Martin Malek

Austrian political scientist, teacher

Aug 20, 2020
The (Geo-)Political Aspects of Austrian-Russian Business Relations, Part II

The first part of this article is available here.
This article is a part of the first issue of the Kremlin’s Influence Quarterly.

You can also download this piece as a PDF.

5. Austria’s Role in the Nabucco and South Stream Pipeline Projects

The Nabucco pipeline was the EU’s flagship project with regard to the energy resources of the Central Asia and Caucasus Region. It could have brought gas from the Georgian-Turkish and/or Iraqi-Turkish border, respectively, to the gas hub in Baumgarten without passing through Russia. OMV was the head company of this project; the other partners were the Bulgarian Energy Holding, Turkey’s Botas, Germany’s RWE, Hungary’s FGSZ (a 100 percent subsidiary of the oil and gas group MOL), and Romania’s Transgaz. As initially assumed, Nabucco would cost an estimated EUR 8 billion, a figure revised to EUR 12–15billion. The 3,300-kilometer-long pipeline should have gone into operation in 2013 and reach a capacity of 31 billion cubic meters of gas (10 percent of EU-27 gas imports in 2005) by 2020. But especially since the fall of 2011, prospects for Nabucco appeared to be dwindling due to several reasons. Thus, the amount of non-Russian gas needed to fill Nabucco did not materialize; so several alternative projects, with a reduced Nabucco West pipeline among them, were under consideration.

Moscow did not want Nabucco to be built from the very beginning and did its best to derail it. An important initiative in this context was the South Stream pipeline, intended to transport gas from the Central Asian and Caucasus region. This pipeline, with a capacity of 63 billion cubic metres of gas per year, is proposed to run from southern Russia under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, then bifurcate to cross several other countries for Italy and Austria.

Russia’s opposition to Nabucco was, of course, well known throughout the entire EU. Austrian Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann (Social Democratic Party) assured then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in November 2009 in Moscow that Nabucco is not directed against Russia.

Moscow wanted to involve Austria in South Stream at all costs, and Vienna did not take long to be persuaded. In April 2010, an Austrian-Russian intergovernmental agreement and a Gazprom-OMV cooperation agreement to bring Austria into the project were signed. Putin made it clear in Vienna it would be “realized no matter what.”[1] At the occasion of Austria’s accession to South Stream, Russian news agency RIA Novosti highlighted a “big victory for Russia and a major blow to Nabucco”[2]—which, again, left no doubt that South Stream was, above all, planned as a “Nabucco-stopper.” On 21 February 2011, Gazprom’s CEO Aleksey Miller announced in Moscow that his company and OMV had officially registered a joint venture to build and operate the Austrian section of South Stream. Its planned Austrian route practically duplicated Nabucco’s (and therefore the EU’s) envisaged route, from Hungary to the Nabucco terminal at Baumgarten.

The main supply planned for Nabucco was to be Shah Deniz natural gas field in the South Caspian Sea, off the coast of Azerbaijan. But after the Shah Deniz consortium took the decision to prefer the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline over Nabucco for its exports, the Nabucco plan was finally aborted in June 2013.

South Stream was expected to cement Gazprom’s influence over south eastern European gas deliveries. EU member-states Bulgaria and Greece are heavily dependent on Russian supplies. In 2014 the European Commission challenged South Stream on the basis of the EU’s Third Energy Package (according to this legislation, adopted in 2009, a gas company cannot own a pipeline that supplies its gas) and threatened legal action against Bulgaria. This led to the cancellation of South Stream. The Commission accused South Stream of violating EU law regarding the access of competitors to the pipeline. After the cancellation, Gazprom quickly unveiled an alternative route. The new pipeline, called TurkStream, was designed to deliver 33.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas—half of which is intended for the Turkish market while the other half is slated for the Balkans and further to Central Europe. The new Russian pipeline through the Black Sea to Turkey was inaugurated on 8 January 2020 at a lavish ceremony in Istanbul. Austria’s Baumgarten gas hub could be a key European transit point for Russian gas that flows through the TurkStream pipeline to Turkey (circumventing Ukraine) and on to the EU. Before TurkStream gas can end up in the continent, however, Gazprom will have to build a pipeline that connects this pipeline to the EU network.

6. RosUkrEnergo, Firtash, Mogilevich, and Raiffeisen

In 2004, the Centragas Holding AG, registered in Vienna and controlled by the pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarch Dmitry Firtash, teamed up with Gazprom to establish Swiss-registered RosUkrEnergo, or RUE, to exclusively import Central Asian gas to Ukraine. Firtash and Gazprom roughly split the ownership of RUE. Firtash’s share was held in trust for some time by the Austrian Raiffeisen Investment AG, or RIAG (a subsidiary of Raiffeisen Zentralbank). Given that Gazprom was then and still is controlled by the Russian Government, observers speculated that Firtash had cultivated strong ties to Putin’s inner circle in order to make RUE operational.

RUE then bought billions of dollars’ worth of cheap natural gas mainly from Turkmenistan, mixed it with expensive gas from Russia and resold it at significantly marked-up prices inside Ukraine. Critics, however, pointed out there was no purely economic reason to use the services of an intermediary in the gas trade between the former Soviet republics. It soon became clear that RUE was nothing more than a shell to siphon off profits. And the press started to speculate about ties of alleged gangster boss Semion Mogilevich to RUE. In April 2006, Raiffeisen International CEO Herbert Stepic “strictly” denied that “we came close to organized crime.” According to him, there was no “proximity [of Raiffeisen] to Mr. Mogilevich.” At this occasion, Stepic, however, declined to say for whom RIAG held its share in RUE. But he insisted that all relevant authorities in the Ukraine and Russia would know who was behind it.[3]

Raiffeisen had RUE checked by Kroll Inc., a renowned US consulting firm with good links to the intelligence community. The bank had been certified that the business relationship was unobjectionable. But finally, Raiffeisen severed all ties with RUE. As to the “relevant authorities” in Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchinov, head of the Security Service of Ukraine, or SBU, was convinced that RUE was indirectly controlled by Mogilevich. Ukraine’s then Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (a gas-business insider in her own rights) said after 2006 repeatedly that she had “documented proof that some powerful criminal structures are behind RUE company.”[4] In 2009, Ukraine and Russia agreed to stop using intermediaries, referring to RUE, which was liquitated between 2014 and 2016.

The contacts between Firtash and Mogilevich were discussed for a while in some Austrian and international media outlets. According to a cable from the US Embassy in Kyiv on 10 December 2008, Firtash admitted at a meeting with Ambassador Bill Taylor, which had taken place shortly before, that he had “ties” with Mogilevich, but they were “not close.”[5] Later Firtash denied having said this and assured that he had been “misunderstood.” Be that as it may, in 2010, Ukraine elected pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych president. Firtash was one of the main Ukrainian oligarchs who had financed Yanukovych’s campaign, which was also supported by the notorious US lobbyist and political consultant Paul Manafort.

In 2013, Firtash was charged by the US Justice Department with having overseen a criminal enterprise which paid millions in bribes to both state and central government agencies in India in order to obtain mining licenses. He was arrested by Austrian police in Vienna weeks after Yanukovych had fled Kyiv on 22 February 2014. Firtash’s contacts in the Kremlin must have been excellent because the bail of EUR 125 million, which was due for his release, came from Russia: it was within a few days (!) paid by Russian billionaire Vasily Anisimov.Therefore, it was not really surprising that Firtash remained pro-Russian also in view of Putin’s war against his homeland Ukraine.

Firtash is still in Vienna after six years and fighting against his extradition to the United States—with the assistance of a “cohort of attorneys, PR consultants and lobbyists on both sides of the Atlantic.”[6] The best-known jurist working for Firtash is Dieter Böhmdorfer (2000–2004 Austria’s Minister of Justice, nominated by the Freedom Party, of which he was not a member).

7. Former Austrian Top Politicians and Managers at the Service of Russia

On 14 February 2005 then German Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (Social Democratic Party) received Oleg Deripaska for a dinner with German and Russian entrepreneurs, although the German Foreign Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND) had expressly warned against the Russian oligarch. An official of the German Federal Chancellery noted: “According to BND reports there are indications of [Deripaska’s] links with organized crime that go beyond the ‘normal level of dubious business methods’ for top representatives of the Russian economy.”[7] In 2007 Deripaska, who at times was Russia’s richest person and is noted for his close ties with Putin, acquired a large stake in Vienna-based Strabag, one of the largest construction companies in Europe. Its then boss Hans Peter Haselsteiner responded very emotionally to the question about Deripaska’s—benevolently formulated—controversial reputation: “Europeans and Americans have no reason whatsoever to point the finger [at Russia]: Russia has completely redistributed its national wealth in less than twenty years, without bloodshed. America has needed three generations of lawlessness and a great civil war for this; Europe has needed two revolutions and two world wars.” And addressed to the then US vice president (who wasn’t actually up for discussion at all), Haselsteiner declared: “I’d rather do business with Oleg Deripaska than with Dick Cheney,”[8] who, however, has not been known to have wanted to cooperate with Haselsteiner. Haselsteiner’s position regarding Putin’s Russia was also, and especially, fuelled by his desire to do profitable business there. Strabag then built the Olympic Village and the airport for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, among many other things in Russia. According to figures from 1 January 2019, 25.9 percent of Strabag was owned by Cyprus-registered Rasperia Trading, which belongs to the Deripaska-controlled diversified industrial group Basic Element.

The Chairman of Strabag’s Supervisory Board is Austria’s former (2007–2008) Federal Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer (Social Democratic Party), who had no experience in the construction business prior to this appointment in 2010. Another interesting member of this Supervisory Board is (since June 2018; he will leave in 2020) the Russian national Oleg Kotkov, a Soviet and Russian military officer-turned-banker. He graduated from two Soviet Military Academies. From 2003 to 2007, he was Military Adviser at the Permanent Mission of Russia’s Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, in Vienna. From 2016 to 2018, he was adviser to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Russian PJSC Asian-Pacific Bank.

Haselsteiner was a MP for the Liberal Forum from 1994 to 1998 and financed it afterwards, as well as the liberal party NEOS, which is represented in the National Council since 2013. The ideology of these parties was and is respectively very far away from Putin’s or Deripaska’s. Nevertheless, Haselsteiner declared to “admire” Putin, whom he has met several times. Haselsteiner’s willingness to converge on opinions that he considered to be widespread in Russia was reflected, among other things, in his statement about a “Jewish network” among Russian oligarchs in which he “did not want to interfere.”[9] Such statements, which were largely ignored in Austria, can hardly be read otherwise than by the intention to “fish for compliments” in Putin’s Russia. In Austria, at least publicly nobody noticed that Haselsteiner and then Freedom Party leader Heinz-Christian Strache, regardless of the enmity between them (Haselsteiner believes that for Strache he represents an “enemy image”[10]), share the same—largely favorable—opinion about Putin’s rule.

In interviews Haselsteiner considered it a serious mistake that the EU had “allowed” NATO’s “rapid eastward expansion.” Instead, an attempt should have been made to bring Russia into the EU. “Putin could have been won over. That would have made Europe great.” But all this, Haselsteiner believed, had been thwarted by “the Americans and NATO,” and “the Europeans” had followed suit “in their naivety.” For the United States, there were two very bad scenarios: “A united Europe including Russia” and a functioning euro.[11] Haselsteiner thus disclosed a complete ignorance of even the basic concepts of Russian foreign and integration policy, distorted the facts (for example, EU and NATO are completely different organizations, so one cannot prevent the enlargement of the other; and post-Soviet Russia has at no time shown any interest in joining the EU, which would be completely unrealistic anyway due to the size of the country), and propagated conspiracy theories. But at least, one learned from such interviews what Haselsteiner “geopolitically dreamed” of—namely a “united Europe together with Russia,” which is opposed to the US. And coincidence or not, this is also one of the most important goals of Putin’s foreign and military policy.

Only exceptionally did Haselsteiner express somewhat more sceptical views about Russia: “I very much regret that the Putin regime is moving further and further away from the rule of law [. . .] and leaves us no choice but to impose sanctions.” But “nevertheless Russia remains an important European nation and a promising market for the construction industry.” Haselsteiner continued that this is in his interest and has “nothing to do with Russian efforts to strengthen the [political] right in Europe, destabilize Europe and denigrate the EU.” This was, according to Haselsteiner, reprehensible despite the economic interests.[12] And he, of course, maintained his cooperation with Deripaska.

Siegfried Wolf is one of the most internationally renowned Austrian managers. For him, Deripaska is an “upright, obliging and good entrepreneur.”[13] Wolf had introduced Deripaska to Strabag in Vienna. And at Deripaska’s request, Wolf became a member of Strabag’s Supervisory Board in 2007 and remained there until 2015. Also in 2007, Deripaska joined Magna International Inc. of the Austrian-Canadian industrialist Frank Stronach (who met Putin personally and gave him the highest praises), but already the following year—officially due to the financial crisis—he had to sell his share (20 percent of the stocks with 43 percent of the voting rights) to those banks that had previously helped him to handle the 1.5 billion dollar deal. In 2010 Wolf moved from Magna to the industrial conglomerate Russian Machines (which belongs to Basic Element): He became Chairman of the Board of Directors there (where he remained until 2018) and had to cooperate with Colonel General Valery Pechionkin, (in Soviet times he was a staff member of the Soviet Committee for State Security, or KGB, and from 1997 to 2000 Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Security Service, or FSB), who in 2018 became Basic Element’s CEO. Wolf is also chairman of the Supervisory Boards of GAZ, located in Nizhny Novgorod and part of Basic Element, and of Vienna-based Sberbank Europe AG, a European subsidiary of Sberbank.

In interviews Wolf always defends Putin against any criticism. Thus, Wolf said that human rights violations occur not only in Russia, but “also in other countries.” Russia, according to him, needs a “strong leadership.” And: “I can only report positively what I have experienced with Mr. Putin.” Wolf declared at the beginning of 2014 that in Russia “a more liberal society will emerge in the next few years” (in reality, exactly the opposite happened, M.M.). According to Wolf, Europe needs a “very, very close relationship with Russia.”[14] Needless to say, he is massively opposed to EU sanctions against Russia.

Wolfgang Schuessel, from 1995 to 2007 was head of the People’s Party, during and after his tenure as Austrian Federal Chancellor (2000–2007), repeatedly praised Putin. In June 2019 Schuessel (who occasionally devoted his spare time to Russian icon painting) joined the eleven-member Board of Directors of Russian Lukoil, one of the largest publicly traded, vertically integrated oil and gas companies in the world. In 2018, Schuessel became one of nine members of the Board of Directors of the largest mobile operator in Russia and the other post-Soviet republics, Mobile TeleSystems, or MTS, with 110 million clients; it belongs to the Russian conglomerate AFK Sistema,headed by CPSU-member-turned-billionaire Vladimir Yevtushenkov. At the end of May 2019, however, it became known that Schuessel would lose this mandate: His name was missing from the list of candidates for reappointment. On it, however, there was another well-known person: Valentin Yumashev, who from 1997 to 1998 (under President Boris Yeltsin) was Head of the Presidential Executive Office.[15] He and his wife were granted Austrian citizenship in 2009, which was what the Magna Group had stood up for.

The leader of the Social Democratic Party Christian Kern, during his short tenure as Austrian Federal Chancellor (2016–2017), made himself popular in the Kremlin by polemicizing against the EU’s Russia sanctions, for example, at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2017. Kern has been CEO of the Austrian Federal Railroads from 2010 to 2016. In this position, he spoke out in favor of a broad-gauge (1,520 mm) railroad project to Vienna initiated by Russia. In July 2019 Kern joined the Board of Directors of the state company Russian Railroads, where he currently is the only foreigner. One of Austria’s best-known political journalists, Hans Rauscher, commented on this, referring to Putin’s military campaign against Ukraine: “This is not a good time for a former Austrian Chancellor and Social Democrat to become a lobbyist for Russian interests.”[16] But such statements, of course, did not change anything about Kern’s financially rewarding commitment in Russia.

Austrian banks have always been strongly committed to Russia. As of 2014, Raiffeisen Bank International and Bank Austria[17] alone had EUR 36 billion in loans in Russia. Raiffeisen remained strongly represented on the Russian market even as many other Western banks have pulled back due to the impact of EU sanctions and assertiveness of Russian state-owned competitors. Deripaska’s companies had been Raiffeisen clients in Moscow for many years before he and the (1994–2012) Advocate General of the Austrian Raiffeisen Association (in German: Generalanwalt des Österreichischen Raiffeisenverbandes; an important position in the Austrian banking landscape) Christian Konrad met personally; Haselsteiner had introduced them to each other. In 2007 Konrad said: “I have no fear of contact with Russians: Raiffeisen is active in many business areas in Russia. [. . .] Deripaska has my respect. As far as I know so far, he is an incredibly direct and straightforward guy, acting in an understandable way with comprehensible reactions.”[18]

Stepic, who met Putin personally and was head of the Austrian-Russian Friendship Society from 2001 to 2003, resigned as head of Raiffeisen Bank International in 2013 and then acted as Senior Adviser to the Board of the bank. He continued to give interviews in which he (as before) made no secret of his political views mixed with conspiracy theories. For example, in June 2014 (i.e., shortly after the Russian annexation of Crimea and the start of the fighting in Donbass) said that he would “continue to defend Putin,” because “the media coverage of the conflict [in Ukraine] was totally one-sided, the formation of opinion is determined by New York and London.” The EU had wanted to conclude an Association Agreement with Ukraine “quickly,” “without talking to the Russians” (as when Russia “talks” to Ukraine before concluding any agreements, including with the EU). Stepic also justified the Russian military intervention against Ukraine with a US antimissile system in the Czech Republic and Poland (which, however , had less than nothing to do with the Russian war against Ukraine). Under “Yushchenko and Tymoshenko” a “pigsty” (Saustall) had ruled in Ukraine, but “successor Yanukovych had stabilized the country.” At least Stepic confessed that Yanukovych, at the same time, had “stolen everything so that nothing remained.” And for Stepic, the annexation of Crimea could be explained by the fact that “the West has annexed Ukraine” (!) “Russia’s goal was not to get NATO to its borders. This is the main concern.” And Putin is “light years ahead of the EU in implementing his plans—quite simply because he can decide for himself.” The EU, as Stepic supported Haselsteiner’s views, should have “moved closer to Russia”—because “the US never liked the EU as a structure.” One does not need to speculate about the main reason for such opinions, as Stepic spoke out: According to him, over the past two decades Russia had been the market where the most money could be made worldwide.[19]

8. Austria and the EU Sanctions Against Russia

The Austrian Economic Chamber constantly lamented the impact of the EU sanctions on the business of its members in Russia, although it was and is limited.[20] And the homepage of the Austrian Embassy in Moscow literally states: “Austrian-Russian trade has developed extremely dynamically in recent years.”[21] Therefore, EU sanctions do not stand in the way of this “dynamic.”

The head of the Economic Chamber from 2000 to 2018, Christoph Leitl (People’s Party), always gave Putin a very warm welcome in Vienna. Leitl, since 2009 a knight of the Russian Order of Friendship, from the very beginning opposed the EU sanctions against Russia (the Austrian public was not really interested in the fact that he was involved in two companies in Russia that produce insulation materials). And Christoph Matznetter, Deputy Head of the Economic Chamber (2005–2007 and since 2009), Deputy Head of the Austrian-Russian Friendship Society and long-standing Member of the National Council, has made it repeatedly clear that he, as well as a “broad majority” in his Social Democratic Party, wants to see the sanctions terminated[22]—as wants the EU-skeptical Freedom Party both in the opposition and, between December 2017 and May 2019, in the government.[23] Notwithstanding this, Freedom Party-nominated Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl during her tenure always agreed to the six-monthly extension of EU sanctions against Russia.

According to statistics from the National Bank (Austria’s central bank), Russian direct investments in Austria have increased two and a half times since 2013 to around EUR 25 billion in 2018, which made Russia the second-largest investor in Austria. This gave some observers reason to suspect that the EU sanctions were being circumvented via Austria: “Given Russia’s limited corporate footprint and the lack of tangible projects that would necessitate these investments, it appears Austria is used mostly as a hub or throughput for Russian investments across Europe and as a point of repatriation of capital from Russian subsidiaries in Europe.”[24]

In May 2019, Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen noted that Austria is participating in the sanctions against Russia as a loyal member of the EU—“regardless of what the Austrian position really is.”[25] Translated into plain language, this means that “in reality,” “Austria” is against the sanctions. And Leitl in his capacity (since 2017) as president of Eurochambres (the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry, representing over 20 million companies) went on to demand an abolition of the EU sanctions. According to him, they “had no use whatsoever.” Russia is “a partner with whom Europeans should engage in dialogue on economic, political, cultural and sporting issues.”[26]

9. Conclusions and Outlook

Austrian politicians and managers find it difficult to say “no” to Russian officials and/or to find critical words about its domestic, foreign, security, and foreign trade policy. Austrian media outlets have paid some attention to increasing authoritarianism and the huge corruption under Putin, but Viennese politicians and businessmen rarely raise this issue. Instead, it is a widespread argument that Russia is “too important” as a power—and especially as a supplier of energy resources—so relations must not be “spoiled” under any circumstances.

There are no significant political forces in Austria which could be labelled as “anti-Russian” by Moscow-based politicians and/or media. Truly, nobody in Austria’s political elite wants to “argue” with Moscow. The governments in Vienna and Moscow like to emphasize that they are “very close” in most of the issues of international politics, that there are very few (if any) differences between them, that their relations are “trouble-free,” “cordial” etc. It is therefore not surprising that representatives of most parties and important interest groups (as the Economic Chamber) have been calling for the lifting of EU sanctions against Russia practically from the day they were imposed.

Natural gas and oil are “nonrenewable” resources which are imported into the EU and to Austria to a considerable extent from conflict regions and/or undemocratic states (such as Russia). There is no resistance whatsoever in Austria’s politics, media, and public against the fact that OMV portrays an increasing dependence of Austria and the EU on energy source supplies from Russia as a “guarantee of supply security.” Russia does not grant a “stable and secure gas supply” for Austria and the EU, but just the opposite: Moscow, especially since 1999 when Putin rose to power, has on several occasions demonstrated its capabilities and willingness to use gas and oil supply as a political leverage and a “geopolitical weapon” in order to subdue and/or punish “disloyal” states. It is irresponsible in the sense of a sustainable energy policy to make oneself dependent on the whims of the Kremlin.

If one wanted to give a very brief forecast on Austrian-Russian relations, it is totally obvious that there will be no change in the conditions described—regardless of the composition of the Austrian Government. The opposition hardly offers any alternatives with respect to the policy towards Russia, as all the major political forces in Austria have so-called Putin understanders (Putin-Versteher) among their ranks. And what all Austrian parties and special interest groups have in common is a total lack of understanding for the functional mechanisms of Russian domestic, security, foreign, and economic policy.


[1] “Putin Hails Russia’s Gas Reserves as Austria Joins South Stream Project,” Sputnik, April 24, 2010, https://sptnkne.ws/3BcY.

[2] Andrei Fedyashin, “Vladimir Putin Goes to the Land of Strauss and Schnitzel,” Sputnik, April 23, 2010, https://sptnkne.ws/pacK.

[3] Christine Zeiner, “Raiffeisen steigt aus russischer Gasfirma aus [Raiffeisen Withdraws from Russian Gas Company],” Wiener Zeitung, April 25, 2006, https://www.wienerzeitung.at/archiv/117286-Raiffeisen-steigt-aus-russischer-Gasfirma-aus.html.

[4] Luke Harding, “WikiLeaks Cables Link Russian Mafia Boss to EU Gas Supplies,” Guardian (US edition), December 1, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-cables-russian-mafia-gas.

[5] “Ukraine: Firtash Makes His Case to the USG,” WikiLeaks, December 10, 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KYIV2414_a.html.

[6] Stefan Melichar, Michael Nikbakhsh, and Christoph Zotter, “All the President’s Men,” Profil, no. 43 (2019): 35.

[7] “Schröder empfing 2005 dubiose Gäste aus Russland [Schröder Received Dubious Guests from Russia in 2005],” Spiegel Online, May 4, 2015, https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/vorab/schroeder-empfing-2005-dubiose-gaeste-aus-russland-a-967403.html.

[8] Renate Graber, “Die russische Wende [The Russian Turnaround],” Der Standard, June 4, 2007, https://derstandard.at/2857801/Die-russische-Wende.

[9] Christa Zöchling, “Ein Freigeist als Milliardär [A Free-Spirited Billionaire],” Profil, no. 8, (2008): 27.

[10] Renate Gruber, “Da lachen ja die Hühner, Herr Hofer” [“That’s a Good Laugh, Mr. Hofer”] [interview with Hans Peter Haselsteiner]. Der Standard, June 29–30, 2019, 23.

[11] “Haselsteiner: Russland in der EU ‘hätte Europa groß gemacht’ [Haselsteiner: Russia in the EU ‘would have made Europe great’] [interview],” Die Presse, September 20, 2017, https://www.diepresse.com/5288922/haselsteiner-russland-in-der-eu-hatte-europa-gross-gemacht.

[12] “Haselsteiner will sich Auftragsvergabe bei Westbahn anschauen [Haselsteiner Wants to Take a Look at Contract Awards for Westbahn],” Die Presse, May 20, 2019, https://www.diepresse.com/5631337/haselsteiner-will-sich-auftragsvergabe-bei-westbahn-anschauen.

[13] Jakob Zirm, “Siegfried Wolf wechselt von Magna zu Oleg Deripaska [Siegfried Wolf Moves from Magna to Oleg Deripaska],” Die Presse, September 14, 2010, 15.

[14] Miriam Koch and Andreas Lampl, “Putin ist der richtige Mann” [Putin’s the man] [interview with Siegfried Wolf],” Format, no. 5, (2014): 22–25.

[15] Yumashev’s daughter from his first marriage, Polina, in 2001 had married (and in 2018 divorced) Deripaska.

[16] Hans Rauscher, “Neuer Job für Kern: Russian Connection. Es sind bereits etliche ehemalige Top-Politiker in Putins Reich engagiert [New Job for Kern: Russian Connection. Several Former Top Politicians are Already Employed in Putin’s empire],” Der Standard, May 1, 2019, https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000102353840/neuer-job-fuer-kern-russian-connection?fbclid=IwAR3eeZ4VLlmX3-h87hpnMKPAZftnO0NOr3A2FGpdV1lETGjxCM2r7NbQ5X0.

[17] The headquarters of UniCredit Bank Austria AG (which is its full name) is located in Vienna, but it has not been “Austrian” for a long time, as it is almost entirely owned by the UniCredit Group based in Milan, Italy.

[18] “Deripaska ist ein gerader Bursche [Deripaska is a straight guy] [interview with Christian Konrad],” Der Standard, June 4, 2007, https://www.derstandard.at/story/2859447/deripaska-ist-ein-gerader-bursche.

[19] Martina Salomon, “Stepic: ‘Putin ist EU um Lichtjahre voraus’ [Stepic: ‘Putin is light years ahead of the EU’] [interview],” Kurier, December 6, 2014, https://kurier.at/wirtschaft/stepic-putin-ist-eu-um-lichtjahre-voraus/70.074.860.

[20] Cf. Otmar Lahodynsky, “Schwein gehabt [Had Good Luck],” Profil, no. 12, pp. 56-60.

[21] Österreichische Botschaft Moskau, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen Österreich und Russland [Austrian Embassy Moscow, Economic relations between Austria and Russia], https://www.bmeia.gv.at/oeb-moskau/bilaterale-beziehungen/russische-foederation/wirtschaft/ (accessed 30 May 2020).

[22] “The Winner is: Zar Wladimir [The Winner is: Czar Vladimir],” Trend, no. 46 (2016): 21.

[23] Cf. “Strache fordert Ende von Russland-Sanktionen [Strache demands end to Russia sanctions],” Die Presse, June 2, 2018, https://diepresse.com/home/ausland/aussenpolitik/5439865/Strache-fordert-Ende-von-RusslandSanktionen.

[24] Heather A. Conley et al., The Kremlin Playbook II. The Enablers, Center for Strategic & International Studies, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 50, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/190327_Conley_KPII_interior_v3_WEB.pdf (accessed 30 May 2020).

[25] Jutta Sommerbauer, “Van der Bellens und Österreichs ‘wirkliche’ Russland-Position [Van der Bellen and Austria’s ‘real’ position on Russia],” Die Presse, May 15, 2019, 4.

[26] Christoph B. Schiltz, “Europäische Wirtschaft ruft zur Abschaffung von Sanktionen auf,” Die Welt, December 9, 2019, https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article204148482/Europaeische-Wirtschaft-ruft-zur-Abschaffung-von-Sanktionen-auf.html?fbclid=IwAR0cMRb_u5mEhqAsdqNihEliLnzmfQLaSKl9KR4jl65L9SjS3_XN8Ub8Pvo.

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