyska i naseleniye zarubezhnykh stran / Uchebnoye posobiye* [Psychological Influences on Troops and Populations of Foreign Countries / **Textbook**], Moscow: Voenizdat, 2000, pp. 60–77.
3. *Organizatsiya sistemy radiopropagandy i nekotoryye voprosy yeyo vedeniya v ugrozhayemy period* [Organization of a System of Radio Propaganda and Certain Questions of Running It During a Threat Period]. Inventory 8050.
4. *Organizatsiya i vedeniye PsB v armeyskikh operatsiyakh* [Organization and Conduct of PSYOP in Army Operations]. Inventory 2043.
5. *Aktual'nye voprosy psikhologicheskoy bor'by* [Relevant Issues of Psychological Warfare], Edition 1–11, Moscow, Voenizdat; GRU General Staff, 1997–2010.

¹ Voenizdat, sometimes shortened to the Russian acronym “VI” is the Military Publishing House—**The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation**.

Threat period: a period of time (of various lengths) which usually precedes the onset of war.

It is characterized by an extreme worsening of the international situation and conflicts between likely adversaries.

The threat period is used for:

1. increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces;
2. their strategic deployment;
3. conversion of the economy from peacetime to martial law.

Given modern means of warfare and the deployment of major groups of forces (p)² on the theater of combat, the threat period may not occur. (*Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'* [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary], Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983, p. 761).

Peace – relations between states characterized by the absence of war and the exercise of foreign policy without the use of armed force, observing treaty obligations (*Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'* [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary], (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983), p. 449)

War – civic and political phenomenon, the continuation of politics by forcible methods. (Lenin developed Clausewitz's thesis further: war is the continuation of politics).

The content of war is armed struggle, force with the use of Armed Forces; therefore, the main and decisive means of conducting war are the Armed Forces and other militarized formations (*ibid.*, pp. 151-152).

1. Management of Forces and Means of Psychological Warfare and PSYOP.

Management of Units and divisions of PSYOP consists of targeted activity of the relevant headquarters, psywar governing bodies, the command of the PSYOP units and divisions in support of combat readiness, planning, and organization of combat application, management of psywar forces and means in preparation and during the course

of operations (battles, combat actions) and also in the daily activity of the Armed Forces.

Management of the PSYOP units and divisions includes:

- organization and carrying out of activities to increase (support) combat readiness and support (restore) their

2 The page number is missing in the original text—*The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation*.

fighting capability;

- continuous collection, study, and analysis of situational data;
- taking decisions; assigning tasks to subordinates;
- planning and organization of the implementation of combat assignments;
- organization and support of interaction;
- organization and provision of comprehensive support;
- organization of a management system;
- oversight and provision of help.

A number of **requirements** are made of management of units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations. Under all conditions, the management environment must be stable, uninterrupted, operational, and clandestine, to provide effective deployment of forces and means, and to successfully fulfill assigned tasks.

Management stability consists of the ability of governing bodies to manage under any conditions of the environment. This is achieved by:

- use of all available channels of communications from management centers and their communications hubs;
- duplication of basic combat orders (orders) via several forms of communication;
- organization of communications from the higher governing body to subordinate

forces and means of the senior chief.

Uninterrupted management consists of constant clarification of combat (special) assignments by subordinate governing bodies and units (facilities, divisions). It is achieved by:

- determination by the senior governing body of the roster of urgent reports and strict compliance with it by subordinates;
- initiative of subordinates in compilation and reporting of important information to the senior chief;
- support of stable communication between the chief and subordinates.

Efficiency of management consists of transmitting combat orders (orders), and other important information in close to approximate real time. This is achieved by:

- grounded application of the parallel method in planning psywar (combat deployment of forces and means);
- provision of the PSYOP units (facilities, divisions) with regular means of communication and management; their support for readiness to deployment.

Clandestine management consists of keeping in secret from the enemy the intent of psychological warfare until the start of the combat deployment of PSYOP units (facilities, divisions). It is achieved by:

- use of the method of personal communication in assigning tasks of especially important lines to

subordinates;

- broad application of the means of clandestine communications;
- strict observation of the established work regimens for technical facilities for communication; moving the positions of radio-broadcasting facilities out of the areas where control stations are located and other important facilities;
- organization of work with prisoners of war (defectors, displaced persons, deported persons) outside the areas of checkpoints and military units;
- prohibition of access of prisoners of war intended for return leave (deployment) with special tasks, to information constituting a military secret;
- restriction of the number of persons with the right to use technical means of communication, and restriction on using the radio equipment of armored ground stations and open communication channels;
- maximum restriction of the number of officials involved in development of psywar plans, combat use (application) of forces and means of the unit (institution), PSYOP plans, especially in a unit concerning information confrontation of troops (forces);
- correct organization of secret work, especially under field conditions; ensuring the reliable integrity of classified

documents;

- instruction of all categories of personnel in a spirit of high vigilance and timely discovery of possible channels of leakage of secret information; ensuring counterintelligence.

The organizational and technological foundation of management by psywar forces and means is a **management system**. It includes agencies for management of psychological warfare; intelligence management centers and management means – and communications and automated management systems.

Psywar governing bodies and their basic duties. *Management of forces and means of psychological warfare is achieved in a general management system by the forces and means of military intelligence.*

General management of psywar is carried out by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation through the GRU. In the area of psywar, the General Staff determines which forces of armed forces, the branches of forces (special troops, forces) conduct the psywar; determines the list of countries and armed forces against which psychological warfare is permitted to be waged; develops the basic purposes and tasks of psywar; determines the basic principles of the use of psywar forces and means and their organizational and staff structure. In addition, the General Staff coordinates psywar efforts with other ministries (offices)

of the Russian Federation, and with friendly (allied) states in the area of informational and psychological influence on important targets (groups of targets) for psychological warfare.

Functions of the General Staff. In the interests of psywar, the **General Staff**:

- drafts orders, directives, and instructions on questions of organization and conduct of psychological warfare;
- exercises general leadership by psywar governing bodies and PSYOP units of types of armed forces and branches of forces, military districts (groups of forces, fleets); provides them practical help in the organization of psywar and oversees their conduct;
- exercises direct leadership through the PSYOP facilities and divisions of central subordination;
- carries out the selection, deployment, and training (re-training) of psywar officer cadres;
- organizes interaction with the structural divisions of other ministries (offices) and allied (friendly) states in the interests of psychological warfare;
- organizes interaction with the chief (central) departments of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff on psywar issues;
- leads the development work and takes the role of general purchaser for models

of weapons and special equipment for psywar; delivers special equipment to the PSYOP units.

The Center for Special Service is the chief working agency of the General Staff for issues of psychological warfare (psychological operations).

The Center for Special Service determines the chief directions of development of psychological warfare; develops relevant issues of its theory and practice; organizes its experimental testing; and develops and clarifies the conception (the chief directions) of psychological warfare. Other tasks are also assigned to the Center for Special Service, including:

- drafting of guidance documents for psychological warfare, and obtaining comprehensive approval for them;
- concretizing (clarifying) the chief directions, aims and main purposes of psychological warfare; the chief areas (targets, groups of targets); the forms, methods, and means of informational and psychological influence; and support of cooperation with other ministries (offices) in the interests of psychological warfare;
- oversight for fulfilment of the tasks of psychological warfare assigned by the General Staff;
- informing of the military and political leadership of the Russian Federation, the commander-in-chief (commanders,

commanding officers) and staffs for problems of psychological warfare at all levels;

- organization of interaction on issues of psychological warfare in the Ministry of Defense and General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; coordination of interaction with the chief staffs of the types of the Armed Forces, and the branches of troops (special troops);
- informing of governing bodies for psychological warfare on issues of changes in the military and political, informational and socio-psychological situation; the emotional and psychological state of the targets (groups of targets) of psychological warfare; the features of the conduct of psychological operations by the psychological warfare agencies of the special operations forces of foreign governments' armies; and the experience and effectiveness of the conduct of psychological warfare;
- provision of help in carrying out activities of combat and mobilization readiness; plans for operational (combat) use by operational intelligence governing bodies; units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations; mastering of new technology by them; consolidation and dissemination of experience in performing combat (special tasks); development of training

and methodological materials for psychological warfare;

- coordination of issues of planning, organization, conduct and support of psychological operations with the plans of the strategic use of troops (forces, branches of intelligence).

The Center for Special Service organizes and conducts PSYOP at the **strategic and operational level** in the interests of supporting operations (battles, combat actions) of troops (forces for strategic lines and support of the activity of troops (forces) in the zones of responsibility; takes part in activities of informational confrontation according to the General Staff's plans; analyzes the socio-political and informational and psychological situation in the strategic areas; the emotional and psychological state of the personnel of the armies of the targeted countries in order to take them into account in planning and preparation of psychological operations (psychological warfare activities); and studies the psychological features and experience of the special and PSYOP armed forces of the targeted states.

The chief staffs of the branches of the armed forces exercise direct supervision through the intelligence governing bodies for planning and organization of psychological warfare in the formations (groups) of their branch of the armed forces on the basis of instructions (directives).

The chief governing body for psycholog-

ical warfare in the formations is the **intelligence directorate (department, division) of the headquarters** and the department (division, senior officer) of psychological warfare within it. It carries out its work on the basis of assignments given by the commander-in-chief (commander, commanding officer); instructions by the chief of staff; decisions and directives by the formation's head of intelligence; orders on psychological warfare by the above-mentioned staff; and also proceeding from the purpose and features of the combat assignments performed by the formations (groups, units).

The chief of intelligence and deputy chief of staff of the military district (front, fleet, army, or army corps) for intelligence is the immediate organizer of psychological warfare and has complete responsibility for its state and results.

On the basis of the directives (commands, instructions, and orders) of the General Staff, the chief of intelligence plans and organizes psywar and supports the timely fulfillment of tasks assigned. It determines the order and sequence for performing special tasks; the procedure and means of organization of management and communications; the procedure and time periods for development and submission for approval to the chief of staff of the district (front), or fleet of the basic planning and information and reference documents and emotional and psychological influence materials.

The chief of intelligence leads the development of the psywar plan, submits it for signature to the chief of staff of the district (front) or fleet and for approval to the commander of the troops of the military district (front) or commander of the fleet; leads the development, submits the plans for conducting the PSYOP for approval to the higher command, leads the conduct of the most difficult and critical PSYOP.

It is the duty of the intelligence chief to review and approve the plans for combat use of the subordinate units (divisions) of psychological operations; to review and submit for approval to the chief of staff of the military district (front, army, army corps) or fleet the draft materials for informational-psychological influence; and under certain circumstances approve them personally or yield such a right to the commander of the unit (facilities, division).

Furthermore, the chief of intelligence ensures constant combat and mobilization readiness of the governing bodies for psychological warfare, and the subordinate units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations; and organizes the operational, material, technical and rear support of the subordinate units (facilities, divisions) of the psychological operations.

Work in planning and organization of psychological warfare, and leadership of subordinate units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations is organized and con-

ducted by the intelligence chief through the **department (section, senior officer) for psychological warfare.**

The distribution of duties among officials of the department (section) for psychological warfare is made by the chief of intelligence on the basis of the roster of functional duties for performance of assignments in peace and war time and also in the prewar period, submitted by the chief of the department (division) of psychological warfare.

The performance of the following main tasks is assigned **to the department (section, senior officer) for psychological warfare:**

- guarantee and support of military and mobilization readiness of subordinates to the chief of intelligence of units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations;
- planning and organization of psychological warfare in the area (zone) of responsibility of the formation (group) for conducting intelligence and psychological warfare;
- management of forces and means of psychological warfare, directly subordinate to the chief of intelligence;
- oversight and provision of assistance to troops (forces) and headquarters in the organization of psychological warfare and performance of special tasks;
- organization of interaction on psywar issues inside headquarters and

participation in the organization of cooperation between formations (groups) on a strategic line (line, operational line) by means of distribution of targets (groups of targets) of influence, forces and means by PSYOP according to goals, assignments, time and content; participation in organization and conduct of informational work (including preparation and submission of information documents to the superior headquarters);

- leadership of combat and special training of units (divisions) for psychological operations;
- study, consolidation, and presentation to troops (forces) of the experience of the organization and conduct of psychological warfare;
- leadership of the study and evaluation of the military, political, informational and socio-psychological situation, and the military and political states of the targets (groups of targets of psychological warfare in the zone of responsibility; participation in the drafting of conclusions from its evaluation;
- preparation of informational, analytical, and reference documents and proposals for the commander (commanding officer) for making decisions.

The headquarters of the branches of troops (forces) and special troops (services) have the responsibility for performing

tasks in the area of psychological warfare; comprehensive support of their actions; collection of data on issues of the emotional and psychological states of targets (groups of targets) of psychological warfare; and reporting them to headquarters and informing the intelligence directorate (department, section).

The management of PSYOP units is conducted from the intelligence and psywar management centers which may be stationary and mobile.

Stationary intelligence and psychological warfare management centers are deployed at protected command centers of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; troops of lines; border military districts; groups of forces, fleets, armies, and flotillas. During peacetime, combat duty is organized at them by duty (combat) shifts (watches), but the psychological warfare officers are not included in them. During a threat period and from the onset of hostilities, intelligence and psychological warfare governing bodies are deployed at these centers and work at full staff.

Mobile management centers are deployed in a threat situation or from the onset of military actions, and as a rule, at the same time at command and reserve command centers of formations and operate within them.

Assignment of psychological warfare officers' corps to management centers is made by decision of the formation's intelligence chief. As a rule, the head of the department

(section) for psychological warfare; 2-3 senior officers (an officer) of a department and an information and analytical group from the district (front or fleet) group of psychological operations are located at the intelligence management center of the formation's command center.

The senior officer of the department for psychological warfare at the command center of the front is assigned for work in the intelligence planning group and alongside the department head is a member of the group of the basis operational staff. Officers of the department for psychological warfare may be assigned to the staff of the group for supervision of the mobilized groups and units; to the operational groups of the field management of the front for work in the staffs of subordinate formations (groups) and also in groups (units) on issues of planning, organization and support for psychological warfare.

The deputy chief (senior officer) of the department is assigned to the intelligence management center of the formation's reserve command center in readiness to take over management of the units (divisions) of the psychological operations in the event the command center fails.

The senior officers (the officers) of the psywar department, by decision of the intelligence chief may appoint senior operatives of the groups (PSYOP detachments) assigned to the PSYOP group in operational subordination to the operational (army) commands.

2. Planning of Psywar.

Procedure for work of the command and formation staff in planning and organization of psywar. Management of psywar forces and means is the duty of the commander-in-chief (commanders, commanding officers) and headquarters.

It consists of the following:

- determination of the purpose, tasks, and targets (groups of targets) of psychological warfare;
- making decisions on the combat use of units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations;
- planning and organization of psychological warfare;
- direct leadership of the preparation of the PSYOP units (divisions) for performing the tasks assigned;
- organization and supervision and other activities.

All activities for managing psywar forces and means in preparation and in the course of the operations (battles, combat actions) are done comprehensively in accordance with the assignments performed by the troops (forces).

Methods of work while performing them are determined by the specific situation, the level of combat, emotional and psychological state of the targets (groups of targets) for

psywar; the state and degree of readiness of the units (facilities, divisions) for psychological operations toward performance of the tasks assigned; however, in all cases, upon receipt of a combat assignment, the command and staffs must define the purposes, tasks and targets of psychological warfare, and plan and organize it.

The commander-in-chief (commander, commanding officer) determines the goal, the most important tasks, the psywar groups of targets, the direction to concentrate basic efforts, the time periods and sequence for conducting psychological operations (activities, psywar actions) and gives the chief of staff tasks in its organization. He confirms the plan for psychological warfare personally and through headquarters and has oversight over the performance of the assigned tasks. If necessary, he assigns additional forces and means to perform certain tasks.

The headquarters is the chief organizer of psychological warfare. The chief of staff, depending on the tasks assigned by the commander-in-chief (commander, commanding officer) and the instruction for psychological warfare from a superior headquarters determines (details) the tasks for psychological warfare, the forces and means (including the branches of troops and special troops given to the units and divisions) to perform the most important of them; the proce-

duration and time periods for deploying the units (divisions) for psychological operations; the measures for comprehensive support of their actions; gives instructions on organizing psychological warfare to the intelligence chief and the heads of the branches of troops (forces); establishes the time periods for drafting and submission for signature (approval) of the main planning, information and analytical, and reference materials as well as materials about the informational and psychological influence developed in the PSYOP units.

The direct organizer of the PSYOP in a formation is the chief of intelligence. He makes the decision to perform the assigned tasks of psychological warfare, the combat application of units (facilities, divisions), psychological operation in the interests of fulfilling tasks (including special tasks; organization of interaction in the headquarters; management of units (divisions) of psychological operations; collection, processing and analysis along with timely reporting to interested parties of information characterizing the psychological states of the targets (groups of targets) of psychological warfare; to exercise comprehensive oversight of the preparation of subordinate PSYOP units.

The intelligence chief of the formation through the intelligence directorate's department (division, senior officer) for psywar provides the plan for psychological warfare; gives combat (preliminary) orders to the subordinate units (facilities, divisions) of the psychological operations; reviews, signs and

submits for approval to the chief of staff draft materials for informational and psychological influence.

The **goal and tasks** of psywar are determined from the goals of the operation (battle, combat actions), the content of operational tasks performed by troops (forces), intelligence tasks, tasks for psychological warfare assigned by the superior staff; the psychological characteristics of targets (groups of targets) of psychological warfare, and also the presence and preparedness of PSYOP units.

Psywar **is planned** comprehensively, to the entire depth of the operative construction of the enemy's opposition group. Moreover, along with other factors, the ability to reach targets with psywar's available means is considered (regular and attached television and radio station broadcasting, artillery, aviation and aeronautical broadcasting, and ground stations).

Psywar planning is chiefly done through the areas of active informational and psychological influence. Their number and design are determined by the concept for the operation, the combat assignments of the troops (forces), the concept for conducting psychological warfare, the tasks of psychological warfare assigned by the superior staff; the completeness of data about the targets (groups of targets) of psychological warfare; the presence and technical capabilities of the forces and means of psychological warfare

and other factors.

Planning for psywar is made *on the basis of a decision by the commander-in-chief (the commander, the commanding officer) and the tasks assigned them, the instructions from the chief of staff and the orders for psychological warfare from the superior staff, taking into account the real strategic (operational, combat) situation, the available data on the targets (groups of targets), their psychological characteristics, the state of psywar forces and means and their capabilities.* This includes:

- detailing of tasks and targets for psychological warfare;
- determination of sequence, form, methods, means and time periods for performing the assignments; concretization of the targets (group of targets) of psychological warfare; the radius of active informational and psychological influence; reinforcement of the zones (districts, lanes) of responsibility for conducting psywar for units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations; calculation of the expected effectiveness from the use of psychological warfare forces and means;
- establishment of the necessary consistency and periodicity of using informational and psychological influence on targets (groups of targets, areas of active psychological influence);

- deployment of psywar forces and means according to tasks, lines, zones (regions, lanes) and targets (groups of targets);
- calculation of the creation of a group of psywar forces and means in the lanes of the subordinate formations;
- determination of the areas of deployment and the order of movement of units (facilities, divisions) for psychological operations;
- establishment of a procedure for reporting results of informational and psychological influence and the effectiveness of psywar;
- determination of the basic issues of interaction, measures to support the organizations and organization of the management of psywar forces and means.

Detailing of the assignment of targets (groups of targets, areas of active psychological influence). Psywar is waged on the basis of their careful analysis. Furthermore, the tasks with regards to each of the targets (groups of targets, area of active psychological influence) must be determined for a certain period of time and in accordance with their typological emotional, political, and psychological features.

Simultaneously, the procedure (the sequence and periodicity) for informational and psychological influence on targets (groups of targets, regions of active psychological influence) is determined; there is

consideration of their socio-psychological characteristics, emotional and psychological state and combat readiness; and the theme of the materials for informational and psychological influence, which require correction (making changes) on the basis of an analysis of the effectiveness of the content, form and methods of influence.

In order to concentrate the efforts of psywar on performing the most important assignments, during its planning, the targets (groups of targets, areas), morale, combat, and socio-psychological features, content, periodicity of influence, its forms and methods are carefully coordinated with the efforts of state news agencies, the formations of others ministries (agencies) and the psywar governing bodies of neighboring formations. As a rule, coordination is organized by areas of active psychological influence and chief psywar targets (group of targets), taking account their specific nature and psychological features.

The sequence and content of the work of formation staff officials in planning and organizing psychological warfare is determined by the conditions in which the preparation of the operation is done, and the amount of time.

In preparation of the first operations (battles), all activities of planning and organization of psychological warfare are carried out initially in advance and then subsequently directly during the preparation of the

operation.

During the advance preparation of the operation, the psywar tasks are determined, decisions are made for the use of forces and means of psychological warfare and the activities in its organization which may be fulfilled in advance, during peacetime.

Detailing of tasks, targets and lines for informational and psychological influence is made on the basis of a thorough analysis of the emotional and psychological state of the psywar targets (group of targets) and the detection of weak spots in them for the purposes of increasing the effectiveness of informational and psychological influence.

The chief psywar planning document drafted in the strategic (operational strategic and operational) formation is the **plan for psychological warfare** during the operation (the stage of hostilities).

It should anticipate the possibility of performing the tasks assigned in various settings, and also with drastic changes to it. During the operation (hostilities), to the extent there are changes in the situation, the composition of forces and means for psychological warfare, and the degree to which the tasks have been completed, the plan is refined. In doing so, all the planned (updated) activities for the next stages of the operation (hostilities) are once again reported to the chief of staff.

The formation's plan for psychological warfare is drafted graphically on a map with an attached explanatory note. In a group,

the psychological warfare activities are reflected in the intelligence plan. If there is time, information and analytical and informational reference materials characterizing the emotional and psychological state of the psychological warfare targets (group of targets), and necessary spreadsheets and diagrams may be prepared in the form of attachments to the plan.

The formation's psywar plan is signed by the chief of staff and the intelligence chief and approved by the commander-in-chief (commander, commanding officer).

The attachments to the psychological warfare plan are signed by the head of the psywar department (sections, senior officer).

The psywar plan of the front (army, army corps) is drafted by the staff intelligence directorate (department) with the involvement of the staffs of the branches of troops, special troops, and services. The executor of the plan is the head of the psychological warfare department (senior officer).

The following affect the psychological warfare plan:

- the position, combat strength, grouping of the enemy, including the number of psychological warfare forces and means and the likely nature of their actions;
- the forefront of our own forces (line of contact of the sides), the dividing lines of the front (army, army corps) and groups given their actions in a consolidated direction; their command

centers and other elements of decision for an operation (battle, combat actions) necessary for psywar planning;

- grouping and position of psychological warfare forces and means of the front (army, army corps) attached, interacting with and transferred to operational subordination of units (facilities, divisions); assigned by decision of the commander (commanding officer) for completion of individual psywar tasks; the time of their deployment (actions); the capabilities for preparation (publication) and distribution of informational and psychological influence materials; the areas of active emotional and psychological influence; and the time periods and means of fulfilling the psywar tasks;
- the location and sequence for transferring the psywar reserve forces and means;
- areas, means, and time for distributing materials of emotional and psychological influence and their labeling; zones of stable reception of television and radio broadcasts of the psywar facilities of the front (army, army corps), senior head, interacting state mass media, forces and facilities for emotional and psychological influence of other ministries (agencies);
- centers for management of interacting governing bodies of formations (groups) of the Federal Border Service, Federal Security Service, the Internal Forces of

the Interior Ministry; the areas and time of deployment of centers for collection (camps) of displaced (deported) persons of regional governing bodies of the Federal Migration Service; the composition of the persons in them;

- areas and time periods for deployment of centers for collection of prisoners of war, labor camps for prisoners of war, data on the composition of the persons kept in them;
- other data characterizing the military and political, informational, and psychological setting in the lane (zone) of responsibility.

The explanatory memorandum indicates: the purpose, the most important tasks and targets for psychological warfare, its intent, the composition of the grouping of forces and means by lines (in lanes subordinate to formations and groups); the main questions in organization of interaction, support of psychological warfare forces and means and management of them.

The following may be drafted in the form of attachments to the psywar plan:

- reference paper with conclusions from the evaluation of the military-political and psychological setting in the zone (lane) of responsibility and the emotional and psychological state of the targets (groups of targets) for psychological warfare;
- memo on the composition of forces and

means of the psywar agencies of the special operations forces of the enemy and the chief lines of their activity;

- informational and reference materials on the main targets of psychological warfare with an indication of their most characteristic psychological and other features.

Organization of psywar is carried out in conjunction with implementation of measures for its planning. It includes:

- assignment of tasks to units (facilities, divisions) for psychological operations;
- coordination of efforts and organization of interaction;
- preparation of units (facilities, divisions) for psychological operations and units (divisions) assigned for performing individual tasks in the interests of psychological warfare, and their deployment;
- development and implementation of activities to ensure the actions of psychological warfare forces and means, the organization of their management, and also collection, processing, and analysis of information of interest to intelligence.

Plans for conduct of PSYOP, as a rule, are made textually. In the event of greater scope for distribution, the development of the plan for the psychological operation may be made on a map with an attached explanato-

ry memo. The plan for the psychological operation indicates: the purpose and chief tasks of the operation; the time periods and areas (targets, groups of targets) for emotional and psychological influence; the composition of the forces and means involved; the justification for the feasibility of conducting the operation and evaluation of its possible effectiveness; the concept of the operation developed in detail; and the procedure for performing the assignments of the operation.

The PSYOP plan is developed by the psychological warfare governing bodies in cooperation with all forces of intelligence, is signed by the chief of staff, and approved by the troop commander of the military district (fleet commander) and must be coordinated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces (through the GRU).

Informational analytical and informational reference materials, spreadsheets and other documents characterizing the targets (groups of targets) and their features may be attached to the plan of the operation.

As a rule, the PSYOP planning is done in stages.

Draft materials on the informational and psychological influences in the first stage of the operation, and organizational and technical documents, including a memo on the legending of the information source are attached to the PSYOP plan and submitted to the General Staff for approval.

The drafting of the PSYOP plan is con-

ducted with maximum preservation of secrecy, with the involvement of a strictly limited number of officials from the governing body for intelligence and psychological warfare. The following are permitted access to the full content of the PSYOP plan: the chief of intelligence, the head of the psywar department, the development officer and the PSYOP group commander. For all the remaining persons involved in the drafting of certain documents of the operation, the parts of the psychological operation plan concerning them is given to them. The command to conduct a psychological operation is brought to the psychological operations group as a written battle order from the staff of the military district (fleet).

Assignment of tasks for the organization and conduct of psychological warfare is made:

- to the formation (group) of the front (fleet) of the head of the branches of troops (forces) and special troops (services) – by **instructions** of the staff of the district (front), army (fleet) for **psychological warfare**;
- to psychological operations units (divisions) – by **battle orders**.

The orders for psychological warfare indicate the following:

- brief conclusions from the evaluation of the military-political and psychological setting; zones (lanes) of psychological warfare; important psywar targets;

- psywar tasks and the time periods for performing them; the order of deployment, activation of forces and means of psychological warfare and support of their actions;
- order of interaction with forces and means of psychological warfare of neighboring and interacting formations;
- chief psywar activities conducted in the lane of the formation (group) by the senior chief's psywar forces and means;
- location of the management centers of the senior chief, and also the procedure and time periods for submitting reports and accounting documents.
- amounts of television broadcasting; air fields and periods of delivery of print runs of materials for informational and psychological influence;
- procedure for the use of civilian mass media (including in a liberated, occupied territory);
- procedure and time periods for introducing planning, informational, reference, analytical and emotional and psychological influence materials;
- procedure for organization of work in camps (collection centers) for prisoners of war, deported (displaced) persons;
- procedure for organizing interaction, combat support and management of the main divisions;
- procedure for exchange of information with neighboring units (divisions) of psychological operations.

In the battle **orders** of PSYOP forces the following are indicated:

- brief conclusions from evaluation of the military-political and psychological situation;
 - psywar tasks and the time periods for completing them;
 - areas and time periods for creation of the grouping of forces and the means for psychological warfare, including the time period for release of the main divisions to the areas of battle use;
 - important targets of psychological warfare and the procedure for their military-political study;
 - frequency and schedules of broadcasts of regular and attached radio facilities for psychological warfare;
- In order to reduce the time periods for drafting and issuing orders, automated methods, and standard documents (forms) are used.
- For the purposes of providing subordinates with more time for planning and organization of combat use of units (divisions) of psychological operations, they may be given preliminary orders.
- In the interests of obtaining more complete data about the emotional and psychological state of the targets (groups of targets) of psychological warfare in the area of up-

coming actions, and also on the flanks (outside the area of actions) of formations, the staffs may send requests to superior and interacting staffs (intelligence governing bodies) to receive information.

The request usually indicates which data, about which grouping (target, area), when, and in what form these are desirable to receive. It is signed by the chief of staff and the chief of intelligence.

3. Procedure for Organization of Interaction

The **interaction** of PSYOP units and divisions, attached and supporting units (divisions) of branches of troops (forces), special forces (services) is organized by the lines of emotional and psychological influence, its content, zones, the districts of active information and psychological influence, the tasks, targets, time periods and means of influence. It stipulates:

- the establishment of the zones (lanes), targets (groups of targets), areas of active informational and psychological influence, responsibility for informational and psychological influence which are assigned to the formations and groups (shops);
- the optimal distribution of tasks (targets, areas of active psychological influence) among divisions (operational groups of divisions), a unified understanding of the content and purposes of jointly performed tasks of psychological warfare; the means and sequence of their completion in space and time;
- coordination of the efforts of the

units (divisions, facilities) of central subordination, state mass media, information agencies of other ministries (offices) with the activity (combat work) of the units (divisions) of the formations;

- mutually advantageous positioning of units and psychological operations divisions;
- mutual doubling while influencing the basic groups of targets (areas of active informational and psychological influence);
- support of stable and uninterrupted communication with neighbors and interacting governing bodies, to units (divisions) of psychological operations;
- coordination of issues of operative (combat) technological and rear support of units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations.

The chief organizer of interactions in the interests of psychological warfare is the **chief of staff**, directly, the chief of intelligence and, according to his delegation, the

head of the department (section, senior officer) of psychological warfare.

With the operational directorate (department), the following issues must be coordinated in the interests of organization and conduct of psywar:

- concept of psychological warfare;
- order and time periods for bringing PSYOP units (divisions) into various stages of combat readiness and the areas of their deployment;
- time, routes, and order of their advancing, movement (deployment);
- sequence of performance of main (special) tasks, targets (groups of targets) and areas of active information and psychological influence;
- activities in operational (combat) support of actions of units (divisions) of psychological operations, attached and interacting in the interests of completing individual psychological warfare tasks of units (divisions) of branches of troops (forces), special troops (services);
- procedure for participation of units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations in activities (actions) of information confrontation;
- procedure for the work of psywar officers at management centers.

With the directorate (department) of the head of the communications troops:

- assignment of radio frequencies for radio broadcasting;
- positions (basic and reserve) of broadcasting radio facilities;
- linking them to the front (army) communication support network by allocating radio relay communication facilities;
- organization of technical maintenance and repair of radio facilities of the units (divisions) of psychological operations;
- organization and procedure for use (rent) of civilian broadcasting radio facilities in the interests of psywar;
- procedure for assignment of additional means of communication for conducting radio broadcasts in the interests of psychological warfare;
- procedure for adding units (divisions) to the nodes (centers) of courier mail service.

With the staff of the airborne army (front-line, long-range aviation, and military transport aviation):

- regions (zones, lanes) of targets (groups of targets) of informational and psychological influence with aviation and aeronautical means;
- amount of distributed printed materials and the allocated flight resource to perform the psywar tasks;
- airfields for receiving of printed materials

of informational and psychological influence and the procedure for their delivery.

With the directorate (department) of the aviation of the front (army):

- procedure for organization of oral broadcasting through helicopter ground stations;
- procedure for delivery of print runs of printed matter to the airfields of the bases of front (long-range, military-transport) aviation.

With the staff of the rocket troops and artillery:

- procedure for delivery, supply and firing of agitation projectiles;
- areas, time periods and order of firing (for army, corps, and division links).

With the directorate (department) of instructional work:

- procedure for submission of information about the presence, structure, deployment, and nature of the activity of the enemy's psychological warfare units (divisions);
- procedure of supply (provision) of technical means of psychological warfare; organization of their repair;
- procedure for supply of disposable materials.

With the department (service) of radio-electronic warfare:

- determination of the electromagnetic compatibility of the radiating technical means for psychological warfare, and attached means;
- procedure for reconnaissance and electromagnetic suppression of radiating targets of the enemy's psychological warfare;
- warnings of jamming of frequencies and during the work of regular (attached) psywar television and radio facilities;
- the possibility of involving radio-emitting devices of radio-electronic warfare in the interests of psychological warfare.

With the staffs of branches of troops (forces), special troops (services):

- areas of deployment of units (divisions) assigned for completion of particular psychological warfare tasks, their status, staffing level, management procedure and communications with them;
- assignment of specific tasks and time periods for their performance;
- procedure for submission of dispatches (reports) on activities conducted.

With staffs of the rear and armament:

- procedure for organization of the rear and technical support of units (divisions) of psychological operations with a determination of the specific addition of sufficient rear agencies and technical maintenance and repair agencies.

- amount, time periods and procedure for delivery (receipt) of the necessary material means and methods of evacuation of the wounded and sick, and also the procedure for informing the staff of the rear about areas of actions by PSYOP units, their movements, the presence of wounded and the provision of other data necessary to organize support.

Interaction with staffs of neighboring (interacting) formations (groups) on psywar issues is organized by determining the responsibility for conducting psywar on the flanks and gaps, facilitating task fulfilling, and also through regular exchange of information. Furthermore, this staff determines:

- the tasks which must be completed by psywar forces and means of certain formations in the interests of others; the order and time periods for their completion;
- zones (areas) of joint fulfillment of psywar tasks;
- methods and time periods of exchange of information and also the procedure for mutual support of combat activity of the psywar forces and means.

With the directorate (department) of military counterintelligence:

- procedure for organization of work with prisoners of war at collection centers and (camps) for prisoners of war until they are handed over to the Internal

Troops of the Interior Ministry;

- coordination of the procedure for return release (planting) of prisoners of war in the interests of psywar;
- procedure for organization of PSYOP counterintelligence support (of activities, psychological warfare actions).

In organization of interaction with territorial governing bodies of the FSB and Interior Troops of the Interior Ministry, the procedure for exchange of information is coordinated; efforts at informational and psychological influence are coordinated against targets (groups of targets, regions of active informational and psychological influence) of psywar.

In organization of interaction with the governing bodies of the Border Troops of the FSB, the following are subject to mandatory approval:

- during a period of preparation and conduct of border operations (the threat period): the procedure for combat use of combat-ready divisions (operational groups) of units (divisions) of psychological operations, in the interests of informational and psychological support of border operations; the organization of dissemination of materials of informational-psychological influence on individual checkpoints (simplified checkpoints) until the State Border regimen is lifted; use of the forces and means of special intelligence of the

Federal Border Service in the interests of informational and psychological support of border operations; the procedure and periodicity of exchange of information;

- from the onset of military (combat) actions in transferring formations (groups) of border forces to operational subordination to formations of the Armed Forces, interaction is replaced by the combat directorate for issues of organization, support, and conduct of psychological warfare.

Preparation of units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations and their deployment is organized by the staff of the formation and is done by commanders and staffs of units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations, as a rule, ahead of time, with the advance of the deployment of the main grouping of troops (forces) with the purpose of providing timely informational and psychological influence on the targets (groups of targets, areas of active informational-psychological influence). It includes:

- bringing the units (divisions) of psychological operations selectively (partially) to high degrees of combat readiness before the start of strategic (operational) deployment of a grouping of troops (forces) on a strategic line;
- their resupply (mobilization) strictly within the time periods indicated; the resupply

of personnel, vehicles, armament and materiel, combat alignment and direct preparation for conduct of psychological warfare;

- detailed planning and working out of options for combat use of units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations in peacetime during tactical-special and special trainings;
- comprehensive completion of the tasks of psychological warfare during the planning of combat use of troops (forces);
- creation during peacetime of a group of forces and means of psychological warfare on strategic lines (lines), their timely reinforcement from the reserve of the Center and the formations of other strategic lines (lines) not involved in military (combat) actions.

Measures to ensure the actions of psywar forces and means are developed simultaneously with its planning and are carried out both in advance and during the immediate preparation for the completion of the assigned tasks and their launching. They include:

- operational *maskirovka*³ of the preparation, launching and actions of the forces and means of psychological warfare;

3 A Russian military doctrine covering a broad range of measures for military deception, from camouflage to denial and deception—**The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation**.

- concealment of the sources of emotional and psychological influence (especially in peacetime and in the threat period);
- ensuring the timely departure of the units (PSYOP) to areas and organization of their concealment;
- protection from weapons of mass destruction and the enemy's air attacks;
- engineering equipment of the areas and their *maskirovka*;
- comprehensive technical and rear support of actions of psychological warfare forces and means.

All measures for operative (combat) support of the actions of psychological warfare forces and means are developed by a strictly limited circle of persons and carefully coordinated with their executors as to place, time, and sequence for the completion of tasks and content.

For the purposes of increasing the survivability of psychological warfare forces and means, positions and areas of units (facilities, divisions) of psychological operations are prepared in advance in engineering terms as well as shelters for management centers with equipment in them; the route and procedure for departure are determined and coordinat-

ed at the forefront for oral broadcasting from ground stations; measures for concealment, notification and timely withdrawal of forces and means from the enemy's strikes.

In developing measures to restore the fighting capacity of psychological warfare forces and means, it is determined what forces and means, in which structure and at what expense they are to be restored; the time periods and sequence for their restoration, and also measures to restore a disrupted management system are also anticipated.

The work of the staffs, intelligence governing bodies and the immediate psychological warfare governing bodies in leading the transfer of units (facilities, divisions) from peacetime to war time and their deployment is organized on the basis of plans developed in advance for bringing troops (forces) into combat readiness and plans for their mobilization (replenishing), advance, and occupation of areas, taking into account the current situation. In deploying the psychological warfare forces and means, the staff of the formation monitors the departure of the psychological warfare units (facilities, divisions) to the designated areas, the conduct of engineering works in equipping and camouflaging them and the increase of readiness for the completion of the assignments.

4. PSYOP in conditions of peacetime

Psychological warfare in peacetime is a component of the state's information policy, a form of information confrontation and is a package of measures for emotional and psychological influence of military personnel and the population of foreign countries in the interests of performing the assignments made by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The psywar service during peacetime also has a public title – “Foreign Military Information and Communications Service of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” [ZVIK]. In keeping with its purpose, it has the functions in particular of conducting informational and propaganda work abroad and making military and humanitarian contacts with foreign military and civilian organizations and mass media. Within the framework of this form of cooperation, each year dozens of international conferences and seminars are held, in which thousands of people take part, along with numerous publications in the press and on electronic media as well as special events.

The purpose of psywar in conditions of peace consists of forming and stimulating opinions, views, emotions, and behavior corresponding to the interests of Russia's national security through the means of emotional and psychological influence on military personnel and the population of foreign countries.

Conducting psywar in peacetime is simultaneously preparation of the governing bodies and service units for psychological operations in a combat setting.

The chief targets of psywar in peacetime are the personnel of the armed forces and populations of the target states.

In special cases, when the contingents of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are involved in conducting peacekeeping operations (for example, in the former Yugoslavia, at the decisions of the UN; in Tajikistan, Abkhazia and so on) and also special operations with border and internal troops, targets of psywar may be:

- opposing armed groups, ethnic groups of the population;
- participants in provocative and destabilizing actions on the borders of the Russian Federation and countries with which Russia has agreement of mutual protection and defense of borders;
- members of extremist nationalist and religious organizations, unlawful armed formations, terrorists and criminal groupings, and participants in mass disorders, anti-government, and socially dangerous actions.

In this case, **the psywar tasks** may be: facilitation of the stabilization of the situation, settlement of the conflict; mobilization of the

population to support the government; and elaboration of principles of a loyal attitude to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The main lines of **content** of informational and propaganda materials are truthful information about our country and its army; explanation of the reasons and nature of wars, the dangerous military preparations of the West (the expansion of NATO to the East); demonstration of the contradictions inside the coalition of a potential enemy; popularization of military cooperation (allied relations) of foreign countries with the Russian Federation.

In conditions of peace, all basic forms of information and psychological influence are employed: print, oral, direct (unmediated) communication, emotional and psychological influence with the aid of electronics, including radio, video, and television; emotional and psychological influence through Internet channels; graphic depiction; providing the population with humanitarian aid; and providing medical services and other methods.

The chief forms of **emotional and psychological influence** in print are newspapers, journalist, brochures, books, and letters, including facsimiles. Leaflets are printed and distributed in zones of local conflicts.

Army and non-army domestic and foreign print publications are widely used in the interests of PSYOP, as a rule on the basis of cooperation with editorial offices interested

in the relevant materials, relying on freelance service assets.

Publications in the foreign press may be made in cooperation with the Chief Directorate of International Military Cooperation, the Directorate of External Relations of the Ministry of Defense, the staffs of military attaches, advisors, representative offices, and embassies of the Russian Federation abroad.

Informational and psychological influence are practiced by handing out Russian productions – albums, books, brochures, and booklets which are for sale openly or are published by the Voeninform agency of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

The most rapid form of printed production is faxed messages. They ensure only a limited capture of the reading audience, however and are used in special cases.

Within the framework of **oral propaganda**, lectures and reports are given; conferences, seminars and talks with foreign military personnel and the population are held. A large part of this work is done through military-humanitarian contacts. Lectures and presentations are given to audiences of military personnel and the publics of foreign countries. A large amount of work on oral propaganda is done through military attaché generals and officers in Russian Federation embassies abroad, and also during visits of warships of the Russian Navy to foreign ports.

Individual conversations are an important form, enabling in a confidential setting to have influence on people from the foreign assets of the service. A significant role is played in this setting by the knowledge of officers of the service of foreign languages and the psychological features of the population.

Increasingly relevant is the form of giving (or demonstrating play) to foreign representatives of audio production – compact discs, recorded tapes, records, and so on with recordings of classical works of Russian music.

Oral broadcasting with the use of broadcasting stations is used as a rule only in areas of local conflicts.

Radio, video, and television propaganda. Broad use of radio facilities is conditioned on the possibilities for radio to cover mass audiences of radio listeners; to rapidly convey information to the targets; and to have feedback from them. Radio propaganda for military personnel and the population of foreign countries is conducted mainly with the use of stationary state radio broadcasting stations in close cooperation with state organizations and radio editorial offices.

The system of foreign broadcasting, in particular Radio Golos Rossii [(Voice of Russia)] plays a special role in this system. It broadcasts in four dozen foreign languages and is listened to in practically all the countries of the world. The psywar service plays the role of organizer and direct executor of a number of broadcasts to the foreign audi-

ence of Radio Golos Rossii.

The ability to have direct communication with an audience on the radio is of significant value. For this form of work, radio advertising is run in the preparatory period; listeners are informed in advance of the frequency, time, and topic of broadcasts, and the telephone and fax numbers in the studio. Through various channels, for example, with the aid of military delegations, groups, military ships visiting foreign states, and also foreign delegations in our country, printed advertising materials from Radio Golos Rossii is distributed with the necessary information.

For example, for a German language audience, it exceeds 300,000 people, according to the estimates of radio specialists.

The question of organization and airing of radio broadcasts with the use of foreign radio station is an exceptionally important issue. Such a form of activity is not yet systematic in nature. Certain opportunities are available in this regard through the staffs of military attachés at embassies of the Russian Federation in foreign countries, at military and other representative offices, missions, delegations and on ship voyages.

The psywar service plays the role of organizer and producer in preparation of video production and running television broadcasts for a foreign audience. The capabilities of the central and regional television of Russia and foreign countries are used for television propaganda.

As with oral propaganda, radio and television propaganda must strictly adhere to the requirements of the relevant policy documents and rules. The appearance of military personnel on the radio, as on other media, is allowed only with permission from immediate superiors who have this right, and after careful preparation.

Emotional and psychological influence has wide application **with visual productions**.

Its chief forms are posters, banners, signs, photo materials (photo collections – newspapers, collages, exhibits, individual photographs), postcards, calendars, special symbols on ordinary and faxed letters, business cards and so on. This form was particularly widely used by Russian (Soviet) groups

of troops during work with the military personnel of armies and the population of countries where they were temporarily stationed. At the present time, visual productions are used in psychological operations (measures) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, RT;⁴ during the calls of Russian Naval ships at foreign ports; during foreign trips of military delegations; at international conferences and seminars and the activities of military attachés.

A specific form of psywar is propaganda with the aid of souvenir products. Souvenirs may contain a symbol of Russia, its culture, military history, and so on. In them, as a rule, elements of audio, video, and print are combined, and also of visual productions propaganda. This refers to pennants, booklets, albums, brochures, books, buttons, audio and video cassettes, t-shirts, and other items.

5. PSYOP during a prewar (threat) period

The onset of direct military actions, as practice and theoretical research have shown, is preceded by a threat period, the timely recognition and tracking of which largely determines the future dynamics of events and the justification for decisions made by the command, including in the area of organization and conduct of psywar (psychological operations).

The **features** of this period are a sharp worsening of the military-political, informational and socio-political setting in the world and the region (regions); activation of information confrontation of the sides, to justify the active participation of each of them in resolving the conflict in their own (or a certain coalition's) favor, and so on. Its most characteristic features include:

4 "RT" does not appear to be a reference to the television company RT, but perhaps references the Republic of Turkey—**The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation**.

1. in the internal political area – a sharp escalation of the general international situation; an increase in diplomatic activity; intensive talks with allies and likely allies; an increase in tension in relations with states of opposing groupings right up to a break in diplomatic relations; incitement of ethnic, religious and other border conflicts;
2. in domestic politics – introduction in the “crisis” areas of a state of emergency; tightening of the administrative and police regimen; increase in the activity of reactionary organizations and movements; persecution and ban on the activity of opposition parties and organizations; incitement of nationalist and chauvinist sentiments; abolition or suspension of traditions and freedoms; harshening of censorship;
3. in the economy – the maximum increase of production of arms and military vehicles; clandestine transfer of industry to manufacture of military products; change in the work regimen of rail, water and automobile transportation; sharp increase in the volume of military shipments; activation of activity in improving the facilities of the military infrastructure;
4. in the military field – secretly conducted military activities, an increase in intelligence in all spheres, especially in border regions; bringing forces and

means to the highest degree of combat readiness; conducting mobilization, reinforcement and deployment of strike groupings of troops; enhancement of management systems and communications.

5. in the area of information confrontation and psywar – activation of the forces and means involved; abrupt changes in its content, deployment and use of forces and means of psychological operations (psychological warfare).

The duration of the threat period to a significant extent depends on the nature of the military and political situation; the readiness to take part in the proposed conflict by leading government circles; various categories of the population and military personnel; the state of the economy, armed forces, and also other factors.

Based on what has been indicated, **the purpose of psychological warfare** in the prewar (threat) period consists of facilitation through informational and psychological influence of the reduction of military-political and socio-psychological tension; and reduction of the threats that it will grow into an open crisis (conflict) situation, which in turn may grow into an armed conflict.

Psychological warfare during this period is conducted, as a rule, within the framework of information confrontation on a national state level.

The **tasks** of psywar in the prewar (threat)

period and its content are determined by the developing situation on the strategic (operational) line of the military-political, informational, and socio-psychological situation; changes in the sentiments of border regions; the emotional and psychological influence of targets (groups of targets). Psywar in the prewar (threat) period includes:

- securing the replenishment (mobilization) of PSYOP units, conducting combat coordination, and ensuring their combat capability;
- refinement of plans for psychological warfare and combat use of units (divisions, facilities) of psychological operations in various versions of development of the military-political and strategic (operational) situation;
- determination (clarification) of the lines (targets, groups of targets) on which it is feasible to concentrate the main efforts of psychological warfare;
- information and psychological support of border operations; selection, preparation, and involvement in psychological warfare of representatives of the political and other opposition to the leadership of the country (coalitions) of the potential (likely) enemy;
- determination of the content, forms, and methods of psychological influence on targets (groups of targets) of

psychological warfare.

In the threat period, psywar is organized on the first stage by governing bodies for units of PSYOP both central as well as the district (fleet) set, by the available forces and means in cooperation with the forces and means of other ministries (agencies) with the use of the capabilities of the media.

The enhancement of psywar efforts is made according to the extent of replenishment and mobilization of PSYOP units (including advanced ones) and their transfer (including in part) to wartime strengths.

In the prewar (threat) period, the command and staffs of military districts (fleets), on the basis of directives from the General Staff of the Main Directorate of the General Staff,⁵ ensure the mobilization and resupply of the psywar governing bodies and the centrally subordinate PSYOP units (facilities, divisions), and also on threatened strategic lines.

Before the onset of hostilities (lifting of the state border regimen), according to the General Staff's decision, after refinement of previously taken decisions, the psywar forces and means conduct PSYOP envisioned by the psywar plans, independently or with the participation and under the leadership of central governing bodies. Furthermore, unplanned PSYOP may be conducted as well.

In conducting PSYOP (psywar measures) in a prewar (threat) period, special at-

5 The original text has the acronym: "GSh GU GSh" — *The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation*.

tention is paid to the legending of the activity of the psywar forces and means. As a rule, influence on psychological warfare targets (groups of targets) is organized with the use of federal television, and also under cover of commercial (nongovernment) broadcasting and on its frequencies.

The chief lines of content of informational and psychological influence materials are refined and rounded out depending on the developing situation.

“Will This Be on the Test?”

Exam Questions for Cadets Studying Psychological Warfare at the Russian Military Institute

These are a set of actual exam questions posed to the cadets at the Russian Military Institute who attended the foregoing lecture on the GRU’s organization of psychological operations.

1. Who approves the Psywar Plan?

Commanding officer (chief of staff).

2. Which official is responsible for the organization of psywar?

Chief of intelligence/deputy chief of staff.

3. Cite the chief forms of psywar plans.

Ongoing and prospective.

4. With which interested ministries (agencies) is cooperation organized on questions of organization of psywar?

- Interior Ministry (MVD) – camps for prisoners of war, displaced persons;
- Federal Security Service (FSB) – return and release, border troops;
- Ministry of Print, All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) (Foreign Broadcasting), Ministry of Communications;
- Directorate (Department) of Military Counterintelligence.

5. Which management body is responsible for the overall planning of the psywar of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation?

Main Directorate for Intelligence of the General Staff (72nd Special Service Center).

6. What is a threat period?

Abrupt escalation of the situation.

7. Which bodies make assignments for combat orders for psywar, and to whom?

Management bodies (headquarters) of PSYOP military units.

8. What is the core of psywar management?

Focused activity of headquarters (management bodies) in supporting combat readiness, planning and organization of the combat use, and daily activity of the Armed Forces.

9. What is the “graphic part of the psywar plan”?

The map.

10. Name the basic attachments to the psywar plan.

Conclusions from assessment of the situation, deployment of forces and means, theses and arguments for psywar, enemy’s opposing grouping, main lines of information and

psychological influence, [?] information and psychological warfare.

11. Who signs the Psywar Plan?

Chief of intelligence

12. Which management body is responsible for direct planning of psywar by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation?

Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (72nd Special Service Center).

13. With what directorates (departments) does headquarters organize cooperation on issues of organization of psywar?

- operations directorate (department);
- directorate (department) of head of communications troops;
- air force headquarters (long-range aviation, military transport aviation);
- directorate (department) of aviation of the front (army); headquarters of the rocket forces and artillery;
- directorate (department) of instruction; department (service) of radio-electronic warfare; headquarters of types of troops (forces); special troops; headquarters of the rear and armament; with the headquarters of adjacent (interactive) formations (groups).

14. What levels are there for management of psywar?

- strategic (Armed Forces, types of Armed Forces);

- operational (joint strategic command, joint command – district – army);
- tactical (group).

15. Which bodies make assignments under orders for psywar and to whom?

Management bodies (headquarters) to subordinate headquarters.

16. What source data is required for planning psywar?

- directive (instruction) from superior headquarters
- decision (order) of a commander (commanding officer)
- conclusions from assessment of the situation

17. From what necessary components is the psywar plan combined?

Map with explanatory note, attachments to the plan.

18. What data are indicated in an explanatory note to a psywar plan?

Purpose, tasks, targets, intent (whose order, by which forces), composition of the group of forces and means, basic questions of organization of cooperation and support, procedure for communications (report).

19. Which requirements are made of management?

Persistence, continuity, responsiveness, discretion.

20. What is the length of a threat period?

There are no clear limits, up to several months.

Know Thine Enemy: How the GRU Picks and Attacks Its Targets for Psychological Warfare (And Why The War Never Ends)

Targets of informational and psychological influence and PSYOP

The notes compiled for another lecture delivered within the last decade to cadets of the Russian Military Institute, this one on the proper assessment and readings of targets of psychological operations, including a primer on how to properly persuade prisoners of war into giving up details of their own country's military strategy, morale and general outlook. A key disclosure from this lecture is the fact that GRU-run psychological operations against enemy states (the United States, Europe, NATO countries, etc.) persist during both wartime and peacetime. Moreover, in peacetime, psychological warfare allows for the GRU to second all Russian institutions, be they governmental, journalistic or religious and based both within Russia and abroad. See the introductory essay by Soldatov and Weiss for contemporary examples of GRU Unit 54777 running various cut-out organizations, including those aimed at cultivating the Russian diaspora, which were nominally founded by different Russian government bodies such as Foreign Ministry and its cultural outreach agency, Rossotrudnichstvo.

1. Characteristic forms and methods of studying the enemy in the interests of PSYOP. the Law of the Russian Federation (RF) "On Foreign Intelligence" and the Statute on the Chief Directorate of the General Staff.

2. Initial interrogation of prisoners of war (deserters).

Today, psychological warfare serves as one of the most important tools of ensuring national interests in peacetime and is a factor for achieving victory in armed conflict. Its conduct is regulated not only by the guidance documents of the Armed Forces, but

Psychological warfare is conducted constantly, in peacetime and wartime, by the intelligence agencies of the Armed Forces. The chief feature of psywar in peacetime is that it is organized and conducted both from the territory of Russia as well as the territories of the target countries, but the main targets of informational and psychological influence

are defined as the military and political leadership, the staff of the armed forces, and the population of foreign states.

During this period, psywar may be conducted at the strategic and operational level in cooperation with the forces and means of other RF executive-branch federal agencies, state, civic, and religious organizations.

In accordance with the *Manual for Security Military Operations of the RF Armed Forces (Psywar)*, **psywar is a set of special operations (PSYOP, actions, and psywar measures) for informational and psychological influence on the military and political leadership, Armed Forces personnel, and the population of foreign states (of the enemy) for the purposes of**

performing the tasks assigned to the RF Armed Forces.

The effectiveness of the organization and conduct of psywar among the military personnel and population of foreign countries in peacetime, the threat period, and at the onset of hostilities directly depends on the level and amount of accumulated knowledge about the target of the impending informational and psychological influence. The foundation of this knowledge is made up of information on a wide range of sociopolitical, economic, military, socio-psychological and other relationships in foreign countries and their armies. In this connection, informational and analytical work in studying psychological warfare targets are among the chief directions of psywar service activity.

METHODOLOGY OF STUDYING PSYWAR TARGETS

The methodology of studying psywar targets is a complicated process of using various methods for the purposes of collection, processing and accumulation of the necessary information about a country, the armed forces, and population of foreign countries; their socio-political and economic development; emotional and psychological state; national and psychological features; as well as their culture, everyday life, temperament, customs and specific behavior under various circumstances. To a significant degree, this

process is determined by the level of effectiveness and quality of the entire activity of organization and conduct of psychological warfare. The specific features of the study of psychological influence targets are determined by the guidance documents on psychological warfare, and the instructions and directives for combat and mobilization training of troops.

The study of targets of psychological influence must be carried out on the basis of a number of important **principles**.

The principle of comprehensiveness determines that when studying the targets of psychological influence, officers and management bodies for psychological warfare must always strive to define the amount of information required to draw conclusions. With that purpose, it is important to know which features and characteristics of the psywar targets must be studied in order to receive the necessary information. Moreover, it is always important to establish which methods and techniques should be used to complete the assigned task.

The principle of an activity-based approach is oriented toward obtaining the most important information about the psywar targets, drawn mainly from specific activity that is significant for them (in their everyday life, profession, studies, and so on). Only by analyzing people's activity can grounded conclusions be made about the internal essence of the target for study, in order to provide an exhaustive characterization of him and to understand the specifics of his behavior and acts.

The principle of the socio-confessional approach requires a study of the psywar targets on the basis of analysis of social, economic, legal, cultural, religious, ethnic and other relationships which they must make in the process of their daily life, in communication and interaction with other people. These relationships have an imprint on all the most important features and characterizations of the targets for psychological warfare.

The principle of goal orientation implies a clear and definite goal, for whose sake the study of the psywar targets is in fact organized. If it is absent, then the study may not achieve concrete and persuasive results. As a rule, this goal must be the identification of the internal essence of the psywar target: his worldview, needs, motives for activity, and the specifics of his behavior and acts. Based on the purpose for the study, a plan is made and a program of study of targets of psychological warfare, which enables, first of all, to study precisely those aspects and features of the psychological warfare target's activity and acts, which is determined by the set goal. Secondly, a plan and program for study of psychological war targets provides the opportunity to achieve the set goal step-by-step, comprehensively.

The principle of objectivity assumes that study of psychological warfare targets must rely on objectively expressed and comprehensively verified facts that must be compared with each other. Prejudice cannot be allowed in interpretation, explanation, and evaluation of these indicators. Haste in determination of the chief features of the psywar targets is unacceptable and dangerous.

Content of the study of psychological warfare targets. During the course of study of psywar targets, first of all, the following are identified and assessed:

- the nature, direction and specifics of the course of socio-political and economic

processes in the foreign countries: the presence of signs of militarization of economic production and the entire society; increase in the capacities of the military economy; state policy in the area of human rights and democratic freedoms (prohibitions on strikes, protest actions, rallies, the activity of progressive parties and civic organizations); economic, political and other ties with various states and our country; the presence of allies; the content and specifics of the moods of various segments of the population, and so on.

- the attitude of various social segments of the population to government policy;
- the degree of influence of political tendencies and parties on people's lives and activity;
- statements and actions of leaders of political parties and organizations; a comparative analysis of the evolution of their political views, ambitions, and so on;
- nature and degree of influence of militarist, revanchist, and reactionary forces on the formation of public opinion in the country and in the armed forces;
- level of material, socio-legal, household, and medical support for the population and the armed forces;
- content and tone of mass media materials;

- new forms and methods of informational and psychological influence of media on public opinion aimed at the militarization of public consciousness; the incitement of nationalism, enmity toward other countries and peoples, exploitation of the "image of the enemy," praise of one's own superiority, and so on;
- attitude of various segments of the population and various categories of military personnel to the possible start of aggressive warfare;
- degree of informedness of the public and military personnel on activities of a political and military nature conducted in the country and the attitude toward them;
- nature of population's attitude toward our country and its allies.

Secondly, the main attention while studying psychological warfare targets should be devoted to:

- military doctrine, construction, the system of formation of the armed forces of foreign countries;
- new phenomena and processes in the political, emotional and psychological and combat training of troops in the nature of preparation for war; the intensity of operational and combat training of troops; widescale exercises, the transfer of troops; facts of provocative violations of the state border; incitement of hatred toward our country and its

Armed Forces, and so on;

- system of professional training and preparation of military cadres;
- level of professional and technical training; combat and emotional and psychological training; system of political education and ideological and psychological cultivation; degree of political, emotional and psychological readiness of the enemy's troops to conducting hostilities (technical equipment, material provision, level of fighting motivation, and so on);
- morale and psychological characterization of the types of armed forces;
- the emotional and psychological state of the personnel and population (by categories); level of their political reliability, state of military discipline; the presence of conflicts between various categories of personnel, various ethnic and religious groups in its composition;
- political, combat morale and professional qualities (their strong and weak sides);
- degrees of informedness of the population and military personnel about the military and political measures taken by their political and military leadership (mobilized under the guise of exercises, the transfer of troops, and so on) and their attitudes toward them;
- facts of anti-war, pacifist demonstrations; manifestations of civil disobedience to the government's political line (among the population and military personnel); their scales and degrees of influence on civic and political life;
- manifestation of activity by psychological warfare agencies and the nature of their activity;
- level of political, emotional, and psychological preparedness of the troops and population to war against our country and its allies;
- progress of hostilities, evaluations of results from our strikes against the enemy, his losses, and degrees of influence of the combat successes of our forces on the emotional and psychological state of the personnel of the opposing groupings;
- attitude of the enemy to prisoners of war, the population of occupied regions (facts of mockery, insubordination, looting, and so on);
- attitude toward those wounded on the battlefield, to their fellow servicemen in combat conditions (mutual aid, and so on).

The content of the study of psychological warfare targets depends on an entire range of circumstances: on when it is conducted (in peacetime or wartime; during hostilities or pre-combat conditions); on the methods of direct study and many other factors.

Methods of study of targets of psychological warfare

Observation – the most widespread method used to monitor, in a targeted, organized, and focused way, the actions and behaviors of psywar targets under various conditions without interfering in their flow.

A chief source of information about the enemy is observation of enemy personnel actions in a battle setting or under other conditions where the features of his behavior and activity can be manifested as well as his emotional and psychological state. Observation consists of direct registration of events, and targeted tailing and recording of the actions and behavior of certain military personnel (the public) of foreign countries and their groups in various specific situations and circumstances.

The targets of observations may be the enemy's personnel on the battlefield; prisoners of war; and the population of areas occupied (liberated) by our troops. The method of observation is supplemented by a survey of the terrain left by the enemy.

Since observation can only register certain acts of behavior and the activities of people and groups, in each specific case, officers and psychological warfare management bodies must know and take into account which features of behavior and activity

conceal the true meaning of the studied characteristics, phenomena, and so on.

Thus, in studying the features of activity and behavior of certain military personnel (their personalities) the following are manifested and are identified and taken into account:

I. General data: time and place of birth, nationality, education, specialty (civil and military), position, attitude toward the leadership of the country, political parties, their duties and fellow servicemen, place of residence, marital status.

II. Outward signs:

- face (general impression, brief verbal portrait, features of facial structure);
- height (tall, medium, short, anomalies in height);
- weight and physique type (obese, husky, slim, thin, very thin), and also the classification of a soldier by one of the somato-physiological types (pyknic, athletic, asthenic);¹
- clothing (neat, sloppy, follows fashion or does not);
- manners (makes a pleasant or unpleasant

¹ Based on the theory of German psychiatrist Ernst Kretschmer, who had a classification system of four main body types: 1) asthenic (thin, small, weak); 2) athletic (muscular, large-boned); 3) pyknic (stocky, fat); 4) dysplastic (disproportionate)—**The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation**.

impression; expressiveness or lack of expression and gestures; dexterity or stiffness in motions);

- gait (smooth, bouncing, clumsy, tense, relaxed, heavy, light);
- voice (pleasant or unpleasant, resonant, muffled, strong, nasal, smooth, shaky).

III. Life Path:

- parents (including place of residence, birthplace, education, profession, their relationships, attitude toward children, pastimes, livelihood);
- description of birthplace;
- early childhood (life in the family and outside of it); school (favorite subjects);
- other educational institutions (reasons for admission, successes, knowledge); work record and service in the army;
- marriage, children.

IV. Life Areas

- family (relationship with spouses, children, parents, dependency on wife (husband));
- professional and specialty (motives, job changes, satisfaction, promotion, social status);
- civic, political, and professional activity;
- spending of free time (sports, liquor, gambling, movies, theater, music);

- material conditions in life (housing, furnishing, budget, material values, satisfaction with one's material and professional position);
- health (general state, attitude toward one's health, presence of serious illnesses).

V. Behavior

- dominant emotional tone (prevailing mood, enthusiasm, reaction to difficulties);
- features of display of emotions and feelings (characteristics of arousal, suppression, and irritation; experiencing failures; attachments, and so on);
- display of will;
- behavior under difficult situations;
- behavior in a state of intoxication;
- moral behavior (observation of moral norms, attitude toward women, honesty and truthfulness, courage).

VI. Temperament and character:

- temperament (sociability, emotionality);
- character (features of character expressing attitudes; dominant character traits (cardinal, primary, secondary)).

VII. Motivation for behavior:

- dominant needs (biological, for self-

preservation, for affiliation to a social group, for respect, for self-expression);

- values and principles (personal, social, material, political, professional)
- interests and ideals.

VIII. Social adaptation:

- social milieu (degree of connection with relatives, mutual relations with acquaintances and friends, degree of recognition from others);
- perception of a social situation (premised on a real or imagined situation; the logic or absence of same in activity; rapid or slow adaptation);
- self-evaluation (of one's own social role, attitude toward the opinion of others and their potentials; level of claims, confidence, or lack of confidence in oneself; sense of one's own worth; inferiority complex).

IX. Abilities:

- General (level of facility with numbers; rapidity and smoothness of speech; richness of imagination; ease of memorization; way of solving problematic issues;
- special (linguistic, organizational, pedagogical, and so on); ability to

make an acquaintance, to grow close. Influence on people, winning them over; ability to read people).

X. Moral-political and military-professional qualities:

- loyalty to one's political and military leadership, and so on; military discipline;
- strong and weak sides of emotional and psychological state;

In studying groups of psywar targets, officers and psychological warfare management bodies must study and take into account the following:

1. National and psychological features;
2. Individual and personal affiliation;
3. Group affiliation;
4. Features of emotional and psychological preparation and emotional and psychological state.
5. Large, medium, small, and micro groups.
6. Formal (official) and informal (unofficial);
7. Real (contact) groups and arbitrary (experimental); primary and secondary;
8. Groups that are: a) weakly developed – associations, corporations, diffuse; b) highly developed – collectives;
9. Referential (model) groups² and

2 A sociological term indicating groups to which others are compared or which serve as a model—**The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation/Free Russia Foundation.**

nonreferential (membership groups).

Observation can be ordinary or scientific; participant or nonparticipant; systematic or nonsystematic.

Ordinary observation is restricted to the registration of facts and is random and unorganized in nature. **Scientific** observation is organized, assumes a clear plan, and involves a recording of results in a special diary. **Participant** observation assumes the participation of the researcher in the activity he is studying; **nonparticipant** does not assume this.

Systematic observation is constant, while **nonsystematic** observation is episodic.

Observation is always planned and carried out in a certain sequence:

First, the purposes of the observation are defined, and its target and object are established:

- the basic tasks are formulated; the form or means of observation is specified;
- a certain observation place is prepared, and its time is determined;
- a procedure for recording observation is established;
- the information received is collected, processed, and analyzed.

After the observation plan is made, the significant situations are selected, which allow for completing the goals and observation tasks to the fullest extent.

Experimentation is a specific method of studying psywar targets, assuming that officers and psychological warfare management bodies will actively interfere in the activity of the subject studied for the purpose of creating the best conditions for comprehending his specific psychological and other characteristics.

If the observation method is used, and you wait until the psywar target (targets) manifests various psychological and other features, it is not known how much time will be needed for this. In order to avoid this, and quickly reach the goal, officers and psychological warfare management bodies must place the subject in relevant conditions, and then observe how the necessary characteristics of the psywar targets are manifested. The general logic of the experiment consists of placing the object of psychological study into an unusual situation.

The experiment may be like in a **laboratory**, when it takes place in specially organized conditions, yet the psywar targets' actions are determined by his professional and other similar characteristics. The disadvantage of the laboratory experiment is that the officers and psychological warfare management bodies are limited in the possibilities for implementing it, and the psywar targets, as a rule, are aware of their study. For that reason, the laboratory experiment must be combined with other methods of studying psywar targets.

The experiment may be **natural**, when the study of the psychological warfare targets is carried out in natural conditions and the subjects do not suspect that they are the focus of intense attention. In this case, officers and psychological warfare management bodies select and use the conditions which will ensure that the psywar targets' aspects and characteristics of interest to them are most clearly manifested.

An important method of study for psywar targets is the survey, involving **answers** by the targets of psychological study to specific questions by officers and psychological warfare management bodies.

Such a survey can be **written** (by **filling in a form**), when questions are asked in writing; or **verbal**, when they are posed **orally**; or be in the form of an **interview** or **conversation**, in which personal contact is made with the psychological warfare targets.

The **interrogation** of prisoners of war (defectors) is a special and extremely significant form of survey.

The interrogation's content and structure will depend on the specific combat situation; the tasks performed by our troops; the developing situation during its progression; and also, the individual and socio-psychological features of the prisoner of war (defector). They are determined by the goals and tasks of psychological warfare.

The chief methods of interrogation of prisoners of war and defectors for the pur-

poses of psywar under combat conditions are individual, group, form, and written interrogation.

The **individual** interrogation is the most effective means of obtaining military-political and socio-psychological information about the enemy. It enables the establishment of direct contact with the prisoner of war and the obtaining from him of answers to questions of interest. Furthermore, this method of conducting an interrogation contains elements of subjectivism and can lead to a known bias in evaluation of a given phenomenon or event; that is, when conducting such an interrogation, particularly careful checking of testimonies is required.

The **group** interrogation is conducted, as a rule, when there is insufficient time for organization and conduct of individual interrogations. For a group interrogation, the prisoners of war of one division (unit) are brought in, and they are given several specific questions. A group interrogation enables the coverage of a significant number of prisoners of war within a brief period; it is hard, however and sometimes impossible to obtain answers to more sensitive questions during it, since the prisoners of war in such a situation will not always dare to openly express their opinion.

A **questionnaire** interrogation can be with a name or anonymous. Questionnaires with names have a number of special requirements. The questions on the form must be formulated clearly and specifically to be

understood. Moreover, the possibility of an alternative answer must be excluded.

On the *anonymous* questionnaires, the prisoner of war does not indicate his last name, first name, and military rank. Participants in an anonymous survey usually give more objective information. Questions for the anonymous form must be formulated particularly distinctly and clearly.

A **written** interrogation is used in the event that the testimony of the prisoner of war is particularly important. It is effective in two cases: first, when the testimonies are given by prisoners of war who possess the necessary knowledge and perspective (generals, the officers' corps, war correspondents, and so on) and second, when they are given by persons expressing the readiness to voluntarily and sincerely report information of interest.

An important method of studying psywar targets is the **study of documents** (including archival). In *peacetime*, such documents are: officials documents of our country; government and state materials of foreign countries; open and classified sources of information, both domestic and foreign; analytical materials of specialized scientific and research organizations and institutions; documents of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces; intelligence management bodies of the staffs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and friendly countries; archival sources; domestic and foreign press; literature of targeted countries;

broadcasts of foreign radio and television, and so on.

Additional forms of obtaining information of a military-political and socio-psychological nature are applied in a *combat setting*: battle documents, intelligence reports and communications, seized documents, radio intercepts, and so on. In the psychological warfare service of intelligence management bodies, first are studied documents characterizing the political, emotional and psychological state of prisoners of war and the enemy's population, and also data needed to prepare informational and reference materials and materials for informational and psychological influence.

An important source for obtaining military, political and socio-psychological information during wartime **is radio intercepts and video recordings of television images**. These are made by radio technology units and divisions. The radio intercept is distinctive for its significance and possibilities. The following types are distinguished:

- monitoring the radio exchange of military radio stations of the enemy's units and divisions;
- interception of radio exchange of military radio stations of the enemy's units and divisions;
- listening to the programs of the broadcasting radio stations of the enemy and neutral countries;
- listening to the radio stations of the

enemy's psychological warfare agencies, which conduct subversive propaganda against our troops and population.

The monitoring of civilian and military broadcasting radio stations and also the radio stations of the psychological warfare service of the enemy's units and divisions is done by our own forces, using regular radio equipment. In units and divisions of psychological operations, duty officers are appointed who select the most important reports obtained in the course of listening to radio broadcasts, then analyze them and report about them to the command. In the interests of a clear organization of radio intercepts, a schedule of the enemy's radio stations must be made.

Organization of radio interception of the enemy's military networks requires intensive language training of an officer of the psychological warfare service; close cooperation with units; communications with radio-electronic warfare; a clear knowledge of the tactical and technical characteristics of the enemy's radio stations; knowledge of the organization of these radio networks and the regulations for audio exchange; conversational slang; and also the skills to work on radio equipment and the technology of sound recording.

In peacetime, the watching of foreign television broadcasts is organized for the purposes of obtaining information about psywar targets. Televised information is used

for preparation of news reports, bulletins, surveys, and so on. The most important television radio broadcasts are recorded on video equipment.

An extremely productive form of studying psywar targets in peacetime is the participation of officers of the psychological warfare service in peacekeeping operations; in visits of their country's military delegations abroad and receiving of foreign military delegations. Conducting informational and propaganda work among a foreign audience during such trips and visits also enables them to refine and correct many evaluative and predictive conclusions about a foreign country, its army, and so on.

The psychological warfare service may fairly effectively use the **method of generalizing from independent characteristics**, which involves identification and analysis of information and opinions about various psywar targets, obtained from independent sources and different people.


This method is in addition to all the previously cited methods and enables officers first to compare and contrast the same (or different) information about the same psywar targets, and then with the aid of mathematical and statistical analysis (using content analysis, transactional analysis, and so on), to formulate the most significant and reliable conclusions about their features and main characteristics.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY OF PSYWAR TARGETS

Organization of the work of collecting and analyzing reports on psywar targets is one of the chief functions of the psychological warfare service. The tasks for organizing the study of psywar targets are determined by the command, based on the specific situation, the features of the activity of psychological warfare troop formations (groups) and divisions (units). All the tasks are specified as to time, the targets of influence; the time periods for conducting psychological operations;

the interim stages of informational work, according to specific divisions and executors conducting the informational work; by forms of reporting and documentation; by means of collecting information; by the consumers of the information; and by the characteristics of the target of study.

The chief demands made of an organization studying psywar targets are: accuracy, focus, continuity, responsiveness, and timeliness.



Accuracy in studying psywar targets consists of a precise reflection of the developing military, social and political situation, and the level of the emotional and psychological state of their armed forces personnel in the targeted countries which corresponds to objective reality. It is achieved by a careful

and comprehensive study of all information coming in, taking account of the time of its entry in close connection with already available data.

Focus in studying psywar targets is achieved by initial collection, analysis and reporting (informing) of relevant information

and preparation of the appropriate informational and analytical documents for the command and staff to make decisions, with consideration of the conditions of the military and socio-political situation.

Continuity in study of psywar targets consists of constantly conducting it in peacetime, during the threat period while in preparation, and during the course of operations (hostilities). It is achieved by constantly tracking, studying and analyzing military, social and political processes in the psywar target countries and their armed forces; and maintaining a stable and consistent communication with superior, subordinate and interactive organizations in the interests of collecting and analyzing information.

Responsiveness in studying psywar targets consists of a constant effort by psywar management bodies, PSYOP units and divisions to collect (obtain) the necessary information; to its timely analysis and reporting to the command and communication to subordinate and interactive organizations in any situation.

Timeliness in studying psywar targets consists of collecting (obtaining) the necessary information by the deadline; analyzing it and immediately reporting it to the command; and timely processing and presentation (reporting) to superior, subordinate, and cooperating organizations of the informational documents. It is achieved by effective organization of the study of the psywar

targets; a wide use of automated equipment and systems for collection, processing, and transmission of information.

All work in studying psywar targets must be conducted prospectively and dynamically, and not limited to the data of the minute regarding various phenomena in processes. For these purposes, those socio-political trends which may provoke changes in the situation and in the emotional and psychological state of the psywar targets must be analyzed, evaluated, and forecast. Moreover, the conclusions from the evaluation of the psychological situation must be taken account rapidly in the organization of psychological warfare and troop fighting.

The study of psywar targets must be viewed as a regular and continuous process of tracking the development of social phenomena and political events in foreign countries and in their armed forces, which has as its goal, on the one hand, to identify negative trends in the development of the military and political situation on the strategic (operational) line and in a specific region; and on the other hand, to help determine the degree of emotional and psychological vulnerability of the foreign army and population, and enable the development of specific lines of content, theses and arguments for effective conduct of psychological operations (psywar activities). The evaluations and conclusions obtained as a result of this analysis become the basis for preparation of informational and psychological influence (IPV) materials for foreign au-

diences.

In order to realize these goals during the study of psywar targets in the interests of conducting psychological operations, it is necessary to perform a number of tasks whose implementation passes through the following basic stages:

The first stage of this process involves the collection, processing and accumulation of basic information about the country (coalition of countries), armed forces, socio-political life, economics, national and psychological features of the population, culture, everyday life, manners, customs, specifics of their perception of information, and so on.

During **the second stage** the evaluation is made and a prognosis for the military and political situation (psychological situation) and the emotional and psychological state of the personnel of the armed forces and population of the country (countries) on the strategic (operational) line; and an identification of their strong and weak sides in the interests of performing the informational and psychological influence tasks. The evaluations, conclusions and prognoses obtained are also taken into account in the organization of the combat preparation of our forces in peacetime, in a threat period and in planning of operations (hostilities) in wartime.

In the process of **the third stage** of performance of tasks in the study of psywar targets, informational and analytical materials are created as well as reference materials,


and on their basis, there is preparation of the basic lines of content for the theses and arguments of the informational and psychological influence materials, and on the whole, the effectiveness is determined of all the further activity in the organization and conduct of psychological warfare.

The study of psywar targets in the **fourth stage** enables the identification of those main psychological warfare targets which, in the process of evaluative and predictive analysis, are determined to be the most vulnerable or most receptive to our information. This stage also enables the finding of the optimal ways and means for informational and psychological influence on the basis of study of the national and psychological features of the perception of information by the potential target.

The process of study of psywar targets is logically concluded in **the fifth stage**, during which information that is constantly coming in and being processed enables the determination of the reliability of the preceding basic information, and to check the results of the evaluation and prognosis analysis with the real development of events; and to evaluate the degree of effectiveness of the informational and psychological influence.

The possibility emerging in the final stage of the possibility of verifying and determining the effectiveness of the work conducted turns the entire process of organization of the study of psywar targets into a unified cycle, which

has an internal mechanism for self-correction and for increasing the effectiveness of informational and psychological influence.



Thus, study of psywar targets is a complicated process, requiring scientific organization and comprehensive, well-conceived implementation. This process to a significant extent is determined by the level of effectiveness of all the work in the organization and conduct of psychological warfare. It is nec-

essary to note, however, the sequencing of the implementation of the realization of the goals and tasks by stages, and the collateral subordination of these stages are not absolute and may have various options.

The process of studying psywar targets, viewed in its most general traits, takes on

specific features in peacetime, a threat period and during hostilities.

Thus, in **peacetime**, the study of psywar targets includes the collection and storage, processing, and analysis of data on a wide range of socio-political, economic, cultural-historic, socio-psychological, military, and other problems. The chief goal of this study during peacetime is the comprehensive and grounded evaluative and predictive analysis of the development of the military and political situation in the country, on the strategic (operational) line and the degree of emotional and psychological readiness of the population, personnel of the armed forces of the foreign government to possible conduct or support of aggressive actions against our country.

On the whole, on the basis of results of the evaluative and predictive conclusions from the developing military and political situation and analysis of the emotional and psychological state of the population and armed forces of foreign countries, the lines, theses and arguments of materials for informational and psychological influence are determined

The purpose of studying the psywar targets during **the threat period** is to identify direct and indirect signs of an escalation of the military and political situation; new events and process in the emotional and psychological and combat training of a likely enemy's troops, reflecting a potential threat of them launching hostilities; the degree of emotion-

al, psychological and political readiness of the enemy's armed forces and population to war against our country.

Moreover, taking into account the incoming intelligence data, the content, forms, methods and targets of informational and psychological influence are corrected and refined; specific emotional and psychological influence materials are developed; changes are introduced into the organization and conduct of psychological warfare against a likely enemy's troops and population in a threat period; a rapid report (communication) to the command, subordinates and coordinating organizations are made in order to make a grounded decision for the organization and conduct of psywar.

Study of psywar targets in the interests of conducting psychological operations during **combat** has as its chief goal the constant and rapid determination of the leading trends of the development of the military and political situation on the strategic (operational) line and the determination of the degree of their possible influence on the course of hostilities. The goal of the study of the military, socio-political and other intelligence data about the enemy under combat conditions is to evaluate as a whole the military-political and emotional and psychological potential of the countries of the aggressor's coalition and, in particular, to determine the degree of their unity and the possible nature of contradictions for their further exploitation in the interests of psychological warfare. Analysis

of the nature of the changes in the emotional and psychological state of servicemen of the opposing grouping also enables an increase in the effectiveness of our informational and psychological influence.

The results of an evaluative and predictive analysis of various data on the developing combat situation and the enemy's emotional and psychological traits are the basis for the content, theses, and arguments of informational and psychological influence materials; facilitates the refinement of targets of influence, forms and methods of psychological warfare; enables the determination of the effectiveness of the psychological operations (psywar measures) conducted; and the degree of belief in our informational and psychological influence.

Simultaneous tracking of the development of the situation in the area of fighting and at the enemy's rear enables rapid reporting (communication) to the command, subordinates and cooperative organizations about the nature of what is happening and a forecast of changes, and also to develop proposals to the command for making comprehensive, grounded decisions on the organization and conduct of PSYOP during hostilities.

The effectiveness of study of the enemy depends on the skillful use of various sources of information; the application of a set of forms and methods of studying psywar targets to obtain information about the public

and the personnel of the opposing side's troops.

The interrogation of prisoners of war (defectors) and interned persons in the interests of psywar. The most valuable source for obtaining information in a combat setting while studying the enemy for the purposes of PSYOP in wartime is the interrogation. It is conducted with the purpose of:

- identifying or clarifying the emotional and psychological state of the enemy's opposing group;
- obtaining factual materials for preparation of relevant information and reference materials and for informational and psychological influence materials;
- evaluating the effectiveness of the psychological operations (psywar measures) conducted.
- *Content of the interrogation.* The content and structure of the interrogation depends on the specific combat situation; the tasks performed by the troops; the level of the intelligence management body; the developing psychological situation during an interrogation; and also the individual particularities of the prisoner of war (defector). They are determined above all by the goals and tasks of psychological warfare. Furthermore, questions of interest are divided up into groups.

The first group of questions is aimed at identifying the competence of the interrogat-

ed person in a given field of military activity. The purpose of such type of question is to establish the nature of the service of the prisoner of war before his capture and during the interrogation, identify the exact demographic, socio-political and military professional information.

The second group relates to the identification of the line of content, the form and methods of political indoctrination, clarification of the forces and means of its staff, the psychological warfare agencies, the level of professional training of their personnel; their technical equipment; the procedure for interaction with military clergy, attitudes of the interrogated persons to the effectiveness of the work of the political indoctrination staff and psychological warfare agencies.

The third group of questions is related to obtaining information about the emotional and psychological state of the enemy and his population. The particular value of such an interrogation is that it enables the identification of factual information about the strong and weak sides of specific divisions, units, and formations of the enemy.

The fourth group of questions is aimed at identifying the attitude of the enemy's military personnel and population to the content of their national mass media and toward our propaganda, and the degree of trust in our information.

These enumerated groups of questions do not exhaust the entire content of the inter-

rogation. Other questions may also emerge, related to the circumstances of the combat situation.

Organization of the interrogation. The effectiveness of the interrogation to a significant extent depends on its organization, on clear and efficient actions by an officer of the psychological warfare service; his close cooperation with FSB officers; on his ability in a concretely developing situation to give the interrogation the necessary direction; and to choose the most successful ways to conduct it. The organization of an interrogation in various parts of the intelligence management bodies has its own characteristics.

In a division (brigade), the categories of interrogated persons enumerated, as a rule, are detained for a relatively brief time. Therefore, the initial interrogation is conducted in the headquarters' intelligence department. Its purpose is to obtain the necessary information about the emotional and psychological state of the personnel of the enemy's opposing units and divisions. The intelligence department of the army (fleet) organizes and conducts a detailed interrogation, during which the necessary information and news are identified to the maximum possible extent. The main work of the interrogation is conducted at the army reception center for prisoners of war.

The intelligence directorate of the front (fleet) conducts the repeat or control interrogation of the prisoner of war, and also the

detailed or thematic interrogation of the most informed prisoners of war.

The conduct of the interrogation of the prisoner of war must be assigned to a comprehensively trained officer of the psychological warfare service who has mastered the methodology of the interrogation; who knows the relevant foreign language well; who knows the internal political situation in the given country, and the military situation on his part of the front. The officer conducting the interrogation must skillfully analyze the information received and determine its significance and fairness. He is obliged during the course of the interrogation to be polite, restrained, but at the same time strict and principled; to demand from the interrogated person observance of military discipline; to try to maintain his emotional and psychological superiority over the prisoner of war.

Methodology of conducting an interrogation. The structure of an interrogation contains a number of sequential stages: preparatory, the interrogation itself, and the conclusion.

The preparatory stage is largely determined by the quality and the effectiveness of the interrogation. After receiving an assignment to conduct an interrogation, the psy-war service officer must first acquaint himself with the materials of the interrogation of the prisoner of war by the lower intelligence management bodies, and also the personal documents seized from him (letters, diaries,

photographs, etc.). This preliminary familiarization with the basic data about the prisoner of war enables him to approach the interrogation in a thorough and individual way. With the data from the preliminary interrogations, during the forthcoming interrogation, the testimony of the prisoner of war can be compared and checked, and he can be caught, if there is a basis for it, in giving contradictory testimony and insincerity.

In preparation for the interrogation, it is necessary to study the content of the logbook for the characteristics of the unit (formation) of the enemy where the prisoner of war served; and to acquaint oneself with the content of the latest transcripts of interrogations from other prisoners of war from that unit (formation). This is necessary, first of all, in order to obtain additional information and clarify unclear issues in the documentation on the enemy; second, to select information that needs to be made more concrete and rechecked; thirdly, to freely work with the information of the given unit (formation); to learn additional details about the person, circumstances, and events, with the aid of which the testimonies can be monitored and encouraged.

On the eve of the interrogation, it is recommended to look up in the card file information about the district in which the prisoner of war was born or lived in recent years. This information will help to obtain truthful testimony and provide the opportunity to easily detect and intercept attempts to lie or fabricate. It is also necessary to determine the

circumstances of the capture; was the prisoner of war taken in battle or did he surrender voluntarily; the motives for surrender to captivity, and so on. It is also prudent to acquaint oneself with the IPV (informational and psychological influence) which is prepared and disseminated among the personnel of the unit (formation), where the prisoner of war served. Knowledge of the texts of leaflets; programs of radio and oral broadcasts will help to obtain more specific information from the prisoner of war about his attitude toward informational and psychological influence.

After studying the documents cited and having made for himself a definite opinion of the prisoner of war, the officer of the psychological warfare service makes a list of questions which are essential to be identified or clarified during the interrogation.

The choice of premises in which the interrogation will be held is vitally important. It is desirable to select an isolated space. There should be no documents, materials, diagrams, or maps revealing the location and intention of our troops. To clarify the testimonies of the prisoner of war, it is recommended to have a clean captured map of the area of fighting without any notations. It is desirable to place a concealed tape recorder in the room; this will help later to prepare a high-quality and complete transcript of the interrogation. When choosing a space, issues of security should also be planned.

If there is a possibility of selecting pris-

oners of war for interrogation, it is necessary to pay particular attention to the prisoners of war from the senior ranking officers; officers of the political education and psychological warfare staff; and staff from the rocket units, airplane crews, nuclear submarines and large surface ships.

An interrogation assigned by the chief of the intelligence management body is usually conducted by an officer of the psychological warfare service. During the interrogation, he must be guided by a number of rules, methodological techniques ensuring that he maintains the initiative and encourages testimonies from the prisoner of war.

The effectiveness of the interrogation depends as well on the behavior of the interrogating officer, his treatment of the prisoner of war during the interrogation. The prisoner of war must see in him an official representative of the command, a comprehensively trained specialist, who knows the situation on the front and in the enemy's units.

During the interrogation, the rules of behavior acceptable in our Armed Forces must be observed. The interrogated person must greet the officer of the psychological warfare service; answer questions standing, or, if he is permitted to sit, to speak to the interrogating officer using the formal "you." The officer conducting the interrogation must cut short any carelessness or familiarity, and not allow any fraternization, since this leads to a loss of the proper respect on the part of the

prisoner of war to the officer conducting the interrogation.

In conducting the interrogation, the requirements of the Geneva Convention from August 12, 1949, ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on April 17, 1954, must be observed regarding treatment of prisoners. Article 17 of the Convention, in particular, states: "No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind... The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph."³

A nonconflict or conflict situation may arise during the interrogation. In a nonconflict situation, the prisoner of war gladly answers all the questions and gives truthful testimony. In this case, the officer conducting the interrogation does not have to resort to any specific methods. Conducting an interrogation in a nonconflict situation follows a consistent format:

- asking questions to obtain more detail

from the testimony of the interrogated person;

- obtaining explanations for information and data already obtained in order to check and clarify them;
- identification of new circumstances.

If by virtue of various reasons and motives the interrogation is conducted in a conflict situation, either the interrogated person refers to the statute of the Geneva Convention ("Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information"), tries to restrict himself to information about his identity, then a number of psychological and logical methods should be used to enable encouragement of the testimonies and overcome the conflict situation created at the interrogation.

Let us review the chief psychological methods to conduct an interrogation when a conflict situation emerges.

The point of the method of "suddenness" is that during the interrogation, not connected to the previous questions, suddenly a question is asked to which an immediate

3 The following sentence from this Geneva Convention article was left out of this paragraph and is indicated with an ellipsis: "Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service." See <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2D8538058860C1FCC12563CD0051ABBE> – **The Interpreter**.

answer must be given. Since there is no logical connection between the questions asked, most often the prisoner is not in a condition to orient himself rapidly and therefore may give information which he had tried to conceal from the interrogator.

The method of “*sequence*” consists of having the interrogator ask questions in a certain sequence, allowing the prisoner to feel their significance, for the purpose of obtaining truthful testimonies.

With the method of “*using the prisoner’s positive qualities*,” the interrogator asks the kind of questions that reflect the positive sides of the prisoner (his bravery, selflessness, and so on), with the calculation that they are not compatible with lies and concealing facts. This will also help obtain the necessary information.

In using the method of “*allowing the legend*,” the interrogator does not prevent the prisoner from giving all of his testimony, although from other sources he knows that they are false. In giving the prisoner the opportunity to say his piece, the interrogator with successive questions proves the falsity of the statements, demonstrating their contradictory nature and logical incoherence.

The method of “*interception*” consists of having the interrogator, as soon as the pris-

oner begins to give false testimony, to interrupt him with his questions, the point of which is to illustrate to the prisoner the informedness of the interrogator regarding information refuting his testimony (the use of face-to-face confrontations,⁴ cross-examination, persuasive material evidence, the testimonies of other prisoners of war).

The method of “*distracting attention*” is used when it is clear that the prisoner is concentrating his attention on the main thing for him in an interrogation and is internally preparing himself to answer it. The interrogator deliberately distracts the prisoner to secondary details, dulling his vigilance, and then suddenly asks the main question.

The effectiveness of an interrogation to a significant extent depends on its form and methods, and the nature of the questions asked. The greatest effect is brought by a combination of the question-answer form with the conversational. Difficult questions should not be asked, demanding analysis, evaluation, and conclusions of all prisoners of war. Sometimes for the purposes of obtaining fuller, truthful testimonies, the officer may demonstrate his informedness on a topic mentioned in the interrogation with a few seemingly casual lines, that is, to create the situation of so-called forced awareness.

4 A practice of the Soviet and Russian justice systems, whereby prisoners and others such as fellow prisoners, victims, plaintiffs, and witnesses are brought in by officials to confront a prisoner in an effort to gather information or extract confessions—**The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation/Free Russia Foundation**

In the process of an interrogation, of particular importance is establishing the degree of the prisoner of war's sincerity, the reliability of his testimonies, and exposure of those who resort to lies and disinformation. For that purpose, the logical methods are used. Special forms of control and verification may also be used. These include:

- face-to-face confrontations and cross-examination questions, used in a situation when prisoners of war give contradictory testimonies on the same question. Face-to-face encounters are used also to encourage testimonies from stubborn prisoners of war;
- alternating interrogations of prisoners of war related to each other by joint service or activity (the crews of a plane, tank, etc.). In order to organize such an interrogation, it is necessary immediately after capture to keep the prisoners separate up until the completion of the entire cycle of interrogations, so that they cannot manage to agree among themselves to a common line of behavior, to identical answers to the basic questions. By interrogating them consecutively, several times, it can be easily established which questions are getting contradictory statements.

The concluding stage of the interrogation is the compiling of the transcript. The raw (tape recorder) recordings are the basic material for making up the transcript. The

information from the interrogation is entered into the transcript in a systematized form and is grouped by the most important questions. The recordings in the transcript of the interrogations are made in the Russian language, but the names, geographical names, unfamiliar terms, and figures of speech are given in the foreign language. The transcript is in the third person, as a rule. More important testimonies and statements of the prisoner of war, however, may be cited verbatim. All the facts entered into the record must be precisely dated. The prisoner of war's personal documents may be attached to the transcript: letters, diaries, photographs, and the originals of his written testimonies.

Survey of the local population. A valuable source for obtaining information from the enemy, above all about the military and political situation in his rear, may be a survey of the population of liberated (occupied) areas. They are conducted for the purposes of:

- an evaluation of the emotional and psychological state of the population of liberated (occupied) areas;
- a determination about the degree of support of the population for military and political measures conducted by the ruling circles of the enemy's country;
- identification of contradictions and disagreements in the enemy's country;
- study of the propaganda influence system by the ruling circles on the

- population and armed forces personnel;
- clarification of the attitude of the population to our country and its Armed Forces;
 - determination of the degree of effectiveness of psywar and the selection of the necessary factual materials for having effective informational and propaganda influence on the population and troops of the enemy.

Individual or group conversations, questionnaires, and written testimonies are the main forms of survey of the population.

In organizing the work of surveying local residents, it is important to define the type of people who will be surveyed. The most interesting information may be given by representatives of the democratic circles and organizations, persons not subject to repression on the part of reactionary, ruling circles, the members of their families; workers of state and municipal facilities; courts, prosecutor's offices, educational institutions and persons with great authority, and so on.

In conducting the survey of the local population, one must consider the possibility of false or provocative information and statements which require thorough checking.

Trophy documents. Seized documents must be reviewed, sorted, and analyzed.

The *psychological warfare intelligence management bodies* first of all must analyze seized documents characterizing the military,

political and psychological situation; the morale and psychological state of the service personnel and population of the enemy; and also information needed for preparation of factual, analytical and reference materials and informational and psychological influence materials.

The *formation's intelligence division headquarters* organizes a general review of the seized documents and reports about their nature to the superior intelligence management body. On orders from the latter, they are brought to the appointed place. Certain documents related to the emotional and psychological state of the enemy's opposing units, with the permission of the command, may be effectively used by the formation's intelligence division headquarters for the purposes of psychological warfare.

At the *army (fleet) intelligence department headquarters*, the initial sorting, classification, processing and study of the trophy documents is conducted with the goal of maximum use of the information obtained for a report to the command and to wage psychological warfare. If there is a large quantity of seized documents, some of them can be sent to the intelligence directorate headquarters of the front (fleet) without sorting and processing.


At the *intelligence directorate headquarters of the front (fleet)*, the seized documents are systematized, classified, and exhaustively studied. The sorted and classified

documents are sent to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

When sorting the seized documents, groups are separated out that are needed for evaluation of the military and political situation; the emotional and psychological state of the troops and population of the enemy; for determining the effectiveness of psychological warfare; for organization and conduct of psychological operations (psywar measures); for sending to superior headquarters.

In working with seized documents, the


secrecy regimen must be observed, and they cannot be shown to other persons and organizations without permission of the superior command. Careful treatment of trophy documents is required. In sorting and processing them, sets of items cannot be broken up (letters separated from envelopes, identification separated from other personal documents, etc.). No marks or notations should be made on the documents since they may be required to be xeroxed (photographed). Particular care must be taken in handling undeveloped film and photo film.



Explanatory notes and other additional materials must be attached to the most im-

portant seized documents. For example, if there are orders, a memo indicating the circumstances of their receipt must be attached (when, where, on what part of the front, in what unit, by whom the document was seized). Work with seized documents usually begins with their sanitary processing and disinfection (deactivation). Special measures

of caution must be taken in work with documents seized or picked up in zones where weapons of mass destruction have been used. Such documents must be subjected to thorough, special monitoring in order to detect radioactivity, chemical or bacteriological contamination.



In conducting hostilities on the enemy's (liberated) area of institutions or repositories territory, reports must be made to the command about the presence in the occupied with state or international significance (state and military archives, film stocks, video pro-

duction and other repositories of art works, book, newspaper, magazine publishing houses, and so on). The necessary measures must be taken to protect and preserve these objects.

The main documents for studying psy-war targets are: the dossier, the profile card, and the logbook. The **dossier** is a selection of materials on one topic (the target of study) systematized by topic and time. Depending on the volume of information available, it may be subdivided by headings (sections). For convenience of use, the sections (headings) are noted with serial numbers, numerals, titles.

The **card file** contains information on topics (issues), political figures, and command personnel in alphabetical orders. The **profile cards** are prepared with two lines: official capacity and official position. The information is arranged in a certain sequence:

1. Personal data (year and place of birth, nationality, social origin, education, family status, party affiliation).
2. Socio-political information (service career, social affiliation, property status, political views, authority among subordinates, work references, character features).
3. Compromising data (improper behavior, negative personality traits, vices, ties with criminal organizations, individuals).
4. Conclusions (about political orientation,

ability to have influence on politics and the course of events, etc.).

Moreover, material must be created containing the information about the military and political situation on the strategic (operational) line, in individual countries; the ideological (socio-political) situation in foreign countries; the emotional and psychological state of the personnel of the armed forces and populations of foreign states; the political profile of the foreign states and military figures.

In addition to them, information materials are prepared containing news about the current events occurring in foreign countries which include reports of current information from foreign agencies without commentary; topic abstracts; selective abstracts; reference materials.

A report on the current information from foreign agencies without commentary is a compilation of information reports about the most urgent problems in the world's military and political situation, on the strategic (operational) line, the internal political situation in the relevant foreign countries, and also domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation during a certain time period (as a rule, 24 hours).

The thematic abstract is a brief outline of one or several newspaper, magazine, radio, or television materials devoted to one current problem or united by a common theme.

A selective abstract is a selection of ab-

stracts from newspaper, magazine, radio, and television materials not united by a common theme.

Reference materials containing a compilation of brief news about specific targets for military and political study, are usually divided into the following categories:

- political fact sheet on state, political and military figures (personnel note);
- political fact sheet on formations and groups of types of armed forces and armed forces as a whole;
- political fact sheet on foreign states, regions, strategic (operational) lines (general nature and on individual aspects);
- report fact sheet with conclusions from the evaluation of the military and political situation and the socio-political characterization of the opposing forces.

The personnel fact sheet contains brief biographies of state and military figures; information about their professional traits, political orientation, hobbies, preferences, and also the episodes from their work and personal lives which characterized them negatively.

A political fact sheet on the formation or group contains the following information:

- brief history, combat experience;
- general information about the commanding officer (commander);

- organizational structure, number of personnel, weapons, deployment;
- emotional and psychological state of the personnel.

The political fact sheet on the types of armed forces contains information about the following issues:

- brief history;
- organizational structure;
- armaments (ship composition);
- combat training;
- the recruitment and service by personnel;
- political indoctrination of the personnel;
- emotional and psychological state of the personnel.

A political fact sheet on the armed forces of foreign states contains the following information:

- general information about the armed forces, a brief history;
- basic lines of military policy;
- superior military governance bodies;
- land forces (organization and armament);
- military and air forces (organization and armament);
- military and naval forces (organization, ship composition);
- other forms of armed forces;
- psychological warfare bodies

(operations);

- combat training;
- recruitment and ways of service;
- political indoctrination of the personnel;
- emotional and psychological state of the personnel.

A political fact sheet on foreign states contains information about the following issues:

- general information about the country (geographical location, borders, topography, main mineral resources, climate zones, etc.);
- brief historical essay;
- state system, administrative and territorial divisions;
- population (numbers, growth rate, population density in the main areas of the country, sex and age, national and religious affiliation, social and class structure, features of intra- and inter-class relations);
- political parties and civic organizations;
- economy and infrastructure, military industry;
- mass media, psychological indoctrination of the population;
- armed forces.

The report fact sheet with the conclusions from the evaluation of the military and political situation and the socio-political charac-

terizations of the opposing forces is compiled on the basis of analytical research on the following issues:

1. Brief profile of the military and political situation (with conclusions on the degree of danger of war breaking out; possible influence of the situation on the course of hostilities);
2. Brief assessment of the emotional and psychological state of the opposition forces with a conclusion on:
 - readiness for war;
 - possibility of their deserting during combat;
 - It consists of the following:
 - composition of the grouping of the opposing forces; highlighting of the most and least prepared in the combat and morale and psychological attitude of the formations and units;
 - attitude of various categories of military personnel to their government and its policy; toward its role in unleashing and waging war;
 - attitude of the personnel to the Russian Federation, its armed forces;
 - emotional and psychological state of the personnel, level of anti-war and pacifist sentiments, degree of class, national and religious conflicts in the troops, state of discipline;

- strong and weak sides of the personnel in the opposing grouping of forces.
3. Brief assessment of the emotional and psychological state of the population with conclusions about its influence on the military efforts of the state and political leadership:
- attitude of the population to their government and their policy;
 - attitude of the population to the Russian Federation and its armed forces; level of anti-Russian, anti-war and pacifist sentiments.
4. Possibilities of opposing forces in the conduct of psychological warfare:
- presence of psychological warfare agencies on the operational line (in the combat zone);
 - assessment of their capabilities;
 - chief lines of content of psychological operations;
 - possible effects of these operations for commanders and headquarters to take them into account in organizing the troops' combat activity.

Thus, all the forms and methods enumerated for studying psywar targets in the interests of conducting psychological warfare complement each other in their aggregate and enable exhaustive and objective data about its political and emotional and

psychological potential to be obtained. The comprehensive use of various forms make it possible to analyze deeply and precisely the military and political situation on the strategic (operational) line, in the zone of responsibility; to correctly evaluate the emotional and psychological state of the enemy's troops and population and to make the appropriate conclusions; to reduce the likelihood of mistaken, accidental and superficial judgements.

Thus, study of the psywar targets for the purposes of psychological operations (psywar measures) is one of the central tasks which commanders and headquarters decide in the area of psychological warfare. This study is conducted by collecting from various sources military, social, political, and psychological informational and analyzing it. It requires scrupulous, persistent, and analytical work in order to correctly assess and forecast the military and political and socio-psychological nature of the development of the situation on the relevant strategic (operational) line. Study enables one to identify the strong and weak sides of psywar targets in the sense of their socio-political state, morale, and fighting capacity; to develop proposals for the command to take decisions about the conduct of PSYOP (psywar measures); and to comprehensively plan and organize effective informational and psychological influence on the troops and population of foreign countries under various conditions.

The Lingo of Tradecraft: A Layman's Guide to GRU Terminology

Synonym:¹ Troop Unit 54777 – 72 TsCC – Center for Special Service (Psychological Operations) – Center

A glossary of terms and definitions used by Unit 5477 at the Center for Special Service, the headquarters for GRU's psychological operations.

INFORMATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TARGETS. State and military governing bodies and their leadership; political, economic, financial and other organizations; groupings (groups) and their leaders, armed forces, troop formations, military personnel, members of armed (opposition) formations; nations, population of countries, civic, ethnic, social, religious and other communities (formations, organizations, groups), including their leaders; collectives of publishing houses (programs, channels) of mass media.

INFORMATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE. A set of measures to influence the intellectual, rational-volitional and emotional sphere of the psyche and subconscious of informational and psychologi-

cal targets, aimed at the formation in them of predictable opinions and views, worldview and psychological principles, as well as behavioral reactions. Informational and psychological influence are carried out by propaganda and agitation; disinformation; demonstrative and demonstrational actions; application of special psycho-physical and psychological methods, including the use of special (psychotropic, psychotronic,² energy-informational³ and other) means.

INFORMATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL (PSYCHOLOGICAL) WEAPONRY. The combination of methods and means (technologies) of overt (or semi-covert) influence on the psyches of people, used during informational and psychological

1 "Synonym" appeared in English, in the singular, in the original document—*The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation/Free Russia Foundation*.

2 A Russian term for research and development in parapsychology—*The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation/Free Russia Foundation*.

3 This term has been used by a range of Russian scientific and pseudo-scientific works and appears to indicate the influence of biological and other energies on individuals—*The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation/Free Russia Foundation*.

warfare (informational warfare) for achieving stated goals.

Technologies of informational and psychological confrontation (informational warfare) include such methods as open discussion, argument, conversation, colloquium, and so on, during which one side persuades (convinces) his opponent through the logic of thought, appeal to reason, and citing of persuasive arguments. The appearance of "dirty" (manipulative) techniques of informational and psychological confrontation (warfare) is linked to the globalization of mass media, a significant influence on the formation in people of different viewpoints on various political and social processes and phenomena; on international and domestic events; on the formation of their attitudes toward political and party leaders, and leaders of the government. The set of "dirty" techniques includes: disinformation, lying, manipulation of facts, distortion of the content of messages, activities, and acts; emphasis of the negative and silence about the positive side of a problem (an individual); alternating truthful information with false, and so on. "Dirty" techniques are implemented, as a rule, through all forms of media over a long period of time. The infiltration of agents of influence into the media of an opposing state enables the manipulation of public consciousness; to use special means for zombifying it – informational and psychological techniques of covert (clandestine) influence, which make up the physical essence of psychophysical weaponry.

INFORMATIONAL SUPERIORITY.

Advantage over the opposing side in the information sphere, ensuring favorable conditions for effective performance of the assignments of the Armed Forces, the groupings of troops (forces). It is characterized by a more effective functioning and stable state for informational influence on its information targets by comparison with the functioning and state of the information targets of the opposing side.

The scope of informational superiority may be: global (at the level of the world community) or strategic (on a strategic air and space line, continent or ocean theater of hostilities); regional (at the level of groups of states) or operational and strategic (on a strategic line, in an ocean zone); operational (on an operational line, air line or ocean zone); operational (on an operational line, air line, sea zone) and tactical (on a tactical line, in certain regions of an operational line). In content, information superiority may be technological, emotional, and psychological, intellectual, and so on.

INFORMATIONAL CONFRONTATION BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Confrontation by the Armed Forces in the information sphere by means of influence on information targets of the opposing side and defense of our own information targets from such influence.

INFORMATIONAL CONFRONTATION BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

Confrontation between states in the information sphere for achievement of political, economic and other goals, and also states with organizations, civic associations and unlawful armed formations, whose actions are aimed at violent change of the foundations of the constitutional order and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation; undermining state security; and incitement of social, racial, national [ethnic], and religious enmity. This includes: a protective (defensive) component consisting of the development and implementation by executive branch federal agencies of a system of measures to defend the information space and the information infrastructure of Russia; an active (offensive) component, consisting of the development and implementation by executive branch federal agencies of a system of measures for targeted influence on the information space and information infrastructure of the opposing side. The Russian Federation's informational confrontation is conducted by the informational confrontation of state agencies and the military directorate of the Russian Federation, the Armed Forces, other troops of the Russian Federation, ministries, departments, and institutions of the Russian Federation.

TARGET OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Targets of psychological warfare are a specific person (an official) or a group of military personnel or civilians, varying in size, which belong to the same national contingent, under identical political, military, infor-

mation, and psychological conditions; which have to a significant extent similar needs and interests; and which are united in an organizational structure and a general line of their activity.

INFORMATION WEAPON. The combination of methods and means of informational influence on equipment and people with the purpose of performing the tasks of the influencing party. An information weapon has two basic forms: an informational-technological weapon and an informational-psychological weapon. The chief target of the informational-technological weapon is equipment, and the chief target of the informational-psychological weapon is people. A weapon of information is distinguished as follows: a strategic information weapon – a combination of information, techniques, and means of implementing techniques capable of causing unacceptable damage to political, economic, and interests of a country.

WAR THREAT ESCALATION PERIOD. May be of various lengths of time and is characterized by extreme tension in relations between opposing states (coalitions of states) and the activation of immediate preparation for war. The escalation period of the threat of war may be used by an aggressor for strengthening his political positions in various regions; for the advance, covert conversion of the economy to war footing; for the strengthening of the groupings of troops (forces) in the zones of responsibility; for destabilization of the situation in countries

against which an attack is being prepared; for their political and economic isolation, discreditation in the eyes of the world community, and intensification of information and psychological influence on the personnel of the armed forces and the population.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION BY THE ARMED FORCES. A form of strategic, operational combat support of the actions of troops (forces); a combination of measures conducted by the command and staffs at all levels, and special actions by trained units and divisions in propagandistic and psychological influence on the military and political leadership, personnel of the armed forces, and population of foreign states (in war time – the enemy) for the purpose of ensuring the national interests of the Russian Federation, the successful use of its troops (forces) and reduction of the effectiveness of the enemy's use of troops (forces).

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. (foreign), a system of coordinated measures conducted by a state or coalitions of states against other countries for the purposes of undermining the emotional, political, and psychological state of their population and the armed forces; interference in internal af-

fairs; incitement of enmity among peoples; provoking of dissatisfaction, disorders, and distrust of the government. In the USA, the CIA, the International Communication Agency⁴ and others engage in psychological warfare. Within NATO, psychological warfare is coordinated and is conducted under the leadership of the USA.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION. (PSYOP) The chief form of conducting psychological warfare (psywar) is a set of simultaneous or consecutive measures and actions of psywar coordinated and interrelated by goals, tasks, place, time, targets and content; carried out according to a single intention and plan for informational and psychological influence on the psywar targets to support the operations (fighting) of the Armed Forces. Psychological operations are characterized by a wide range of applied forms (methods, techniques) of conducting psywar; conducted in several stages; long-term and have considerable range in space; conducted by the psywar forces and means both independently as well as with the involvement of forces and means of types and branches of troops of the Armed Forces in coordination with the forces and means of federal executive branch bodies of the Russian Federation,

4 The International Communication Agency (ICA) was created in the State Department in 1978 when the US Information Agency (USIA) was abolished. The ICA then reverted to its previous name of US Information Agency in 1982 and was known overseas as the US Information Service. The USIA's broadcasting functions were then moved to the Board of International Broadcasting, and its non-broadcasting public diplomacy functions were moved to the office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in 1999. <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/principalofficers/director-usia>—*The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation*.

state, civic, and religious organizations.

FORCES AND MEANS OF INFORMATIONAL CONFRONTATION. Forces and means that are specially intended and/or deployed for performing tasks of informational confrontation. They may include: government and military managing bodies; mass media; scientific research organizations; forces and means of intelligence and counterintelligence; radio-electronic and psychological warfare; strategic and operational *maskirovka*⁵, ensuring the security of communications, protection of information, moral and psychological support, and so on.

5 A Russian military doctrine covering a broad range of measures for military deception, from camouflage to denial and deception—*The Interpreter/Free Russia Foundation*.

Free Russia Foundation is an independent nonprofit organization with a 501 (c) 3 status registered in the U.S. in 2014.

The work of Free Russia Foundation is focused in three key mission areas:

1. Advancing the vision of a democratic, prosperous and peaceful Russia governed by the rule of law by educating the next generation of Russian leaders committed to these ideals;
2. Strengthening civil society in Russia and defending human rights activists persecuted by the Russian government; and
3. Supporting formulation of an effective and sustainable Russia policy in the United States and Europe by educating policy makers and informing public debate.

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