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Confidential Contacts in the KGB's Foreign Intelligence and Work with Them

Analytical Overview

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Introduction

The foreign intelligence service of the Committee for State Security (KGB) performs critical assignments to obtain intelligence information essential to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) and the Soviet government for making important political and strategic decisions; influencing the foreign and domestic policies of the capitalist and developing countries to the USSR's advantage; and ensuring the state security of the Soviet Union. The chief means of fulfilling these assignments is the network of foreign agents, through whose assistance access can be gained to the most guarded secrets of the targeted countries, and the carrying out of sensitive and deeply clandestine active measures, to ensure successful resistance to the enemy's subversive actions. Therefore, the broadening, strengthening and improving of the agents’ apparat is the primary task of all operative subdivisions of the central apparat of foreign intelligence, the intelligence subdivisions of territorial agencies and the KGB’s rezidenturas abroad.

Due to the difficulty and diversity of assignments performed by foreign intelligence, however, and the specific features of the intelligence operational environment in certain foreign countries, along with the agents’ network, regardless of conditions, there is a need for widespread use of several other means, particularly confidential contacts. This is explained not only because efforts to acquire a reliable and workable agent in the target location or in the necessary line of intelligence activity are not always successful for various reasons but also because some intelligence assignments for political or operational reasons are not always prudent to perform with the use only of agents.

Confidential contacts by comparison to agents are a less developed, less effective and less manageable means of foreign intelligence. However, it is precisely the more limited use of specific intelligence forms and methods in work with confidential contacts, with the opportunities for maintaining sufficiently convincing legending of contacts with foreigners, on the one hand, that enables the use for intelligence purposes of persons who occupy high professional or public positions in their countries but with whom relations are impossible or inadvisable to be taken to the level of agent. On the other hand, such use enables the concealing of intelligence work against certain countries and targets and makes difficult the work of the enemy’s
intelligence service in compromising Soviet intelligence and intercepting its contacts with some categories of foreigners.

The possibility of more active involvement of foreigners in confidential collaboration is ensured at the present time by certain objective factors, in particular the unceasing growth of the Soviet Union’s international influence; the successes of Soviet foreign policy based on the principles of internationalism and peaceful co-existence; the placement on the international arena of a large number of states en route to independent development which are interested in the support of the USSR and cooperation with it.

The use of confidential contacts does not mean wholly reducing the role of agents, who always were and will be the main means of the KGB’s foreign intelligence. Confidential contacts do not replace agents but add to their capabilities and provide greater flexibility and diversity in foreign intelligence’s choice of the means and methods for performing intelligence assignments regardless of their nature or the agent and operative setting in the target countries.

1. The Concepts of Confidential Relations and Confidential Contacts in Foreign Intelligence

1. Forms of Intelligence Relations

Confidential relations, just as agent relations in the KGB’s foreign intelligence are one of the forms of intelligence relations established by intelligence officers with foreigners to perform their tasks.

Moreover, intelligence officers use their legal relations with foreigners to the extent possible. In the process of supporting legal relations with a foreigner, the intelligence officer does not go beyond his official duties under his cover, or protocol regulations or logical and persuasive justified personal interests and thereby does not permit actions capable of drawing suspicion of his affiliation with intelligence.

The foreigner in this case also does not permit deliberate deviation from the requirements of the lawful and administrative legal regulations in effect in his country, or from his rights and duties ensuing from his citizenship, work position or Party affiliation. Even so, he does not surmise that he is dealing with an officer of intelligence in the person of a Soviet representative. Therefore, the foreigner, within the framework of legal relations, may be used by the intelligence officer primarily unwittingly or may wittingly provide help to the
intelligence officer of the type which is of a strictly personal nature from the perspective of this foreigner and does not contradict his interests and the target he represents and does not violate regulations.

Agent relations with foreigners in foreign intelligence are the most developed form of intelligence relations in the operational sense. They are characterized by deliberate and persistent collaboration with intelligence, secret in content and form, by a foreigner studied and vetted in the appropriate way on a solid ideological-political, material or mental-psychological foundation. The foreigner with whom the agent relations are maintained is attached to intelligence, is subordinate to intelligence discipline and performs intelligence assignments in violation of the current legal and administrative regulations in his country.

Confidential relations in foreign intelligence are one of the forms of intelligence relations. Depending on the purposes and forms of the operative cultivation of the foreigner, and also on the intelligence operational situation in the country, their inherent special nature is that they may be the extent of, or an interim stage of that cultivation; that is, operational cultivation may be completed by establishing only confidential relations. Or else they may be brought to the level of agent relations as a result of planned, deliberate actions by intelligence.

Confidential relations are characterized by deliberate, voluntary, relatively stable confidential collaboration ensuring continuity, which a foreigner, studied and vetted in the appropriate manner has with an intelligence officer who appears as a representative of a Soviet institution or under a false flag on an ideological-political, material or mental-psychological basis. Unlike collaboration with an agent, this collaboration combines some of its obligations to the intelligence officer (or to the cover agency used by intelligence) with compliance mainly with the current legal regulations in his country, and also with the interests of his official activity, entirely preserving his self-reliance and independence from intelligence and remaining not bound by intelligence discipline.

Consequently, confidential relations involve collaboration by such a foreigner with an intelligence officer, which, unlike collaboration with an agent, is outwardly carried out largely within the law of his country in practice. The foreigner places
his obligations to his government or to his party higher than his duties to the Soviet representative (or agency).

But unlike lawful relations, the foreigner who maintains confidential relations with the intelligence officer, influenced by certain incentives, to some extent consciously "gets around" or partly violates the requirements of certain legal and especially administrative regulations. He does this, however, within such limits and in such a form which are permissible from his perspective and do not involve criminal liability. They take into account the judicial practice, customs, work and social status of the foreigner in his country, the commonly accepted norms of behavior in the relevant circles and also the interests of the ruling circles of the country. In addition, he may deliberately carry out such actions that by themselves do not go beyond certain legal norms and do not look like infractions, although in combination with other actions of intelligence not known to the foreigner may be against the law.

Wider possibilities for certain foreigners to deviate from the norms of behavior established by law in their countries are available in those cases when the foreigners are abroad, especially in the Soviet Union, where they are not subject to the action of the intelligence services of their countries and feel themselves to be freer.

The intelligence officer who maintains confidential relations with a foreigner regards with understanding the foreigner's effort to mainly observe the relevant legal norms, and himself outwardly shows respect to these norms, legending his actions and the motives for his behavior convincingly. Even in those cases when the intelligence officer essentially goes beyond the bounds of his official duties for the sake of his tasks, to a certain extent he deviates from them. Showing interest to issues which essentially are of a confidential nature, he nevertheless always strives to create the appearance of legality in his behavior. As a rule, he does not conceal his affiliation with intelligence.

Thus, confidential relations include, or combine within them some characteristics specific to agent relations, and several characteristics pertaining to lawful relations. They contain certain elements; the foreigner's deviation from legal and administrative regulations in effect in his country, not to mention the deviations of both the intelligence officer and the foreigner from the official line of behavior, and thus qualitatively differ from lawful relations. But these deviations are not systematic and persistent and do not create a threat of
criminal prosecution of the foreigner, which substantially distinguishes confidential relations from agent relations.

2. Chief Features of Confidential Relations

A fuller and clearer concept of confidential relations illustrates their comparison with agent and legal relations.

1. Agent relations presuppose conscious secret assistance to foreigners by intelligence, under its own flag, on behalf of a neutral Soviet agency or under a false flag. Even so, intelligence virtually does not conceal efforts to use the foreigner in its purposes.

Confidential relations presuppose conscious working collaboration, conspiratorial by its nature, of the foreigner with an intelligence officer who appears under cover of a Soviet agency or under a false flag, when receipt of information from the foreigner or urging him to actions necessary to intelligence, as a rule, as a consequence of the appropriate mutual understanding between a foreigner and an intelligence agent. Even so, the foreigner is aware that the intelligence officer is maintaining contact with him not as a private person, but as the officer of a certain agency, and represents the interests of this agency in relations with a foreigner. He realizes that the information transmitted to the intelligence officer and the measures undertaken at his requests will be or may be used in the interests of this agency of the Soviet government (if the intelligence officer appears as a staff member of a Soviet agency).

Legal relations, as a rule, do not envision a foreigner's deliberate, working confidential collaboration with an intelligence officer. Within the framework of legal relations, intelligence tasks are solved not on the basis of an appropriate relationship between the foreigner and the intelligence officer but primarily clandestinely, with the use of such forms and method that enable the intelligence office during conversation with a foreigner to outsmart him, deceive him, force him to blurt something out or commit actions whose nature he does not understand. Certain tasks can be done as well by periodic appeal to the foreigner with requests which conceal the strictly personal interests of the intelligence officer.

2. Agent relations envision performance by the foreigner of intelligence tasks related to violation of the legal and administrative regulations in his country, presupposing criminal, administrative or party sanctions.
In confidential relations, the foreigner basically tries to comply with relevant legal and administrative regulations in force in his country of residence and citizenship; in the process of collaboration with the intelligence officer, however, he essentially deviates from strict compliance with them deliberately, within limits that are permissible given the situation, his status in society, his professional and personal interests, and which virtually do not entail criminal prosecution.

With legal relations, the former acts only within the framework of legal possibilities and does not permit deliberate violation of any legal or administrative regulations, or rights and duties defined by his citizenship, party affiliation, professional or civic position.

3. Agent relations presuppose the presence of certain obligations by the foreigner, formulated, verbally agreed or practically acknowledged to intelligence, limiting to some extent his independence and ensuring his subordination to intelligence discipline.

Confidential relations are characterized by a certain working agreement between intelligence officer and foreigner, verbally agreed or practically without formal agreement, and certain moral obligations acknowledged by the foreigner not only to the employee of the Soviet agency (the intelligence officer), but also to the cover agency used by intelligence, which does not limit, however, the foreigner’s self-reliance; does not attach him to intelligence; nor guarantee his subordination to intelligence discipline.

Legal relations are, as a rule, characterized by the lack of an agreement between an intelligence officer and foreigner and the absence of mutual or unilateral promises agreed by them or virtually observed concerning the nature and purposes of their contact.

4. Since agent relations presuppose witting, secret help to foreigners by intelligence, then regardless of whether the intelligence offer appears under his own flag or under cover of a Soviet agency or a false flag, inevitably it leads to a disclosure by the intelligence officer to the foreigner, even if the officer avoids formal confirmation of his affiliation with intelligence.

The intelligence officer maintaining confidential relations as a rule does not disclose his affiliation with an intelligence
service and appears as the employee of the cover agency or under a false flag, but in the process of working with the foreigner, may diverge from his rights and duties in the line of official activity, and go beyond the limits permitted by his cover, both in issues of the problems discussed in conversations with the foreigner as well as in the depth and sharpness of the questions posed, sometimes bolstering his actions with the relevant legend.

With legal relations, the intelligence officer not only tells the foreigners of his affiliation to intelligence; he acts exclusively within the limits permissible of his cover and official position.

Confidential relations, like agent relations presuppose a fairly deep study of a foreigner and comprehensive vetting of him; the intelligence officer’s confidence in his honesty, sincerity, reliability and the absence of the danger of exposure by him of the content of the collaboration to his bosses, colleagues, much less the enemy’s intelligence services.

With legal relations, the foreigners are usually not subject to a thorough and comprehensive study and vetting. Intelligence officers do not have assurance of their honesty and sincerity. It is also possible that the foreigner keeps contact with an intelligence officer on mission, with sanction, approval or silent consent from his bosses or colleagues and like-minded people through work, party or other activity.

6. Agent relations presuppose the maximum use (depending on the agent and operative setting, and the individual features and reliability of the agent) of specific intelligence forms and methods for doing the tasks facing intelligence and providing security for work with an agent.

Confidential relations do not allow for the use of specifically intelligence forms and methods of work in full volume but allow for the use of certain of them under the condition of convincing legending to the foreigner of the need for their use.

Legal relations make it impossible and impermissible to use any specific intelligence forms and methods of work for performing intelligence tasks or maintaining communication with a foreigner.

7. Characteristic of agent relations is the possibility and necessity of operational training of the foreigner on the questions of tradecraft and providing security for the collaboration, as well as methods of performing intelligence tasks.
Confidential relations do not create conditions for a sufficiently serious operational training of the foreigner or make his training inadvisable, especially in the realm of forms and methods of performing intelligence tasks. They do, however, permit the cultivation of some tradecraft skills in the foreigner and the ability to create a convincing legend for his actions and motives of behavior, taking into account his official position and the peculiarities of the intelligence operational environment in his country of citizenship.

With legal relations, naturally operational training of the foreigner is totally excluded.

8. Agent relations are characterized by total secrecy of the collaboration and concealment from the foreigner’s environment and from the enemy’s intelligence services not only of its content but even the fact of contacts between the intelligence officer and the foreigner through use of the relevant forms and methods of work and strict compliance with the requirements of tradecraft.

Confidential relations are secret in their content. However, during work abroad they are not secured by reliable concealment of contact from a foreigner’s surroundings and the enemy’s intelligence services, since more reliable, specifically intelligence forms and methods of works cannot be used. The security of collaboration in confidential relations is ensured by non-disclosure above all of its content and legending by the foreign and intelligence office of their meetings, actions, and motives for behavior.

In maintaining legal relations, tradecraft is not deployed, as a rule, for meetings between the intelligence officer and foreigner, nor are their conversations kept secret. The intelligence officer may use some tradecraft only on a unilateral basis. The foreigner, as a rule, does not hide his contact with the intelligence agent from third parties since he does not see anything prejudicial about them, and sometimes even tries to advertise the contact if it is in his personal interests or the interests of his government, institution, party or other organization.

9. Agent relations ensure the maximum full use of the foreigner’s intelligence capabilities. With the highest level of development they are characterized, as a rule, by independence of the substance of the foreigner’s collaboration with intelligence from the interests of his political, work, business or scientific activity and his readiness or ability (at least potentially) to
perform intelligence tasks aimed against his own government, party or other organizations. Sometimes, if intelligence needs this, he will be willing to change his citizenship, party, the nature of his work activity and so on.

Confidential relations enable the foreigner's intelligence possibilities to be used systematically, but to a significantly lesser degree. The foreigner does not fully reveal and realize his possibilities to the intelligence officer, however, which is explained not only by his effort to comply with the basic legal and administrative regulations of his country, but also his own political, work, scientific and other interests. As a rule, with confidential relations, a foreigner's collaboration with an intelligence officer is closely tied with his political work, business or scientific activity. It is a continuation of that activity and makes impossible his use beyond the bounds of the interests at hand, much less for performing intelligence tasks contradicting those interests.

With legal relations, the intelligence officer manages to use the intelligence possibilities of the foreigner only periodically, and quite insignificantly.

10. Agent relations, as a rule, presuppose the presence of certain obligations by the foreigner, formulated, verbally agreed or practically acknowledged to intelligence, limiting to some extent his independence and ensuring his subordination to intelligence discipline. Agent relations must be preserved during severe crises and during a special period.

Confidential relations are characterized by a certain instability of collaboration, and the absence of certainty regarding its continuation if the intelligence operational environment, official situation or the foreigner's position changes drastically. At the same time, confidential relations presuppose continuity of collaboration; they must ensure the possibility of transferring the confidential contact from one intelligence officer to another without changing the substance of those relations.

Legal relations are, as a rule, characterized by the lack of an agreement between an intelligence officer and foreigner and the absence of agreed or practically observed mutual or unilateral pledges concerning the nature and purposes of their contact. These relations may be completely lost or changed substantially and become useless to intelligence under a change in the intelligence operational environment, official situation or nature of the foreigner's official activity, as well as in the
transfer of legal contacts from one intelligence officer to another.

None of the characteristic signs indicated, taken separately, can be sufficient for distinguishing confidential relations from other forms of relations. Therefore, in each case, these signs must be reviewed as a whole, considering their interrelatedness and interdependence.

In practice, we encounter situations where relations with foreigners are characterized by mixed signs peculiar both to confidential as well as to agent relations. This makes the border between intelligence relations rather arbitrary. This is inevitable, particularly given that in the process of cultivating a foreigner, certain signs develop unevenly, depending on the intelligence operational environment, intelligence assignments, the foreigner’s personal traits, the intelligence officer’s professional skill and so on. However, possible doubts in determining the nature of the intelligence relations established with the former may resolve if you proceed from the fact that a more developed form of intelligence relations is not possible and must have the signs peculiar only to the less developed form of such relations.

Confidential relations may be formed: in the process of recruitment cultivation of a foreigner, when they are one of the interim (transitional) stages of development of agent relations in the form of a gradual involvement of the foreigner into collaboration with intelligence; in the process of operational cultivation of the foreigner, as its final goal, when intelligence considers it impossible or inadvisable to establish agent relations with the foreigner.

In the first instance, the foreigner, despite establishment with him of confidential relations, continues to be viewed as a target of recruitment cultivation. In the second instance, in establishing confidential relations with him, the foreigner is validated in his capacity as a confidential contact.

Sometimes, when cultivating a foreigner with the purpose of establishing agent relations with him, an unforeseen change occurs in his position or in the intelligence operational environment; various previously unknown facts about the foreigner come in, and so on. This leads to intelligence’s rejection of agent relations with him and to the stabilization of the relation at the lower operational level reached. If this level meets the requirements for confidential contacts, then the foreigner is confirmed as a confidential contact.
Thus, confidential contact is the term for a foreigner used by intelligence officers (appearing under cover of a Soviet agency or a false flag) for intelligence purposes based on confidential relations and vetted in this capacity by a person who has the relevant authority. In his capacity as a confidential contact, the foreigner is validated when his cultivation in that vein is largely completed and he has begun to perform intelligence assignments.

II. Conditions for Establishment and Use of Confidential Contacts

Confidential contacts are among the most important and effective means of performing intelligence tasks. To a significant degree, they complement and extend the agent opportunities of foreign intelligence and sometimes serve as the chief means of obtaining intelligence information and conducting active measures.

Confidential contacts, however, just like other agent and operative means of intelligence cannot be universal and suitable for all cases of life. Many intelligence tasks cannot be done with the help of confidential contacts. Moreover, specific conditions are required to establish and maintain confidential relations.

On the other hand, it is sometimes inadvisable to establish agent relations under some circumstances. Even when a foreigner who possesses the necessary intelligence capabilities is prepared in principle to engage in agent collaboration with Soviet intelligence, sometimes the establishment of agent relations with him must be held off and must be limited to using him as a confidential contact.

In deciding the issue of the possibility and advisability of establishing confidential relations with a foreigner, aside from the relevant intelligence capabilities, the following factors in particular will have influence:

1) the nature of the intelligence tasks ahead or which are planned to be done as a result of recruiting a foreigner into collaboration with Soviet foreign intelligence;

2) the nature of the target of the intelligence interest;

3) the specific features of the intelligence operational environment in the country of the foreigner’s citizenship, relations between the foreigner’s country and the Soviet Union and the general state and tendencies of development of international relations during the period of cultivating the foreigner;
4) the foreigner’s work and civic position, and his individual features.

The tasks performed by foreign intelligence with the help of confidential contacts very often are indistinguishable from the tasks done through agents. Confidential contacts, like agents, may transmit to intelligence secret information on political, economic, scientific, technical, counterintelligence and operational issues in verbal, written and sometimes in document form. They may be effectively used for conducting active measures, having influence favorable to the Soviet Union on government, party, business, scientific and military circles of foreign countries and for resolving other issues in the interests of Soviet intelligence. Moreover, the value of the information obtained from confidential contacts, especially from those who occupy a high professional or civic post may be no less than the value of information obtained by an agents’ network, and active measures carried out with the help of confidential contacts may be no less important and effective than the active measures conducted through the agents’ network.

Thus, confidential contact “Argo,” who was a prominent scientist and maintained personal contact with the president of his country, as a result of interest in developing contacts with the USSR in science, systematically informs an operative of the KGB’s rezidentura about the plans and intents of the president regarding the Soviet Union, which enables measures to be taken in a timely manner to neutralize phenomena undesirable for us. Along with this, on our assignments in his own name, Argo tells the president his recommendations concerning relations between the USSR and USA and which are reflected in the activities of the president and government.

Confidential contact “Ber” (who collaborates with an intelligence officer for material gain) transmits scientific and technical information about the enemy’s work on important problems of military significance. Intelligence orients Soviet scientific research institutes to work on these problems in a timely manner.

The following fact may serve as an example of a successful use of a confidential contact for conducting active measures. In a certain country, a government was formed which had taken the route of anti-Sovietism and created a threat of drastic worsening of relations with the Soviet Union. “Deputy,” a confidential contact of the rezidentura, a member of parliament, spoke out for developing friendly relations with the Soviet Union and resolutely rejected the foreign policy line of the new government
of his country. A decision was made to bring about the resignation of this government, using the possibility of Deputy. He agreed to raise an inquiry in parliament using points prompted by us, and to raise the issue of no confidence. Deputy went through the necessary preparation for the intended event, bringing over to his side several undecided members of parliament, and correctly determining the most advantageous moment to raise the inquiry. As a result, the government received a vote of no confidence and was forced to step down. Normal relations were re-established with Deputy’s country of citizenship.

It must be kept in mind, however, that the field for applying confidential contacts is relatively limited. They cannot replace agents in solving several important problems of interest to foreign intelligence, and in some areas of intelligence activity they are ineffective or completely unsuitable.

The decision on the question of using confidential contacts depends above all on to what extent the fulfillment of the tasks before intelligence require violation of the legislation in effect in the targeted country or the foreigner’s country of citizenship; on the possibility of circumventing some laws without particular risk, exploiting their weaknesses or flaws in judicial practice; and on the opportunity for legending the assignment in order to mask its intelligence nature.

When intelligence is faced with tasks which involve obvious and unconditional violation of relevant law, intelligence cannot rely on confidential contacts and must orient itself toward establishing only agent relations with foreigners.

In particular, confidential contacts must not be used to resolve tasks which by themselves are intelligence in nature, for example, related to the documenting of illegals, the staging of special actions, performing the functions of a radio operator, signalman, postbox keeper, fitter, and so on. This is explained by the fact that performing these tasks involves clear violation of the law and cannot be sufficiently and convincingly legended; that is, there is no possibility to conceal from the foreigner the fact of using him for intelligence purposes.

At the same time, to solve problems which cannot be qualified as a legal violation under the current legislation of the target country or foreigner’s country, it is enough (considering other factors and circumstances) to establish confidential relations with the appropriate foreigners.
Thus, one of the foreign KGB rezidenturas was cultivating "Vir" and "Gek," two officers of a political party’s headquarters staff, to establish confidential contacts with them. Vir, however, soon went to work for a government agency whose employees do not have the right to meet with foreign representatives. Under these conditions, materials on Vir were reviewed and the decision was made to deepen the relations with him for the purpose of his recruitment, since meetings with Vir at a confidential level had become impossible. Meanwhile, contact by the party figure Gek with a Soviet representative could not be viewed as a violation of the law, and information coming from him did not go beyond internal party problems. Therefore, work with him at the level of confidential relations quite ensured both the security of the collaboration and addressing information tasks.

All of this does not mean that confidential contacts can address information tasks and carrying out active measures only in the area of political, economic and scientific technical problems, and are not capable of performing operational assignments. Confidential contacts provide great help to intelligence in getting tips; collecting character references for persons of interest to intelligence; vetting targets for recruitment; establishing contacts needed for intelligence, and so on. In such cases, however, confidential contacts are used, as a rule, clandestinely, under the appropriate legend.

In defining the tasks that confidential contacts can decide, the nature of their official activity, sphere or interests, or goals pursued must be strictly considered, since confidential collaboration is carrying out, as a rule, within the bounds of the foreigner’s professional, political, civic, business or scientific interests and may not contradict these interests and purposes.

For example, one of our rezidenturas works with the confidential contact “Zin,” who, as a member of government, speaks out resolutely for the independence of his country from the USA. Understanding that his interests coincide with the political interests of the Soviet Union, he cooperates actively with us on matters of exposing American policy in this region, passes only information about the activity of American diplomats and intelligence officers, and discerns the intentions and behind-the-scenes activity of the pro-American members of his government. Attempts by an intelligence officer to receive information from Zin about the activity of his country’s counterintelligence against the employees of Soviet agencies yielded no result, however. First, Zin tried to avoid answering
the relevant questions, and then when the intelligence officer persisted, he said outright that he sees a threat in US policy to the interests of his country and considers it his duty to fight its influence, relying on help from the USSR and political collaboration with its representatives, but he did not want to address issues which are the internal affairs of his country in talks with a Soviet representative, despite his sympathies toward the USSR.

In order not to violate confidential relations with Zin, the intelligence officer had to give up receiving the operative information of interest to us and assure Zin that we regard his country with respect and do not intend to interfere in its internal affairs.

To go further, a division of the central apparat cultivated “Zhang,” a famous China scholar in one of the European countries interested in the exchange of information on Chinese topics with Soviet scholars. Zhang gladly engaged in confidential collaboration with a Soviet intelligence officer who appeared under cover of a scholarly research institute. Zhang systematically sent to the intelligence officer confidential information about the situation in the PRC, on China’s relations with European countries and so on. After obtaining information about Zhang’s solid contacts in the government circles of his own country, the intelligence officer decided to utilize Zhang’s possibilities and began insistently to try to get information from him about his country. Zhang was pained by the intelligence officer’s questions and tried to avoid answering them, but then yielded to the pressure on him and promised to answer the intelligence officer’s request. However, once back in his own country, he sent a letter addressed to the intelligence officer through the Soviet embassy, in which he asked him to “forgive him for ill-conceived promises” and subsequently ended his travel to the Soviet Union. Thus, when the intelligence officer went beyond the framework of the interests and goals of the confidential contact, it led to the loss of a source of valuable information.

2. Nature of Target of Intelligence Process

The possibility and advisability of bringing a foreigner into confidential contact depends also on the target of the intelligence process. If intelligence does not approach from official positions to the relevant target to get its tasks done; and if its employees cannot talk to Soviet representatives, due to this target’s hostile nature to the USSR or the harsh counter-intelligence regimen in it, then the use of confidential contacts
under the Soviet flag is practically impossible and intelligence orients only to agent penetration of that target. Even so, if the target has a nature hostile to the USSR or a special purpose to carry out subversive anti-Soviet activity, then a certain risk is justified, related to agent penetration, since the possible failures under these circumstances cannot be used by the enemy’s intelligence agencies to compromise the USSR and its policies.

For example, cultivation of employees of such organizations as Radio Liberty, the NTS [Narodno-Trudovoy Soyuz or Popular Labor Alliance], anti-Soviet nationalist centers, is conducted primarily in the recruitment vein. Establishment of confidential contacts with them under cover of Soviet agencies is practically impossible.

In contrast to this, for intelligence tasks related to agencies and organizations advocating friendly relations with the USSR, and holding a progressive political orientation, not only are favorable opportunities created for maintaining confidential contacts with Soviet intelligence officers, but for political and operational concerns are well. Sometimes it turns out to be inadvisable to establish agent relations with them, since in the event of the failure of agents from progressive circles, the enemy may not only inflict harm on the Soviet Union but compromise organizations that are progressive and friendly to us.

Nevertheless, it must be taken into consideration that representatives of progressive organizations in capitalist countries are under heavy surveillance by the enemy’s intelligence services, and therefore the possibilities of failures while maintaining agent relations with them are more likely than with representatives of right-wing and anti-Soviet circles. Here, confidential contacts, who can totally replace agents, become the priority.

Thus, in one country, the KGB rezidentura was forced to monitor pro-Chinese tendencies in some of the leaders of a group friendly to us and neutralize these tendencies. Solving these problems by acquiring agents from among the group members, given the conditions when the group was under the observation of the enemy’s intelligence service could have led to its compromise, and in the event of exposure of the unofficial contact by these services, or targeted provocations organized by the enemy. To avoid this, the rezidentura conducts work by establishing confidential relations with certain members of the group of interest to it, in which the very fact of their contact with
Soviet representatives is not concealed but is explained by a reliable legend.

Intelligence sometimes refrains as well from establishing agent relations and restricts itself to confidential relations with ideologically proximate or major political and state figures of foreign countries objectively useful to us, especially with those who have official contacts with party or state agencies of the Soviet Union. Establishment with such people of only confidential relations is needed to avoid possible compromise of both foreigners as well as the agencies. From the perspective of the Soviet Union's state interests, it is useful to provide unofficial help to members of this category of foreigners through intelligence capabilities and steer their activity in a way advantageous to us within the bounds of confidential cooperation.

Thus, a KGB rezidentura maintains confidential relations with "Dean," a prominent political figure who is used to receive information and carry out active influence on the ruling circles of his country. Meanwhile, Dean, in accordance with his official position, periodically visits the USSR and meets with representatives of Soviet and Party agencies, which relates to support of inter-party ties. Work with Dean as an agent, if it failed, could lead to serious political consequences. At the same time, maintaining confidential contacts with him makes it possible to use his intelligence possibilities with sufficient effectiveness and act upon him in the necessary direction. A transfer to agent relations in this case would not only be unjustified, but dangerous.

It is also inadvisable to establish agent relations as well with members of pacifist, religious and other organizations whose activity to some extent or at some stage is objectively advantageous to the Soviet Union, but these organizations themselves are not of intelligence interest as targets of agent penetration, and their members or leaders do not possess intelligence possibilities beyond their own organizations.

For example, the rezidentura in one capitalist country uses the newspaper of a religious pacifist organization for the publication of certain materials advantageous to the USSR. The theses for publication are verbally transmitted to the editor by an intelligence agent acting under cover as a journalist. The editor, interested in receiving factual material from us, gladly maintains confidential relations and does not allow disclosure of the sources of the information. The relations with the editor are
confidential. There is no need to recruit him into agent collaboration.

A division of the Center works with "Pavel," the head of a progressive emigre organization abroad. This emigre organization conducts patriotic activity, distributes objective information about the Soviet Union, and condemns the extremist actions of anti-Soviet minded emigres. During his trips to the USSR, Pavel informs an operative about the situation in emigre circles on a confidential basis; gladly follows his recommendations; uses materials sent to him by an intelligence officer for the purposes of neutralizing the anti-Soviet activity of several emigrants; fulfills certain requests to identify persons of interest to intelligence in his country and collects character references on them. Work with Pavel is done under cover of a Soviet civic organization. Since in maintaining confidential contacts, virtually all of Pavel’s intelligence capacities available are utilized, intelligence does not see the need to convert the relationship with him into that of an agent.

Establishment of agent relations are restricted or even totally prohibited also in countries friendly to the Soviet Union. Soviet intelligence uses the citizens of these countries usually at the level of confidential, and sometimes even at the level of "legal" relations.

Thus, the rezidentura in one country friendly to the Soviet Union maintains confidential relations with the party figure "Jean," who is positively inclined toward the USSR and is an internationalist in his convictions. He regularly sends information about the intrigues of Chinese splitters in his country and about the anti-Soviet sentiments of some of the leading workers of his party. Understanding that contacts with Soviet representatives may be used by the agents’ network of Chinese intelligence service to compromise him, Jean behaves in a clandestine manner, carefully checks himself when going out to meetings scheduled with him in advance, does not call the intelligence officer on the telephone, and reports all suspicious incidents in his surroundings. He would regard an offer to maintain totally clandestine forms of communication, including impersonal ones. The rezidentura, however, cannot reveal the fact of the presence of Soviet intelligence officers in Jean’s country and therefore cannot use special forms and methods of work. The intelligence officer, at meetings with Jean, emphasizes to the utmost that he views him as our friend and a politically like-minded fellow, and exchanges opinions with him on the basis of his convictions and not as an official.
A division of the Center cultivated Ali, a graduate student studying in the USSR from a country friendly to us. As progressively minded and an advocate of socialist reforms in his country, Ali gladly contacted an operative and soon shared with him information about the situation in his countrymen's organization, the political positions of his fellow citizens, and the activity of diplomatic representatives of his country. During the holidays, Ali went back to his homeland. Upon return to the USSR, he passed on information about internal political issues worthy of interest. Meetings with Ali were conducted regularly observing the necessary tradecraft. Ali displayed discipline and caution in performing the intelligence officer's assignments, understanding the confidential nature of his relations with him.

Before Ali’s departure from the USSR, all the conditions were met for completion of Ali’s cultivation with recruitment, with his ensuing handover to the rezidentura, which was suggested by the operative. The division leadership could not agree with this proposal, however, since the Soviet Union’s friendly relations with Ali’s country did not allow it to conduct agent work on its territory. A failure in agent’s work could have serious political consequences. It was decided to confirm Ali as a confidential contact and establish contact with him in his country of residence in the name of the organization under whose cover work with him had been done in the USSR.

In light of what has been discussed, the following pattern can be seen clearly: the more hostile to us are the targets of intelligence interest, the less opportunities there are to acquire and utilize confidential contacts under the Soviet flag and the more indispensable the agents’ networks becomes a means of intelligence. And on the contrary, in carrying out intelligence measures regarding progressive targets friendly to the Soviet Union and ideologically close to us, the use of an agents’ network turns out not to be acceptable for political and operational considerations. In such cases, the role and significance of confidential contacts is increased.

3. Features of the Intelligence Operational Environment and General State of International Relations

To a significant extent, the establishment and maintenance of confidential relations depends on the intelligence operational environment in the country of the foreigner’s citizenship. In terms of this environment, confidential relations are enabled in particular by the following factors:
a) the absence in the foreigner's country of legal regulations prohibiting or seriously restricting contact by its citizens with Soviet representatives; the presence of categories of citizens who are not covered by the laws that restrict such contacts;

b) sufficiently broad development of political, economic, cultural and other relations between the foreigner's country and the Soviet Union or a serious interest of certain circles of the foreigner's country in the development of such relations.

Regulations prohibiting or restricting the contacts of citizens of the target country with Soviet representatives have a substantive and sometimes decisive influence on the acquiring and effective use of confidential contacts. In the absence of democratic freedoms in the foreigner's country, when these regulations are extended to all local citizens without exception, and the sanctions stipulated by them are fairly harsh and strictly enforced, the intelligence officers and the foreigner are not in a position to legend their contact abroad. Applying the simplest methods of tradecraft and without sufficient operational training, such a foreigner sooner or later winds up in the field of vision of the enemy's counterintelligence agencies. At the same time, the intelligence officer in these cases is not in a position to invite the foreigner to the USSR. Thus, when the contacts with Soviet citizens are totally prohibited and actively intercepted, intelligence is forced to use primarily agent relations with foreigners or establish confidential relations with foreigners from illegal positions.

In practice, the total prohibition of contacts with employees of Soviet agencies and other Soviet citizens (members of Soviet delegations, tourists, sailors, and so on) very often turn out to be impossible, especially under conditions of international detente. In the overwhelming majority of states, with the exceptions of several countries with dictatorial or semi-fascist regimes which maintain a line openly hostile to the Soviet Union, the prohibition on or restriction of contacts with Soviet representatives applies only to certain categories of local citizens who possess the most important secrets.

Meanwhile, usually there are significant groups of citizens who represent an interest to intelligence and to whom no restrictions apply, and sometimes the law itself at least formally guarantees them full freedom of actions. These include, in particular, members of governments, parliamentarians who sometimes enjoy legal immunity, major political and civic figures, prominent representatives of the business world; international affairs
journalists and so on. All of this creates a favorable environment for maintaining and legending the contacts with foreigners necessary to intelligence, and consequently, for establishment confidential relations with some of them.

Naturally, the absence alone of legislative prohibitions or restrictions on contacts with Soviet citizens is not sufficient for the establishment and broad use by intelligence of confidential relations. For this, it is also necessary that developed political, economic, cultural and other relations have existed between the target country and the Soviet Union, so that the ruling circles, broad public, representatives of the business world and the creative intelligentsia are interested in development and maintenance of these relations, so that these relations have a more or less important meaning for the interests of the target country or certain of its circles. Only under this condition is foreign intelligence in a position to find a broad contingent of persons capable of confidential collaboration and using confidential contacts as one of the means of completing intelligence tasks.

The establishment and maintenance of confidential relations is enabled also by such factors as international detente and the favorable development of international relations overall on the basis of principles of peaceful cooperation between states with different civil and economic systems.

The aggravation of the international situation due to tensions in international relations; the "cold war" with the inevitable rise in anti-Soviet propaganda; spy-manias, distrust between peoples, and an increase in the liability for contacts with employees of Soviet agencies and other Soviet citizens usually leads to a reduction of the possibilities for establishing and maintaining confidential contacts. In such cases, intelligence sometimes must make do with rare official contacts and rely mainly on the use of an agents’ network.

On the contrary, to the extent that international detente is deepened and the trend increases toward normalization of intergovernmental relations and mutually-favorable cooperation, support is made easier for systematic contact with certain categories of foreigners for whom interest is increased in resolving certain political, commercial, scientific, cultural and other questions in the process of communication with Soviet representatives, and consequently, the prerequisites are created for support and legending of confidential relations.
In an environment of international detente and improvement of official relations between countries, the enemy’s intelligence agencies are not in a condition to effectively restrict or totally ban contacts between their own citizens with employees of Soviet agencies abroad and other Soviet citizens.

4. Professional and Civic Position of the Foreigner; His Individual Features

The social position of the foreigner also has a substantial influence on the establishment and maintenance of confidential relations with him. For persons who may be brought in by intelligence for confidential collaboration, as well as candidates for recruitment, the presence of intelligence capabilities are necessary as well as other objective and subjective data enabling us to count on using them to perform intelligence tasks. Even so, although it is rare, it happens that precisely those factors that make a foreigner an especially valuable candidate for recruitment (for example, direct access to the most important secret materials) turn into their opposite when the question is being decided about involving the foreigner in confidential collaboration, since it becomes impossible to legend support of legal contacts.

The practice of intelligence work indicates that the candidate for involvement in collaboration as a confidential contact, aside from meeting several other requirements, also must hold an official position or have official interests which enable him to convincingly legend his relations with an intelligence officer in his own country or on more or less regular trips to the Soviet Union, and must not be on the special registry of the enemy’s intelligence services as having secret information.

The existence of such an official position or official interests for the foreigner is essentially the only means of guaranteeing the security of confidential collaboration, in which clandestine forms and methods of works cannot be used and periodic meetings between the foreigner and the intelligence officer cannot be hidden from the enemy’s intelligence services.

What type of official position for the foreigner is the most convenient for maintaining confidential contacts?

The answer to this question depends on the intelligence operational environment, in particular on the relevant legislation and on the traditions and customs of the foreigner’s country of citizenship. In the majority of cases, confidential contacts are successfully maintained from the positions of
“legal” rezidenturas or from Soviet territory with political and state figures; parliamentarians, leaders and activists of political parties and civic organizations; journalists specializing in the field of international relations and foreign economic ties; business people interested in developing trade with the Soviet Union; representatives of the scientific and technical intelligentsia related to research of international issues or which require exchange of information with Soviet scientific institutions; and with members of the diplomatic corps and officials of international organizations.

At the same time, working from legal positions and from Soviet territory, the intelligence officer is not in a position, as a rule, to ensure support of persistent and reliable confidential relations in terms of security with such categories of foreigners as office employees, couriers, guards, and other technical personnel of state, diplomatic, closed scientific technical and other institutions, since these persons, if they are simultaneously, for example, prominent activists of political or other civic organizations, from the perspective of the enemy’s intelligence agencies, cannot have common interests with employees of Soviet institutions. Their rights are often very restricted. Their travel to the USSR may be partially or totally prohibited. Moreover, these categories of foreign citizens are easily subject to preventive measures and re-recruitment. Therefore, as soon as the enemy’s intelligence agency manages to record the contact of such persons with employees of Soviet agencies or Soviet citizens temporarily in the country, further work with the foreigners under review becomes impossible.

In order to maintain confidential relations, it is vital to have the official position of the foreigner correspond to the official position of the intelligence officer in the cover agency. A great difference between the official position of the intelligence officer and the official position of the foreigner or the work of the foreigner in an agency that does not have contacts with the intelligence officer’s cover agency, attracts the attention of the enemy’s intelligence services and makes confidential collaboration more difficult or impossible.

A necessary condition for maintaining confidential relations is the intelligence officer’s deep and comprehensive knowledge of the problems for whose information coverage he is establishing intelligence collaboration with the foreigner. The intelligence officer who does not understand the relevant topics, on the one hand cannot count on the trust and respect of the foreigner, and on the other, will not be in a condition to extract the necessary
use out of the confidential collaboration, since it is impossible to rely on the fact that the confidential contact will regularly pass on documented or written information or carry out active measures without well-argued explanation of their substance.

Confidential relations cannot be supported from positions of a "legal" rezidentura or from Soviet territory or with foreigners who have direct access to the most important state secrets and are under special observation by the enemy’s intelligence services. This condition is related to the fact that if a foreigner has access to the most important state secrets, any legending of his contact with an intelligence officer, or trips to the USSR will not be convincing for the enemy’s intelligence services and they will always view this as a threat to state security.

A consequence of this might be preventive measures against the foreigner; his recruitment into an intelligence service for the purpose of becoming a dangle to Soviet intelligence; his transfer to another job or compromise of the intelligence officer. An exception to some extent in this regard may be foreigners who hold high professional or civic positions and are obliged to maintain contacts with Soviet representatives and institutions in accordance with their functional duties, for example, members of government officials of some ministries holding high posts, members of business circles maintaining contacts with Soviet trade organizations.

When a foreigner has direct access to important secret information, but his work and civic position do not allow him to maintain contacts with Soviet citizens and institutions, intelligence orients toward only agent relations and from the very outset of cultivation, chooses the appropriate forms and methods of work.

Thus, intelligence obtained information about how "Karl," an office employee at one of the ministries of the target country, who dealt with the registry and duplication of secret documents, is the son of an emigrant from Russia, displays great interest toward the Soviet Union and would not refuse meetings with a Soviet representative. All of this created the prerequisites for establishing contact with him and developing relations up to the level of confidential. At the same time, it was known that he was obliged to report to the security officer of acquaintance with a Soviet citizen, and in the event of concealing this fact, which the enemy’s intelligence service could record, he was threatened with dismissal. It was impossible for the intelligence officer to
legend the contact with Karl, since he did not have persuasive excuses for meetings with a Soviet citizen. Naturally, under these conditions, it was impossible to rely on the maintenance of confidential relations and the rezidentura decided to study Karl more deeply without making personal contact with him, and in the event of determination of grounds for his recruitment, make him a direct recruitment offer. This was exactly how his cultivation was done.

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The conditions reviewed under which it is possible, advisable or necessary to use confidential contacts show that these contacts cannot totally take the place of agents, but sometimes they cannot be replaced with agents, either. As one of the means of performing intelligence tasks, confidential contacts are used where, when, and to the extent that the establishment of agent relations turn out to be impossible or inadvisable for political or operational reasons.

As a rule, bringing foreigners into confidential collaboration is done as a result of their targeted operational cultivation with an end result planned in advance. Depending on the tasks faced by intelligence and its individual divisions, the intelligence operational environment, the official position and individual peculiarities of the foreigners from the outset of their cultivation, it is determined whether to conduct the cultivation to recruit a given foreigner or establish with him only confidential relations. This is especially important because the forms and methods of action on the foreigner are selected depending on the final goal.

III. Bringing Foreigners into Confidential Collaboration

In the previous section, the conditions for acquiring and using confidential contacts were reviewed, but attention was also paid to certain requirements which the foreigner must meet as a candidate for confidential collaboration. In particular, it was noted that persons who may be brought in by intelligence to confidential collaboration must have intelligence possibilities and other objectives, and subjective factors enabling us to rely on their involvement in intelligence tasks.

1. Grounds for Bringing Foreigners into Confidential Collaboration
One of the most important prerequisites for bringing a foreigner into collaboration with Soviet intelligence as an agent or confidential contact is the presence of the appropriate foundations.

The grounds for establishing confidential relations with foreigners essentially are not distinguishable from those for recruitment of foreigners as agents. In both cases, ideological and political, material and mental and psychological bases are used, as also their various combinations. The difference mainly consists of the fact that the degree of effectiveness of these grounds for establishing agent relations must be in comparable cases higher and unconditionally sufficient so that the foreigner is capable of taking a risk of violating the law in the interests of intelligence tasks, and put himself at the disposal of intelligence.

The ideological-political basis is the most reliable. In establishing confidential relations, it is used very often by itself, as well as in combination with material or mental-psychological grounds.

Just as with recruitment of agents, so in establishing confidential relations with foreigners, the ideological and political grounds are not limited only to the compatibility of ideological and political positions between the intelligence officer and the foreigner, but presuppose the foreigner’s readiness and striving for certain active motions in the interests of defense of his ideological and political positions and the achievement of corresponding political aims. When there is only a coincidence of views of the foreigner with the ideological and political principles which are maintained by the intelligence officer in discussion with him, or the foreigner’s passive approval of our ideological and politics with his absence of clearly-expressed effort toward active motions to achieve certain goals, then this is not sufficient to establish confidential collaboration.

The ideological and political positions used to establish confidential relations with a foreigner are, as a rule, less profound compared to the positions of a foreigner needed for his recruitment as an agent. The target of recruitment cultivation must be potentially able to use such methods and means of struggle for his ideals and political goals that may be qualified as violation of his country’s laws, and which are in contradiction with a formal understanding of his civic, work, or party duty. To establish confidential contacts, it is sometimes
enough if the foreigner tries to reach certain goals (of a progressive nature) and needs help, support or even sympathy from our side, but for this or that reason cannot make up his mind to seriously violate the law, or his civic, work or party duties.

The ideological and political basis does not always presume the foreigner’s actual ideological proximity to us. In order to establish confidential relations on an ideological and political basis it is not obligatory that the foreigner shares the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and is an advocate of communism. Intelligence successfully uses even such persons whose political positions and political aims only partially or temporarily coincide with the political interests of the Soviet Union in the capacity of confidential contacts.

Many foreigners who hold a bourgeois ideology and a negative attitude toward the ideas of socialism may, nevertheless, actively collaborate with us in the campaign for peace; for the national independence of their country; in the battle against imperialism and neocolonialism; in the interests of international détente; and the development of political, economic, scientific and cultural relations between the foreigner’s country and the USSR. Intelligence flexibly utilizes all possibilities for resolving the tasks it faces.

For example, a KGB rezidentura enlisted “Lan,” a major political figure who advocated anti-communist positions in confidential collaboration on an ideological and political basis. His enlistment in collaboration was facilitated by the circumstance that in relations between his country and a neighboring country, the Soviet Union supported Lan’s country, whereas the Americans defended the interests of the other country. An intelligence officer persuaded Lan that by passing on information to us about the position of the government of his country, about the content of negotiations with the Americans, about their plans and intentions, he would be acting in keeping with his own political views.

Lan began confidential collaboration with the intelligence officer and continued it after the settlement of the conflict on the basis of his remaining lack of trust in US policy regarding his homeland, and understanding that the Soviet Union not only did not threaten its independence, but in accordance with its foreign policy principles, advocated support of this independence. Even so, Lan did not change his bourgeois views and openly told the intelligence agent of his disagreement with the ideas of socialism. Under these conditions, the intelligence
officer did not try to change Lan’s worldview, avoided arguments about ideological issues, but continued to reinforce his anti-American positions, which had served as the basis for confidential collaboration.

The material basis used for bringing foreigners into confidential collaboration and in the process of work with confidential contacts also essentially does not differ from the material basis applied in recruitment of agents and work with them. However, the confidential contacts’ degree of material interest and material dependence on the intelligence agent, as a rule, is not as significant as agents collaborating with Soviet intelligence on that same basis.

For a foreigner to agree to agent collaboration with intelligence, it is necessary for the material incentive to be stronger than restraining factors determined by socio-political and moral principles, and possible legal sanctions and other consequences related to such collaborations. Consequently, the foreigner must have such great material needs that if they are not satisfied, it is considered a serious disruption of his normal life and activity or makes some vitally important goals unreachable for him. The foreigner’s interest in fulfilling his material needs must be sufficiently great that intelligence can impel him to consciously begin collaboration and intelligence assignments.

Unlike agent relations, the material basis in confidential relations does not provide sufficient attachment of the foreigner to intelligence and involves his dependence only relatively, when intelligence deals with prosperous people. As a rule, material compensations received by such confidential contacts satisfy secondary or one-time needs, and depriving foreigners of these compensations cannot put them in a difficult much less a desperate position. However, in the case of establishment of confidential relations on a material basis with people of average means, payment to them of regular remuneration facilitates the strengthening and development of such relations.

The difference in the use of a material basis in confidential and agent relations is also expressed by the form in which the material incentive is paid. Payment of any compensations to confidential contacts is done clandestinely, for example, disguised as presents coinciding with holidays or family celebrations; one-time help for treatment or a vacation; compensation of representative or organizational expenses, and so on.
In a number of cases, material incentive for confidential collaboration is made not by compensation to the confidential contact, but by funding the organization or group he represents, if this corresponds to the interests of the Soviet Union. Incentive is also provided in the form of commercial deals profitable for the foreigner, through organization of his trips to the USSR at our expense, and so on.

At the same time, payment by “deals” or “tokens” for assignments carried out by the confidential contact or establishment of regularly monetary support, is not allowed, as a rule. Remunerations to confidential contacts are cloaked in a form that does not expose the intelligence nature of the collaboration, does not hurt the pride of the foreigner and does not place into doubt his self-reliance or independence from the intelligence officer.

For establishment and support of confidential relations, the material basis is used in pure form relatively rarely, and often plays a secondary role in combination with ideological-political and mental-psychological grounds.

The mental and psychological basis is also used to attract a foreigner to confidential collaboration in the sense of intelligence. The establishment of confidential relations may foster (often in combination with ideological and political or material bases) notions of prestige, careerism, the foreigner’s indignation at his bosses, a personal disposition to the intelligence officer and so on. At the same time, the use of threats of compromise, also included in the concept of the mental and psychological basis, and any other means of coercion are practically excluded, since confidential collaboration presupposes a total voluntary relationship on the part of the foreigner.

The grounds reviewed for enlistment of foreigners into confidential collaboration are rarely encountered in a ready-made form. Sometimes they are insufficiently developed or appear only as likely tendencies. Among the important tasks of operational cultivation of a foreigner are the development and strengthening, and sometimes the creation of sufficiently reliable and stable grounds of confidential collaboration as well as through appropriate operational tricks.

2. Types, Forms and Methods of Enlistment

The types, forms and methods of enlisting foreigners in confidential collaboration largely coincide with the types, forms
and some methods of recruitment of foreigners as agents; however, they have certain specific features.

Enlistment of foreigners in confidential collaboration, like recruitment as agents, may be carried out under one's own flag (the Soviet flag) or under a false flag. In establishing confidential relations under the Soviet flag, the intelligence officer of a "legal" rezidentura, as a rule, does not reveal his agency affiliation to the foreigner and, consequently, appears under a legend as an employee, or on behalf of official Soviet organizations not connected to the state security agencies. A false flag is used in establishment of confidential relations by officers of illegal rezidenturas, since the consideration of security does not allow for an illegal to appear under the Soviet flag to a foreigner who cannot be securely attached to intelligence.

Enlistment of foreigners in confidential collaboration, like the recruitment of agents, may be carried out in a form of gradual involvement and in the form of a direct offer.

Gradual involvement, especially in work with "legal" rezidenturas is practiced more often. It consists of a more or less prolonged actions on the foreigner for the purpose of his examination, vetting, the creation or reinforcement of the grounds for confidential collaboration and gradual involvement of him in carrying out incrementally more difficult intelligence assignments. In gradual involvement, the foreigner who is a target of operational work does not notice or does not notice immediately the qualitative movements in his relations with the intelligence officer and without noticing it himself is brought to confidential relations.

In some cases, when as a result of gradual involvement, the foreigner has begun to perform intelligence assignments, a conversation may be held with him during which to a permissible degree the results of his collaboration are cited, its mutual usefulness is noted, mistakes and shortcomings are reviewed, directions of further work is outlined, a legend is clarified, certain tradecraft measures are worked out and so on.¹ Such a talk is useful for strengthening confidential relations and for active influence on the process of its further development.

¹ The conducting of such conversations is systematically practiced in the work of divisions involved in intelligence from Soviet territory.
Such a conversation is not obligatory in all cases, however. Sometimes it is more profitable to keep certain things unsaid about the substance of the actual relations between the intelligence agent and the foreigner, so as not to traumatize the foreigner and not provoke feelings of caution in him, and so on.

The involvement of foreigners in confidential collaboration in the form of a direct offer is done only when the foreigner can be studied without entering into personal contact and when, as a result of this study, sufficiently effective grounds for collaboration is determined as well as the interest of the foreigner in maintaining confidential relations with a Soviet representative.

This form is most often used in working with foreigners on Soviet territory, which is explained, on the one hand, by sufficient possibilities for studying the foreigner with the aid of agent and operational and technical means without entering into operational contact with him, and on the other, the limited time for gradual involvement of the foreigner in confidential collaboration. A direct offer enables agreement about the legending of the contact from the very outset, and to introduce certain elements of tradecraft in the organization of meetings, and to reduce in this way the danger of exposure of the nature of the relations between the intelligence officer and the foreigner.

Enlistment in collaboration in the form of a direct offer does not mean definitely reaching an agreement about confidential collaboration at the first meeting and allows for the conducting of several preliminary meetings for re-checking and clarifying previously received information about the foreigner, and also establishing the necessary rapport between the intelligence officer and foreigner and eliminating cautions on the part of the latter. Under any circumstances, however, the nature of the involvement of the foreigner in confidential collaboration in the form of a direct offer consists in a qualitative change of relations between the foreigner and the intelligence officer as a result of direct agreement about this.

In such a case, the practical involvement of the foreigner in intelligence collaboration, in performing intelligence assignments occurs after the formal agreement about it, since the conversation with the foreigner does not validate a collaboration that has begun, but only marks the beginning of its development.

A direct offer of confidential collaboration is most often made in work with a foreigner on USSR territory, when the foreigner...
has been sufficiently studied, but intelligence does not have the
time for his gradual induction into collaboration.

Thus, cultivation of the foreign scientist “Mur,” who had come to
our country for a month through a scientific exchange, was made
on USSR territory. During that period, information had managed to
be collected that indicated Mur was seriously interested in
maintaining contacts with Soviet scientific research institutions
and that his scientific career depended to a significant degree
on the development of these contacts. Using this circumstance,
the decision was made before Mur’s departure from the USSR to
come to an agreement with him about confidential collaboration,
presupposing the receipt from him of classified materials on
several issues of interest to intelligence.

The intelligence officer, once having contacted Mur, under the
appropriate guise requested him to pass on confidential
information to us. Mur gave his consent, promising to collect the
information we needed by his next trip to the USSR. An agreement
was reached at a meeting about confidential collaboration with
Mur; however, this agreement was not nailed down properly and
therefore Mur was not confirmed as a confidential contact. Only
after several subsequent meetings with Mur during his trips to
the USSR, when the necessary information was received from him,
and confidential collaboration became a fact, was Mur confirmed
as a confidential contact.

As for the methods of influencing a foreigner for the purposes of
enlisting him in confidential collaboration, they have a lot in
common with the methods of influence on a foreigner for the
purposes of his recruitment, with the exception of the use of the
method of coercion, since, as has been indicated, the
establishment of confidential relations with a foreign
presupposes total voluntary action on his part. Therefore, in the
process of enlisting a foreigner into confidential collaboration,
only the method of persuasion is used, and in fact the main
attention is given to development of the foreigner’s conscious
interest in confidential collaboration, to the creation of
confidence in him that this collaboration is mutually useful,
does not contradict the foreigner’s civic, work, and party duties
and does not create threats to his safety while complying with
certain conditions ensuring that the relations are kept secret.

Regardless, the inability to apply the method of coercion to
involve a foreigner in confidential collaboration does not mean
that this method cannot be used to some extent in work with him
when confidential collaboration has become a fact and the
foreigner has begun to receive real benefits for himself. In this case, intelligence is in a position to combine the method of persuasion with certain elements of coercion and place pressure on the foreigners, for example, by threatening to end cooperation if the foreigner is genuinely interested in it or weakening the political or material support given to him. Nevertheless, this pressure must always be careful and veiled, and may play only a secondary role compared to the means of persuasion.

Thus, a KGB rezidentura maintained contact with “Nick” who headed a political group that took anti-American positions. In order to enhance the activity of this group, we provided it monetary assistance. The intelligence officer used this circumstance to overcome certain hesitations by Nick in the process of confidential collaboration with us to galvanize his activity in the interests of intelligence. Before giving to Nick the funds he needed to support his group, the intelligence officer learned his plans and intentions in detail, found out the information Nick possessed about the activity of Americans in the target country and so on. When the information was too general in nature, the intelligence officer gave Nick to understand that it would be hard to prove to Moscow the need to support the group he headed, since from his reports it was not visible that it had information deserving attention about the activity of Americans, and therefore about the possibilities for weakening their positions in the country. Posing the question this way did not offend Nick but forced him to work more actively in a direction advantageous to intelligence.

An officer of a Center division maintained confidential relations with “Pedro,” a West European businessman who regularly traveled to the Soviet Union to make deals with Soviet foreign trade organizations. Pedro passed on certain political information and was used to purchase certain models for the scientific-technical intelligence line. At first, Pedro encountered certain difficulties in conducting his business with Soviet foreign trade and the intelligence officer had to help him, which was used to stimulate Pedro’s activity in the interests of intelligence. In time, Pedro’s positions grew stronger, however, and he began to receive orders without the help of the intelligence officer, which had a negative effect on his performance of intelligence assignments.

In that connection, a decision was taken to make an agreement with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade to reject several of Pedro’s deals and drag out negotiations with him on other deals. Pedro was forced to turn to the intelligence officer for advice.
The intelligence officer was sympathetic to Pedro’s difficult situation and promised to give him the necessary help. Meanwhile, he drew his attention to several of the intelligence officer’s unfulfilled requests. This was done while observing the necessary tact and without a direct connection to the difficulties that had arisen in Pedro’s business affairs.

The ruse yielded the necessary results. Pedro began to more actively perform the assignments, and intelligence continued to follow his negotiations with the foreign trade organizations closely, putting the break on their development as needed.

3. Some Features of Cultivation of a Foreigner to Enlist Him in Confidential Collaboration

The process of enlisting a foreigner into confidential collaboration at the appropriate stage of development of relations (at the stage where relations with the foreigner are near to the level of confidential) does not significantly differ from the process of drawing a foreigner into agent collaboration. However, in establishing confidential relations, more cautious and quite limited, specific elements of tradecraft are introduced; less importance is given to obtaining validation in order not to make the foreigner cautious; and the actions and motives of behavior of the intelligence officer at all stages of the cultivation are more carefully legended.

In cultivating a foreigner for the purposes of drawing him into confidential collaboration, the intelligence officer cannot be limited only to bilateral contact with him and rely only on his personal impressions of him. In the process of enlistment of a foreigner into confidential collaboration (just as in the process of a recruitment developmental), all capabilities of the rezidentura and the Center are widely used, including agents and confidential contacts from among foreigners, enlisted persons and contacts of intelligence officers from among Soviet citizens, and also other officers of the rezidentura or territorial agencies of the KGB, officers of the Center’s intelligence apparatus.

It is precisely a diversified use of all forces and capabilities of intelligence in the interests of enlisting a foreigner to confidential collaboration that ensures the achievement of the best results: it enables one to gather more complete character references on the target of operational cultivation; to place on him the influence necessary to intelligence; to create more favorable conditions for the intelligence officer’s establishment of personal contact; to monitor his behavior at various stages of cultivation; to carry out vetting activities, and so on.
As has been noted, the confidential contact remains essentially independent from intelligence, sufficiently not attached to intelligence and does not subordinate himself to intelligence discipline. This does not relieve the intelligence officer of the necessity of taking measures to create at least temporary or relative independence of the foreigner from himself in the process of cultivating him, obtaining validation from him, ensuring the foreigner completes the assignments and fulfills his obligations to the intelligence agent’s cover agency.

Within the framework of confidential relations, the intelligence agent does not manage to achieve the foreigner’s independence from intelligence, or his attachment and subordination to intelligence discipline, as happens with agent relations. The receipt from the foreigner of written or especially documented materials, however, if this cannot be seen totally as a validating moment, creates certain precedents, convinces the foreigner of the possibility and safety of committing similar actions. Gradually, he is trained to view these actions as ordinary, not extraordinary phenomena, and thus he is led to a fuller use of his intelligence possibilities.

Furthermore, the intelligence officer during the process of enlisting the foreigner to confidential collaboration must not overestimate these validations and display excessive persistence in obtaining them, if the foreigner himself is not interested in collaboration, is not convinced of its advisability or regards it painfully and cautiously. Confidential collaboration is ensured not so much by validations as by the foreigner’s confidence in the usefulness of this collaboration for him personally, for his government, party and so on. Therefore, the main accent in the course of cultivating a foreigner must be placed on persuading him of the mutual usefulness of his collaboration with the intelligence officer (and the Soviet institution which the intelligence agent is using as cover) and in the impossibility of his achievement of certain goals without help and assistance from our side.

A foreigner who has been studied, vetted and brought into confidential collaboration is validated as a confidential contact. The right to make such a validation belongs to the proper persons who have the authority for validation of recruitment of foreigners.

In order to validate a foreigner as a confidential contact, the head of the intelligence division addresses a report to the name
of the appropriate official with an attached analytical memo containing information about the target of cultivation and showing the nature of the intelligence relations established with him.

A case of operational cultivation is created on a confidential contact, just as on an agent, in which are gathered all the material about the foreigner and the activities related to him; plans for his use and the results of periodic checks; reports of meetings with him and other documents. The establishment of confidential relations with a foreigner is treated as an operational result and the activity of an operative and the corresponding intelligence division.

IV. PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF WORK WITH CONFIDENTIAL CONTACTS

The fundamental principles of management of confidential contacts has much in common with the principles of management of agents. Such principles in work with agents as ideological commitment, integrity, secrecy, dedication, regularity, specificity, an individual approach, systematic study and vetting extend to work with confidential contacts as well.

There are specific features in the forms and methods of managing confidential contacts, however, which stem from the fact that with confidential relations, the foreigner preserves self-sufficiency and independence from the intelligence officer, is not subordinate to intelligence discipline, and in his actions and behavior is guided by the legal and moral norms of his country and also by his work, party, business or scientific interests. These features influence the methods of receiving information and the carrying out of active measures on a confidential basis, on the means of ensuring the security for the confidential collaboration, to the organization and procedure for holding meetings with confidential contacts, to the behavior of the intelligence officer, taking into account the need to conceal his real agency affiliation, and so on.

1. Influence of Specific Features of Confidential Contacts on the Forms and Methods of Obtaining Information from Them and Making Assignments

One of the features of confidential contacts consists of the fact that unlike agents, as a rule, they deliberately restrict the use of their intelligence capabilities for performing the assignments of intelligence officers. They usually pass on to them not all the information they have in their possession and agree to conduct only those active measures that coincide with their
interests. In trying to keep within the bounds permissibly by legal, moral and other norms, and watching out for their own interests, the confidential contacts may deliberately conceal from the intelligence officer certain of the most secret and especially important information from the intelligence perspective, known to a strictly limited circle of persons, or will report about certain facts and events in a general form without concrete details, thus preserving the appearance of compliance with his civic, work or party duty.

Thus, an intelligence officer of our rezidentura supports confidential relations with “Pierre,” a member of the government of the target country who is a source of information on political issues and a person through whom influence on governmental circles of the country is made to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Pierre passes on the usual important political information of a confidential nature; however, he avoids describing decisions taken at secret government meetings, or speaks of the content of these meetings in the most general expressions. Essentially, the decisions taken at such meetings sometimes have a less confidential nature than other issues which Pierre covers. Pierre explains his position by the fact that he “does not have the right” to disclose the content of issues discussed at closed meetings of the government. As for other confidential information in his possession, he believes it possible to dispose of it at his own discretion, since from a legal point of view it is hard to determine which information he may bring to the attention of Soviet representatives, and which not.

Unlike an agent, a confidential contact cannot ignore the interests of the target with which are connected his work and public position, his material welfare, scientific activity and so on. He not only limits his cooperation with the intelligence officer if it has negative consequences for the target, but furthermore, often he tries to use the very collaboration with the representative of the Soviet institution in the interests of the target by ensuring its political, moral, material or other support on the part of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in cultivating the targets of interest to intelligence, such confidential contacts can play only a supporting role and cannot replace agent penetration.

Thus, “Rem,” a leading official of a scientific research institute brought into confidential collaboration, would systematically pass on confidential information on scientific and technical problems. He avoided dealing with the set of issues which his own scientific research institute was involved,
however. Rem’s position is explained by his concerns that his scientific achievements may be used by the corresponding Soviet institutions and he would lose the primacy in his discoveries. As a result, despite the indisputable value of Rem as a confidential contact, a deep cultivation of the target where he worked turned out to be impossible or little effective.

A confidential contact often passes on only other people’s secrets to an intelligence agent, for example, information about third countries, especially hostile to his own country, or about his political enemies inside the country or inside the party, and so on. At the same time, the confidential contact primarily reports on his own activity, as a rule, on the situation in the political group; on activity advantageous to the government of the target country, which does not put him in a disadvantageous light in the eyes of officials of the Soviet institution. In that case, information coming in from confidential contacts is sometimes deliberately not sufficiently objective, which must be considered in processing it.

For example, a KGB rezidentura maintains confidential relations with “Sem,” a member of the opposition in a political party. Disapproving of the policy of the party leadership, Sem informs our intelligence officer in detail about all the plans, intentions and behind-the-scenes activity of the leadership, starkly characterizing certain of its members, accentuating those elements in the party leadership’s activity that have an anti-Soviet tendency. At the same time, Sem tries to represent the inner party group he leads as loyal to the Soviet Union and advocating development of relations with the USSR, although it is known that in principle he has stood for nationalist positions. Therefore, the rezidentura actively used the information coming from Sem about the official leadership of the party, viewing it as reliable, although there were elements in it of a certain bias. At the same time, information about the opposition group headed by Sem was practically not used.

Naturally, in work with a confidential contact, as in work with an agent, an intelligence officer strives to expand the boundaries of collaborations, to obtain fuller use of its intelligence opportunities. Even so, he does not have sufficient means of influence, since the foreigner retains relative independence from intelligence and is forced to restrict himself in the choice of assignments, and also the forms and methods of influence on the foreigner in order not to expose his affiliation to intelligence. The intelligence officer’s action without calculation of this circumstance can lead to disruption of
confidential relations, to refusal by the foreigner to continue contact with the intelligence officer and to thus harm to intelligence.

Considering the features of confidential contacts reviewed, one cannot rely on systematic receipt from them of documented information or on comprehensive coverage of issues of interest to intelligence in written reports. Confidential contacts pass on documented information, as a rule, only when it is profitable for them to acquaint the intelligence officer with the material. As for written information received from confidential contacts, usually certain problems are covered one-sidedly, not those affecting the interests of the confidential contact’s political group, or which contain only general information requiring clarification during a conversation.

If we are limited to receiving only documented and written information from confidential contacts, then the use of their informational possibilities will be minimal. Deeper and more concrete information from confidential contacts can be obtained only at meetings in person, in the process of substantive conversations, and active discussion of problems of interest to intelligence. Moreover, the intelligence officer must display erudition, the ability to lead the conversation to the topic needed and construct it in such a way as to obtain concrete details of the foreigner’s statements, confirmation of them with the relevant facts, figures, arguments, clarification of the sources of information, and so on.

For these aims, the intelligence officer raises additional questions in a tactful form, expresses doubt about the authenticity of certain elements or regret in connection with the absence of such details which devalues the information. In the course of the conversation, the intelligence agent utilizes in every way the personal features of the foreigner, for example, his ambitiousness, pride, boastfulness, envy, susceptibility to flattery and compliments and so on.

Every conversation with a confidential contact requires thorough preparation – a plan devised in advance taking into account the foreigner’s individual traits; his likely position on the problems of interest to intelligence; a persuasive legending of the intelligence officer’s interest in these problems; knowledge of the intelligence operational environment at the time of the meeting, and so on. Furthermore, the intelligence officer must respond keenly to any unforeseen circumstances that arise in the process of talking with the confidential contact and boldly
introduce the necessary correctives to the plan, displaying creative initiative, flexibility and self-reliance in resolving certain issues.

While in a conversation with a confidential contact, an experienced intelligence officer mentally compiles information reports on an issue of interest to intelligence in order to clearly envision what is still missing in the information obtained from the foreigner; what still requires clarification in order to give the informational report the required specificity, persuasiveness and finality; and in the future, concentrate efforts on clarifying insufficiently concrete or weakly-argued details. Mastery of the art of conducting a conversation with confidential contacts enables their intelligence potentials more fully, significantly exceeding the limits of confidential collaboration which the foreigner consciously or subconsciously tries to establish.

The content and form of the intelligence assignments are significant in confidential contacts. In their content, intelligence assignments for confidential contacts must at least externally correspond to the ideological and political positions, interests and goals of the foreigner, and take into account his attitude toward various political problems, political organizations and groups, and certain government and political figures. The intelligence officer must clearly indicate that the confidential contact cannot perform an assignment that does not correspond to his positions, interests, goals and so on. Moreover, giving the assignment without evaluating these elements may disrupt the confidential collaboration and lead to the loss of the confidential contact.

Thus, the confidential contact “Tor” was successfully used by the rezidentura for getting information about the activity of pro-Chinese elements in the target country. The operative, however, in trying to use Tor’s proximity to the president of the country began to take an excessively open interest in some negative aspects of the president’s activity, especially regarding domestic political issues. Moreover, he had not taken into account that Tor considered the president his protector and counted on his support for promotion at work. The intelligence officer’s interest in the president’s activity began to alarm Tor, and then led to him informing the president about the interest shown in him. The confidence in relations with Tor was disrupted, and further work with him had to be discontinued.
In making assignments, the intelligence officer must ensure the confidential contact fulfills them consciously, conscientiously and upon his own initiative. For that, it is necessary, considering the foreigner's ideological and political positions and interests, to explain to him the substance and meaning of the problems related to the assignment, and convince him that doing each assignment directly or indirectly corresponds to his interests or at any rate does not contradict them.

In form, the intelligence assignments for confidential contacts, especially from the state, political and other prominent figures, cannot be given as commands or ultimatums or without appeal. They must be given to the foreigner in the form of a request, wish, or polite recommendation. The form of giving the assignments must not hurt the foreigner's pride, lower him to the level of a "petty agent," or place in doubt his self-reliance and independence. Even so, the assignments cannot be given casually, as if by the way. In that case, the foreigner may not pay attention to the assignment, and not ascribe it the necessary meaning, which inevitably reflects on the quality of its fulfillment.

At the usual meeting, the intelligence officer is obliged to ask the foreigner about whether a previously given assignment was done, and if it turned out not to be done, to ask the reasons for this, expressing regret or disappointment. Sometimes, it is useful to emphasize that the relevant circles in the Soviet Union attach great meaning to clarifying the questions asked in the assignments and that people there will be quite disappointed if they cannot get the expected answer. It would also be prudent to have the foreigner realize that if he fails, their "common cause" or the interests of the foreigner himself will be harmed. All of this must be done tactfully, without insulting the foreigner, but at the same time, firmly and convincingly enough. Thus, the intelligence officer must constantly train in the foreigner a more responsible attitude toward performing intelligence assignments, regardless of whether they are put in the form of a request, wish, recommendation, and so on.

2. Ensuring Security of the Intelligence Officer's Meeting with the Confidential Contact

One of the most important and difficult problems in the process of working with confidential contacts is the ensuring the security of contact between the intelligence officer and the foreigner. With confidential relations (unlike agent relations), clandestine forms and methods of work peculiar to intelligence
cannot be used to the more or less full extent. Therefore, confidential relations, confidential by nature, are distinguished at the same time by legality or insufficient tradecraft in meetings between the intelligence officer and the foreigner.

Only secret relations, hidden not only from those around the intelligence officer but the foreigner as well may be called confidential. However, in concealing the nature of the relations with the intelligence officer, and the content of the conversations with him, confidential contacts rarely consider it necessary to keep secret the fact of a contact with a Soviet representative in their environs and in many cases do not consider it necessary to use clandestine forms of communication.

Sometimes, the reluctance of the confidential contact to conceal a contact with a representative of a Soviet institution is explained by lack of confidence in the reliability of certain clandestine forms and methods of work; insufficient briefing on the activity of intelligence agencies; overvaluation of constitutional “liberties” or his own invulnerability in connection with his official position, and so on. Moreover, many confidential contacts believe that the use of clandestine forms and methods of work may by themselves be viewed by the country’s authorities as a violation of the law, and qualified as espionage even if during his collaboration with intelligence, the former didn’t cause harm to his own country or the target country.

Often, a confidential contact does not reflect on the issue of concealing his contact with a representative of a Soviet institution or does not see a reason for this. Such a position can be explained by the fact that the intelligence officer’s communications with the confidential contact formally cannot be qualified as intelligence work such as espionage, and outwardly is not distinguishable from ordinary diplomatic, political, civic or commercial activity. The foreigner quite often views the collaboration with the representative of the Soviet institutions as an extension of his official state, political, civic, commercial or other activity and underestimates the influence and the possibility of intelligence agencies causing him harm.

Work with certain confidential contacts is made more difficult by the fact that for political, work, business, prestige or promotional considerations, they may be interested in having their contacts with officials of Soviet agencies or Soviet organizations to be known in certain circles. In such cases, hiding the contact with the confidential contact is practically impossible.
Let us cite the following example as an illustration of this situation.

Confidential contact "Fet," head of a firm, maintained confidential relations with a Soviet intelligence officer, informing him about several economic and scientific and technical issues of interest. Considering the importance of the information coming in from Fet, the rezidentura tried to the extent possible to conceal the fact of contact with him; however, since Fet was interested in getting purchase orders from the Soviet Union, he deliberately spread the news of his contacts with Soviet representatives in government circles in his country, demonstrating his friendly relations with them, often visiting the Soviet embassy, traveling to the USSR, and organizing trips primarily through the potentials of the intelligence agency's cover. Under these conditions, attempts of the rezidentura to hide the contact with Fet were not successful. They had to then make the contact fully legal, while keeping secret the substance of the relations with Fet.

Maintaining tradecraft in the work with confidential contacts is quite a complicated business, requiring flexibility and inventiveness; the ability to combine the collaboration which is confidential in substance with legal forms of work; a sophisticated use of the possibilities for an intelligence agent's cover; strict accounting of the personal traits of the foreigner, his work and social position and so on.

Quite often, due to the impossibility of hiding the fact of contact between an intelligence officer and a foreigner, special attention is paid in work from the positions of the "legal" rezidenturas, just for keeping secret the substance of the relations between them, and to some extent lead astray the enemy's intelligence services regarding the places, times, regularity and frequency of meetings by providing the maximum possible secrecy (above all, on the part of the intelligence agent) for every meeting. This is particularly vital in order to make it more difficult for the intelligence services to determine the substance of the meetings using operational technology. Furthermore, concealing at least some part of the meetings prevents intelligence agencies from picking out the confidential contact from the intelligence officer's other contacts as a result of more intensive work with him. Even so, one must make sure the number and frequency of meetings corresponds to the legend, and to the foreigner's and intelligence officer's official positions.
In order to conceal a meeting from the enemy’s intelligence services, the time and place of each subsequent meeting is set at the previous one. The telephone is not used for these purposes. If the terms of a meeting are made by telephone or mail for some reason (for example, after a temporary loss of communication), then the intelligence officer has a conversation at that meeting only within the limits of the legend. The meeting places, as a rule, are not repeated, and the time is systematically changed. When leaving for the meeting, the intelligence agent carefully, but naturally checks himself and if the appropriate opportunities are available, monitors the foreigner’s travel to the meeting place.

In selecting the meeting place with confidential contacts, also taken into account are correspondence with the legend used in the world with the foreigner, and the foreigner’s and intelligence agent’s official positions, the features of the intelligence operational environment, and customs and norms of behavior accepted in the target country.

On the one hand, the place of the meetings must ensure security for holding confidential, substantive conversations, and on the other, be natural and justified for the intelligence agent and the foreigner and not lead to a thought that they are trying to conceal their contact as some sort of unlawful action.

For example, a KGB rezidentura maintained confidential relations with “Herst,” a parliamentary deputy in the target country, who provided confidential information on political issues and carried out certain active measures on assignment from the rezidentura through his opportunities in parliament. When giving a report in confidence of his collaboration with an official of a Soviet agency, Herst hid his contact with the intelligence officer from those around him and was understanding about trying to maintain certain requirements of tradecraft. Meetings with Herst at first took place in restaurants, in his apartment, and at the intelligence officer’s apartment.

Subsequently, a decision was made to change the place of meetings with Herst, in order to make them more clandestine. But the rezidentura encountered serious difficulties with this, however. During a meeting between the intelligence officer and Herst in a city park, where they were strolling through the lanes of trees, people passing by kept greeting Herst, since he was a prominent politician, and his pictures were constantly published in newspapers. It turned out to be impossible to meet with Herst outside the city, since he did not go on country hikes and his
appearance in the suburbs would be unusual. The rezidentura was forced to hold the meetings in restaurants and other public places, ensuring their security by making agreements ahead of time and having a variety of meeting places.

In working with confidential contacts, the intelligence officer, since he is not in a position to use the arsenal of tradecraft methods, ensures the security of the collaboration, aside from unfailing concealment of the nature of the relations and leading intelligence services astray regarding time, place, frequency and intensity of meetings, mainly through a durable, convincing legend of acquaintance and meetings with the foreigner, and also through sophisticated legending by the foreigner of his actions related to performing his assignments.

In maintaining agent relations, it is always necessary to legend the acquaintance and meetings in person between the foreigner and the intelligence officer, but security for each meeting with the agent is ensured not only by a legend, but special forms and methods of tradecraft. Even so, the legend may be created for a certain situation and for one-time use. For example, a meeting with an agent may be legended as an accidental talk between two strangers, as a one-time contact to decide a certain issue, and so on. Such a legend, which emphasizes the lack of permanent and long-term relations between the intelligence agent and the foreigner is permissible under the condition that there is a strict observation of tradecraft measures as even one meeting may be noted by someone around the foreigner or the enemy’s intelligence service.

In maintaining confidential relations, tradecraft measures are used sparingly and must come from the real possibility of repeated recording of meetings between the intelligence officer and the foreigner both by their acquaintances and the enemy’s intelligence service. In such a situation, a reference to the accidental nature of a contact not only will fail to be convincing but on the contrary, will increase the suspicion regarding its confidential contact.

As a consequence of this, the legend with confidential relations must be persistent, long-term, and rely on a persuasive cover for in fact regular, and sometimes rather intensive meetings between the intelligence officer and the foreigner.

Just as with agent relations, the legend must hold up to qualified testing by enemy intelligence and ensure the possibility of continuing the confidential collaboration even when the enemy finds out about the regular meetings. The
legending of confidential relations must strictly correspond to the official position and real interests of the confidential contact, and the position and nature of the intelligence officer's official activity. In working with confidential contacts on Soviet territory, legending of their travel to the USSR and explanation of the need for such trips are a priority, as well as the sources or possibilities for their financing.

For example, our intelligence officer maintains confidential relations with "Jan," a representative of a commercial firm. With wide connections in political and scientific circles of the country, Jan possesses important intelligence information. He legends his contact with a Soviet representative by business interests and the wish to get orders from Soviet foreign trade organizations. In order to legend the contact, the intelligence officer, appearing as a trade official, was forced to periodically make trade deals for which there was no particular interest from Soviet foreign trade organizations, although in principle they did not contradict the trade and economic interests of the Soviet Union. Attempts by the enemy's intelligence to disrupt Jan's contact with the Soviet representative (a counterintelligence chief had a conversation with him) were decisively rejected. The intelligence officer worked successfully with Jan, since the legend was convincing and intelligence could not make a provocation against Jan, given the position he held and his wide contacts in the country's government circles.

3. Operational Training of the Confidential Contact

The difference between a confidential contact and an agent is determined particularly by the content and volume of the foreigners' operational training in the degree and form of concealment of their contacts with intelligence officers, an agent is trained in both methods of tradecraft and methods of carrying out intelligence assignments. The level and volume of operational training of an agent depends on the degree of his vetting and reliability, and on the assignments he performs. Operational training is given in its most complete form to illegal agents and special agents.

Unlike agents, confidential contacts are instructed in cautious, and as a rule, veiled form primarily about the methods of legending the nature of their contact with the intelligence agent. As for the special methods of performing intelligence assignments, they are not disclosed to the confidential contact
and the foreigner does not undergo any special training on these issues.

This situation is explained by the fact that first, the intelligence officer maintaining contact with the confidential contact cannot openly display professional intelligence knowledge and skills in avoiding exposure of his affiliation to state security agencies. Second, there is no need for the special training of a foreigner collaborating with intelligence at the level of confidential relations, since the tasks he is doing during such collaboration serve as a kind of extension or development of his daily official or unofficial activity.

Thus, an experienced political figure, professional journalist and scientist always obtain certain information in their interests. The intelligence officer can only help them with advice or direct their efforts in the direction needed for intelligence. Merchants providing some samples to intelligence on a confidential basis may also successfully rely on their own experience of commercial activity. No special preparation is required for foreigners with whom confidential relations are maintained, or for the staging of such active measures as the publication of articles, the organization of rallies, meetings, inquiries in parliament, and so on.

Naturally, the inadvisability or lack of opportunity for training confidential contacts on matters of form and method for performing intelligence assignments in no way excludes the comprehensive discussion with them of their form of actions and the methods and ways proposed of solving certain tasks; a thorough planning of intended activities, careful review of security issues, and so on. In instructing the confidential contact, the intelligence officer does not impose ready-made solutions on him, but above all listens to the considerations of the contact on the most advisable forms and methods of performing tasks through asking clarifying questions, expressing doubts about the feasibility of certain actions; analysis of their possible consequences and so on, making correctives in the foreigner’s suggested plan of action; drawing particular attention to issues of security.

4. Stability and Continuity of Confidential Collaboration

Certain difficulties in work with confidential contacts occur in maintaining the stability (persistence) of the collaboration in drastically changing agent and operational environments in the target countries and when severe crisis situations break out.
A vetted agents' network, attached to intelligence and trained in the operative sense must be capable of performing intelligence tasks regardless of the changes in the agent and operational environment, including in a crisis and during a special period. Rejection of this demand of the agents would deprive intelligence of its most effective weapon, and would lead to the impossibility of mobilized planning of intelligence activity and would make intelligence helpless precisely when the authorities have most critical need of intelligence information and the staging of active measures through unofficial channels, since no other intelligence contacts can take the place of an agents' network in that regard.

As for confidential contacts, they collaborate with Soviet employees only in a certain agent and operational environment, and therefore their relations with intelligence officers are in close dependency on that environment. Confidential contacts react with particular sensitivity to such difficulties in the environment that are a consequence of changes in the legal and administrative regulations in their countries, a tightening of the police regimen and judicial practice, an increase in liability for breaking the law, and also a worsening or disruption of relations between the target country and the Soviet Union. Confidential relations depend also on charges in the official situation of the foreigner and his activity, since such factors determine the advisability of collaboration as well, from the foreigner's perspective and the possibilities of legending it, which relates to ensuring his security with it.

Thus, "Albert," an official of the trade ministry, maintained confidential relations with a Soviet intelligence officer, which was legended by the fact that Albert, by dint of his work position, could freely maintain contacts with foreigners to handle work issues. Then Albert was transferred to work in the ministry of economics. Albert's new position widened his informational opportunities; however, officials of the ministry of economics did not maintain official contacts with foreigners, and therefore it became difficult to legend the meetings with the Soviet representative. Attempts to conceal these meetings by certain common personal interests and hobbies failed, since Albert led an insular life and did not have any serious recreational activities which could be the basis of a legend. While preserving his loyal attitude toward the Soviet Union, Albert nevertheless began to fear for his job, and began gradually to reduce the number of meetings with the intelligence officer, expressing worry about his collaboration with him. Contact with Albert had to be temporarily cut off.
In another case, cooperation between a division of intelligence’s central apparat and the KGB’s counterintelligence divisions led to confidential collaboration with “Gnome,” a diplomat of a certain country. Relations between the Soviet Union and this country were developing satisfactorily. Gnome regularly met with an intelligence officer who appeared under the name of a Soviet civic organization, shared with him confidential information about correspondence with his government; about the state of affairs in the diplomatic corps; and about his chats with foreign diplomats.

When Gnome left the USSR, an agreement was reached with him to continue the confidential communication in his country, and the procedure was set to establish contact. However, Gnome’s departure coincided with several changes in the foreign policy orientation of his government, which took on a line unfavorable to the Soviet Union. This immediately reflected on Gnome’s attitude toward collaboration with us. He came to the first meeting, but behaved cautiously, avoiding answers to questions about the situation in his country’s government circles. After that, he totally ceased coming to meetings with the official of the Soviet agency.

The operative who had taken part in enlisting Gnome in confidential collaboration in the USSR traveled to his country and was able to meet with Gnome there. Gnome announced that due to the change in his country’s political line, meetings with Soviet citizens had become possible only for work necessity. It was impossible to explain the meetings by personal interests under these conditions. Therefore, Gnome, in his words, could not find a convincing reason to justify contact with an official of a Soviet institution, although he had not changed his attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

All of this does not mean that with the intelligence operational environment worsening, and the emergence of a crisis, the intelligence officer’s confidential relations with the foreigner are inevitably interrupted. Much depends on how much and in which way these events affect his official situation and concern his personal interests, and on many other factors. Sometimes confidential contacts who hold a high professional or civic position do not interrupt collaboration even during a crisis, at a time when holding meetings with certain agents becomes dangerous. Furthermore, the circumstances arising in the process of the crisis and as a result of it may not only lead to a foreigner dropping confidential collaboration, but also remove
previously existing obstacles to develop relations to the level of an agent.

At any rate, in work with confidential contacts, the intelligence officer must be particularly attentive to the slightest changes in the intelligence operational setting and also to changes in the official status and activity of the foreigners; must carefully analyze the possible influence of such changes on the collaboration; and change the line of his behavior accordingly, taking timely measures to eliminate consequences undesirable for intelligence.

The stability of the confidential collaboration along with other factors also determine the succession of relations, that is, the possibility of handing a foreigner from one intelligence officer over to another for contact, while preserving the previous level of relations. Confidential relations in principle presuppose that the foreigner, after the preparation necessary in each situation, should successfully continue to work with the new intelligence officer without lowering the level of collaboration.

This is explained by the fact that confidential collaboration arises not only on a personal basis, but under the influence of more effective ideological, political, material or mental and psychological factors. As the relations deepen, the foreigner begins to collaborate personally not only with the intelligence officer, but with the government, institution or organization represented by the intelligence officer. Therefore, the change in intelligence officers, although the foreigner is not indifferent to it, must not affect the foundations of the confidential collaboration.

Transfer of the confidential contacts, however, especially after establishing confidential relations, requires careful preparation. The foreigner is imbued with a certain trust in the intelligence officer with whom he began the confidential collaborations; a certain mutual understanding has been established between him and the intelligence officer which not every person achieves, and often requires more or less long association. Moreover, the confidential contact cares about the issues of his security and therefore always prefers the person whom he knows and trusts.

Particular difficulties emerge during the hand-over of confidential contacts acquired in the Soviet Union, to the rezidenturas to contact. A change not only of intelligence officers but conditions of work as well occurs with this. Many foreigners who collaborate with intelligence officers in the USSR
refuse meetings with employees of Soviet institutions in the target country or drastically reduce the level of their cooperation. Therefore, the handover of a confidential contact from one intelligence agent to another is hardly a formality and involves a fairly difficult operation.

The preparation of a confidential contact for transfer to another intelligence officer begins well in advance by convincing the foreigner that the confidential collaboration with him is not the officer’s personal affair, that behind the officer stands the Soviet government, or a certain institution or organization which guarantees the confidence and security of collaboration, regardless of who concretely and where the contact with the foreigner will be maintained. In reporting about his possible replacement, the intelligence officer creates the necessary positive impression about him and exerts such influence on the foreigner as needed to preserve the confidential collaboration at the previous level.

The transfer of the confidential contact takes place painlessly in those instances when the new intelligence officer was previously known to the foreigner. Sometimes, such familiarity under the appropriate legend must be organized in advance, in order to determine the foreigner’s opinion about the officer to whom he is being handed over. When intelligence is dealing with a major and influential government or public figure who visits the Soviet embassy in the target country and is familiar with a certain circle of Soviet representatives, as a confidential contact, he may be offered to name the person with whom he would like to continue the contact within the framework of confidential collaboration.

Thus, when the necessary preparation is made, the transfer of a confidential contact from one intelligence officer to another is made without serious damage to the performance of intelligence tasks, if, of course, the second officer is equal to his predecessor in professional and personal qualities.

5. Study and Vetting of Confidential Contacts and Their Instruction

One of the inevitable principles in work with confidential contacts, just as in work with agents is the constant study and vetting of the foreigners. Study of confidential contacts neither in form nor in substance differs from the study of agents. The vetting of confidential contacts, however, has certain specific features.
In vetting confidential contacts, intelligence cannot use strictly intelligence means and methods. This makes vetting of the confidential contacts more difficult.

However, the situation is eased by the fact that confidential contacts frequently are widely-known government, political, and civic figures; a lot of information on them can be obtained through agents, other confidential and "legal" contacts, from the press and other official sources and also through analysis of their activity, information coming in from them, and their attitudes toward the assignments, advice and recommendations of the intelligence officer. There are wide possibilities for vetting confidential contacts in the Soviet Union, where intelligence, using various agent and operative and operational-technical and other means is able to conduct very effective vetting measures.

For example, in order to cultivate the foreign scientist “Brem” inside the Soviet Union, agents and confidential persons were drawn from among Soviet citizens who were tasked with studying the target through operational work. In addition, an illegal intelligence officer posing as a foreigner was planted near Brem. With the help of operational-technical means, all Brem’s contacts in the Soviet Union were detected, including among the officers of his country’s embassy; recordings were made of his conversations with him; and, a number of important facts were gleaned from his correspondence. On the whole, the materials accumulated on Brem in the course of several months enabled a fairly full picture to be compiled of his ideological and political views, his character traits, his habits and inclinations, and a grounded conclusion could be made on the prospects for enlisting him in confidential collaboration.

One of the most important elements of managing confidential contacts is their systematic instruction. The main purposes of instruction are to reinforce or inculcate the Marxist-Leninist worldview, as well as the correct understanding of the patterns of social development, a conviction of the rightness of the cause for which the Soviet Union and other countries in the socialist alliance are fighting, and to make these foreigners our friends and like-minded colleagues.

Few foreigners who have given consent to confidential collaboration with us are prepared to accept the Marxist-Leninist worldview and become like-minded with us. Intelligence uses people in its interests of different political beliefs including adherents to the bourgeois ideology and those who do not share
the ideas of communism. Accordingly, the goals of instructive work may be diverse and in many cases limited.

In work with foreigners who do not and cannot share our worldview, attention is paid to the development and deepening in them of ideas of the fight for peace, social progress, democratic reforms, national liberation, and against imperialism, neocolonialism, petty bourgeois opportunism, and so on. In all cases, however, the intelligence officer speaks from the positions of a convinced Marxist-Leninist, consistently conveying the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, insistently explicating the foreign policy principles of the Soviet government, persuading the foreigner of the rightness and nobility of those tasks which are done while in confidential collaboration with it.

The instructive work with the confidential contacts can take different forms. Most often, this work is done during conversations with the foreigners and exchange of opinions on relevant political issues, by analysis of current events, discussion of ideological and political positions of certain parties, groups and political figures, exposure of bourgeois propaganda, dissection of the flaws of capitalist society, systematic explanation of the successes and achievements of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist alliance, the policy of the CPSU and fraternal communist and workers’ parties.

In conducting talks of an instructional nature, the intelligence office should not display obsessiveness, allow a didactic, mentoring tone or rely on common clichés. His statements must be argued persuasively, backed up by facts well known to the foreigner, but at the same time be notable for their originality and novel exposition. The conversation should be held in a benevolent spirit, in the form of an exchange aloud of opinions or judgement.

In dealing with a person of bourgeois views, the intelligence officer must display tolerance to his mistaken positions but should not make ideological compromises with him. Any “playing along” with the foreigner on fundamental ideological issues not only will fail to strengthen relations with him, but on the contrary, may undermine respect and trust in the intelligence officer.

Instructive work may be held also by handing the foreigner relative literature to read with a subsequent discussion of what was read, and also through inviting the foreigner to a show of Soviet or progressive foreign films, to exhibits, lectures,
debates, meetings and so on that are advantageous to us in the ideological sense. A visit by confidential contacts to the Soviet Union has important significance in instructive work, since proper organization of such activities yields a more visible and impressive view of our achievements and the advantages of the socialist system.

Ideological and political instruction of confidential contacts is the main content of educational work with them. But along with this, the officer must pay attention to cultivating such qualities as honesty, reliability, diligence, conscientiousness, punctuality, and so on.

Educational work with confidential contacts must not be conducted sporadically, from time to time. This work must be done systematically and is a component of every activity conducted by the intelligence officer with the confidential contact.

6. The Intelligence Officer's Concealment of Affiliation to State Security Agencies

One of the features of work with confidential contacts consists of the fact that when establishing and maintaining relations, the intelligence officer, as a rule, does not disclose to the foreigner his affiliation to state security agencies and does not allow such actions that are of an intelligence nature and are peculiar only to intelligence. In the eyes of the foreigner, confidential relations must have the appearance not of intelligence, but political, party, commercial or scientific collaboration.

In order to more effectively use the foreigner's possibilities, while maintaining confidential relations with him, the intelligence officer may to a certain degree, deviate from his official rights and duties, interest himself in issues not related to his cover work, and take actions which to some degree overstep his authority in accordance with his official position. However, not all the intelligence officer's deviations from his official rights and duties while maintaining confidential relations with a foreigner should go beyond the bounds of political, party, commercial and scientific interests, even if they are "special" and are not openly related to intelligence.

Sometimes a confidential contact understands, proceeding from the subject of the questions of interest to the intelligence officer that to some degree he is going beyond his official position. In fact the foreigner himself, once embarked on confidential collaboration, may take up such issues which he would not have
been in a condition to address within strictly official relations, but nevertheless, he does not want to admit to himself that he is dealing with an intelligence officer and as a result of that, committing an illegal act. In explaining his actions and the motives for his behavior through official interests, he prefers for the intelligence officer for his part not to construct similar conceptions but on the contrary, to help the foreigner justify his actions through noble reasons, and not conforming the illegality of his actions.

Conscious or unconscious admission by the intelligence officer of the fact that the foreigner’s collaboration with him goes beyond the bounds permissible by the law, may mentally traumatize the foreigner, making the justification of his actions to himself more difficult. It is especially impermissible for the intelligence officer to break cover to confidential contacts when the officer does not consider it possible or advisable to use agent methods of work in the target country or with the cultivation of a target of interest to intelligence, deliberately does not deepen the confidential relations with foreigners for political reasons. Such an exposure, causing political harm to the interests of the Soviet government, cannot be justified by operational considerations.

Naturally, the demand not to allow the exposure of intelligence officers to confidential contacts should not be absolute. In the difficult and complex situations which you sometimes encounter in intelligence work, you cannot get by without some exceptions, especially when the confidential relations, at the level of operational development, come directly closer to agent relations. For example, the issue of exposure of the intelligence officer to the confidential contact does not make sense if the officer is speaking as an official representative of Soviet state security and works in the advisory office of the local security service.

Conscious or deliberate exposure is allowable even in the work of an intelligence officer in the cover agency. In practice, there are situations, particularly when major political figures of foreign states become more open, where they begin to understand that they are dealing with a representative of an organization which most strictly keeps the secrets entrusted to it. However, the question about the possibility of an intelligence officer’s exposure must be resolved as an exception, and not by the officer himself, but only with the Center’s permission.

Thus, the intelligence officer, in maintaining confidential relations with foreigners, may in the interests of his
operational tasks deviate without the Center’s permission from his rights and duties defined by his cover or legend only to such an extent that is justified by his official position and does not lead to his exposure as a Soviet state security officer. The inadmissibility of breaking the intelligence officer’s cover to confidential contacts requires of him the corresponding tact, sense of proportion, flexibility and fine art in performing intelligence tasks. In that sense, work with confidential contacts is no less difficult and sometimes more difficult than work with agents and may be successfully conducted by officers who have the relevant experience of work with foreigners.

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Confidential relations are one of the forms of intelligence relations. Intelligence uses them along with agent relations. As has been noted, intelligence, even when the relevant opportunities are present, sometimes for political or operational considerations does not take the development of relations with certain foreigners to the agent stage and stabilizes them at the level of confidential.

In intelligence work, in cultivating a recruit, sometimes you are forced to limit yourself to confidential relations only because it turns out to be impossible to complete the development of the recruit. This can be a consequence of an insufficiently effective basis for agent collaboration, and also the consequence of the foreigner’s lack of preparation for agent collaboration in the mental and psychological sense. Or the foreigner has not been sufficiently studied and intelligence has not yet made up its mind to risk his recruitment until additional data are obtained.

If in these cases intelligence nevertheless considers it necessary to take the matter to the recruitment of the foreigner, then in working with him as a confidential contact, it continues to develop confidential relations with the aim of turning them into agent relations. Even so, attention is paid to deeper study of the foreigner, to the development and increase in an effective basis for collaboration, to removing the foreigner’s hesitations, if provoked, for example, for mental and psychological reasons. This is achieved in the process of his performance of intelligence assignments.

As a result of the measures conducted by intelligence, confidential relations may gradually, and unnoticed by the foreigner, grow into agent relations. As a result, the foreigner is validated through the established procedure as an agent and
included in the agents' network, and in fact a special recruitment talk with him may not be conducted.

For example, an intelligence officer of a KGB rezidentura maintained confidential relations with Magister, an employee of a scientific research center on the basis of his loyal attitude toward the USSR and his interest in scientific cooperation with Soviet scientific research institutes. Magister passed on information about certain designs at the research center, made on orders from government agencies. The contact with Magister was done through holding meetings in person in his country, in third countries, and in the USSR.

In order to provide security and persistence in the communications, the Soviet intelligence agent gradually introduced certain elements of tradecraft: at first certain conventions were used in correspondence between Magister and the Soviet scientific research institutes; then a system of signals in the country where Magister lived was established. Magister was paid "honoraria" for materials he sent in; due to his wife's illness, one-time assistance for treatment was given and a signature was obtained.

Magister's growing dependence on intelligence enabled us to turn to him with a request to hand over copies of a specific classified report, which required direct violation of the relevant administrative and legal regulations by Magister and could have led to his judicial prosecution. After some hesitation, Magister consented to fulfill the intelligence officer's request. Magister was given a rather large monetary compensation for handing over the report, with his signature registered. In order to maintain contact with Magister in third countries, a safe house with a code word and response was installed. Magister made contact three times in the third country using the conditions of the safe house, displaying the necessary discipline, which was recorded by counter-surveillance. After that, coded communication terms were established with him in his country. Magister began to be given more difficult assignments which he performed, as a rule, carefully.

The intelligence officers who worked with Magister in the USSR and abroad did not disclose to him their affiliation to intelligence, but he could not help but realize that he was dealing with an intelligence organization. In this connection, it became necessary to transfer Magister to the agent category. At the next meeting with him in the Soviet Union, a discussion was held during which satisfaction was expressed with his
collaboration, the increase in tradecraft was noted, clarifications were made about the terms for communication, and the list of issues was defined which he was to systematically obtain and transmit information to us. The conversation was not a recruitment talk in the full sense of the word, but it enabled the work to be summarized, to reinforce relations at the level actually achieved, and bring clarity into the relation between Magister and intelligence. After this talk, Magister was confirmed as an agent and included in the agents’ apparat.

The transfer from confidential relations to agent relations may occur as a result of a kind of jump in the development of these relations influenced by an acute change in the intelligence operational environment or the official situation of the foreigner and also as a result of objective and subjective conditions emerging in the foreigner’s country or in his personal life (a severe internal political or foreign political crisis; a change of regime in the country; military danger; the threat of dismissal, bankruptcy and so on). When such circumstances arise, intelligence may conduct a recruitment activity and sway the foreigner toward agent collaboration.

This situation was confirmed by the following example.

"Khasan," a civic figure in a country friendly to us, was enlisted in confidential collaboration on an ideological and political basis. He was used to receive political information and to conduct influence actions needed by intelligence. Meetings with Khasan were held during his trips to the USSR on behalf of his civic organization, and in his own country, to which our intelligence officer traveled periodically.

A coup d'état took place in Khasan’s country, however, as a result of which reactionary forces came to power which embarked on the path of anti-Sovietism and the environment changed drastically.

Since Khasan had managed to retain positions that were of interest to intelligence, and his sincerity with regard to us did not provoke doubts, a decision was made to recruit him. When Khasan managed to travel to the USSR through a third country, the intelligence officer, who appeared to him in the name of a neutral Soviet agency and who hid his affiliation with intelligence, learned his sentiments, his attitude to the reactionary regime established in the country and enabled another operative to be brought into the development of the recruit, who conducted the recruitment talk and offered Khasan collaboration for the purpose of battling with the regime established in his
country. A clear picture of Khasan’s political positions and sentiments and a successful choice of the moment of recruitment enabled the operative to move relations with him to agent status.

In making the transfer of confidential to agent relations, however, it must be noted that if the confidential contact and the intelligence officer were in communication for a long time, the enemy’s intelligence services may know about it. Therefore, special measures must be taken to vet the foreigner for the purpose of determining whether he is under observation by the enemy’s intelligence or not, and to conceal this contact in accordance with the requirements for agent relations. If there is no certainty about whether the foreigner is under the enemy’s observation, then it is not advisable, as a rule, to move to agent relations with him.

CONCLUSION

Confidential contacts, as one of the means of foreign intelligence by the Committee of State Security under the USSR Council of Ministers are used constantly. Moreover, given the regularity of use, due to the necessity, advisability and opportunity, the scale of use of confidential contacts is thus growing as well, directly proportionate to the degree of the development of political, economic, trade, scientific, cultural and other relations between the Soviet Union and other countries. The conclusion can be made that as such relations increase, the role and significance of confidential contacts in the activity of intelligence will grow.

The difficulty and specific nature of intelligence activity makes for particular demands on Soviet intelligence officers. The qualities and professional skills indispensable for an intelligence officer are developed in the process of training intelligence cadres in special educational institutions and are perfected in performing intelligence assignments.

The training of intelligence officers is multi-faceted. In principle, every intelligence officer who passes through the relevant training and who possesses the necessary set of professional knowledge, abilities, and skills is capable of successfully working with both agents and confidential contacts. In practice, however, sometimes we find that some intelligence officers display a great inclination toward agent work and do not always successfully maintain contacts with foreigners at the level of confidential relations, even as others obtain significant successes precisely in the work of establishing confidential relations and in running confidential contacts. This
is explained by the fact that acquiring confidential contacts and maintaining communications with them have their properties compared to agent work and in that regard, certain specific requirements are made of the intelligence officer. These features are determined particularly by the following factors:

First, candidates for enlistment in confidential collaboration are selected, as a rule, from among foreigners who have a more or less high professional and social position in their countries, who are in many cases political or government figures, prominent media workers; and major specialists in the fields of sciences of interest to intelligence. These persons are usually relatively independent, enjoy significant authority, popularity and respect in their milieu, are able to dispose people well toward them, have influence on them, and guide them. Naturally, work with such a category of foreigners requires high political, general educational and professional training by the intelligence officer; experience in working with people; abilities to freely get their bearings in complicated political processes, and economic and scientific-technical problems.

The intelligence officer, in working with a confidential contact, must be competent above all in the issues which directly interest intelligence and form the purpose of confidential collaboration. He must be in a position to hold conversations with the foreigner on major fundamental problems of a political, economic and scientific nature, displaying the necessary erudition, self-reliance and breadth of thought. Along with this, he must possess the ability to critically assess information reported to him, with good arguments, and with dignity and tact explain the fallacy of the foreigner’s mistaken claims. Deep knowledge of problems which make up the content of confidential collaboration must be combined with the ability to conduct discussions on various topics of issues interesting to the confidential contact, including those about which there is and cannot be no mutual understanding with the foreigner due to the difference in ideological positions. Moreover, the intelligence officer must not drive the foreigner away with his negative attitude toward his ideological and political views, but at the same time, must not make ideological concessions. He is obliged to attain the foreigner’s respect for his ideological and political positions.

Second, the confidential contact, in cooperating with the intelligence officer who is appearing as a representative of a Soviet institution (or with a Soviet institution used by intelligence as a cover) strives not to formally violate legal and administrative regulations, trying to combine his relations
with the intelligence officer (or with the cover institution used by intelligence) with the obligations to his government, institution, firm, organization and so on. This requires that the intelligence officer knows the laws of the foreigner’s citizenship and residence in detail, which relate to the preservation of state, institutional and company secrets and to the procedure for citizens of this country to communicate with foreigners.

He must clearly realize what he may expect from this foreigner within the framework of legal and administrative regulations in effect, customs and traditions without a significant threat to his interests and without risk of his criminal prosecution. He must know the strong and weak sides of the law and judicial practice in order to find opportunities to circumvent legal restrictions and also convincingly explain those actions and behaviors which border on violation of legal and administrative regulations and go beyond the bounds of what is permitted by them.

Thirdly, confidential contacts, beginning to collaborate with Soviet representatives or an institution are guided by their political, scientific, business and other interests and therefore try to look at the confidential collaboration as two-way and gain from the Soviet representative the information, advice and recommendations they need on the questions of interest to them. Yet sometimes they need political, scientific, material and other support not only for themselves, but for the institutions or organizations they represent as well. Therefore, certain issues which must be decided with confidential contacts go beyond the bounds of the intelligence officers’ competency, and sometimes even intelligence as a whole. This requires a deep understanding by the intelligence officer of the tasks of intelligence, the interests of the Soviet Union, the ability in each individual case to find the decision that would correspond to the policy of the Soviet government and not compromise the intelligence officer in the eyes of the confidential contact as an incompetent person.

Fourth, confidential contacts do not totally utilize their intelligence capabilities, transmit information primarily in verbal form, often avoiding specifics and references to its sources. This requires from the intelligence officer a great art in conducting conversations with the confidential contact, flexibility and inventiveness in asking questions, and the ability to direct the conversation in the necessary direction.
Fifth, confidential contacts preserve relative independence from intelligence agents and do not subordinate themselves to intelligence discipline. The intelligence officer working with a confidential contact, as a rule, does not have at his disposal the means of coercion; in the best case, he has extremely limited means. Under these conditions, the intelligence officer, for successful management of a confidential contact and the most effective use of him in the interests of intelligence may rely above all on his art of persuasion. For this, it is necessary to analyze deeply the psychology of the personality; to be able to create the necessary psychological situations; to detect in time various nuances in the behavior of the target of operational development and remove or neutralize undesirable elements of his behavior. The intelligence officer must know the structure and patterns of interpersonal relations; to be able to create a psychological climate favorable for himself; to ensure, through sophisticated use of his "role" the necessary psychological compatibility and interest by the target of operative development in communication with him.

Sixth, confidential contacts do not receive operational training and therefore they are not compatible with the more effective and secure methods of performing intelligence assignments and concealment of their actions in the interests of intelligence. In work with them, intelligence forms and methods are not used, which requires an especially thorough and convincing legending of the contacts.

Seventh, the intelligence officer cannot break cover to the confidential contact as a representative of intelligence, although he must perform its tasks. The intelligence officer, in working with confidential contacts, must operate on the border between legal and illegal. If he wishes to give more complete instruction on questions of security; to ensure the maximum concealment of the contact; to obtain more complete and more secret information, the intelligence officer inevitably goes beyond the bounds of what is permitted at the level of confidential relations and creates a threat of his exposure. All of this requires special professional training, rapid and flexible thinking, inventiveness and a sense of limits.

Here only some of the features of work with confidential contacts have been enumerated, but even this is enough to become convinced of the high and specific demands which the intelligence officer must meet in maintaining contact with them.
The qualities necessary for an intelligence officer for successful work with confidential contacts, just as the abilities of the person in general, are manifested and developed in the process of training intelligence cadres in the educational institution and in practical work as the relevant experience is accumulated. The intelligence officer’s constant striving for improvement of his intelligence qualification, regular, deep and self-critical analysis of his actions while working with foreigners, bold admission and consideration in future work of mistakes and lapses permitted in the first periods are a reliable guarantee of development of the necessary qualities and capabilities and achievement of success in intelligence activity in any of its lines.