Putin’s annual press conference upheld his long-standing tradition: no matter what topic the Russian president attempted to discuss, his narratives are full of fakes, disconnected from reality and inevitably swerve into anti-Western tirades.

Putin has hosted a large press conference every year since 2001, only taking a pause from May 2008 to May 2012 when he was Prime Minister.

The 2021 year-end press conference (which was Putin’s 17^th), took place on December 23 and lasted 3 hours and 56 minutes. The president fielded questions from 44 people, covering both domestic and international issues.

Representatives of three outlets designated by the Kremlin as “foreign agents,” — Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Meduza, and Dozhd — had been invited to Putin’s press conference but not allowed to ask questions. The Kremlin lead spokesman Dmitry Peskov explained that “foreign agent media” were not given a turn, because the queue was too long. “Well, the queue was too long, they can’t get lucky every time,” he said, answering a question from Meduza. “You see how many people present here were unable to ask their question, how many people from the presidential pool were unable to as well… Foreign agents cannot be our priority,” he added.

In order to participate in the event, 507 invited journalists had to fulfill a number of conditions, including a daily PCR test starting with Sunday, December 19.  After three negative PCR test results, it was possible to enter the Moscow Manege, where the results were checked at the entrance. In front of the hall, special machines had been installed that sprayed a disinfectant solution, allegedly containing silver particles. Then, guests had to don special protective masks treated with an obscure “antibacterial solution of nanosilver.” The Presidential Administrative Directorate had spent 117 million rubles (about $1.6 million) to organize this press event — of which about 1.4 million rubles, or $19,000, went toward spraying journalists with silver particles, according to public procurement records.

The distance between the president of Russia and the journalists during the event was greater than ever — a few dozen meters. Only cameramen and photographers who had been quarantined were allowed to approach closer.

Before Putin’s appearance, his press secretary Dmitry Peskov reminded the participants to periodically change protective equipment (masks), to observe social distance and added that microphone pads will be disposable.

In April 2020, after the start of the pandemic, Putin stopped in person meetings and events. On September 14, 2021, Putin went into self-isolation due to spikes in COVID infections in Russia (according to media reports, about three dozen people in Putin’s entourage tested positive for COVID-19). The president himself boasted that he managed to avoid getting infected due to his “high level of antibodies.” It has been reported that Putin was vaccinated with the Russian Sputnik V vaccine — and did so back in February 2021. During this summer’s live TV press-conference the president explained why the process of his vaccination was not documented on video: according to Putin, he did not consider publicizing such an event particularly important.

Most people with whom Putin meets are required to spend from several days to two weeks in quarantine beforehand. For example, at the beginning of September 2021, Olympic and Paralympic medalists went into self-isolation, and for some of them this had a detrimental effect on their preparation for competitions. At the same time, Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, with whom Putin also met, were not mandated a similar quarantine.

Foreign Policy

NATO and Ukraine. Moscow’s further actions will depend not on progress in negotiations with the US on security guarantees, but on real action, taken to ensure Russia’s security, Putin announced.

“As for the guarantees [of security] and what will depend on progress in negotiations, our actions will depend not on progress in the talks, but on unconditional measures to ensure Russia’s security today and in the long term,” the president said. He stressed that Russia has made it pretty clear that “NATO’s further expansion to the East is unacceptable.”

“Are we planting missiles near US borders? No. It is the United States that has brought its missiles to our doorstep,” Putin said. “Is it an excessive demand — no more attack systems near our home? Is there something unusual about this?”

Putin also mused about ways the United States might react if Russia deployed its missiles in Mexico or Canada on the border with the US. “Have Mexico and the United States never had any territorial disputes? Whom did California belong to in the past? And how about Texas? Have they forgotten? Nobody recalls all this the way many tend to look at Crimea these days. We, too, have been trying not to recall how today’s Ukraine took shape and who created it — Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet Union. There was the Union Treaty of 1922 and the Constitution of 1924. The latter was adopted after his death, but in accordance with his principles,” Putin said.

Reality Check: Since 2014, Putin has, on numerous occasions, articulated various versions of the genesis of Ukraine. In July 2021, he even penned an article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” which was supposed to convince the reader that Ukraine had never existed and that all of its land and people inhabiting the territory had always been originally Russian. During December press conference, Putin has shared an even more bizarre story according to which, Ukraine was created by Vladimir Lenin in 1922, when the leader of the Russian proletariat announced the creation of the USSR.

Asked by a SkyNews correspondent what guarantees might Russia provide to assure that it would not attack Ukraine or any other sovereign state, the Russian leader said that it was not Russia that posed threats to other countries.

“Have we approached the borders of the United States or Britain? They have approached ours. And now they say ‘Ukraine will be a NATO member.’ Consequently, there will emerge [their weapon] systems,” he explained.

“You are demanding some guarantees from me. But it is you that must provide guarantees. You must do that at once, now, and not keep talking about this for decades,” Putin said.

He stressed that Russia was “treacherously deceived” when it was told in the 1990s that NATO would not expand eastwards.

“’Not an inch towards the east’, we were told in the 1990s. And what? They cheated us. They outrageously deceived us: five waves of NATO’s expansion. Now the corresponding systems are emerging in Romania and Poland,” Putin said.

Reality Check: Speaking at a press conference, Vladimir Putin once again spoke emotionally about Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO: Russia was allegedly “cheated” in the 1990s by promising not to expand the alliance to the east, and now they plan to take Ukraine there as well.

The next day, NATO denied Putin’s words. The North Atlantic Alliance never promised that it would not expand, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told DPA.

“NATO has never made a promise not to expand. In fact, it is in the founding treaty of our organization that it says that any European country can become a member of the alliance. <…> This is a fundamental principle of European security,” Stoltenberg said.

Stoltenberg noted that the alliance is ready to negotiate security guarantees in the framework of the Russia-NATO Council, so he is ready to convene a council meeting as early as possible next year. “But we will not compromise on basic principles. We cannot compromise on NATO’s right to defend and protect all allies, and we cannot compromise on the basic principle of every nation’s right to choose its own way,” Stoltenberg added.

“We must understand how our security will be ensured. That’s why, all tricks aside, we made the straightforward case that there shouldn’t be any further NATO expansion eastward,” Putin said. “The ball is in their court and they should say something in response… We are generally seeing a positive reaction so far. Our American partners are telling us they are ready to start discussions… Both sides have appointed their representatives,” he went on to say. “I hope the situation will develop along these lines.”

On the topic of the war in eastern Ukraine, Putin condemned the leadership in Kyiv for refusing to comply with the Minsk agreements and to negotiate with the leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” (the territories in the Donbas controlled by Kremlin-backed separatists).

“The Minsk agreements, in substance, imply an autonomous Donbas. Elections need to be held, an amnesty needs to be held. But Kyiv isn’t doing any of this — instead, it’s returning troops,” Putin said, alleging that Ukraine is planning to retake the region by force.

Russia is willing to establish good-neighborly relations with Ukraine, but it is almost impossible due to the actions of the current administration in Kyiv, Vladimir Putin said.

“What is the problem for us? We want to build good-neighborly relations with Ukraine and, moreover, we want it, I should say, at any cost and we are in fact doing everything possible in this regard,” he said. “However, how can we build these relations with the present-day administration [in Ukraine] considering what they are doing at the moment? This is practically impossible,” the Russian president said.

Putin stressed that Moscow was ready to work with the Ukrainian authorities, “who are ready to build relations with Russia in a good-neighborly atmosphere.”

“What’s happening with these authorities? We see extrajudicial killings, sanctions against their own citizens, which contradict the laws and the Constitution of Ukraine, or simply murders right in the street. Nobody is searching for these murderers.”

And Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky has found himself under the influence of radical elements after coming to power, according to Putin.

“Instead of responding to the people’s demand for peace, President Zelensky fell under the influence of radical elements, as they say in Ukraine, Nazis.”

Reality Check. Ukraine’s progress toward  joining NATO now is about the same as it was in 2008. At that time, together with Georgia, it applied to join the NATO Membership Action Plan, the name given to the program for the admission of new members. In the spring of 2008 possible membership of Ukraine was much discussed at the NATO Bucharest summit (Putin was there, and, apparently, this experience had a strong influence on him), but neither Ukraine nor Georgia were allowed to join the Action Plan – Germany and France prevented this. Without giving Kyiv a road map, the NATO summit welcomed the very idea of accession – since then it is believed that Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is only a matter of time.

Since 2008, however, when Viktor Yushchenko was the president of Ukraine, much has changed. Later, Viktor Yanukovich, who advocated Ukraine’s non-bloc status, came to power. And then 2014, Crimea and events in eastern Ukraine happened, which turned Ukraine toward NATO again: Presidents Poroshenko and Zelensky repeatedly (and quite insistently) appealed for  NATO to accept Ukraine, and in April the latter declared that “NATO is the only way to end the war in Donbass.

Ukraine’s accession must be supported by all 30 countries of the alliance, and there are precedents when some countries blocked the accession of others. Ukraine itself believes that the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Donbass are the most important barriers to Kyiv’s NATO membership. Ukraine’s ambassador to NATO, Natalia Galiborenko, says that Russia decided from the very beginning to block Ukraine’s membership in the alliance through these conflicts, and NATO countries, having accepted Ukraine, are simply afraid of finding themselves in a situation of armed conflict with Russia.

Taliban. When asked about Russia’s relations with the new Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Russian president did not say whether Russia would recognize the new government in Kabul, but said he hoped the situation in the country would be stable and warned against the penetration of extremists into the bordering Central Asian republics. He also called on the West to unfreeze Afghanistan’s financial assets, saying the country is on the brink of a widespread humanitarian crisis.

Reality Check: The Taliban movement is officially banned on the Russian territory, as are any official contacts with representatives of the organization. Nevertheless, Moscow maintains relations with the leaders of the movement, and they have repeatedly come to the Russian capital for negotiations. And although the Russian authorities admit that they are ready to negotiate with the new Afghan authorities, they do not hurry to remove them from the list of terrorists. Russian authorities have never concealed their contacts with Taliban representatives because “they are part of Afghan society.”

In October 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1267 recognizing the Taliban as accomplices of terrorists and imposing sanctions against this movement. In pursuance of this resolution in May 2000 Vladimir Putin signed the first presidential decree on Russia’s sanctions against the Taliban, banning flights, blocking funds and financial resources.

After the negotiations in Moscow on July 8-9, 2021, it became known that Taliban representatives asked the Russian authorities to remove the movement from the UN Security Council sanctions list.

But even if it happens, the ruling of the Russian Supreme Court of 2003 that recognized the Taliban as a terrorist organization and outlawed its activities in the country will remain in force. It was precisely because of this decision that the Taliban ended up on Russia’s list of terrorist organizations. The media are obliged to mention its status every time, and citizens are still fined for posting the movement’s symbols on social media. And the Russian authorities are formally prohibited by law from making political concessions to the Taliban.

In recent months, the official Russian media have stopped referring to the Taliban as a terrorist organization. The management of the Rossiya Segodnya news agency demanded that its journalists use another formulation instead: “The organization is under UN sanctions for terrorist activities.” News about the Taliban began appearing on RIA Novosti’s Web site on Monday with this footnote. The same phrase is used on RT news agency’s website.

Belarus. At the conference, Putin boasted closer integration with Belarus and Alexander Lukashenko. According to Putin, Moscow and Minsk are working on a number of proposals to closer integrate the two countries, as Russia has become Belarus’ key financial and political supporter amid widespread international isolation of the Lukashenko regime over the past year.

“We are building a ‘Union State,’” Putin said, but noted that the level of integration between Russia and Belarus was “at a much lower level than that in the European Union. It’s incomparable.”

Reality Check: Closer integration between Russia and Belarus has been discussed since the 1990s. The agreement was signed on December 8, 1999, by Alexander Lukashenko and Boris Yeltsin.  The rapprochement then included the creation of a common parliament, constitution, court, accounting chamber, and common currency, but the State Council of the Union State never signed the agreement.

In 2019, negotiations resumed at Russia’s initiative. Some media speculated that even a unification of the two countries was possible. And explained it by Vladimir Putin’s desire to stay in power without changing the Russian Constitution. In this logic, the union of Russia and Belarus would have led to the formation of a new state with a new constitution. But nothing of the sort has happened.

Lukashenko still does not give up either his union with Russia or the idea of deeper integration. At the same time, he constantly stresses that independence is sacred and that Belarus is not going to become a part of Russia.

In Belarus, the idea of integration with Russia is viewed with apprehension and considered a threat to independence. In 2019, more than 800 people came out to protest with the slogans “Zhyve Belarus,” (“Long Live Belarus”), “No Anschluss” and “No Russian Occupation.”

Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko held their last integration negotiations by this point in Moscow on September 9, 2021. At the meeting, they agreed on 28 union programs aimed at the integration of Russia and Belarus. “There is nothing bad for the peoples of Russia and Belarus in these programs and could not be. Everything is aimed at the growth of welfare,” said Lukashenko after the meeting. Putin, in his turn, did not rule out the organization of a union parliament of Russia and Belarus in the future. But he added that first it is necessary to create the “economic basis” for the integration.

The Pandemic

New coronavirus strains emerge in those countries, which have problems in their public health systems and do not have a high level of herd immunity, Vladimir Putin said.

“As for new waves of the coronavirus infection, new strains — what is the reason for this? It stems from this virus’ ability to mutate. That’s all. The answer is simple. New strains emerge where there are problems in the public health system and where herd immunity is low. Well, African countries have many immunodeficiency infections, with new strains emerging. There is nothing unexpected about that,” he said.

Reality Check: The arrival of a new strain of coronavirus with a large number of mutations was reported in late November 2021 by scientists from South Africa. The new strain, “omicron”, quickly became the predominant variant of covid in the country. It also spread almost immediately to dozens of countries around the world. In Russia, the identification of the first “omicron” strain became known as early as December 6.

The “omicron” strain has several dozens of mutations in the spike protein by which the virus enters the human body. Because of this, scientists fear that any vaccines will be less effective against this strain of coronavirus.

The quality of the health care system around the world is virtually irrelevant. Even if all of humanity somehow becomes immune to COVID-19, its spread will continue, both through repeat (in the case of those previously overexposed) and breakthrough (in the case of those vaccinated) infections, as well as through newly born children who have no specific immunity.

Putin’s words about collective immunity are also easily refuted. For example, as of December 21 in Germany, 73.5% of the population was vaccinated with at least one dose, 70.5% were fully vaccinated, and a booster dose (the third or second in the case of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine) was given to 32.7% of residents. Doctors believe that the booster dose has become especially important due to the spread of the “omicron” strain of coronavirus, which easily infects even fully vaccinated people. In Russia, according to the same source, at least 50.2% of residents have been vaccinated with one dose, 44.8% with two doses, and only 4.6% with a booster dose. Thus, Russia is one of the least vaccinated countries in Europe, along with Bulgaria and Ukraine.

Russian economy was better prepared for pandemic shocks than other countries, according to Putin.

“Our economy, faced with the challenges of coronavirus infection, necessary, forced restrictions in this regard in the economy, and in social areas, despite all the challengers turned out to be more flexible and ready for these shocks than many other developed world economies… Our economic decline rate was 3%, which is much lower than in many leading economies in the world.” And Russia recovered from these shocks much faster than other countries, he stressed.

Reality Check: Even before the new quarantine, the head of the Ministry of Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov, stated that the recovery growth that the Russian economy had shown in recent months had exhausted itself.

This is compounded by global problems, such as the rise in world commodity prices, which is noticeable in many countries of the world. In Russia, almost everything was rising in price throughout 2021: building materials, fuel, and food. The government launched a system of monitoring the risks of price hikes for socially important commodities in order to combat inflation. It is planned to combat the price increase by relatively mild methods – reduction of import duties and subsidizing of producers as well as by more drastic measures – increase of export duties and special deals with companies.

On December 1, 2021, the World Bank lowered its forecast for Russia’s economic growth. According to revised data, Russia’s GDP will grow by only 2.4 percent, which is 0.4 percentage points less than the World Bank forecast in October. The outlook for 2023 is unchanged, at 1.8 percent.

Inflation in Russia, as of November 29, 2021, accelerated to 8.38%, according to the review of the Ministry of Economic Development “On the current price situation.” According to Rosstat, consumer prices have increased by 7.51% since the beginning of the year.

In 2020, Russia’s GDP shrank by 3%, which was the strongest decline in 11 years.

The president said he hopes Russia will reach the planned level of herd immunity to COVID-19, 80%, in the first half of next year. Putin added that currently herd immunity stands at 59.4%, which is too low. Some countries now say herd immunity needs to be 90%-95%, he said.

“What is it [the currently herd immunity] for us? 59.4% as of today or last night. I just spoke to Anna Popova and Tatyana Golikova yesterday, knowing for sure that this would almost be the main topic of our meeting today. 59.4% is the collective immunity today in Russia. We are referring to our citizens who have recovered from the disease and those who have been vaccinated. We have about 70 million who have had their first vaccination, and 70 million who have had two shots,” Putin said.

Reality Check: It is impossible to estimate the level of collective immunity in Russia because there is no suitable methodology. It is likely that when Putin gives an estimate to the nearest 0.1%, he is referring to the total of fully vaccinated and over-vaccinated people. But many were vaccinated after the disease, and it is unclear if they are not counted twice. It is also unlikely to take into account the fact that immunity gradually wears off, which is why experts recommend vaccinating with a booster dose. Finally, the data on the number of people who have been infected are extremely unreliable. In November, Meduza estimated that, based on the open database “Stopcoronavirus.rf,” about 58% of all identified infected people end up in the hospital in Russia. By comparison, in France the figure is 7.6%, in the United States – 6.7%, in Germany – 5.3.This may mean that the actual number of infected people in Russia exceeds the official data.  This may be due to insufficient testing, or to deliberate underreporting.

It is not known exactly, what level of collective immunity is necessary to stop the COVID-19 epidemic, it also depends on the rate of spread of the virus. After the appearance of the Delta strain it became clear that the first estimates of 65-70% are not relevant, and to achieve collective immunity a minimum of 85-90% of those vaccinated is necessary. The Omicron strain appears to be more contagious than the previously dominant Delta strain and requires an even higher level of collective immunity.

But what is certain is that achieving collective immunity with such a low vaccination rate is impossible in the first quarter of next year.

Domestic Situation and Civil Society

BBC correspondent Petr Kozlov asked Putin what events in Russia have led to the recent rapid growth in the number of “extremists,” “undesirable organizations,” and “foreign agents.”

Vladimir Putin replied that Russia “can only be destroyed from within.” “And who did this [in the past]? Those who were serving foreign interests,” he stressed.

The amount of organizations designated as “foreign agents” in Russia is the same as in the United States, but the punishment for those who violate it is lighter, Putin pointed out.

“A total of 74 organizations out of 200,000 NGOs have been labeled as foreign agents here, that’s 0.034%, the same as in the US, but there aren’t any tough regulations [in Russia] like those in the US, which particularly include criminal responsibility,” he said.

“If you don’t stop your activities there [in the US], you may face criminal prosecution and up to five years in prison. It can happen even when you end your activities and shut down your organization, you can’t escape criminal responsibility. You’d face a five-year term. We don’t have anything like that here. We don’t ban the activities of such organizations. We only want the organizations involved in domestic political activities to clearly state what their sources of funding are. That’s all. And they can continue their work. Our law is far more liberal,” Putin stressed. He added, however, that there were some issues with the law, particularly related to the understanding of the notion of “political activities” and rules regulating this work.

Reality Check: Putin has once again repeated the fake, popular with Russian officials and propagandists, about the essence of American and Russian laws. And it has been explained more than once what the fundamental difference between them is. First of all, the American law contains a clear definition of a foreign agent: it is an individual or legal entity that “works under the control and direct supervision of a foreign ‘principal’ and in his direct interests” and is involved in political activities, the concept of which is also clearly defined.

The Russian law, on the other hand, makes it possible to declare virtually any non-profit organization undesirable to the authorities as a “foreign agent”; for example, in order to hang this label on the “Golos” movement in defense of voter rights, a 200-ruble money transfer from an Armenian citizen was sufficient.

There are two “foreign-agency” lists for people in Russia. The first one includes people who have been declared as “foreign media agents.”  To get on this list, it is enough just to publish messages “intended for an unlimited circle of people” (i.e. to run a social network account for example), and to receive any funding from abroad (a transfer of 50 euros from an acquaintance also counts). The second list is simply for “foreign agents”, who can be recognized as such for “gathering military information” or “political activities”, provided that they receive any — not only financial — “support” for these activities from abroad or from a “foreign agent” organization.

In both cases, “foreign agents” face criminal liability under certain conditions. If a person declared a “foreign media agent” violates the rules for working in the new status three times within a year, he could face up to two years in prison. It is very easy to accuse a person of violating the rules, since there are quite a few requirements.

Those who get on the list of simply “foreign agents” (not the media) face up to five years in prison. If such a person does not declare his status himself, he will first be fined 30,000 to 50,000 rubles, and if he does not do it later, he may be sentenced to actual imprisonment. These “foreign agents” must also submit reports on their activities and expenditures — and here criminal liability arises not after the third, but after the second violation.

Alexey Navalny’s Poisoning

Western countries have given no evidence to prove allegations about Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny’s poisoning, Vladimir Putin said.

Putin hinted that Navalny serves “foreign interests” that he compared to figures who “destroyed” the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union “from the inside,” and accused the activist of using politics as a “shield” from his criminal conviction.

“You speak about a man who was allegedly poisoned. We have issued numerous official inquiries from the Russian prosecutor’s office asking for any documents proving the poisoning. Not a single paper, not a single evidence of this Novichok, or whatever you call it,” he said answering a question from a BBC correspondent.

According to the Russian leader, Moscow suggested sending Russian specialists “there to work together.” “I personally told the French president and the German chancellor: Let our specialists work, let us take sample, check grounds to open a criminal case. Nothing in response. Nothing,” he said.

“Stop talking about it. Let’s turn the page on this, if you have nothing new to tell us,” he concluded.

Reality Check: The joint investigation of The Insider and Bellingcat has long ago established the names of NII-2 FSB employees involved in poisoning Alexey Navalny. Moreover, one of the poisoners, Konstantin Kudryavtsev, personally communicated with Alexey Navalny, thinking that he was talking to the Assistant Secretary of the Security Council Nikolay Patrushev, and told many details of the attempt. Among other things, he explained that Navalny’s life was saved by the actions of the pilots and the atropine injected by the ambulance doctors, and also specified that the poison was applied to Navalny’s underwear, with the help of FSB and the transport police in cleaning up the traces.

Torture in Russian Prisons

Journalist Ksenia Sobchak asked Putin about a recent prison torture scandal and allegations that penitentiary service officials, some of whom were the recipients of state awards, were responsible for systemic abuse.

He claimed that prison torture also exists in the United States and France. “If you take a look at what is happening in such establishments in other countries, you will see that such problems there are as frequent. It is a world problem.” He stressed that such institutions in some countries looked decently only at first sight. “But in Europe, say, in France, and in the United States there are many places of a kind that, I believe, no longer exists in third world countries,” he stated.

Putin said Russian authorities have opened 17 criminal cases following the torture leaks.

“It should be clear to everyone that punishment for these offenses is inevitable,” he said, adding that the investigations “should of course use the capabilities of civil society.”

Reality Check: In early October, the human rights project Gulagu.net published a series of videos from several Russian colonies, depicting torture and sexual violence against inmates.

Gulagu.net received 40 gigabytes of footage of torture and rape of inmates in Russian colonies. According to Gulagu.net founder Vladimir Osechkin, the secret archive of the special services was given to human rights activists by programmer Sergey Savelyev, who had access to the computers of the Federal Penitentiary Service in the Saratov region for five years during his imprisonment.

Vladimir Osechkin stated that the torture system in prisons is centralized and exists with the full knowledge and support of the Federal Penitentiary Service and the Federal Security Service. According to Osechkin, although there is video evidence of torture in the Saratov, Vladimir, Irkutsk, Belgorod, and Kamchatka regions, in fact the torture system covers the entire Russian penitentiary system.

Inmate “activists” who tortured inmates received cell phones and official video recorders from prison management to record the torture. The videos were then used to blackmail the victims, who were thusly forced to cooperate.

In the middle of October Saveliev, fearing prosecution by law enforcement officers, asked for political asylum in France. And on October 23, he was put on the wanted list.

The Investigative Committee of Russia announced initiation of several criminal cases on the grounds of sexual abuse (part 2 of Article 132 of the RF Criminal Code) and abuse of power with violence (part 3 of Article 286 of the RF Criminal Code). At the end of November, they announced arrest of the former head of OTB-1 in Saratov and the former head of the security department of the prison hospital. 18 lower-ranking employees have been dismissed. On November 25, Vladimir Putin fired the head of the Federal Penitentiary Service Alexander Kalashnikov.

On December 20, 2021 a bill to increase penalties for torture organized by government officials was submitted to the State Duma. According to the bill, such torture would be classified as the extremely serious crime and would be punishable by imprisonment for up to 12 years.

The document also introduces the concept of “intimidation,” while forcing the Federal Penitentiary Service officers to testify is proposed to be equated to torture.

However, leading Russian human rights organizations criticized the draft law on torture. More than 30 human rights activists and organizations, including Memorial, the Public Verdict Foundation, the Committee Against Torture, and the Moscow Helsinki Group, have signed a statement. Human rights activists point out that this version of the bill runs counter to legal logic.The authors called on Duma deputies to include a specific article on torture in the Russian Criminal Code, to establish special characteristics, such as group torture, and to set no limitation periods for such crimes.

Gender Issues and Cancel Culture

Putin repeated his long-standing disdain of Western “liberal” values and defended so-called “traditional values” in response to a question from the state-run RT correspondent on cancel culture and the controversy surrounding “Harry Potter” author J.K. Rowling’s comments on transgender people.

“I adhere to that traditional approach that a woman is a woman and a man is a man. A mother is a mother, a father is a father. And I hope that our society has the internal moral protection dictated by the traditional religious denominations of the Russian Federation,” Putin said adding that he hoped that Russians had enough defenses against gender-fluid “obscurantism.”

Putin also said cancel culture was “like the coronavirus, with new variants frequently appearing,” adding that following traditional values was Russia’s proposed “antidote.”

“If somebody thinks that a woman and a man are the same thing, they’re welcome to [their opinion], but a certain common sense should exist,” Putin pointed out.

The president cited the example of an incident in the US when a criminal serving time for rape declared that he was female and after a transfer to a women’s prison committed the same crime in his cell.

He also said the women’s sports may become to be extinct with the arrival of male transgender athletes. “A male declares to become a female and competes, let us suppose, in weightlifting or any other sports competition,” Putin said. “This is the end to female sports [in this case]. Where is a common sense here?”

Santa Claus

Toward the end of the press conference, instead of asking the really important question, a journalist from newspaper Krasny Sever asked the Russian president’s stance on Ded Moroz (the Russian version of Santa Claus.).

In response to the burning question “Does Father Frost fulfill your wishes?” Putin thanked Father Frost for having helped him become president and urged the mythical figure to help carry out Russian government plans. “I am grateful to him that I can meet with you in my capacity…I can advocate for Father Frost and remind the plaintiff that Father Frost only fulfils the wishes of boys and girls who have been good.”

The Year of Elections and the Dismantling of Democracy

The main political event in Russia in 2021 was the elections to the State Duma, or the lower house of parliament. On the one hand, the elections brought closure to the long period of preparation for them; on the other hand, they signified the onset of a new period in the development of Russia’s political system.

The Kremlin’s preparation for the Duma elections began approximately a year before the start of the campaign, in the summer of 2020. Evidently, according to the original plan, all the potentially strong opposition candidates were supposed to face criminal charges before the start of the Duma campaign, which would prevent them from taking part in the elections. Death was in store for Alexey Navalny, which would have both put an end to his political organizations in Russia and reduced his influence and that of his supporters to a minimum during the campaign.

Despite the fact that the attempted assassination of Navalny turned into an international scandal and most likely harmed the authorities, repression of opposition members continued unabated.  By the beginning of the actual election campaign, it became obvious that strong candidates could not participate, especially those connected to the team of Navalny, who survived the attack.  “Smart voting,” that is, technical voting for any promising candidate capable of defeating one supported by the government, turned out to be the only possible tactic for influencing the outcome of the elections.

But in the final analysis, even “smart voting” had more of an effect on mobilization and morale than a practical result. The readiness of the Kremlin to turn electoral procedures into a fiction with the help of the much-ballyhooed “electronic voting” can be considered both the main result of the Duma elections and the plan for all future campaigns. In fact, Putin’s Russia has returned to a modernized Soviet model of elections, in which the results are manually determined by the executive branch, and citizens are deprived of any opportunity to influence the course and outcomes of any elections. Evidently, the techniques tested in the Duma elections will be applied more and more broadly and this must be considered when analyzing the preparation and course of any election campaigns in the foreseeable future.

The Year of Repression

The year 2021 was a year of truly mass repression against opposition activists.  Although the crackdown affected only a small number of people in proportion to the entire population of Russia, the ranks of political activists were substantially thinned. The mass emigration of political activists from Russia can also be considered a direct consequence of persecution which compounded its effect.  In many regions of the country, no centers of opposition activity remain, because people have suffered criminal or administrative punishment or have left Russia, fearing persecution. Others have ceased to be involved in political activity, dreading problems. In fact, refraining from political activism does not help to avoid problems – either for preventive purposes, or to fulfill a quota, the police and intelligence services methodically persecute all those who one way or another have been exposed working in Navalny’s campaign headquarters or involved in other activity. The authorities’ approach to the persecution of opposition members in 2021 has changed: they have embarked on a course of complete annihilation of the possibilities for any opposition activity in Russia and the purging of the country of opposition.

Looking ahead, it appears permanent repression will continue for the entire time that Putin remains in power and a new peak should be expected closer to the presidential elections, whenever they take place – in 2024 or earlier. Unfortunately, there is no point in expecting any mitigation of the system or a pause in repression in 2022-2023.

Simultaneously, pressure has increased on non-state media, human rights, and civic organizations. Clearly, the authorities consider any civic activity not sanctioned from above as suspicious, or potentially oppositional, and independent media are considered entirely akin to a press service for opposition members, and even funded from the West.

The Year of Navalny

In the political sense, 2021 in Russia became the year of Alexey Navalny, although the government did everything to prevent this. Nevertheless, it was the return of Navalny to Russia on 17 January 2021 that defined the most important trends, as cited above. Navalny’s return provoked both mass protests and a reaction to them by the authorities. The concept which Navalny proposed of “smart voting” turned the entire Duma campaign into a series of attempts by the authorities to minimize its effect. The very fact of Navalny’s incarceration turned into an international political problem, and the forced emigration of his team enabled the activization of work with Western elites and their consolidation in an understanding of the nature of the Putin regime.

Nevertheless, in spite of Putin’s efforts, Navalny became his chief opponent, not only in the eyes of his supporters in Russia but in the global perception.  Regrettably, such a state of affairs did not guarantee Navalny some sort of privileged conditions in detention, but rather the opposite – it forced us to seriously fear for his future. The story of the attempt to poison him demonstrated the lengths Putin is prepared to go when it comes to people in his way.

Unfortunately, Navalny’s imprisonment creates wide opportunities for his murder and there are no reasons to suppose that the inevitable wave of outrage, new sanctions, and other costs will prevent Putin from taking such a step if he himself finds it necessary.

The Year of the Pandemic

The most important domestic challenge for Putin was the continuing coronavirus pandemic. Aside from the problems common to all governments of the world, the Putin regime is suffering particularly hard from this situation. First, the pandemic keeps demonstrating the mendacity of the thesis of the incredible popularity of Putin himself or his regime among the population; despite all the calls for vaccination, the citizens of Russia actively resist it, and the authorities’ anti-pandemic measures do not find understanding among a significant portion of society.

Secondly, the economic situation of Russian citizens even before the pandemic was not so great, but by the end of 2021, it had obviously deteriorated. The rise in mortality put an end to all the slogans which Putin has touted for many years about the overcoming of Russia’s demographic problems. All of this works against the popularity of the government among the population and against Putin’s popularity above all.

Thirdly and finally, the pandemic, or rather the measures to combat it, have put Putin’s core electorate on the verge of a split. By propagandizing conspiracy theories, skepticism regarding modern science and technology, and distrust of everything “Western,” the Putin regime has relied on the conservative-minded part of society and has obtained unconditional support from it despite all the economic problems. But under the conditions of the pandemic, in fact the conservative part of Russian society has led the resistance to vaccinations, the use of QR codes, and other measures to fight COVID-19. By the end of 2021, the government was facing a serious dilemma: either to begin harshly persecuting people with such views, thus widening the split of its core electorate and provoking some to cross over to opposition of Putin, or to meet them half-way and drop some necessary measures, and thereby face new waves of the pandemic in the near future.

We can confidently state that the continuation of the pandemic into 2022 will aggravate this situation even more severely; on the one hand, fatigue from the restrictive measures and skepticism about them will grow even on the part of those ready to vaccinate and follow hygiene rules; on the other hand, the continuation of the pandemic, despite measures already taken will become a very important argument for opponents of vaccination and restrictions.

2022 – the Year of Aggression?

The appearance at year’s end of essentially an ultimatum from Putin to the West clearly indicates what next year will be like.

Inside Russia, repression will continue, with the forcing of the remnants of opposition activists out of the country and the destruction of independent media and journalists. Quite possibly we can expect the blocking of Western social networks and media platforms, the expulsion of the international media from Russia and an increase in isolation. Rational arguments against such measures can hardly be considered weighty in a situation when the preservation of Putin’s personal power remains the only goal for the existence of the state in Russia. Moreover, it seems Putin sincerely believes that all his critics and opponents inside Russia are agents of the West. Therefore, he sees the harsh measures against the opposition as lawful retribution against their purported masters, and pressure on Western leaders as a means of getting rid of those unhappy inside Russia.

The deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Russia makes foreign policy aggression extremely likely. Putin must do something that explains the economic problems to the population and justifies the necessity of further enduring hardship. Unfortunately, there are not a lot of options – it is aggression against Ukraine or a takeover of Belarus.  And if in the case of Ukraine, Putin is taking a risk, because the outcome of any war is difficult to predict in advance, then the takeover of Belarus with the consent and facilitation of Lukashenko will seem a quite realistic scenario.

Assessment of the Election Results

Russia’s State Duma elections have been declared valid and the Central Election Commission (CEC) has shared the final results. Seats in the State Duma are now distributed as follows:

• United Russia – 324 seats
• Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) – 57 seats
• A Just Russia—For Truth – 27 seats
• Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)– 21 seats
• New People – 13 seats
• Self-nominated – 5 seats
• Growth Party – 1 seat
• Rodina – 1 seat
• Civic Platform – 1 seat

Compared with the 2016 elections, United Russia lost 19 seats, the CPRF gained 15 seats, and A Just Russia gained 4 seats. Meanwhile, the LDPR lost 18 seats, New People, which did not exist in 2016, gained 13 seats, self-nominated candidates gained four seats, and the Growth Party, which did not have any seats in the Duma in 2016 gained one seat, while Rodina and Civic Platform continued to hold onto one seat each, which was no change from 2016.

United Russia has managed to retain its so-called “constitutional majority” in the Duma, making it possible to initiate the process of changing the Russian Constitution by voting as a single block (constitutional changes require at least a two-thirds vote in the State Duma, after which amendments are approved by the Federation Council before they are ratified by the legislative assemblies of the regions). The United Russia party faction has enough deputies that it does not need to find allies from among other factions in order to hold such a vote. Thusly, during its previous session, the constitutional amendment adopted on July 1, 2020 was then confirmed by the State Duma because the United Russia faction already had enough votes to do this on its own. 

From the opposition’s perspective, however, the playing field looks drastically different compared to 2016. Then, the CPRF and populist-nationalist LDPR received roughly the same number of votes (about 13% each), while the center-left A Just Russia had just 6.2%. However, approval for United Russia suddenly plummeted in 2018 following a pension reform, just as support for the CPRF began to spike. From 2019 to 2021, the authorities launched an open, public attack on the CPRF, with about 40 Communist deputies in the regions having been subjected to criminal or administrative prosecution.

There has not much “communist” left about the CPRF, and today, it is simply an ordinary left-wing party that tries to benefit from a significant historical brand recognition. In the face of a de-facto ban on registering any new political parties in Russia without the Kremlin’s stamp of approval, the CPRF has found itself without any real political rivals as Russia’s only “left-wing party”. In fact, large numbers of active left-leaning voters have now become CPRF members and activists. Today’s CPRF has no qualms with the notion of private property, advocates for expanding the powers of parliaments at all levels, and supports the protection of political competition, expanding civil rights protections, and frequently supports civic initiatives (the Stop Shies movement in Arkhangelsk Oblast was one striking example of this, as was the Party’s “Statement 45” against political repression in Moscow following the 2019 Moscow City Duma elections).

As a parliamentary party, the CPRF has the advantage of registering candidates without having to gather signatures, which is why many local opposition activists, human rights activists, and others are most often nominated through the CPRF. This privilege extends to registering candidates for elections at all levels. Russia’s electoral system has two options:  candidates are nominated by parties and “self-nomination.” Self-nomination is quite challenging as it involves verification of each voter signature submitted in support of a candidate, making it possible for the authorities to arbitrarily dismiss signatures as invalid.

This is why, CPRF’s privilege draws a lot of supporters who have sensibly concluded that they have no other avenues for registering for elections. For example, after Oleg Mikhailov was elected to the Russian State Duma on September 19, 2021 from a single-mandate district in Komi, according to the CPRF list in the Komi State Council, his seat was given to Libertarian V. Vorobyov, who the CPRF had previously nominated on its list, along with other local activists (Vorobyov was the first Libertarian in Russia to become a regional deputy).  

The Kremlin’s intensifying crack down on the CPRF has only strengthened the protest electorate’s rallying around the Party, and it has emerged as the leader in the opposition field. Elimination of former presidential candidate Pavel Grudinin from the CPRF’s list for the State Duma was one notable example of this. Grudinin was the Party’s de-facto second in command, and a one-time presidential candidate for the CPRF. He finished second in the elections, and enjoys wide popularity among voters. Gennady Zyuganov has been the Party’s permanent leader since 1994. Grudinin was accused of allegedly failing to close an offshore account in Belize in 2018, though the CPRF has claimed that all of the “evidence” of this is forged, and even presented the original documents itself. Moreover, the circumstances were no different when Grudinin was allowed to register as a presidential candidate in 2018.

According to official data, the CPRF received 18.93% of the vote in 2021 (57 seats—48 of which are from the electoral lists, and 9 from the districts). In protest regions, it received a similar number of votes to United Russia, winning in Yakutia, Khabarovsk Krai, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Mari El Republic, and in many major cities (Vladivostok, Omsk, Syktyvkar, South Sakhalin, etc.). In 2016, United Russia won every region.

The LDPR has gone through a sudden decline, which is related to the fact that the party failed to defend its member —a highly popular governor of Khabarovsk Krai, Sergei Furgal, who was arrested in July 2020 over a conflict with Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy Yuri Trutnev. The Far East has always been the LDPR’s electoral base.

Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who turned 75 last spring, is now quite elderly and has long stopped traveling to the regions. During the debates, he was forced to make feeble excuses for handing over Furgal. From 2000 to 2021, the LDPR’s number two was Zhirinovsky’s publicity-shy son, Igor Lebedev (Zhirinovsky was the vice speaker of the State Duma, while his son was the faction leader), though in practice,  Lebedev has led the party for some time. Lebedev did not even run in the 2021 elections, and the LDPR is now openly discussing new leadership. As a result, the party lost nearly half of its previous votes, receiving just 7.55% (21 seats—19 from the party list, and just two from the regions), and even its strong single mandate candidates appear to be underperforming.

Prior to the elections, A Just Russia had merged with two ultra nationalist parties—Gennady Semigin’s Patriots of Russia and Zakhar Prilepin’s For Truth. This drove some moderate supporters away (to the New People party in particular). At the same time, the party organized a wide-ranging publicity campaign that tackled mainstream social and community issues, while staying away from ultra-patriotist narratives. In the end, despite United Russia’s falling approval rating, A Just Russia’s share of the votes barely grew at all—7.46% compared to 6.22% (27 seats, 19 from the party list and 8 from the regions).

In addition to the CPRF’s sudden growth among the opposition, the LDPR’s decline, and A Just Russia’s stagnation, one more important election result is a new party entering parliament for the first time in 17 years. The New People party was created by Alexei Nechaev, the head of Faberlic cosmetics company, in early 2020. The authorities allowed the emergence of this new moderately liberal party with the goal of giving opposition-minded urban educated voters at least some opportunity for political representation. Charismatic former mayor of Yakutsk Sardana Avksenteva, who was forced to resign in January 2021, became the second candidate on the New People list. Most of the other candidates on the party list were not particularly well-known (the party even had to resort to YouTube-based campaigns for recruitment).

In the summer of 2020, New People launched a massive campaign in the regions—newspapers, billboards, LED boards, etc. As the campaigning period came to a close, New People was among the top three parties that received the most mentions on television, and those mentions were always positive (whereas all mentions of the CPRF were negative). As a result, New People obtained 5.32% of the votes and 13 seats from the party list. In regions with high levels of election fraud (as detailed below), it barely received any votes, compared to 8%-10% in protest regions. Now, for the first time since the early 2000s, parliament has a fifth party, which is politically more right-wing than United Russia (since 2003, all of Russia’s opposition has actually been to the left of United Russia).

Campaigns in majoritarian districts played out completely differently from those of 2016. The 2016 election was a rigged match, with just a thin veneer of competition, and the ruling party handing a few districts to the systemic opposition—out of 225 districts, in 19, United Russia did not even bother to nominate candidates. When all was said and done, United Russia won 203 districts (in other words, its candidates only lost in three precincts). This time, the districts were not divided up. Initially, United Russia only vacated five districts, with three more following later. Essentially, the districts were not won by the opposition, but by administrative self-nominated candidates. United Russia still won 198 districts, meaning that its candidates lost in 19 districts, rather than just three. In all of the districts where the opposition parties did win, they faced tough battles. The opposition only lost 20 districts due to fraud.

Thus, the campaigns in 2016 and 2021 were quite different.

The coronavirus pandemic and its repercussions were a constant theme throughout the campaign. Under the pretext of “public health measures,” the Russian authorities banned all public opposition rallies, no matter how small, while still allowing several massive rallies organized by the governing party.

In May 2020, on sanitary and epidemiological grounds, the Russian Central Election Commission was granted permission to hold elections over the course of three days, rather than just one. This made the task of election monitoring significantly more complicated and created greater opportunities to create an environment conducive to pressure and direct fraud (the 2021 elections took place over three days, on September 17, 18, and 19). At the same time, the pandemic led to a deterioration in social and economic conditions, small and medium businesses failed in the face of restrictions, while frustration, depression, and a sense of hopelessness grew among Russia’s citizens, which unsurprisingly soured voters on the governing party and drove many to exercise a protest vote. Russia’s largest official polling agency VTsIOM publicly acknowledged the growth in social pessimism in the spring of 2020[1]:

The data above are from VTsIOM-SPUTNIK surveys—VTsIOM’s daily nationwide telephone survey.

The 2021 elections are also notable because they took place in the wake of the 2020 constitutional reform, which granted the Russian President even more powers than before (especially when it comes to his influence on the judicial system), which greatly complicated the task of protecting citizens’ rights abroad (an attempt to shift from the priority of international law in human rights). The reform also introduced many new prohibitions on electoral rights into the Constitution, whereas they had previously only been contained in laws.

The combination plunging approval for the government and an updated Constitution that has opened the door to new opportunities for repression has led to an unprecedented level of government pressure on civil society and opposition organizations and politicians, even by Russian election standards. The pressure campaign was triggered by authorities’ nervousness and uncertainty over election results. Targeted pressure campaigns are nothing new in Russia, but this time, things were far more widespread, with victims numbering in the thousands. In 2021, a “victim” is not necessarily just a citizen deprived of his or her right to run for office, but also often someone who was actually arrested or forced to emigrate.

Against the backdrop of the pandemic and new restrictions, on May 23, 2020, law number 153-FZ was adopted, depriving citizens who have been sentenced to imprisonment for medium-gravity crimes (under Article 50 of the Russian Criminal Code) from being elected for a five-year period after their criminal record has been dismissed or expunged. This has affected many people convicted of medium-gravity crimes, including those that carry suspended sentence, whether they were sentenced for crimes against individuals or “political” crimes (such as “public dissemination of knowingly false information,” “repeated violations of regulations on organizing rallies,” “calls for separatism,” “extremism,” or “use of violence against representatives of the authorities”). Vast numbers of people have found themselves charged with white-collar crimes such as fraud, misappropriation of funds, or embezzlement, in addition to drug offenses.

Following the arrest of Alexei Navalny on January 17, 2021 immediately upon his return to Russia and the protests that broke out in response, nearly all regional divisions of Navalny supporters’ organizations (the nonprofit FBK, or Anti-Corruption Foundation, and the Navalny headquarters) were violently crushed—some Navalny allies fled the country, while others were arrested. On April 16, 2021, it was reported that the Moscow Prosecutor’s Office had filed a suit to recognize the FBK, Navalny headquarters, and the Foundation for the Protection of Citizens’ Rights (FZPG; another group associated with the FBK since 2019) recognized as extremist organizations. The Prosecutor’s Office stated that “the actual goals of their activities are to create the conditions for altering the foundations of the constitutional order, including by way of a ‘color revolution’ scenario”[2]. On June 9, 2021, the courts ordered them all liquidated. Following a protest in support of Alexei Navalny in January and February 2021 alone, 17,600 individuals were arrested in 125 cities[3]. Over 9,000 administrative charges were filed, and 90 criminal cases were opened. Nearly 1,800 individuals are still behind bars following the April 21 protest[4]. 

On May 27, 2021, it was reported that the Open Russia organization would be shuttering all of its activities and closing its branches in the regions. Executive director Andrei Pivovarov announced that the decision was made in order to protect supporters from criminal prosecution. “All members of [Open Russia] have been expelled from the organization and their membership has been canceled, in order to avoid any possible harassment. We do not need any new fines or criminal charges, and we want to protect our supporters,”[5] he stated. The police have linked Open Russia with the British organization Open Russia Civic Movement founded by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an organization that the authorities had previously deemed “undesirable” and liquidated in 2019. Andrei Pivovarov himself was removed from a flight to Warsaw from St. Petersburg on the evening of May 31 and taken to Krasnodar, where he was arrested and charged with cooperating with an undesirable organization (Article 284.1 of the Russian Criminal Code).

At the same time the case against the FBK, Law 157-FZ was hastily passed (the entire procedure took just a month from the time of filing, in violation of the Duma’s own laws and regulations) on June 4, 2021, denying Russian citizens of their right to be elected if they have been involved with a social, religious, or other organization that the court has ordered liquidated or shut down after recognizing that organization as extremist or terrorist in nature. Organization founders, managers, and the heads of regional or other divisions and their deputies who held one of these positions in the three years prior to the date on which the court ruling entered into force may not be elected for a five-year period. “Ordinary” participants, members, or employees of that organization or other individuals involved in its activities beginning up to one year prior to the entry into force of the court ruling to liquidate the organization or ban its activities are deprived of their right to be elected for a three-year period following the entry into force of that court ruling. The law specifies that any expressions of support via statements, including those made online or via other means (including donations or other assistance) may be considered as involvement with the organization. Contrary to common legal standards, this law has retroactive force, meaning that it punishes people for activities that, at the time they were committed, were not illegal. Vague wording (about statements of support online or  providing any type of assistance) opens the door wide for any authorities seeking to use it arbitrarily against any opposition-minded citizens.

It is impossible to calculate the exact number of Russian citizens who are now deprived of their right to be elected. According to rough estimates by the Golos association, no less than nine million Russian citizens, or about 8% of the total electorate, are currently prohibited from running for office (and the real number is likely far higher). Law 157-FZ’s entry into force and the recognition of Navalny’s organizations as “extremist” means that hundreds of thousands more politically active citizens’ rights are also being trampled on[6]. 

Thus, the Russian government is attempting to quash and subdue citizens’ protest activities as much as possible. However, in no way does the fear of becoming a victim of repressions negate Russians’ growing dissatisfaction with their worsening quality of life and lack of opportunities for a dignified and secure future. Citizens are afraid, but so are candidates and political parties (especially the “systemic” parties represented in the State Duma). Therefore, they are very careful when expressing any criticism, always while observing many unwritten “limits,” and ritually distance themselves from Alexei Navalny and his supporters. Examples of this behavior are the CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov and the founder of nominally liberal party Yabloko, Grigory Yavlinskiy.

Officially, the Kremlin managed to retain control over the electoral system, control voting in the regions largely viewed as its “electoral sultanates” (regions rife with electoral fraud), hold onto its constitutional majority in parliament, bring political parties loyal to the Kremlin into the Duma, and cut the non-systemic opposition out of the electoral process altogether. Voter fraud also made it possible to weaken systemic opposition in the Duma, notably the CPRF.

The Russian government’s successes and failures

We can view the latest elections as a success for Putin’s regime. The Kremlin has achieved the following goals:

– United Russia retained its constitutional majority in the Duma;

– No mass protests broke out following the election results;  

– The electronic voting system made it possible to falsify votes in Moscow (the region most prone to protesting the Kremlin);

– Smart Voting failed to win in a large number of constituencies, with disappointing results, even in Russia’s traditional protest regions;

– The authorities managed to supress the voter turnout, especially in major cities;

– For the first time in an election, media resources blocked both systemic (CPRF) and non-systemic politicians (Alexei Navalny supporters), under direct pressure from the Kremlin. For the first time, international corporations like Google and Apple took part in blocking Smart Voting by blocking Smart Voting media resources just three days prior to the elections.

Nonetheless, not everything was quite so rosy for the authorities, who did see some setbacks during these elections.

– A big number of politicians, experts, and ordinary citizens are now challenging the reliability of electronic voting;

– Against the backdrop of plummeting real support for United Russia and lower voter turnout than in 2011, more votes had to be falsified compared to 2011 and 2016. Thus, there is some “environmental resistance” limiting just how many votes can be falsified;

– The potential for protest in the regions of the Far East, Siberia, and Northwest Russia (see table below) has not gone anywhere;

– The potential for voter fraud did not expand with the institution of a three-day voting period (the authorities extended the voting period from one to three days, from September 17-19, 2021, citing measures to fight the pandemic). Initially, many members of the opposition feared that the change would increase opportunity for fraud, though in practice, the list of regions in Russia where votes were counted honestly or relatively honestly did not actually change much at all, nor did the total volume of fraud overall). The reason for their fears was that the new, three-day voting period introduced a procedure in which ballots are stored for one or two days, during which time they can easily be replaced or destroyed. In practice, however, this was not widespread;

– Voting abroad was a complete disaster as far as the Kremlin was concerned—Smart Voting candidates won in nearly every embassy. The Kremlin’s saving grace was the fact that voting abroad represented only 0.38% of the votes cast;

– The Kremlin did not manage to obtain any clear recognition of the elections from the international community.

The opposition’s successes/failures

Assessing the elections from the opposition’s perspective is most logical when we divide the opposition into systemic (political parties and politicians  registered for elections) and non-systemic—in these elections, mostly supporters of Alexei Navalny, and more broadly, Smart Voting.

For the systemic opposition, these elections were a success:

– The CPRF, A Just Russia, and New People increased their number of seats in the Duma;

– Candidates from these parties were not subjected to any significant reprisals at the hands of the Kremlin;

– The CPRF actually strengthened its position as Russia’s main opposition party, including through an attempt at holding a public demonstration in Moscow against voter fraud;

– New People entered the Duma on its first election.

The following can be considered as failures:

– The LDPR led a very confusing campaign, losing nearly half of its seats in the Duma;

– Support for Yabloko has plummeted. Many strong Yabloko candidates were barred from running in the State Duma elections at all;

– The CPRF was unable to shield former presidential candidate Pavel Grudinin from being barred from running, and it was unable to collect enough funds for its electoral fund, nor was it able to register a number of strong regional supporters as candidates.

The non-systemic opposition executed the Smart Voting strategy, which aimed to throw support behind constituencies’ second-strongest candidate after United Russia. It is difficult to assess whether the campaign was successful or not, though it did achieve the following:

– Voting at Russian Embassies abroad went almost entirely according to Smart Voting recommendations (this comes as no surprise, as polling at the embassies was randomly assigned to majority districts, and as a result, voters at embassies were voting on candidates from regions on which they had almost no information, while Smart Voting made up for the lack of information on these options);

– In Moscow (in nine of 15 single-mandate constituencies), the Smart Voting candidate won at nearly every polling station, and the authorities were forced to completely falsify electronic voting data in order to ensure the victory of candidates with the Kremlin’s stamp of approval; 

– A similar situation played out in six of eight districts in St. Petersburg;

– 15 Smart Voting candidates were sent to the Duma, with 169 more in second place. That is more mandates than the New People party, which took just 13 seats.

One downside of Smart Voting was that many voters preferred not to vote for the candidate recommended by Smart Voting, but for other parties or candidates altogether.

For example, in Irkutsk Oblast (considered by experts from the Golos voter rights movement to be a region with an honest vote count), in all four constituencies, Smart Voting recommended voting for candidates from the CPRF. However, study of the voting results shows that while United Russia candidates lost votes in all four constituencies, the additional votes did not go to the CPRF, but to candidates from other parties. New People obtained 9.99% of the vote in Irkutsk Oblast, meaning that people preferred the strategy of voting for the candidate of their choice. In fact, Smart Voting recommendations had the greatest effect in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the embassies. In the other territories, it is difficult to determine where Smart Voting worked, and where voters simply voted for their preferred candidate. We can also consider the “bet on YouTube” strategy employed by the non-systemic opposition a failure. The fact that major global corporations blocked Smart Voting websites highlights the inherent vulnerabilities of using this method to share information.

Criticism of the campaign and elections overall

Russia’s September 19 State Duma Elections cannot be considered free nor fair.

Below are some of the main criticisms of the campaign:

• Current legislation has deprived more than nine million Russian citizens of their ability to participate in elections. We did not even see this level of oppression in the USSR under Stalin;
• The candidate registration system makes it impossible to register via self-nomination. The procedure for gathering signatures has been neutered by a signature verification system (in all 225 constituencies throughout Russia, only 11 people were registered in the State Duma via signature in 2021). Russia has created a multilevel system for screening electoral candidates;  
• Campaign fundraising is extremely difficult, and the candidates raised minimal amounts for their campaigns in this election. There are a variety of complicated reasons for this, including the fact that this is now the seventh year of an economic crisis that has hit small and medium businesses, which are the main source of opposition support, the hardest. There have also been direct campaigns of intimidation and new laws threatening reprisals for providing financial support for any banned organizations and anyone who the authorities recognize as a member). However, the main obstacle to campaign fundraising is the fact that Russia’s entire economy is controlled by the state, and state-owned companies only finance campaigns when the Kremlin directly orders them to do so, if they provide any funds at all. Private companies are afraid to finance any political campaigns because doing so places them at risk of audits or harassment at the hands of government agencies. There is no shortage of cases in Russia in which companies that provided support for opposition campaigns simply folded altogether. The most recent example is Pavel Grudinin’s company, which collapsed following the 2018 presidential elections;
• Prohibitive media laws in Russia hamstring any election coverage—hardly anyone can even write about the elections or candidates once the campaigns have been announced;
• The 2021 State Duma elections were the first in Russian history to take place with almost no international observers at all;
• For over two decades now, the vote counting system has been falsified with data from “electoral sultanates,” or territories where voting results are entirely fraudulent;
• The Remote Electronic Voting systems created for these elections allow three processes that make fair voting fundamentally impossible—voting under someone else’s account, voting under supervision or transferring one’s password from the system to a third party and directly falsifying voting results. All three violations were widespread during these elections;
• There is no system for protesting elections, either at individual polling places, or generally at the Russian Central Election Commission. For example, the CEC has written about violations during the voting in St. Petersburg several times, but no legal decision canceling the election results in full or in part was ever made. Similarly, independent experts’ discovery of vulnerabilities in the Remote Electronic Voting system did not lead to any results being vacated, either.

Political and geographical features of the election results

As noted above, according to official data, United Russia won the State Duma elections held on September 17-19, 2021, taking 49.82% of the votes, giving it 126 out of 225 spots on the party lists. In the majority part of the State Duma, it won 198 out of 225 seats (the Duma operates with a relative majority or first-past-the-post system). As a result of this total victory in the majority, United Russia’s total number of seats is now 324, a constitutional majority. Nonetheless, it lost seats compared to 2016, when it won 54.2% of the vote from the party lists, and a total of 343 seats. Throughout the campaign, United Russia’s approval rating remained low, and even according to official polling service VTsIOM, fluctuated around 27-28%[7].

That discrepancy is possible due to differences in the political and electoral-geographical situation in the Russian regions, which exhibit extremely strong variations in electoral behavior. There is one group of regions with its core in several national regions of the North Caucasus and Volga region with rigid, authoritarian political rule, where the authorities always announce incredibly high turnout (often 80-90%) and equally high percentages of votes for the ruling party. According to independent electoral experts and the opposition alike, in reality, turnout in these regions is not much different from that of other areas of the country, and voter fraud is rampant.

Several other regions that saw widespread electoral deviations (Kuzbass, Yamalo-Nenets Okrug, and others) are also added to this group. Experts refer to these regions as “electoral anomalies” or “electoral sultanates”. They have always shown high results for Russia’s ruling party, and those figures only grew in the 2000s as turnout dropped in more politically competitive areas.

Since 2016, State Duma elections were moved from December to September, which, as in previous regional elections, created additional problems with the mobilization of independent voters. As a result, the September 18, 2016 State Duma elections saw the highest differentiation among the Russian regions in voter turnout since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Voter turnout by region

Region	Took part in elections (turnout)
2011	2016	2021
Republic of Adygea	65.9%	53.9%	68.21%
Altai Republic	63.6%	45.1%	46.19%
Republic of Bashkortostan	79.3%	69.8%	72.79%
Republic of Buryatia	56.9%	40.5%	44.97%
Republic of Dagestan	91.1%	88.1%	84.52%
Republic of Ingushetia	86.4%	81.4%	83.68%
Kabardino-Balkar Republic	98.4%	90.1%	85.78%
Republic of Kalmykia	63.2%	57.5%	50.12%
Karachay-Cherkessia Republic	93.2%	93.3%	89.36%
Republic of Karelia	50.3%	39.6%	37.64%
Komi Republic	72.6%	40.8%	39.47%
Republic of Crimea	—	49.1%	49.75%
Mari El Republic	71.3%	53.4%	46.11%
Republic of Mordovia	94.2%	83.0%	65.11%
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	60,1%	48.1%	50.24%
Republic of North Ossetia- Alania	85.8%	85.6%	86.61%
Republic of Tatarstan	79.5%	78.8%	78.92%
Tuva Republic	86.1%	90.1%	83.28%
Udmurt Republic	56.6%	44.5%	47.45%
Republic of Khakassia	56.2%	39.4%	37.54%
Chechen Republic	99.5%	94.9%	94.42%
Chuvash Republic	61.7%	59.4%	57.14%
Altai Krai	52.5%	40.8%	40.95%
Zabaykalsky Krai	53.6%	38.9%	39.35%
Kamchatka Krai	53.6%	39.5%	42.37%
Krasnodar Krai	72.6%	51.2%	65.41%
Krasnoyarsk Krai	49.7%	36.7%	42.15%
Perm Krai	48.1%	35.2%	39.01%
Primorsky Krai	48.7%	37.4%	42.58%
Stavropol Krai	50.9%	42.1%	67.11%
Khabarovsk Krai	53.2%	36.9%	44.31%
Amur Oblast	54.0%	42.5%	41.65%
Arkhangelsk Oblast	50.0%	36.6%	41.58%
Astrakhan Oblast	56.0%	37.0%	46%
Belgorod Oblast	75.5%	62.2%	59.07%
Bryansk Oblast	59.9%	55.1%	68.65%
Vladimir Oblast	48.9%	38.4%	37.89%
Volgograd Oblast	52.0%	42.2%	64.97%
Vologda Oblast	56.3%	40.9%	45.53%
Voronezh Oblast	64.3%	53.8%	53.86%
Ivanovo Oblast	53.2%	38.5%	38.26%
Irkutsk Oblast	47.1%	34.7%	36.99%
Kaliningrad Oblast	54.6%	44.1%	46.15%
Kaluga Oblast	57.6%	43.1%	44.18%
Kemerovo Oblast	69.4%	86.8%	73.48%
Kirov Oblast	54.0%	41.9%	45.04%
Kostroma Oblast	57.3%	39.4%	39.54%
Kurgan Oblast	56.5%	41.8%	48.28%
Kursk Oblast	54.7%	47.0%	47.01%
Leningrad Oblast	51.5%	44.1%	44.27%
Lipetsk Oblast	56.9%	52.6%	52.72%
Magadan Oblast	52.6%	40.6%	43.7%
Moscow Oblast	51.0%	38.2%	45.35%
Murmansk Oblast	51.9%	39.7%	43.84%
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	58.9%	44.5%	48.47%
Novgorod Oblast	56.6%	39.9%	41.12%
Novosibirsk Oblast	56.8%	34.9%	37.73%
Omsk Oblast	55.7%	38.7%	41.38%
Orenburg Oblast	51.2%	41.7%	45.86%
Orel Oblast	64.7%	53.6%	49.99%
Penza Oblast	64.9%	60.6%	57.52%
Pskov Oblast	52.9%	42.1%	44.81%
Rostov Oblast	59.3%	48.2%	48.8%
Ryazan Oblast	52.7%	43.3%	48.03%
Samara Oblast	53.0%	52.9%	46.77%
Saratov Oblast	67.3%	64.5%	55.71%
Sakhalin Oblast	49.1%	37.1%	39.94%
Sverdlovsk Oblast	51.2%	41.5%	48.47%
Smolensk Oblast	49.6%	40.4%	41.87%
Tambov Oblast	68.3%	49.3%	58.87%
Tver Oblast	53.5%	41.6%	42.46%
Tomsk Oblast	50.5%	33.9%	41.47%
Tula Oblast	72.8%	45.6%	53.17%
Tyumen Oblast	76.2%	81.1%	61.54%
Ulyanovsk Oblast	60.4%	52.4%	45.88%
Chelyabinsk Oblast	59.7%	44.4%	46.54%
Yaroslavl Oblast	55.9%	37.8%	43.4%
Moscow	61.7%	35.3%	50.12%
St. Petersburg	55.2%	32.7%	37.61%
Sevastopol	—	47.0%	49.27%
Jewish Autonomous Oblast	52.1%	39.6%	63.13%
Nenets Autonomous Okrug	56.1%	44.8%	42.61%
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	54.9%	39.3%	46.62%
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	79.1%	64.5%	61.29%
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug	82.2%	74.4%	67.41%
Russian Federation	60.2%	47.9%	51.72%

In Russia, there is no unified scale for defining the list of so-called “anomalous” regions (areas of widespread, systematic voter fraud, known as “electoral sultanates” by Dmitry Oreshkin).

Here, we can distinguish two approaches. Electoral statistics researcher Sergey Shpilkin used a mathematical modeling system for analysis (distribution graphs by voter turnout at polling places and the number of voters at specific polling stations) in 2011 and then 2016 to divide all of the regions (with the exception of Chukotka Autonomous Region, due to insufficient data) by voting distribution curves and the share of “anomalous” voting into several groups. The first group (which he refers to as “totally fabricated”) includes 15 regions, where there were practically no clusters of polling stations with low turnout and results for United Russia. It includes the Republics of Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Mordovia, North Ossetia- Alania, Tatarstan, Tuva, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Chechnya, and Bryansk, Kemerovo, Saratov, Tyumen Oblasts, and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. According to Shpilkin, the total share of “anomalous votes” in these regions was 7.5 million.

The second group (which Shpilkin refers to as “falsified”) was made up of nine regions, in which the share of “anomalous” votes exceeded 10% of the registered number of voters. It includes the Republics of Adygea, Kalmykia, Chuvashia, Belgorod, Voronezh, Lipetsk, Penza, Rostov, and Tambov Oblasts. The total share of “anomalous” votes in these regions numbers over 1.6 million.

Shpilkin classified the remaining regions (60) as “relatively clean” and “clean,” with 3% of the registered voters as the dividing line between the two groups (of which there are equal numbers). It is worth noting that Shpilkin’s method is effective for detecting anomalies associated with higher voter turnout (“stuffing the ballot box,” organized votes under pressure, and other forms of manipulation). The same methods may not detect manipulation associated with “transferring” votes from one party to another.

The second approach was described in the book How Russia Voted in 2016 by Alexandr Kynev and Arkady Lyubarev for the Civil Initiatives Committee (CIC) [Комитет гражданских инициатив], and divides regions into three groups based on voter turnout. The first group includes regions with a turnout below 54%, and includes most regions (65). The second, intermediate group includes regions with a turnout of 55% to 65% (regions with increased turnout), and includes seven regions (Kalmykia, Chuvashia, Belgorod, Bryansk, Penza, Saratov Oblasts, and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug). The third group, with turnout above 69% (regions with very high turnout) includes 13 regions—the Republics of Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Mordovia, north Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Chechnya, Kemerovo, and Tyumen Oblasts, as well as Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

            That division for the CIC was similar to Sergei Shpilkin’s classification based on distribution curves. Shpilkin included all 13 regions with very high turnout in the first group, as well as Bryansk and Saratov Oblasts, which were included in the group with increased turnout by the CIC book. Shpilkin included four regions with increased turnout and five regions with turnout below 54% in the second group.

It is also noticeable that regions with high voter turnout also demonstrated strong support for United Russia. Average turnout in the first group is 41.7%, and an average of 46.7% of these voters voted for United Russia. In the second group, turnout is 61.0%, and support for United Russia stands at 61.9%. In the third group, the average turnout is 81.3%, with 75.9% of voters supporting United Russia. Regions in the third group, which makes up just 12.8% of Russia’s voters, represented 21.8% of the votes overall and 30.6% of the votes for United Russia.

It is also important to note that the electoral situation in the regions is fluid. There are some regions that have been part of the “anomalous” category for 20 years, but there are others that have been part of and then left this group. For example, under Governor Nikolay Kolesov from Tatarstan in 2007-2008, Amur Oblast’s indicators were anomalous, before then returning to normal distribution following Kolesov’s ouster. Under Vyacheslav Gayzer, the Komi Republic became anomalous, though it returned to the category of protest and “electorally normal” regions following the arrest of Gayzer and several other high-level leaders in Komi (including the former chair of the Komi Republic Electoral Commission, Yelena Shabarshina). Under Governor Vladimir Gruzdev, Tula Oblast also joined the group of anomalous regions.

Many regions have their own internal anomalous zones (for example, Ussuriisk in Primorsk and Primorsky Krais, or Oleninsky Municipal District (now municipal okrug) in Tver Oblast, etc.).

However, it appears incorrect to classify regions as anomalous solely based on high turnouts (a turnout of 57-60% is above the national average, though it cannot be considered anomalous). For example, historically, the rural areas of Chuvashia and Belgorod Oblasts have always shown high turnout, though in the region as a whole, that does not go hand in hand with an abnormal percentage of votes for one party. Therefore, we cannot consider Chuvashia as an abnormal region (only 50.9% voted for United Russia in 2016), as is the case in Belgorod (54.7% in 2016). At the same time, in 2016, United Russia results were anomalous in Krasnodar Krai (59.3%), Voronezh Oblast (58.7% with a turnout of 53.8%), Rostov Oblast (58.8%), and Tyumen Oblast (58.4%).

Thus, 58-60% support for United Russia can be considered the “cutoff threshold” for anomalous and semi-anomalous regions in 2016. The Nizhny Novgorod Oblast indicators are close to these figures (58.2% in 2016, with obvious fraud in three districts of Nizhny Novgorod), despite the fact that there is no large-scale falsification of voter turnout numbers (turnout was just 44.5% in 2016).

As a result, 24 regions can be classified as “anomalous” or “semi-anomalous”, given the extremely high official turnout figures and similarly high percentages of votes for one party in 2016. These regions are home to about 30 million voters, or 27.4% of Russia’s registered voters, though given the high turnout numbers, in 2016, they made up 38.04% of all ballots cast, and 49.3% of all votes for United Russia. As a rule, there is simply no way to increase turnout in these regions. Accordingly, any increase in turnout in the protest regions or areas that are simply strongly independent (large cities, most regions of the Urals, Siberia, the Far East, and the Russian North) should reduce the share of “anomalous” regions in the overall results, and with it, the number of votes for United Russia. In fact, the way everything played out during the 2021 campaign was related to one thing—the authorities’ desire to demoralize and discourage protest voters, inspiring a feeling that voting was a hopeless endeavor, and minimizing turnout as much as possible in protest regions. Though turnout in protest regions did slightly increase (total turnout grew from 47.88% to 51.72% in Russia), at the same time, United Russia’s final victory in 2021 hinged on voter fraud in “electoral sultanates”. The 2016 campaign was very quiet, without any major events (then, United Russia enjoyed a rather high approval rating, and the authorities reduced voter turnout in protest regions simply by holding a very boring, uneventful campaign).

Anomalous and semi-anomalous regions during the 2016 elections

	Registered voters at the time of polls closing	Took part in elections (turnout)	Votes for United Russia
Adygea	339,685	183,133	108,778
Bashkortostan	3,040,845	2,121,993	1,195,246
Dagestan	1,653,807	1,457,044	1,294,629
Ingushetia	219,176	178,084	129,222
Kabardino-Balkar Republic	536,867	483,776	375,942
Kalmykia	211,637	121,706	85,923
Karachay-Cherkessia Republic	306,375	285,859	233,498
Crimea	1,493,965	734,230	534,362
Mordovia	628,822	522,021	440,108
North Ossetia	528,993	453,029	303,794
Tatarstan	2,886,295	2,273,070	1,939,563
Tuva	156,983	141,482	116,372
Chechnya	695,573	660,249	635,729
Krasnodar Krai	3,989,178	2,041,529	1,208,327
Bryansk Oblast	1,015,760	560,169	357,780
Voronezh Oblast	1,873,592	999,509	586,142
Kemerovo Oblast	2,032,985	1,764,703	1,363,181
Penza Oblast	1,097,837	665,571	427,283
Rostov Oblast	3,256,186	1,567,627	921,087
Saratov Oblast	1,940,501	1,249,759	850,392
Tambov Oblast	856,499	421,964	267,730
Tyumen Oblast	1,080,797	876,921	511,529
Chukotka Oblast	29,725	19,170	11,266
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Oblast	355,145	264,144	177,214
TOTAL	30,227,228	20,046,742	14,075,097
Share of Russian Federation	27.46%	38.04%	49.34%
Russian Federation	110,061,200	52,700,992	28,527,828

It is clear that for 2021, the following regions should be excluded from the so-called “anomalous zones”: Kalmykia (widespread protest voting in a context of conflict between regional head Batu Khasikov and local elites, with a drop in turnout from 57% to 50%), Crimea (turnout was lower than the national average at 49.75%, with a drop in votes for United Russia from 72.8% to 63.33%), Chukotka Autonomous Oblast (a drop in support for United Russia, to 46.7%, which cannot be considered an anomalous result, and Rostov Oblast (even taking into account electronic voting from Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, turnout was only 48.8%, below the national average), and Voronezh Oblast (turnout remained at 53.8%, which is only higher than the national average for 2021).

It is also clear that in 2021, Stavropol Krai once again joined the category of anomalous zones (there was an abnormal spike in turnout, from 42% to 67%), as did Volgograd Oblast (turnout grew from 42% to 65%), and for the first time, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (turnout grew from 39.6% to 63%, alongside an increase in votes for United Russia, from 45% to 56%).

In all, 22 regions make up the list of most anomalous regions for 2021. Though they are home to 25.12% of Russia’s registered voters (26.4 million), they represent 34.3% of the votes cast, and 47% of the votes for United Russia.

If we add Crimea and Voronezh Oblast to this list, that share grows to 28.18%, 37.33%, and 50.70%, respectively. Thus, the overall share of anomalous and semi-anomalous regions, the number of voters, and number of votes for United Russia has remained more or less stable.

Anomalous and semi-anomalous regions in the 2016 elections

	Registered voters at the time of polls closing	Took part in elections (turnout)	Votes for United Russia
Adygea	341,943	233,246	154,491
Bashkortostan	3,008,258	2,189,823	1,458,777
Dagestan	1,699,609	1,436,544	1,164,969
Ingushetia	234,660	196,372	167,239
Kabardino-Balkar Republic	539,787	463,053	366,099
Karachay-Cherkessia Republic	301,151	269,109	215,309
Mordovia	590,906	384,760	253,523
North Ossetia	520,743	451,010	320,410
Tatarstan	2,941,538	2,321,427	1,833,035
Tuva	197,564	164,526	140,090
Chechnya	775,256	731,968	703,613
Krasnodar Krai	4,320,254	2,826,045	1,720,921
Stavropol Krai	1,889,696	1,268,308	783,327
Bryansk Oblast	964,117	661,820	425,333
Volgograd Oblast	1,807,406	1,174,357	685,705
Kemerovo Oblast	1,939,447	1,425,122	1,003,578
Penza Oblast	1,036,556	596,244	335,032
Saratov Oblast	1,865,540	1,039,249	618,244
Tambov Oblast	817,686	481,413	273,771
Tyumen Oblast	1,136,676	699,502	358,631
Jewish Autonomous Oblast	125,347	79,135	44,623
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Oblast	376,862	254,054	174,561
Total	27,431,002	1,934,7087	13,201,281
Share of Russian Federation	25.12%	34.26%	47.04%
Russian Federation	109,204,662	56,484,685	28.064,200

If we use Sergey Shpilkin’s calculations, the distribution of votes for parties by turnout, according to the proportional system and distribution of polling stations in coordinates, the turnout for 2021’s elections is rather ordinary for Russian elections, and in general does not greatly differ from the distributions seen in, say 2011 and 2016. Moreover, the distribution of the “main core” of polling stations by turnout (about 38%) coincides with that of 2016, and by votes for United Russia (about 32%), coincides with that of 2011. Shpilkin’s calculation gives (based on available, incomplete data) about 13.7 million fraudulent votes for United Russia. Subtracting these presumably “enhanced” votes gives us a corrected result of 33% for United Russia, which is well in line with the “cometary nucleus” in Shpilkin’s graphs (31%). In a beautiful coincidence, the number of real votes for United Russia is the same (based on available data, about 13.7 million, and roughly 14 million adjusted for unaccounted polling stations). According to Shpilkin, this is the lowest level of real support on a proportional system that United Russia has ever seen. The share of questionable votes making up United Russia’s results—50%—is also a record (in 2011, this figure was about 45%, and in 2016, about 43%). By Shpilkin’s estimates, without this factor, United Russia would have received about 33% of the votes, rather than 50%, with the CPRF receiving 25% rather than 19%, and LDPR and A Just Russia—For Truth receiving 10% rather than 7.5%, and New People receiving 7% rather than just over 5%. Other parties would not have had any hope of reaching the 5% threshold[8].

In addition to the “electoral sultanates,” an experiment in online voting (Remote Electronic Voting, REV) also boosted turnout and fraud in favor of United Russia. A special law was adopted for REV, and the Central Election Commission established a list of seven regions participating in the experiment—Moscow, Sevastopol, Kursk, Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov, and Yaroslavl Oblasts. In order to take part in REV, voters needed to submit an electronic application between August 2 and September 13. It is impossible to establish who voted via REV and how they voted, as well as whether the official results correspond to the real ones, according to the opposition.

Officially, citizens chose to take part in REV by submitting an application via an electronic public service system. However, there have been multiple reports of the employees of government agency employees and various corporations being coerced into taking part in REV. There was a raffle for online voting participants in Moscow, who stood to win prizes, including a one-bedroom apartment in Moscow, cars, and even 10,000; 25,000; 50,000, and 100,000 prize points, which can be spent on charity, purchases at cafes and restaurants, buying goods, furniture, groceries, and medicine.  The first drawing took place on September 18, and winners were chosen by a random number generator. The last prize drawing among Moscow’s electronic voters was held on September 20, from 9:00 to 10:00 am live on the Moskva 24 television station.

When citizens registered with the REV system, they were excluded from the voter lists at polling stations and voted using their registration data on the portal at vybory.gov.ru. This experiment was carried out in Sevastopol, Kursk, Nizhny Novgorod, Murmansk, Rostov, and Yaroslavl Oblasts (Moscow voted on its own platform at https://elec.mos.ru/). In the case of Rostov Oblast, residents of unrecognized Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic who were granted Russian citizenship through a streamlined process were able to complete a simplified voter registration, through an email address alone, rather than through a mobile phone number registered in the Russian Federation. Additionally, there were other differences in Moscow’s REV, for example, the option for deferred voting, through which voters had 24 hours to change their selection (the last vote was counted). Moscow’s leaders explained that this option was introduced to avoid voting under duress, for example, if someone voted for the first time under pressure from their employer, they would be able to later change their vote from home.

In relative terms, Russia’s voter turnout increased from 47.9% to 51.72% between 2016 and 2021, and from 52,700,992 to 56,484,685 (or by 3,683,693) in real terms. A total of 2,530,839 voters voted via REV, which represents 67% of the growth  in turnout. REV’s contribution is clearly proven by Moscow, which represented 76.8% of REV voters, and where turnout jumped from 35.3% in 2016 to 50.12% in 2021. REV led to the fact that before REV results were introduced to the State Automated System “Vybory”, opposition candidates were ahead in nine Moscow districts, only for all 15 candidates supported by Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin to win after REV results were introduced. At the same time, REV results in Moscow were only published 12 hours after the polls had closed, once the authorities knew exactly how many “missing” votes their preferred candidates would need in order to ensure a win. The REV system, which was nearly devoid of any public monitoring, drew harsh criticism, and members of the opposition and the general public claimed that it permitted electoral fraud.

On September 23, members of the Moscow precincts and territorial election commissions, along with election observers, called for a cancellation of Moscow’s REV results. They sent an open letter to Alexei Venediktov, the head of the Moscow public headquarters for election observation, stating that the electronic voting system “is a tool for fraud,” and listing reasons why REV should not be accepted. These reasons included:

– Repeatedly, voters arrived at polling stations, only to be surprised to learn that they were registered for REV, though they had never registered themselves;

– There were technical failures that resulted in interruptions to even the scanty levels of REV observation that were provided; 

– Approximately 300,000 voters changed their votes in REV[9].

REV results by region

	Kursk Oblast	Murmansk Oblast	Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	Rostov Oblast (no exact data on voting from DPR/LPR)	Yaroslavl Oblast	Moscow	Sevastopol
Total regional turnout	424,788 (47%)	257,491 (43.83%)	1,246,472 (48.47%)	1,659,674 (48.8%)	436,834 (43.4%)	3,903,133 (50.12%)	166,555 (49.27%)
Regional turnout without REV	377,834 (41.8%)	211,496 (36%)	1,130,397 (44%)	1,381,816 (40.63%)	355,088 (35.28%)	1,959,543 (25.16%)	147,934 (43.46%)
REV	46,954	45,995	116,075	277,858	81.746	1,943,590	18,621
United Russia REV	162,522 (43%)	73,177 (34.6%)	570,812 (50.5%)	668,699 (48.4%)	97,407 (27.43%)	573,823 (29.3%)	83,256 (56.3%)
United Russia with REV	21,843 (46.52%)	18,789 (40.85%)	50,003 (43.08%)	186,052 (66.96%)	31,855 (38.97%)	847,592 (43.6%)	10,016 (53.79%)

With regard to key changes in Russia’s electoral geography, for the first time since the 2000s, United Russia lost in four regions, and ended up in second place (Yakutia, Khabarovsk Krai, Nenets Autonomous Oblast, and Mari El). In 12 more regions, the CPRF took second place after United Russia, by a small margin (Altai Republic, Komi, Khakassia, Altai Krai, Primorsky Krai, Amur Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast). It is clear that these regions are dominated by Siberia, the Far East, and North, where the CPRF has decisively supplanted the LDPR as the “number two” party.

United Russia’s worst results were in Khabarovsk Krai (24.51%), Nenets Autonomous Oblast (29.06%), Komi Republic (29.44%), Kirov Oblast (29.54%), and Yaroslavl Oblast (29.72%). In all five regions, its result was below 30%.

In 37 regions, United Russia received between 30-40% (the Altay Republic, Kalmykia, Mari El, Yakutia, Udmurtia, Khakassia, Chuvashia; the Altay Krai, Zabaikalsky Krai, Kamchatsky Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Permsky Krai, Primorsky Krai; Amurskaya, Arkhangelsk, Vladimir, Vologod, Ivanovskaya, Irkutsk, Kaluzhskaya, Kostromskaya, Kurganskaya, Murmansk, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orenburg, Orlovskaya, Sakhalinskaya, Sverdlovskaya, Smolenskaya, Tverskaya, Tomskaya, Ulyanovskaya, Chelyabinskaya Oblasts; Moscow and St. Petersburg). This is the largest group of regions— almost half the country.

United Russia’s best results were in Chechnya (96.13%), Tuva (85.34%), Dagestan (81.2%), Karachay-Cherkessia (80.06%), Kabardino-Balkaria (79.2%), Tatarstan (78.7%), North Ossetia (71.12%), Kemerovo Oblast (70.75%), Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Oblast (68.92%), Bashkortostan (66.7%), Adygea (66.45%), Mordovia (66%), Bryansk Oblast (64.32%), Crimea (63.33%), Stavropol Krai (61.83%) and Krasnodar Krai (60.98%). Thus, in 16 regions, it received over 60% of the votes. In 13 more regions, it received from 50% to 60% (Krasnodar Krai, Belgorod, Volgograd, Voronezh, Magadan, Penza, Rostov, Saratov, Tambov, Tula, Tyumen Oblast, Sevastopol, Jewish Autonomous Oblast). In 14 regions, United Russia received from 40% to 50%.

Region	United Russia	CPRF	A Just Russia	LDPR	New People
Adygea Republic	66.45%	14.57%	3.94%	6.54%	2.78%
Altai Republic	38.5%	30.09%	8.85%	7.85%	4.92%
Bashkortostan Republic	66.7%	14.74%	2.62%	8.67%	2.79%
Republic of Buryatia	42.63%	26.75%	3.56%	5.74%	11.22%
Republic of Dagestan	81.2%	6.2%	5.56%	2.49%	0.79%
Republic of Ingushetia	85.18%	3.65%	5.13%	1.77%	0.6%
Kabardino-Balkaria Republic	79.2%	16.69%	2.9%	0.35%	0.07%
Kalmykia Republic	39.52%	25.97%	5.86%	3.44%	12.23%
Karachay-Cherkessia Republic	80.06%	13.02%	2.01%	1.88%	0.33%
Republic of Karelia	31.69%	16.01%	11.73%	9.77%	7%
Komi Republic	29.44%	26.88%	8.33%	11.96%	9.57%
Republic of Crimea	63.33%	9.15%	5.93%	7.75%	3.96%
Mari El Republic	33.43%	36.3%	6.48%	7.94%	6.15%
Mordovia Republic	66%	12.99%	4.3%	7.75%	2.99%
Sakha Republic (Yakutia)	33.22%	35.15%	8.19%	5.14%	9.87%
Republic of North Ossetia—Alania	71.12%	11.49%	10.54%	1.43%	0.56%
Republic of Tatarstan	78.71%	9.6%	2.68%	2.8%	1.01%
Republic of Tuva	85.34%	4.2%	2.99%	1.82%	2.28%
Udmurt Republic	35.63%	25.31%	9.19%	9.64%	7.37%
Republic of Khakassia	33.36%	29.85%	6.58%	8.02%	9.85%
Republic of Chechnya	96.13%	0.75%	0.93%	0.11%	0.24%
Republic of Chuvashia	37.18%	22.51%	14.91%	6.78%	5.71%
Altai Krai	33.67%	30.54%	9.85%	9.09%	6.09%
Zabaykalsky Krai	38.66%	19.99%	8.34%	12.15%	9.36%
Kamchatka Krai	34.76%	23.87%	6.92%	11.66%	8.75%
Krasnodar Krai	60.98%	15.5%	6.34%	5.6%	4.67%
Krasnoyarsk Krai	34.64%	22.87%	6.14%	13.68%	7.84%
Perm Krai	33.69%	22.75%	10.8%	9.85%	8.64%
Primorsky Krai	37.42%	28.24%	6.19%	7.71%	5.59%
Stavropol Krai	61.83%	14.92%	9.3%	4.79%	2.63%
Khabarovsk Krai	24.51%	26.51%	6.46%	16.18%	7.72%
Amur Oblast	34.32%	26.51%	5.54%	14.17%	7.04%
Arkhangelsk Oblast	32.21%	18.7%	11.17%	12.92%	9.68%
Astrakhan Oblast	48.1%	17.84%	12.2%	5.34%	5.68%
Belgorod Oblast	51.65%	18.67%	6.88%	7.23%	5.51%
Bryansk Oblast	64.32%	13.7%	4.97%	8.6%	2.33%
Vladimir Oblast	37.64%	25.95%	7.78%	9.42%	7.31%
Volgograd Oblast	58.43%	14.77%	5.77%	11.12%	3.01%
Vologda Oblast	34.31%	21.7%	10.34%	12.46%	7.55%
Voronezh Oblast	55.9%	19.51%	5.21%	6.06%	5.07%
Ivanovo Oblast	36.24%	28.02%	7.63%	9.38%	5.9%
Irkutsk Oblast	35.53%	27.81%	6.67%	8.58%	9.81%
Kaliningrad Oblast	40.99%	20.18%	8.96%	9.59%	6.17%
Kaluzhskaya Oblast	36.33%	22.03%	10.81%	9.44%	8.18%
Kemerovo Oblast	70.75%	9.35%	5.69%	6.24%	1.85%
Kirov Oblast	29.54%	18.27%	18.44%	12.8%	8.18%
Kostroma Oblast	30.26%	28.47%	11.42%	9.93%	8.5%
Kurgan Oblast	36.07%	23.43%	10.51%	11.78%	6.61%
Kursk Oblast	43.48%	19.89%	8.04%	10.67%	6.82%
Leningrad Oblast	43.1%	18.41%	9.75%	8.34%	6.59%
Lipetsk Oblast	48.65%	21.15%	5.96%	7.76%	4.39%
Magadan Oblast	50.08%	20.67%	4.91%	8.95%	5.23%
Moscow Oblast	45.68%	20.65%	7.19%	7.47%	5.16%
Murmansk Oblast	35.81%	17.81%	11.21%	11.06%	8.56%
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	49.95%	19.2%	8.55%	7.14%	5.18%
Novgorod Oblast	32.51%	21.33%	14.37%	9.24%	7.63%
Novosibirsk Oblast	35.25%	25.86%	6.94%	9.61%	8.71%
Omsk Oblast	32.9%	31.19%	8.26%	7.22%	7.62%
Orenburg Oblast	38.36%	26.16%	7.58%	9.44%	6.03%
Oryol Oblast	38.83%	21.86%	10.16%	8.8%	5.99%
Penza Oblast	56.21%	17.24%	6.09%	7.5%	4.89%
Pskov Oblast	40.07%	21.52%	9.05%	8.64%	6.23%
Rostov Oblast	51.59%	20.19%	6.42%	6.97%	5.17%
Ryazan Oblast	47.79%	19.99%	8.22%	6.79%	5.65%
Samara Oblast	44.3%	23.29%	6.32%	7.45%	5.63%
Saratov Oblast	59.84%	20.74%	4.1%	5.15%	2.85%
Sakhalin Oblast	35.73%	28.63%	5.2%	8.89%	9.07%
Sverdlovsk Oblast	34.69%	21.3%	12.85%	8.58%	8.24%
Smolensk Oblast	39.94%	22.81%	7.58%	11.25%	5.97%
Tambov Oblast	56.92%	15%	4.72%	4.87%	2.45%
Tver Oblast	35.4%	23.04%	9.97%	9.88%	6.61%
Tomsk Oblast	32.7%	22.43%	8.52%	12.06%	9.36%
Tula Oblast	52.88%	16.85%	7.49%	6.61%	5.44%
Tyumen Oblast	51.33%	13.5%	10.24%	11.53%	4.48%
Ulyanovsk Oblast	39.03%	33.14%	5%	7.4%	5.36%
Chelyabinsk Oblast	34.31%	19.68%	17.25%	7.83%	8.3%
Yaroslavl Oblast	29.72%	22.74%	19.2%	8.97%	7.86%
Moscow	36.97%	22.67%	7.35%	7.08%	7.09%
St. Petersburg	35.07%	17.98%	10.81%	6.22%	7.55%
Sevastopol	56.45%	12.62%	7.55%	8.57%	5.3%
Jewish Autonomous Republic	56.39%	18.74%	5.36%	8.19%	3.32%
Nenets Autonomous Okrug	29.06%	31.98%	7.97%	11%	6.48%
Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug	42.3%	17.73%	5.78%	12.38%	6.39%
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	46.71%	12.49%	6.26%	15.16%	4.95%
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug	68.92%	7.16%	4.04%	13.49%	1.2%

CONCLUSION

Despite United Russia’s continued official dominance, the 2016 and 2021 electoral campaigns differed significantly, with major changes manifested in the political landscape and dynamics. 

The 2021 campaign was much tougher and competitive both on party lists and majoritarian districts. There is greater political differentiation among the regions, growing polarization in protest regions, and a sharp spike in opposition and dominance among the legal opposition from one party—the CPRF. We can expect that the authorities’ struggle with the CPRF will become one of the main flashpoints of Russian politics in the near future.

Against a backdrop of growing protest, for the first time since the 2000s, the authorities were forced to allow a fifth party, New People, into parliament, though that party’s political future and likely role remains to be seen.

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[1] VTsIOM’s social well-being indexes. https://wciom.ru/ratings/indeksy-socialnogo-samochuvstvija

[2] Прокуратура потребовала признать ФБК и штабы Навального экстремистским [Prosecutor demands FBK and Navalny headquarters be recognized as extremist]. April 16, 2021. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/16/04/2021/6079b2bf9a794761d4e7fa83

[3]Российские власти сообщили о более чем 17 тысячах задержанных на зимних акциях 2021 года [ Russian authorities announce the arrest of over 17,000 during the winter 2021 protests]. June 11, 2021. https://ovdinfo.org/news/2021/06/11/rossiyskie-vlasti-soobshchili-o-bolee-chem-17-tysyachah-zaderzhannyh-na-zimnih

[4] Последствия акций протеста из-за заключения Навального. Хроника, часть 2. [Results of the protest over Navalny’s arrest. Chronicle, Part 2]. April 22, 2021 https://ovdinfo.org/news/2021/06/11/rossiyskie-vlasti-soobshchili-o-bolee-chem-17-tysyachah-zaderzhannyh-na-zimnih

[5] Dyuryagina, K. «Открытая Россия» объявила о самоликвидации [Open Russia announces its self-liquidation]. May 27, 2021. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4828390?from=hotnews

[6] «Новые лишенцы»: за что граждан России массово поражают в праве быть избранными на выборах в 2021 году. 22.06.2021. https://www.golosinfo.org/articles/145272

[7] https://wciom.ru/ratings/reiting-politicheskikh-partii/

[8] Шпилькин С. От обнуления — к удвоению. // Новая газета. № 106 от 22 сентября 2021.
https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/09/21/ot-obnuleniia-k-udvoeniiu

[9] REV results: monitoring is impossible. https://roskomsvoboda.org/post/electronic-voting-2021/

As the dust settles after the September elections into the State Duma, several important factors define the outlook for 2024, when Putin will likely seek to extend his Presidential tenure for another term— and, if in case of success, stay in power indefinitely.

Firstly, popular support for the current regime in Russia is at its historic low. Electoral mathematician Sergey Shpilkin, who has analyzed Russian elections for more than a decade and developed an effective methodology for extracting real electoral results filtering out fraud, estimates that the ruling party United Russia received 31-33% of the votes[1]. This is consistent with other sources of data (including the opinion polls by WCIOM, FOM, Levada Center) that peg the support for the ruling party at around 30%.

Mr. Shpilkin’s analysis demonstrates that the ‘Constitutional majority’ in the Duma now claimed by the United Russia has been achieved through massive fraud at the level unseen before.  He does so by comparing the relatively reliable voting protocols from polling stations monitored by independent observers (which normally see the turnout at around 30-40% and vote for ‘United Russia’ at 30% or only slightly higher) to the outlandish protocols from the rest of almost 97,000 Russian polling stations, which did not have substantive observation efforts.

Even Putin himself is no longer capable of breaking through the 30% support ceiling. A recent Levada Center poll pegs him at exactly that level of support, if one considers respondents who gave him positive marks[2]. Where does the rest of the 60% supporters come from? That’s people who have more neutral views of him, but simply see no alternative, or are afraid of radical changes as such. This type of approval hardly evokes confidence. 

The September Duma elections have uncovered the legitimacy crisis befallen the Russian Government — unprecedented since Putin’s rise to power in 2000. Even thoroughly brainwashed by the state propaganda, Russians do not believe in the fairness of the Duma elections. According to the October 2021 Levada Center poll, public opinion is split on fairness of the September elections, with only 14% of Russians considering them “definitely free and fair”, against 24% who view the elections as “definitely unfree and unfair”.[3]

When it comes to the prospect of extending Putin’s Presidential tenure beyond 2024, one thing is clear— he doesn’t have the required majority support. The October Levada Center poll records only 47% of support of people who want to see him in power beyond 2024, with 42% opposed.[4]

Among Russians aged 40 and younger, and among the people who get their daily news from the Internet (as opposed to television), there’s a prominent majority opposed to the extension of Putin’s rule. This trend will only get worse for Putin: polling data on Russians’ media consumption shows that the share of TV as the main source of information has been steadily declining, the role of Internet growing), and the gap is closing.[5]

Given the evolving demographics and media landscape, Putin will likely face much steeper political challenges in 2024 compared to today.

The second important factor is grounded in the state of Russian economy. There are no reasons to expect any improvements in the social and economic situation in Russia, which is the major source of public discontent with Putin and his ruling party. Consider the draft federal budget for 2022-2024 recently submitted by the Russian Government to the State Duma: it doesn’t envisage growth of Russians’ real incomes in 2022-2024 higher than 2-2,5% per year. However, even this is likely an overly optimistic projection with the inflation likely to spoil the Government’s rosy 4% forecast.  In the past few years, a higher-than-expected inflation was the key factor dragging real incomes into negative territory.

Putin’s new budget is not focused on growth. Its assumption that GDP growth will reach steady 3% in 2022-2024 is not realistic, given the fact that there are no growth factors seen on the horizon. Capital is fleeing Russia, foreign direct investment is in decline, sanctions are still on, structural reforms are not even on the agenda, tax burden is high, government-sponsored investments in ‘national projects’ aren’t working.

Russian opposition spares no effort in broadcasting its key message to the Russian people: continued Putin’s rule means long years of stagnation, isolation, confrontation with the civilized world.

Increasingly, polling data shows that, although still generally skeptical of the West, Russians are tired of confrontation and living in the ‘besieged fortress’ mode and prefer normalization of relations with developed countries.[6] August 2021 poll by Levada reflects that the number of Russians agreeing that the country is in international isolation has reached a historic high stands at 57%, with 57% of respondents saying that they consider the West to be either ‘friend’ (13%) or ‘ally’ (44%) – while only 34% view the West as ‘adversary’ (29%) or ‘enemy’ (5%).[7]

This data suggests that ‘wartime mobilization’ as an instrument for boosting Putin’s popularity is becoming more problematic and a new international confrontation will most likely do Putin more harm than good domestically.

Putin is heading toward a very difficult path to 2024— with popularity already low, and no visible factors to boost it and the legitimacy crisis only deepening. However, Putin clearly remains undeterred. The brutal repressions of 2021 and a dramatic boost in spending on security and police forces (+17,4% overall, +12,5% on National Guard in 2022 as opposed to 2021) in the draft federal budget for 2022-2024 give away Putin’s plans. He will continue to aggress, oppress and imprison people, but will not tolerate their free will to change Russia’s leadership and the country political course.

However, Russians have also lost their illusions about Putin— as manifested in Putin’s inability to boost ‘United Russia’s approval ratings during the election campaign, despite of intense personal involvement in the campaign unseen since the 2007 Duma elections. Putin had personally chosen and announced the top 5 figures on the ‘United Russia’ electoral party list, he had allocated a payment of 10,000 rubles (approximately $140)— to the Russian pensioners.  None of that worked to improve the ruling party’s approval ratings. Putin’s magic has worn off.

The opposition is focused on increasing domestic pressure on Putin in the coming months and years. Putin’s plan to banish Alexey Navalny’s network hasn’t worked.  Having suffered significant setbacks, Navalny’s team still continues to operate and broadcast from abroad, thanks to the support of democratic governments which have provided the ability to relocate for many of the Russian opposition activists facing persecution. After withstanding the initial blow, the opposition was able to gradually recover, increase its broadcasting and mobilization capacity, and put a serious test for Putin during the Duma elections. Despite nominally having reached ‘constitutional majority’ in the new Duma, ‘United Russia’ candidates struggled in most districts challenged by the Navalny Smart Voting candidates, and the fight across most of the country was equally challenging. Moscow and St. Petersburg were unequivocally lost by the ruling party, with the situation “corrected” through fraudulent electronic voting system in Moscow and complete rewriting of protocols in St. Petersburg. Next time around, if popular mobilization grows even a little, even massive fraud would not save Putin from electoral loss.

Naturally, Putin and his circle are not too happy about the Duma election results. They have been raging— punishing Russian civil society with a new wave of repressions, criminal investigations, prison sentences, labeling more NGOs and individuals as ‘foreign agents’ and ‘undesired organizations’. As Putin’s support continues to slide, more repression should be expected.  Russia is heading toward a stormy showdown, as happened many times in our history, when an obsolete dictatorship refused to listen to a growing popular demand for change.

However, the resistance is not subsiding, as many brave Russians are fed up with Putin’s mafia and his dead-end political course and are committed to keep fighting for freedom. There have been no major post-election street protests— simply because people want to regroup and understand the futility attacking the brutal repressive machine head-on. But the anger has not disappeared, and Russians will show it when time and circumstances permit.  We will work tirelessly to make that happen— and the clock is ticking for Mr. Putin.

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[1] https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/09/21/shpilkin-edinaia-rossiia-poluchila-14-mln-anomalnykh-golosov-bez-falsifikatsii-partiia-vlasti-nabiraet-31-33-news

[2] https://www.levada.ru/2021/10/11/vladimir-putin-10/

[3] https://www.levada.ru/2021/10/06/kak-rossiyane-otsenivayut-itogi-vyborov/

[4] https://www.levada.ru/2021/10/11/vladimir-putin-10/

[5] https://www.levada.ru/2021/08/05/rossijskij-medialandshaft-2021/

[6] https://ru.euronews.com/2020/02/18/russia-polls-west

[7] https://www.levada.ru/2021/09/08/mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya-avgust-2021/

Over the last several months, harassment of Russia’s political opposition has intensified, with legislative elections as a clear cause. Many people have erroneously believed that once the elections were over, the repressions would ease, if not entirely disappear.

Since the elections ended, there has been little reason for optimism in this regard—the Putin regime has continued repressions against its opponents and critics, including against members of political movements that have usually been spared in the past—most notably, members of the Communist Party.

Why is that the case, and what does the future hold? First of all, the Duma elections played an important role, particularly in the way the campaign unfolded and its final results. Putin’s United Russia was far less popular than the Kremlin would have liked, and covering that up required flagrant election fraud on the part of the authorities.

From the Kremlin’s point of view, these elections highlighted at least three groups of citizens that pose a threat to the regime. First of all, there are Putin’s radical critics and opponents, who harnessed the Duma elections to create stress on the entire electoral system—most of all Alexei Navalny’s team and its active supporters in Russia. The “smart voting” tactic strengthened the Duma parties’ electorate via protest votes, influenced election results, and in many cases, forced the authorities into a Catch-22 between admitting defeat or engaging in shameless election fraud. 

Secondly, there is the independent media, along with influential bloggers and all kinds of civic activists and NGOs that highlighted violations throughout the run-up to the elections and during the vote itself. They published and discussed negative information about the governing party and its candidates and disputed the official election results. The regime views them all as a threat.

Finally, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) proved a danger to the regime, not as an independent force on its own, but as a tool of the radical opposition. Despite the best efforts of some Party leadership, not least of all Gennady Zyuganov, to distance itself from smart voting and discourage protest voters from voting for the Communists, there were some Party members who welcomed support from Russia’s liberal-minded opposition, and in fact stood in solidarity with Putin’s radical critics. Moreover, after the election results were announced, dissatisfied Communists and their supporters attempted to hold street protests, something entirely unacceptable to the Kremlin. 

Thus, Russia’s legislative election results have underscored at least three areas for the authorities to focus their repressive tactics—persecuting the Navalny team and its most active supporters in Russia while also creating difficulties for their work carried out from abroad, continuing harassment of the independent media and NGOs, including targeting the platforms they use to operate, and pressuring mainstream parties, especially the CPRF.

But beyond the latest elections, there is a good reason for continued political repression in Russia—the 2024 presidential elections. The groundwork already began last year, when constitutional amendments made it possible for Putin to hold onto power. Putin’s entire regime hinges on a credible, indisputable electoral victory. This is in contrast to the State Duma, which is unlikely to hold much influence in Russian politics today, regardless of how its elections turned out. The events in Belarus have made it clear that even after 30 years of dictatorship, people are still willing to head out into the streets and engage in widespread protests, forcing the international community to refuse to recognize elections. Such a development would be a nightmare for Putin, which is why by the time presidential elections roll around, we can expect growing repression campaigns against anyone who poses a threat or a potential threat to the Kremlin, for any reason. Continued attacks against the CPRF look all but certain. One way or another, before Russians head out to vote, the Party will have to be neutralized, whether as a political force of its own, or a potential tool for the marginalized opposition.

The CPRF’s main danger to the authorities is not as an opposition party willing to call people out to the streets. Rather, through the authorities’ own actions, it has become the only political, legal, systemic, and parliamentary alternative. In other words, the CPRF candidate will be Putin’s main opponent in 2024, and in addition to the CPRF’s usual base, it will also receive all or most of Russia’s protest votes. Considering Putin’s plummeting popularity and Russians’  growing fatigue with their perennial leader, this is a real problem.

Of course, the Kremlin has a myriad of ways to “correct” the election results and ensure Putin’s victory. After all, the Duma elections ended with United Russia declared the victor and the authorities ignoring any questions and protests from the opposition. But Putin is not United Russia, and he does not want his own victory to be tainted with scandals and accusations, or for Western politicians to even consider refusing to recognize the election results.

The only way to ensure the appearance of an irrefutable victory is by preventing any candidates capable of taking a significant number of votes from running in the first place. For the reasons listed above, Putin does not want a CPRF candidate to run—that will mean having to steal votes, which will open the door to scandals and overshadow his victory. By 2024, Putin will have to drive the CPRF to the point of ceasing to exist at all, or refusing to nominate a presidential candidate.

Eliminating the CPRF would not be a difficult endeavor, and in fact, work in that direction is already underway with repressions against Party activists and deputies. The authorities have already honed their skills in this technique with Navalny’s team—first, they begin persecuting individual Party members by filing administrative or criminal charges against them, and later ban the entire organization for being “extremist”. Though the Kremlin might have previously feared that these kinds of events might spark millions of protesters to take to the streets, September’s Communist rallies surely allayed those worries—in its current state, the CPRF is in no condition to attract as many supporters to protests as Navalny’s team.

However, doing away with the CPRF is too radical a step, and besides, there are other methods for dealing with the electoral threat, namely by pressuring CPRF activists and deputies and threatening to eliminate the Party in order to coerce the CPRF into making the decisions Putin needs—expelling the most active Kremlin critics from the Party and denying them mandates, reaffirming loyalty to Putin by supporting some unpopular government social measures, and finally, refusing to nominate a presidential candidate. Alternatively, the authorities might intimidate the CPRF into merging with another mainstream party (for years, there have been discussions of uniting with A Just Russia—For Truth), thereby denying it the ability to stand in elections as its own political entity, as it falls under complete control by the Kremlin and refuses to run a candidate at all.

As we can see, no matter what shape it takes, pressure on the CPRF will require repressions against Party activists and members, in order to ensure that by the time the presidential campaign begins, there is no one left in any Russian government body or any legally-operating political organization, who would be willing to run against Vladimir Putin and call for voters to oppose him and his preordained electoral victory.

But in addition to all of those rational reasons, there is one more motivation for continued repressions in Russia, which may be even more important. In his 20 years of rule, Putin has built up an extensive web of political repressions at every level of Russian society, both in Moscow and the regions. Thousands of members of law enforcement, the FSB, prosecutors, and the Investigative Committee conduct surveillance on real, potential, and even imaginary enemies of the regime. Each day, these people go to work and need to be busy with something. It is difficult to imagine any scenario in which they would all report to their superiors that there is no one left to fight off, and thus find themselves jobless.

The very presence of such an apparatus is the main driver of repression in any undemocratic regime. Its employees have an interest in ensuring that their superiors do not put an end to that repression. Quite on the contrary, they want to see it expand. Thus, a vicious cycle begins—the country’s top brass insists on increasing repressions, because it receives information from various law enforcement agencies that confirm its worst fears, while the law enforcement agencies expand their control and even fabricate more information in order to convince their leadership to continue and increase that repression.

It is clear that in the coming years, political repression will rise in Russia. It is unlikely to be widespread to the point of affecting millions of citizens, but political activists run the risk of persecution, regardless of their actual political views. Increasing numbers of random citizens will also find themselves persecuted, due to the simple fact that in many regions, any real political opposition has already been obliterated.

If international pressure does not force Putin to put an end to his attack on civil liberties in Russia, the West can expect an increased flow of Russian emigrants, both those who fear reprisals from the regime, and those who have already fallen victim to it.

The New People party has entered Russia’s State Duma, evoking many questions from outside observers, the first of which is very basic—does the sudden emergence and successful showing of New People demonstrate that it is possible to create new political parties for successful participation in elections?

The answer is simple: yes, in Russia, one can form any political party and it can take part in any elections, but under one condition: the party must be formed with the agreement of the Presidential Administration; all of its leaders and sponsors must get the blessing from the Kremlin to participate in elections; and the party itself must never, ever criticize Vladimir Putin personally, and must also refrain from criticizing the status quo as well as authorities’ decisions, which the authorities themselves would prefer to avoid discussing, anyway.

New People is such a party. Its founder, Alexei Nechaev, has no political experience, and from his interviews, we can glean that even now, he still does not have any political views. By all appearances, politics is simply a business that opens up doors to a new level of wealth and influence for Nechaev, who spent years building a major cosmetics brand.

Obviously, if the Kremlin had even an inkling that Nechaev’s sudden political ambitions posed any danger at all, they would have never allowed him to register the party in the first place, let alone run in elections. Let us not forget that Alexei Navalny and his supporters submitted documentation to register their party over ten times, only for the authorities to deny their request each time with a different, often contemptuous excuse. Alexei Nechaev faced no such challenges—his party was formed on March 1, 2020, and at no point since then has it faced any difficulties. By September 2021, it was already in the Duma.

It is important to keep in mind that the Russian authorities control the participation in politics by the wealthy with an iron fist. In the view of Vladimir Putin and his entourage, money is the most important factor in politics, rather than ideas. Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s misadventures are largely related to the fact that he was a very rich man with political ambitions, which is something that threatened Putin, who believed then, as he still does, that money can buy anyone and anything—and therefore seize power, too. Alexei Nechaev is also a rich man, but the fact that he was allowed to pursue his own political ambitions means that Putin views him as no real danger at all. 

The second question is also fairly obvious—why did the Kremlin need another party at all, especially with seats in the Duma? There are many possible explanations. First, for some time now, the current political system has been not able to respond to the society’s needs, and many voters are frustrated with the established parties. Therefore, it is only natural for the Kremlin’s political puppet-masters to constantly be on the outlook for opportunities for the controlled adjustment of the party system.

Secondly, when the Kremlin has unceremoniously sidelined an entire segment of society attached to liberal, democratic, and pro-Western values from politics, it has left fertile ground for radical critics of the regime to surge in popularity. This is why the Kremlin is always looking for a way to concoct a party that would draw protest votes away from this sector of society, while also remaining malleable and toothless.

Thirdly, Putin believes it is important to maintain the façade of a multiparty democracy in Russia, and here, New People is a good trump card to throw at any critics of the Russian government. Time and again, the peddlers of the Kremlin propaganda will point toward Nechaev’s party as “proof” that anyone in Russia can form a party, take part in elections, and even join parliament—meaning that Putin’s most ardent critics have only their inability to prepare the necessary documentation for party registration and their own lack of popularity to blame for their failures here. It would be no surprise if Alexei Nechaev goes on to tour Western countries, describing his political experience and insisting that Russian democracy is flourishing, and no one is precluded from political participation.

The third main question related to the party concerns the election itself. Can we consider New People’s campaign successful, and does that explain its entry into the Duma? On the one hand, New People certainly have siphoned off some of the protest votes that might have otherwise gone to the Communist Party, thus greatly helping United Russia. On the other hand, New People’s election results look bluntly artificial, especially in a context of manipulation and fraud.

The way the Russian election system is designed, whether a party teetering just on the threshold of five percent enters parliament hinges entirely on what the Kremlin wants, politically. Obviously, if the Kremlin does not want the party in parliament, there are many ways to “correct” the final vote tally so that the party receives just 4.99 rather than an even five percent, and no one will ever be able to prove that there had been enough votes to enter the Duma. If the Kremlin decides it does want the party in parliament, it will get slightly more than five percent, even if the real figure was lower.

In September’s elections, New People received 5.33 percent of the vote, which, given all of the above, looks less like an electoral victory and more like the conscious desire of someone inside the Kremlin to introduce this specific party into the Duma. When we consider that from its very beginnings, New People has been linked to the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, Sergei Kirienko, it becomes plausible that the order to ensure Nechaev’s party a place in the Duma might have come directly from him.

There is also an anecdotal account of how New People managed to worm its way into the Duma. According to this hypothesis, the initial plan was not for it to enter parliament at all, but to rather draw away a portion of the protest vote and receive state funding as a result of the election, and the right to nominate candidates in all future elections. However, with the Kremlin consumed with fighting Alexei Navalny’s “smart voting” during the final weeks of the campaign, plans were changed.

The fight against smart voting took on several different forms. The authorities worked to discredit the very idea of technical protest voting, both in the constituencies and on the party lists. Given that local and regional elections are coming up, and the presidential elections will be held in 2024, the Kremlin had a large stake in convincing the widest cross-section of voters that smart voting organizers are mistaken in their predictions, and therefore should not be listened to, now or in the future.

When it came to party lists, Navalny’s team suggested voting not for United Russia, but for one of the three parliamentary parties, as nonparliamentary parties had no chance of entering the Duma, and therefore voting for them would actually help United Russia. Kremlin propaganda torpedoed this idea in several directions: they talked about how amoral it was to vote for the Communists, and how the right thing to do was either to not vote at all, or vote for Yabloko or New People. While Yabloko worked in its traditional niche, attempting in vain to garner support from its former voters; New People was able to consistently position itself as a party headed to the Duma, and therefore, a good option for a protest vote. Shortly before the elections, pro-government polling agencies, which publish party approval ratings, began talking about the possibility of New People making it into the Duma. At the same time, however, other surveys were not showing any sudden spike in New People’s popularity, and smart voting organizers insisted that voting for the party was not a particularly good strategy.

Thus, New People’s entry into the Duma hit at smart voting from two sides and helped discredit the strategy for any future elections. On the one hand, it now serves as a constant reminder that Navalny’s team misjudged the situation in the fall of 2021 and failed to include New People, which is now a parliamentary party, in its recommendations. On the other hand, the authorities can insist that New People has won thanks to its own campaign, despite the Navalny team’s campaigning, thereby illustrating the propagandist idea that smart voting recommendations have no real impact on anything.

Why does Putin even need a multiparty system? Putin may be attempting to recreate the East German political system, which he saw at close range during his service in Dresden. Unlike the USSR, East Germany officially had a multiparty system, and several parties in parliament, though, in practice, it was a totalitarian regime supported by a colossal repressive apparatus. This system may appear much more effective to Putin than the straightforward Soviet model of a one-party system, which looked the most unappealing to Western observers.

Introducing New People—a hastily-formed party without any coherent ideology or electorate—into the Duma may mark the beginning of a reset of Russia’s entire party system, in which the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, both holdovers Putin inherited from the previous political cycle, are removed from the game; and United Russia attempts to partner with several artificially-created parties devoid of any ideology or electorate, but with just enough votes to get into the Duma with a boost from manipulation and fraud. The West should not recognize this as competitive elections, as multiparty Duma serves as a window dressing for Putin’s dictatorship, underpinned by his all-powerful, uncontrolled security apparatus.

The results of Russia’s September legislative elections are not only important in and of themselves, they provide a preview of how Vladimir Putin intends to govern and secure his own victory in the 2024 presidential elections. Now that the campaign is over, the elections have been officially deemed “conclusive and valid,” and the new Duma has been formed, there can be no more doubts about the direction in which Russia is moving. The Kremlin’s goal is clear: the ability to declare victory in any situation, regardless of how the people actually vote.

During the latest elections, the Kremlin deployed a wide arsenal of traditional and new methods of fraud and manipulation. Traditional methods have involved measures, including preventing any viable independent candidates from running, manipulating voter lists, mobilization of administrative resource, ballot box stuffing, and falsifying the vote tally.

New methods have included remote electronic voting in areas that have long been a thorn in the authorities’ side, such as Moscow. An opaque electronic voting process controlled by intelligence agencies has enabled the Kremlin to announce the victory of approved candidates, simultaneously making it impossible to challenge the elections or their results.

Last month, the authorities combined both methods, and­­­­—at least according to the official published results—they have succeeded. Nevertheless, the old primitive methods of electoral fraud have left behind a trail of scandalous evidence making it obvious that the victory of pro-Kremlin candidates was unfair and was only made possible due to the introduction of electronic voting data. In Moscow and some other regions, opposition-minded citizens have even managed to defeat government candidates at the polls. This had been unheard of in Russia for a very long time and is in itself a rather compelling evidence that Putin’s authority is no longer as popular as his propaganda claims.

Therefore, in order for United Russia to make its targets, the Kremlin assaulted Moscow with an “electoral atomic bomb”—electronic voting “data” was used to rewrite the numbers  at every polling station, ensuring victory for all candidates advanced by the government.

As it turns out, without the boost provided by electronic voting, Putin’s candidates are no longer competitive. At the same time, the targeted use of electronic voting begs the question: why is it that people vote differently at polling stations, while those who vote online seem to pick whomever the authorities want?

The state propaganda response boils down to the claim that the opposition urged people to vote at polling stations, while those who support the government actively registered for online voting. Let us briefly consider this claim, determine whether it is even possible, and what exactly electronic voting means in Russia.

Electronic voting has several mechanisms of depriving citizens of their own political choices.  It is in essence a process through which citizens actually lose control over their votes and have no influence over which candidate or party they end up voting for. Moreover, citizens are unable to verify the results of their own votes or even prove that any fraud took place.

One such mechanism is the required pre-registration for the electronic voting. Given that the entire procedure is organized by the state, citizens cannot be assured in confidentiality of the process and are thusly dissuaded from later voting for “wrong” candidates. The average Russian is deeply convinced that since the entire system was created by the state, his or her vote will be disclosed to the authorities. Even if that is not actually the case, that belief is wide-spread and is actively promoted by those who benefit from it the most—the authorities. Considering that the Kremlin and local leaders were very overt and unceremonious strong-arming citizens into registering with the electronic voting system, any shred of doubt was gone—one would have to be extremely naïve to believe that the authorities would not take advantage of the opportunity to find out how people voted and punish anyone who did not vote as they were asked to.

Many Russians whose salaries come from the government budget (which includes teachers, healthcare workers, etc) participated in electronic voting at the behest of their superiors, turning them into Putin’s electoral asset. Without being coerced into registering with the electronic voting system, these people would have either not registered online, or would have not voted at all, like the majority of the population.

The second mechanism is the voting itself. Even if we were to assume that a citizen still voted differently from the instructions of authorities, there is no way to tell whether such a vote would actually be counted for the candidate he or she supported. Moreover, the possibility of “re-voting,” in which voting results can be corrected by alleging that people changed their minds, raises many questions.

Also problematic was the final vote count. It gave a strong impression of crude rewriting of the vote numbers to bring the results at the polling stations in line with authorities’ wishes by adding the necessary votes to preferred candidates.

Within such a system, authorities can claim victory in any elections —simply by announcing that the majority of those registered are government supporters and “correcting” any voting results at the polls in their favor, as we saw happen in Moscow.

Despite all of the grave violations and red flags raised by Russia’s legislative elections, officials are jubilant with Putin himself calling electronic voting a progress that cannot be stopped and should therefore be introduced throughout Russia and expanded in scope.

Electronic voting saves local and regional authorities a lot of trouble—no matter how people vote at the polling stations, the winner is always known in advance, though Putin is scarcely concerned with the matters of local administrations.

For Vladimir Putin, preparing for presidential elections is the ultimate task, as his entire system of power hinges on the overwhelming majority of voters voting for him in the first round of elections, and then interpreting that majority as a mandate for autocratic rule.

As the latest legislative elections have shown, even with strict control over which candidates are actually allowed to run, there is still a real challenge posed by Alexei Navalny’s “smart voting,” —when everyone who disagrees with Putin’s policies consolidates their votes around one of the registered candidates, no matter how toothless and nonviable.

Of course, the authorities can simply use traditional methods of fraud to avoid the danger of protest votes, though the costs of administrative mobilization throughout Russia and the thousands of incidents of fraud cast a negative shadow over the elections.

Putin’s popularity is waning, and people are getting tired of him, a tide that can hardly be turned around. At the same time, it is vital for Putin to demonstrate a fair and unconditional victory. If this trend continues, the scale of fraud during the 2024 presidential elections might render a devastating blow to the entire system. This is where electronic voting comes into the fore. As we have already noted, this type of voting, as it is practiced in Russia, allows the authorities to add tens of millions of votes for Putin with a push of a button, and to “correct” the results from polling stations. This is what underpins the optimism of Putin and his entourage when it comes to electronic voting, and their grandiose plans to introduce it throughout Russian territory.

Ideally, Putin would like to build an electronic system in Russia in which the authorities are able to formally win elections at every level, without the nuisance of real people’s opinions, and fraud takes place behind the scenes, rather than in plain sight. Naturally, achieving that requires continued repression of independent media and any government critics, but the Kremlin seems to have bet on rolling out electronic voting, which Putin and his inner circle plan on leveraging in order to continually reappoint themselves indefinitely, without any surprises at the polls. 

What are some options to reverse this trend? It is clear that demanding an end to electronic voting and its results, under the threat of refusing to recognize the election results is the only viable tactic. We can hardly expect the Kremlin to meet those demands, in which case the West should refuse to recognize the authority of Russia’s new parliament and its deputies. Practically speaking, this is unlikely to complicate dialogue with the Russian authorities, given that the Russian Parliament has long been denied any real political weight, and simply reflects Putin’s position. However, that decision might at least force Putin to consider that if he deploys the same manipulative technology during the presidential elections, the West might refuse to recognize those result, too, thereby relegating him to the same pariah status as the likes of Lukashenko and Maduro.

Despite Putin’s constant insistence that the opinion of Western democracies are of little concern to him and the Kremlin, the reality is that Putin needs the West to accept him as Russia’s leader—after all, the alternative will lead to his own entourage questioning his legitimacy.

The West’s refusal to recognize Russia’s legislative elections might be its last bargaining chip over Putin, who is preparing to eliminate even the theoretical possibility of losing elections.

Despite the Kremlin’s claim of victory, Putin’s regime is in a weak position in the run-up to the to the 2024 presidential elections.

The Russian parliamentary elections of September 17-19 took place amid a sweeping Kremlin crackdown on the political opposition, independent media and civil society.

The Kremlin sidelined the Navalny network by labeling it extremist, while many other organizations and individuals have been designated as “foreign agents”. Many prominent opposition politicians were not allowed on the ballot, with some arrested and others forced to leave the country. For example, prominent politician Lev Shlosberg of the liberal “Yabloko” party and Anton Furgal, the son of jailed governor Sergey Furgal, have been barred from seeking election. Andrei Pivovarov, former executive director of the opposition “Open Russia” movement, who was previously included in Yabloko’s party list, has been jailed, and Dmitry Gudkov, an opposition politician and former lawmaker from “A Just Russia” party (from which he was expelled) has left Russia after being detained for allegedly not paying his debts. Not to mention the imprisonment of Alexei Navalny himself.  The opposition figures who did make it on the ballot faced pressure and intimidation.

Navalny’s “smart voting” campaign —a strategy aimed to oust the candidates from the ruling party, United Russia, by tactically casting votes in favor of candidates from other parties —offered hope for change. It encountered major setbacks when the Big Tech succumbed to the Putin regime’s pressure, with companies like Google and Apple removing “smart voting” apps from their online stores on the first day of the elections. Russia’s Yandex removed Navalny’s voting website from its search engine and the messaging app Telegram blocked chat bots used by Navalny’s team to promote “smart voting”.

The opposition had hoped to break United Russia’s two-thirds majority threshold in parliament to establish a meaningful independent faction. However, according to the official announcement of the Russian Central Election Committee, United Russia still managed to secure 324 seats (down from 334 seats in 2016) out of 450. The ruling party received 49.8 % of the votes cast for party lists, giving United Russia 126 out of 225 deputy mandates and 198 out of 225 seats distributed through single-mandate districts.

This outcome, however, does not reflect the declining level of support for the United Russia party – which, according to independent pollster the Levada Center, saw historically low ratings at 30% prior to the elections – but is the product of large-scale falsification. In addition to standard tactics like pressuring state employees to vote for the ruling party and ballot-stuffing at polling stations, in this election, electronic voting, especially in Moscow, has been alleged to have been manipulated to secure the win for United Russia candidates. In Moscow, electronic voting results have been reversed in many electoral districts where “smart voting” candidates were previously winning. The Insider investigative outfit estimates that the result was changed in at least 8 out of 15 districts.

When the polls opened, there were few independent election observers and no international observers from the OSCE – the Kremlin had demanded that observation efforts be minimized due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The US State Department issued a statement saying that the Duma elections “took place under conditions not conducive to free and fair proceeding”. The EU has issued a statement by its High Representative Josep Borrell, noting that it is “deeply concerned over the continuous pattern of shrinking space for the opposition, civil society and independent voices across Russia”. Neither the US nor the EU recognize the elections for the Russian parliament conducted “on sovereign Ukrainian territory”.

“The EU needs to be ready not to recognize Duma elections as legitimate,” said Andrius Kubilius, a member of the European Parliament (EP) from Lithuania, during an online discussion “Russian Dialogues: 2021 Legislative ‘Elections’” that he hosted on September 23. The Lithuanian MEP, who serves as a standing rapporteur on Russia and chair of an informal platform of the EP called the Friends of European Russia Forum, emphasized that the elections should be qualified with the prefix “so-called”.

Vladimir Milov, a Russian opposition politician associated with Alexei Navalny’s team who took part in the discussion, said that the outcome of the elections was disappointing for the opposition.

“We hoped that in many races opposition candidates would be able to beat United Russia,” he said. He added that the opposition had sought to bring down United Russia’s parliamentary presence to below 40% and to defeat the governors of the ruling party. “This hasn’t happened,” he said.

Nevertheless, the large popular support for the “smart voting” campaign made the protest movement in these elections very visible. Russians are “fed up with the system, with Putin and his government” and the opposition still managed to mobilize people despite the crackdown, said Milov.

“We can deliver further significant blows to Putin’s system,” he added.

Milov said that United Russia’s result of less than 50% by proportional party lists – despite the fraud – shows that the regime has lost its “organic support”. The election can be seen as a failed “referendum” on Putin, who was actively involved in United Russia’s campaign, notably announcing one-off cash payments to Russia’s pensioners and military service personnel to boost the party’s popularity.

Milov cited numbers from an independent election analyst Sergey Shpilkin, who estimated that approximately half of the 27 million votes claimed by United Russia were fraudulent. Without these fraudulent votes, the ruling party’s support would have been around 30%, corresponding to fewer than 200 seats in the Russian Parliament – far below the constitutional majority.

This does not put the Kremlin and Putin in a strong position ahead of the 2024 presidential elections – and they know it – said Milov.

Russian opposition politician and former Vice President of Free Russia Foundation Vladimir Kara-Murza said that the last democratic election in Russia was the parliamentary election of December 1999.

He noted that according to the independent vote-monitoring organization Golos, there are 9 million people in Russia who are precluded from running in elections for various reasons. “In 1927, there were approximately 3 million of them in USSR,” Kara-Murza added.

The current absence of protests and the silence of the Russian public is “deceiving and temporary,” said Kara-Murza, and the situation may explode in 2024, when “Putin, no doubt, will attempt to extend his presidential mandate”. 

“When governments cannot be changed at the ballot box, they are sooner or later changed by the street,” he said. “And this is where the current regime is leading us, as for the past 20-plus years now, the Kremlin has done everything to dismantle and destroy all opportunity for Russian citizens to be able to change the government at the ballot box”.

Russian journalist and political commentator Konstantin Eggert agreed that 2024 will test the regime. This is especially likely if Putin decides to stay on and the Russian political elite will have to decide whether they “really want to stick with him.” The divide may grow between the people at the very top and those in lower power echelons, he added.

In the meantime, the opposition has to re-think its strategy on how to challenge the Kremlin, said Eggert, who himself supports a tactic of boycotting all elections rather than trying to break the system by participating in them.

“You don’t play cards with the mafia. Essentially, if we say that these people are illegitimate, we have to show they are illegitimate by not voting,” he said. “It is a so-called election. It is a so-called president. It is a so-called constitution and, frankly speaking, these are so-called political parties that took part in this farce,” said Eggert. Approved parties are a “department of the presidential administration under different labels,” he said.

On September 16, 2021,  the European Parliament (EP) issued recommendations for EU institutions on managing relations with Russia. The document backed by 70% of MEPs calls on the EU to revise its current policy toward Moscow. The new approach will introduce stronger deterrence measures against the Kremlin’s aggression, while also laying the groundwork for cooperation with a future democratic Russia.

While the EP asserts the commitment to “engagement and selective dialogue” with Moscow when necessary, it also names the Putin regime “a stagnating authoritarian kleptocracy” which is “threatening peace and security in Europe”. The MEPs acknowledge that the EU should do more to counter the Kremlin’s malign influence within its own borders, including among the European political and business elite.

The MEPs call for “unity among the EU member states” as the “best policy to deter Russia from carrying out destabilizing and subversive actions in Europe,” with Brussels being the “only capital where key decisions about EU-Russia relations are taken”.

MEPs also recommend that the EU builds its capacity to stop flows of dirty money from Russia and to expose the hidden financial assets of the Russian regime’s autocrats and corrupt oligarchs.

Better transparency of the Russian elite’s deposits and spending in the EU would help prevent Russian funding of EU political parties, movements and campaigns as well as investments in strategic infrastructure and bodies, threatening the co-optation of top-level EU decision-makers, the policy document says.

The “Direction of EU-Russia Political Relations” initiative ­– has been led by Andrius Kubilius, a MEP from Lithuania who serves as a standing rapporteur on Russia and chair of an informal platform of the EP called the Friends of European Russia Forum.

On the eve of the EP vote on the recommendations, Kubilius and the Friends of European Russia Forum hosted an online discussion on the findings of a report, “Export of Russian Corruption”, which focuses on the Kremlin’s network of influence in Western Europe.

“It [the report] shows how much we need to do back home here inside the European Union in order to clean our house, because only with our cleaned house we can help Russian democrats to achieve what they want to achieve – to transform their country into democracy against opposition from the Kremlin,” Kubilius said in his opening remarks.

The reach of Putin’s network in Western Europe is “shocking”, said Vladimir Milov, the author of the report, an energy expert and a Russian opposition politician associated with Alexei Navalny’s team.

“We know a lot about Putin’s allies in countries like Hungary and Victor Orban. But it is important to look how deep and comprehensive and wide Putin’s network of influence is in the big founding members of the European Union,” he said at the presentation.

Milov emphasized that the information in the report is publicly available, but the analysis clearly shows the extensive scale and systemic efforts of the Kremlin to influence Europe, especially by way of “financial penetration” into Western European politics.

Milov said the report was, in part, inspired by the news this summer that the former French prime minister Francois Fillon – who as a candidate of the 2017 French presidential elections openly supported many Kremlin views and advocated for lifting sanctions – had been named to the board of Russian state oil company Zarubezhneft.

This is yet another appointment of this kind, adding to the list with such notable examples as former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder taking a position as chairman of the supervisory board of Russia’s largest oil company, Rosneft (which is on the EU and US sanctions list), as well as Nord Stream AG and Nord Stream-2 AG. In another instance, Dominique Strauss Kahn, French political figure and former managing director of the IMF, serves as a member of the supervisory board of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and of Rosneft-owned VBRR bank.

Milov sees such cases of former European officials sitting on the boards of Russian state companies and other organizations in exchange for a taking pro-Kremlin stance and advocating to soften Western policies toward Moscow  as outright “bribes” that should be regulated by some form of code of conduct in the EU.

Serving on supervisory boards not only brings lucrative financial bonuses, but also represents a “rubber stamp” mechanism for major decision-making in these companies. Around 90% of the board meetings of Russian-state companies, such as Rosneft and Russian Railways, occur in absentia, says Milov, and the decisions implemented by the boards have already made by the Russian State.

“If this is not a bribe, I don’t know what is,” said Milov.

Regarding Kremlin influence in Europe, he added, Moscow doesn’t only focus on far-right and far-left political parties, as is often believed to be the case, but also attempts to influence the mainstream parties and significant political figures with more sway. Francois Fillon may have become a marginalized figure in French politics after the corruption scandal, but he had been a prominent politician up until that point and he still maintains a certain influence within Les Republicains party, said Milov.

The Kremlin is eager to “buy people” on the far-left, the far-right and “whoever”, said Leonid Volkov, chief of staff to Alexei Navalny.

“He [Putin] is doing it for the purpose of creating instability in Europe and he needs it to sell it on the domestic market,” said Volkov, adding that his successes validate the message that “liberal democracy has failed, Europe is not working”.

And the Kremlin has money to pay for this, says Volkov. In 2014, the French far-right party “National Front”, led by Marie Le-Pen, took Russian loans worth €9 million. This may be a significant amount of money for many, but it is a “petty cash” for the Kremlin, Navalny’s chief of staff said.

If you are friendly toward Russia, you are  rewarded even if you do not have a lot of influence in your country, said Anton Shekhovtsov, director of the Centre for Democratic Integrity in Europe and a senior fellow at Free Russia Foundation. Shekhovtsov offered the example of former foreign Austrian minister Karin Kneissl who kept friendly ties with Moscow (and who also danced with Vladimir Putin at her wedding back in 2018) thusly earning  a seat on the board of directors of Rosneft. But she is not an influential figure in Austrian politics.

Shekhovtsov adds that the latitude of the Kremlin’s networks of influence across various groups in the EU stems from the variety of actors within the Kremlin’s orbit who work on building their own network of influence while competing for the Kremlin’s resources and awards. Intelligence services try to influence criminal networks, while figures like Konstantin Malofeev, the Russian businessman, prefer to work with conservative organizations, and Russian strategist Aleksandr Dugin works with the far right.

“Every actor has his own approach,” said Shekhovtsov.

Whereas Milov’s report investigates the Kremlin’s networks in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Finland;  Central and Eastern Europe have been fighting Russian malign influence for years. For example, as pointed out during the discussion by Veronika Kratka Spalkova, an analyst at the Prague-based European Values Center for Security Policy, in the Czech Republic, the Kremlin has been able to influence the far-left Communist party, the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy, and also the Czech president, who does a “perfect job for Russia by destabilizing the country”.

Last spring, after Czech officials linked the 2014 explosions of ammunition depots in Vrbetice to Russian security services, president Milos Zeman, openly undermined the Czech intelligence by casting doubt over Russia’s involvement, said Spalkova.

Rasa Jukneviciene, another MEP from Lithuania, recalled that in 2004, on the eve of Lithuania becoming a member of NATO and the EU, the country’s then-president Rolandas Paksas was impeached for connections to the Kremlin. The Lithuanian president had granted citizenship and access to the presidential administration to a Lithuanian-Russian businessman, allegedly linked to the Russian mafia and security services. The businessman donated large amounts of money to Paksas’s election campaign.

Milov’s paper identifies various EU political figures that belong to Putin’s network of influence, including five former heads of government of major Western European nations – France, Germany, Austria and Finland ­– and several former ministers, who currently serve on boards of top Russian companies and are well-paid. The Kremlin recruits through NGOs, various “dialogue associations,” and the business community, the report says.

Commenting on Milov’s findings, Bernard Guetta, a MEP from France, said that the overall picture and the extent of the Kremlin’s influence that the report draws is “frighting” but that, indeed, most of the facts presented are already known.

So, the question is – if all this is old news, why hasn’t the European Union “cleaned its own house”? This is the mandate behind the “Direction of EU-Russia political relations” initiative which has just passed at the European Parliament with significant majority of 494 votes. Another 103 MPs voted against the document and 72 were absent.

With less than a month left before Russia’s State Duma elections, President Vladimir Putin has begun campaigning for his United Russia party, offering both political and material support.

It is obvious that the ruling party is far less popular than Putin himself, and it seems that in the final stretch of the campaign, the Kremlin’s political managers finally realized that without Vladimir Putin, their approval ratings leave a lot to be desired, and something urgent has to be done.

Putin has been unequivocal that United Russia is his party. He has participated in a meeting with party candidates and keynoted the party convention. Putin has formally endorsed leaders of the party list, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. This suggests that the data regularly circulated by pro-government sources greatly exaggerates the popularity of both Ministers Shoigu and Lavrov. On their own, the two of them do not evoke any enthusiasm among voters.

Putin’s financial backing for the United Russia’s campaign has been unprecedented. Twice in the same week, he offered public guarantees of cash payments to Russian citizens—first at the meeting with United Russia candidates, and again— at the party convention. During the first speech, details of a timeline for these payments were sketchy, and one could easily infer that they would probably take place after the election and conditioned on positive outcome. At the United Russia party convention, however, Putin made an explicit promise to make the payments, regardless of the election results. It is entirely possible that between the first and second speeches, research confirmed that Russian citizens were skeptical that they would actually receive these promised cash payments that appeared to hinge on election results. In any case, in Putin’s second speech, he was much clearer and far more generous.

Putin’s plans to hand out money before these elections first were floated last year, when, just before a vote on amendments to the constitution, certain groups of citizens suddenly received cash benefits. Officially, they were compensation for losses incurred during the pandemic. In practice, though, everyone understood that these payments were connected to the votes Putin needed for eliminating presidential term limits.

The upcoming State Duma elections have confirmed what everyone had already guessed. During his speech at the Federal Assembly on April 21 of this year, Putin announced payments for families with children – up to RUB 10,000 (around $125) per child. Officially, the payments were tied to the beginning of school year, which in Russia always starts on September 1. The three-day vote for State Duma deputies ends on September 19, making it difficult to deny the real reason for the payments. Putin then highlighted that people should not expect their payments immediately, in August, but rather on the eve of the elections. This naturally led to a public outcry and accusations that he was attempting to bribe voters.

Probably by some point last spring, Kremlin strategists had realized that the payments would be sufficient to improve the electorate’s mood just prior to the elections. But given that in August, Putin again promised new, large-scale payments, the effects of earlier announcements on the voters’ attitudes had fallen short of expectations.

Another, more likely possibility is that as of August 2021, United Russia’s approval ratings are so low, that drastic measures had to be taken. We can’t ignore the fact that the money that are expected to be disbursed immediately before the elections are going to two groups of citizens traditionally considered as Putin’s voting base.  Putin has promised RUB 10,000 to Russian pensioners. The fact that additional measures are required to keep pensioners’ loyalty is easy to interpret as evidence that Putin’s popularity and that of his party are falling, even among this traditional stronghold. Of course, none of this comes as any surprise in a context of rising prices for groceries and home utilities, as pensioners tend to be the first to feel the effects of those changes. Of course, a one-time payment may not be sufficient change society’s mood – after all, prices continue to climb, and pensioners still believe that the state could pay them more if it wanted to, but only does so rarely, and right before elections.

Even more remarkable was the announcement that all law enforcement officers would also be receiving payments. Initially, the payments were only supposed to be for military personnel, but in the end, anyone in uniform, whether military or police, including cadets, was promised RUB 15,000. On one hand, this looks like a bit of encouragement to the regime’s guards before the protests that are likely to break out after the elections. On the other hand, paying the military, looks like an attempt at mitigating dissatisfaction among the ranks. It is now known that a significant percent of several military units actually voted against constitutional amendments last year. There is another possible major motivation – Russia has many law enforcement officers, and Putin simply found a way to distribute money to the widest circle of people he could prior to the elections.

According to various estimates, one way or another, the payments will be distributed to up to half of the Russian electorate, which would make it the most wide-spread, brazen attempt at buying votes for a ruling party through direct cash payments from the state budget. While we will only be able to evaluate the success of this effort after the publication of election results, it is already safe to assume that distributing money is sure to have an effect. Some people already feel they are now obliged to vote for Putin’s party. The cash payments are also laying the groundwork for something else—should the election results be absurdly in favor of United Russia despite its low approval ratings, it would be easily for the Kremlin to explain its sudden spike in popularity – after all, people have just received money!

Attempting to improve the ruling party’s popularity before elections through widespread, direct cash payments to tens of millions of voters is a relatively new phenomenon in Russia. Not so long ago, people assumed that Putin was so popular that his support alone was enough to ensure any United Russia candidate’s victory. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, it seemed that Putin was going to ride the “Crimean consensus” wave until the end of his political career, guaranteeing his party’s victory every time he brought up his 2014 geopolitical feats.

Seven years later, we can see that neither Putin nor his party can count on his personal popularity. The Russian authorities do not offer messages or platforms capable of inspiring Russian voters to come out and support them. Even when the political field has been cleared out of all critics and set up to be ripe for voter fraud and election rigging, Putin is not feeling so confident anymore. Even in the face of an election devoid of competitors, he still has to pay people to vote for his party.

What is happening in Russia right now should put an end to any claims of Putin’s overwhelming popularity among Russian citizens (and even more so, to those of Sergei Shoigu and Sergei Lavrov). It should also dispel any expectations of Putin’s ability to offer a vision for mobilizing and uniting the nation. The only thing that Putin can give Russia’s impoverished population is a one-time pittance of a payment from the state budget, right before elections. To those dissatisfied with his regime, he has long offered a choice between silence and repression.

In 2021, Putin’s regime relies on buying votes, voter fraud and election rigging, and threats to anyone who doesn’t agree with all of this. When it comes to any ideas, personal popularity, or Russian voters rallying around Putin, the train has long since left the station.

The 2021 elections to the State Duma will be held according to a mixed system. 225 deputies will be elected from party lists, and 225 will be elected in the districts. The 2016 elections occurred under a similar system when candidates from the United Russia party, with strong administrative support, won 98.5% of the districts (203 mandates were received in 206 constituencies where United Russia members participated). In 2016, United Russia representatives won 100% of the mandates (13 out of 13) in Moscow.

The government seeks to hold controlled elections. In these conditions, the chances of representatives of the systemic opposition (the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Just Russia (Fair Russia), and Yabloko) are minimized, and non-systemic opposition isn’t allowed to participate in the elections—they are denied registration. Nevertheless, the Smart Voting (SV) strategy proposed by Alexei Navalny[1] turned out to be very effective. Its strategy is to encourage Navalny’s supporters to vote for the main rivals of the government, concentrating votes on one candidate. In the context of one-round el­ections where the ruling party, United Russia, has a rating of less than 50%,[2] this strategy can lead to success.

During the regional elections between 2018-2020, many United Russia candidates were not elected to various posts. As a rule, Smart Voting recommends supporting representatives of the systemic opposition. In 2021, SV will be tested for the first time in federal elections, but its influence may be insignificant due to political repressions and the departure of a number of Navalny’s supporters abroad. It is also likely that any resources associated with Navalny will be blocked. At the same time, SV supports candidates even against their will. This was the case in the 2019 Moscow City Duma elections, and in 2021, Yabloko founder Grigory Yavlinsky urged Navalny’s supporters not to vote for his party.[3]

United Russia has nominated candidates in 11 districts who will be the absolute favorites in the elections. The remaining four districts are expected to be distributed as follows:

• Leningradskiy election district (No. 198): victory is expected for the representative of Just Russia, Galina Khovanskaya;
• In the Medvedkovskiy election district (No. 200) and the Preobrazhenskiy election district (No. 205), three candidates are supposed to fight for the mandate: a the CPRF candidate, a Yabloko candidate, and a self-nominated candidate;
• Central election district (No. 208): United Russia at the last moment did not nominate a candidate. This is the most oppositional Moscow district with many recognizable people running for it. A difficult struggle between four or five candidates is expected. At the same time, the self-nominated candidate, Oleg Leonov, has the support of the administration.

Electoral districts 196-198, 200, 205, 208, and 210 are the most interesting due to the good ratings of opposition, and the lack of United Russia or strong alternative. All other electoral districts are expected to be won by administrative candidates.[4]

Electoral District 196 – Babushkinskiy

Name	Party	Date of birth	Job title, field, or organization	Place of birth	Location
Bazhenov Timofey Timofeyevich	United Russia	25.01.1976	TV channel, NTV	Moscow	Moscow
Burkova Zinaida Ivanovna	Independent	26.01.1957	Emergency	KazSSR	Moscow
Vikhareva Elvira Vladimirovna	Party of Growth	8.06.1990	Businessman	Irkutsk	Moscow
Ivanova Elena Ivanovna	Civic Platform	16.04.1970	Civil Platform	Moscow Oblast	Moscow Oblast
Kramorova Larisa Nikolaevna	Independent	06.06.1973	Homemaker	Kemerovo Oblast	Moscow
Kryukov Alexey Sergeevich	LDPR	9.06.1987	KAS Group	Moscow	Moscow
Malinkovich Sergey Alexandrovich	Communists of Russia	27.05.1975	Communists of Russia	Leningrad	St. Petersburg
Mironova Viktoria Alexeandrovna	Russian Party of Freedom and Justice (RPSS)	1.08.1981	Newspaper, Rodnaya Losinka	Moscow	Moscow
Rashkin Valeriy Fedorovich	CPRF	14.03.1955	State Duma deputy	Kaliningrad Oblast	Saratov
Rvachev Alexey Sergeevich	New People	21.01.1992	Education programs support company, Kapitany	Voronezh	Voronezh
Strelnikova Elena Nikolaevna	Green Alternative	28.07.1962	Businesswoman	Moscow	Moscow
Tarasov Anton Alexandrovich	Russian Ecological Party (The  Greens)	14.11.1984	Businessman	Moscow	Moscow
Tikhomolov Vladimir Fedorovich	Independent	14.06.1949	Retired	UzbekSSR	Moscow
Fedorov Georgiy Vladimirovich	Just Russia	7.05.1973	National regional socio-economic development fund; member of the Public Council	Moscow	Moscow
Yankov Kirill Vadimovich	Yabloko	17.12.1962	Russian Academy of Sciences	Rostov-on-Don	Moscow Oblast

Districts: Bogorodskoe, Sokolniki, Alexeevskiy, Babushkinskiy, Butyrskiy, Losinoostrovskiy, Marfino, Maryina Roscha, Ostankinskiy, Rostokino, Sviblovo, Yaroslavskiy

Timofey Bazhenov, United Russia, is an administrative candidate. He has administrative support and some recognition. Bazhenov is a TV presenter who has hosted a number of television programs since the 1990s. In 2016, he announced his desire to participate in the elections to the State Duma from the Chelyabinsk Oblast, but later withdrew his candidacy. He has no other campaigning experience, and his social media profiles, except for Instagram, have not been actively used since 2018. His Instagram account has 2.6 million subscribers, and he has Facebook and VKontakte accounts, though previously they weren’t publicly active. There is a fairly expensive website (https://bazhenovteam.ru/), which provides an overview of the initiatives of “Bazhenov’s team.” Bazhenov’s platform focuses on local issues: improvement projects and working with small requests. A standard methodology for an administrative candidate is used: previously agreed upon improvement projects are implemented for a quick response to requests from residents. The collection of signatures for regional initiatives is actively used.

Valeriy Rashkin, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, is Bazhenov’s main competitor and an acting deputy of the State Duma. A native of the Saratov region, Rashkin has a standard biography for a communist candidate: works in production, and since 1988, he has worked for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union/Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Rashkin supported Navalny,[5] is known to be an active participant in the protests, and is considered to be internal opposition to the federal leaders of the CPRF. He participated in elections to the State Duma six times and was elected as a deputy five times. However, he won in the district only once—in 1999 in the Saratov region—all other successful cases were the election from the list. As in 2016, Rashkin is in a passing place in the list of the CPRF, so  it is likely that he will not conduct an active campaign in the district.

Kirill Yankov, Yabloko, is an active member of the party since the 1990s. Previously, Yankov did not work in this district and worked in the Moscow region. His success depends on the degree of his activity. At the moment, he looks like a formal “office” candidate.

Elvira Vikhareva, Party of Growth, will most likely try to appeal to liberal voters, though she has practically no recognition. She previously worked with Gudkov.[6] In 2017, she unsuccessfully participated in the elections of municipal deputies in the Altufievskiy district. She has a YouTube channel with 18 thousand subscribers but most likely does not have the resources to conduct an active campaign. She will likely spoil Yankov’s chances.

Georgiy Fedorov, Just Russia, has been involved in politics since 2000. His biggest success was winning 14% in the elections to the Moscow City Duma in 2019. He has a pre-election website, and he is active on social networks. Fedorov leads an active campaign and goes to competitors’ meetings. He does not support Putin and claims to be a socialist. Fedorov has the potential to be ruin Rashkin’s chances.

Alexey Kryukov, Liberal Democratic Party, is a young candidate (34 years old). He is the LDPR coordinator for the Bibirevo district, though he is practically unknown in the district. Kryukov has participated in seven elections at various levels,  losing every time. His best result was 10% of the Moscow City Duma elections in 2019.

Sergey Malinkovich of Communists of Russia and Anton Tarasov of The Greens will focus their campaigns on criticizing the CPRF and Rashkin. Both are former members of the CPRF, and their task is to take votes from Rashkin. Sergey Malinkovich took part in 48 (!) elections at various levels and was twice elected as a municipal deputy in St. Petersburg. Anton Tarasov was a municipal deputy in the Aeroport district. After leaving the CPRF, he has acted as a spoiler for candidates from this party several times.

Alexey Rvachev, New People, is unknown and inactive. His situation is similar to that of Elena Ivanova of Civic Platform and Elena Strelnikova of Green Alternative.

Victoria Mironova, RPSS, is a municipal deputy of the Losinoostrovskiy district. She is not well-recognized but may receive a small number of votes of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

Independent candidate Vladimir Tikhomolov is not campaigning and is unlikely to be able to collect signatures. Registration is possible only with administrative support.

Zinaida Burkova is a “spare” administrative candidate who is unlikely to receive registration in the elections.

Prediction: the victory of Timofey Bazhenov, with Veleriy Rashkin in second place as a result of losing a small number of the votes due to spoilers. Much will depend on the degree of Rashkin’s activity and the performance of the Smart Voting strategy. The situation is difficult for the opposition.

Electoral District 197 – Kuntsevskiy

Name	Party	Date of birth	Job title, field, or organization	Place of birth	Location
Balmont Boris Alexandrovich	New people	19.08.1975	Businessman	Moscow	Moscow
Glek Igor Vladimirovich	The Greens	7.11.1961	Vice-president of the Moscow chess Federation, district deputy of Troparevo-Nikulino district	Moscow	Moscow
Goncharov Kirill Alexeevich	Yabloko	29.02.1992	Yabloko	Moscow	Moscow
Gorshkova Vladislava Gennadievna	Green Alternative	8.01.1981	Unemployed, Krylatskoe district deputy	Moscow	Moscow
Lobanov Mikhail Sergeevich	CPRF	24.02.1984	Lomonosov Moscow State University	Arkhangelsk	Moscow
Menshikov Mikhail Vasilievich	Party of Growth	26.10.1958	Retired, Dorogomilovo district deputy	Moscow	Moscow
Mitina Daria Alexandrovna	Communists of Russia	14.08.1973	Innovations development institute	Moscow	Moscow
Popov Evgeniy Georgievich	United Russia	11.09.1978	TV channel, Rossiya	Vladivostok	Moscow
Potapenko Dmitriy Valerievich	RPSS	30.03.1970	EN+ Group	Moscow	Moscow
Ramenskiy Pavel Olegovich	LDPR	18.05.1988	Medical center № 2	Moscow	Moscow
Romanov Alexandr Vasilievich	Independent	18.03.1956	Unemployed	Moscow	Moscow
Sobolev Alexey Anatolievich	Rodina	30.10.1977	Businessman	Moscow	Moscow
Tarnavskiy Alexandr Georgievich	Just Russia	20.04.1960	Charity foundation, Care and Mercy	UkrSSR	Moscow
Shaaban Shaaban Khafed Ahmed Ali	Independent	15.03.1952	Unemployed	Jordan	Moscow

Districts: Dorogomilovo, Krylatskoe, Kuntsevo, Mozhayskiy, Prospekt Vernadskogo, Ramenki, Filevskiy park, Fili-Davydkovo

Evgeniy Popov, United Russia, is an administrative candidate. Popov is a well-known TV presenter who conducts propaganda programs. His most popular TV program is the talk show, “60 Minutes” with his wife Svetlana Skabeeva. Despite not having participated in an election before, he is recognizable among the pro-government electorate, and he has a significant number of votes from the elderly electorate. According to social media, he is conducting an active election campaign, but he does not have widespread reach on the Internet. He created his own volunteer organization for the elections, which consists of United Russia members and paid activists. Popov was nominated in a difficult district for the authorities and where the percentage of votes for the opposition is high. At the same time, it is a huge irritant for the opponents of the current government. This is evidenced by a telephone survey of the Gosdumetr project, which found that out of the 25% of voters who do know Popov, only 31% are ready to vote for him.[7]

Mikhail Lobanov, CPRF, is an associate professor of mechanics and mathematics at Lomonosov Moscow State University. He’s an active oppositionist. Lobanov has participated in many protests and is one of the founders of the Initiative Group of Moscow State University,[8] which is quite famous among activists. In general, he is not known outside of the narrow activist circle. Support for Lobanov from the CPRF is expected to be minimal, because Lobanov is not a member of CPRF and supports Alexei Navalny. He does not have serious resources, but it is possible that he will receive votes as a result of Smart Voting. If that is the case, he will be able to unite the supporters of the Communist Party and the liberal opposition. Lobanov has no personal recognition; according to Gosdumetr, only 7% of voters know him and only 25% of them are ready to vote for him. At the start of the campaign, his rating corresponded to the level of support for the Communist Party.

Igor Glek, The Greens, is a well-known chess player and municipal deputy of the Troparevo-Nikulino Moscow district. He has some recognition and is respected in his profession. He received more than 1,500 votes in the 2017 elections. In 2019, he ran on behalf of Just Russia for deputy of the Moscow City Duma in 38^th district. He received second place after United Russia, losing by 6,500 votes. He got first place in the districts of Prospect Vernadskiy and Troparevo-Nikulino—he had an almost three-fold advantage over United Russia—and the other three districts he lost in are not included in the current district. To a large extent, his success was  the result of Smart voting support, for which he will compete again.

Another contender for the support of Smart Voting is Kirill Goncharov of Yabloko, the deputy chairman of the Moscow branch of the party and member of the Bureau. In 2019, he was not permitted to participate in the elections to the Moscow City Duma. He has some recognition and is very active. There are real activists who are ready to help his campaign. He has participated in elections of various levels four times, was not registered twice, and lost twice. His main success was receiving 24% of the vote in the Moscow City Duma elections in 2014. According to Gosdumetr, he is the most recognizable candidate from the opposition—10% of voters know about him, and  27% of them are ready to support him.

Dmitriy Potapenko, RPSS, is a well-known Russian entrepreneur and presenter on the radio show, “Echo of Moscow.” He often criticizes the authorities’ business policy. Potapenko is expected to receive many of the opposition votes of Lobanov, Glek, and Goncharov.

Pavel Ramenskiy, Liberal Democratic Party, is unknown and was not previously seen in the political sphere. He is unlikely to be actively campaigning. He is expected to receive the votes of the LDPR, though its rating in Moscow is insignificant. Ramenskiy’s recognition according to Gosdumetr is minimal— he is known by 3% of voters, of whom only 6% support him, a critically small figure characteristic of most candidates from the LDPR. Most likely, the party’s rating will play a key role.

Boris Balmont, New People, is unknown. Unlike Ramensky, his party does not have a noticeable rating. He is engaged in local activities and is trying to appeal to young voters.

Mikhail Menshikov of the Party of Growth and Vladislav Gorshkov of Green Alternative are municipal deputies. They do not possess great resources or recognition. Most likely, they will work to receive a small share of the votes from their districts, Dorogomilovo and Krylatskiy.

Alexandr Tarnavskiy, Just Russia, is a prominent Moscow lawyer and a regular elections participant. From 2001-2005, he was a deputy of the Moscow City Duma. He has a low level of recognition. He has been a member of Just Russia since its inception. According to Gosdumetr, 7% of voters know Tarnavskiy, and 8% of them are ready to support him.

Alexey Sobolev, Rodina, is practically invisible. According to his social media profiles, he is not running them. He is known by 5% of voters according to Gosdumetr polls, and  23% of them will vote for him.

Independent candidates Shaaban Shaaban and Alexandr Romanov do not have the resources to collect signatures or register.

Daria Mitina, Communists of Russia, is a former State Duma deputy from the CPRF. After leaving the party, she has mainly engaged in criticism of former party members. She is a spoiler for Mikhail Lobanov—the main goal of her campaign is to take away votes from him.

Prediction: Evgeniy Popov of United Russia will win. The opposition will succeed in imposing a struggle in the district if Smart Voting manages to consolidate votes for one candidate (Lobanov, Glek, Goncharov, or Potapenko). Because of the intense competition among the opposition in this district, it will be extremely difficult to do this. Popov’s strongest competitor is Lobanov, given the rating of the Communist Party.

Electoral District 198 – Leningradskiy

Name	Party	Date of birth	Job title, field, or organization	Place of birth	Location
Andrianova Zoya Alexeevna	Greens	19.03.1974	Businesswoman, Begovoy district deputy	Moscow	Moscow
Arkhangelskiy Vyacheslav Vladimirovich	Independent	20.05.1969	Inkom Severo-Zapad	Moscow	Moscow
Aspektnaya Larisa Gennadievna	Independent	09.04.1964	Businesswoman	Novosibirsk Oblast	Moscow
Balabutkin Alexey Alexeyevich	Communists of Russia	31.07.1979	Grushenskaya Academia	Moscow	Moscow
Brukhanova Anastasia Andreevna	Independent, Schukino district deputy	01.09.1993	Urban Projects Foundation of Maxim Katz and Ilia Varlamov	Moscow	Moscow
Vlasov Vasiliy Maximovich	LDPR	27.06.1995	State Duma deputy	Moscow	NovgorodOblast
Goluenko Alisa Vladimirovna	Green Alternative	30.10.1995	Student, Khoroshevskiy district deputy	Moscow	Moscow
Zvyagintsev Petr Semenovich	CPRF	18.01.1948	Economics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences	Kursk Oblast	Moscow
Ivanov Maxim Sergeevich	ROS	7.08.1975	Education center, Gridin	Moscow	Moscow
Kataev Viktor Filippovich	RPSS	7.05.1989	RPSS, Molzhaninovskiy district deputy	KazSSR	Moscow
Litvinovich Marina Alexeyevna	Yabloko	19.09.1974	Newspaper Nash Sever	Moscow	Moscow
Melnikov Alexey Vladimirovich	Independent	06.08.1991	Businessman	Rostov Oblast	Moscow
Tarbaev Sangadzhi Andreevich	New People	15.04.1982	TV union, AMiK	Kalmykia ASSR	Moscow
Khovanskaya Galina Petrovna	Just Russia	23.08.1943	State Duma deputy	Moscow	Moscow

Districts: Aeroport, Begovoy, Beskudnikovskiy, Vostochnoe Degunino, Dmitrovskiy, Zapadnoe Degunino, Koptevo, Savelovskiy, Sokol, Timiryazevskiy, Khoroshevskiy

Galina Khovanskaya, Just Russia, is an administrative, pro-government candidate. Traditionally, United Russia does not nominate candidates in two or three districts in order to give the systemic opposition an opportunity to get into the Duma without defeating United Russia, itself. Khovanskaya is a current deputy of the State Duma. In 1989, she was a member of Democratic Choice (Boris Yeltsin’s movement), then she was a member of Yabloko. From 1993-2003, she was a deputy of the Moscow City Duma, since 2003, a deputy of the State Duma. In 2007, she left Yabloko and later became a member of Just Russia.[9] She deals with housing and communal services problems, and votes the same way on most key issues as United Russia. In 2016, she was elected in 198^th Electoral District with 31% of the vote, while opposition leader Yulia Galyamina got second place. Khovanskaya is highly recognizable. According to a telephone survey by Gosdumetr, 57% of voters know her, about 60% of whom are ready to vote for her.

Marina Litvinovich, Yabloko is one of Khovanskaya’s two main competitors. She is a well-known political strategist and journalist and has great support from opposition activists. Previously, she worked with Khakamada and helped Other Russia, Civic Platform, and Ksenia Sobchak. Litvinovich has never run for deputy. An important factor in her election is the support of Yulia Galyamina who previously gained 14% in this district. It is likely that she (not Anastasia Brukhanova) will receive the support of Alexei Navalny’s Smart Voting since members of Navalny’s team do not support the representatives of Katz team. Despite being less active than Brukhanova, Litvinovich is the second most popular candidate after Khovanskaya at the start of the campaign. According to a telephone survey by Gosdumetr, Litvinovich is known to 17% of residents, 63% of whom are ready to support her.

Independent candidate Anastasia Brukhanova is another notable candidate who may gain a significant percentage of the vote. In order to register for an election, it is necessary to collect a certain number of signatures; without enough signatures,  it is possible to be refused registration. However, from the point of view of the authorities, her participation in the elections together with Litvinovich is preferable, since both will claim the votes of those with liberal values. Brukhanova is a municipal deputy of the Shchukino district, and a representative of the Urban Projects Foundation by Maxim Katz and Ilya Varlamov. Her campaign is accompanied by successful fundraising and very high levels of activity. Despite this, the recognition of Brukhanova is less than that of Litvinovich. According to Gosdumetr, Brukhanova is known only to 15% of voters, 48% of whom are ready to support her. Aa significant part of the remaining 52% are expected to vote for Litvinovich.

Petr Zvyagintsev, CPRF, is active at the local level but is unknown to the general public. Previously, he was a municipal deputy in Vostochnoe Degunino. In 2019, he ran in the district for deputy of the Moscow City Duma and was supported by Smart Voting. He lost by only 139 votes. He does not have large resource and  is not conducting an active campaign. The brand of the Communist Party will allow him to collect a significant number of votes from its supporters, but Alexey Balabutkin, the representative of the spoiler party, Communists of Russia, will take some of them. Despite the fact that Zvyagintsev has been working in the district for more than 30 years, only 11% of voters know him according to Gosdemetr, and only 49% of them are ready to support him.

Alexey Balabutkin, Communists of Russia, is a spoiler for Zvyagintsev of the CPRF. Balabutkin’s goal is to confuse voters who wants to support a representative of the CPRF. Previously, Balabutkin was a member of CPRF, but has participated in a number of elections on behalf of the Communists of Russia. He never received more than 4% of the vote. He is practically unknown, and only the electorate of CPRF knows him, which sharply condemns the spoilers of the candidates from the Communists of Russia. This is the reason for the results of the polls by Gosdumetr, which found that his recognition by voters is 4%, of which only 22% are ready to vote for him.

Vasiliy Vlasov, LDPR, is the youngest active deputy of the State Duma. He is known for eccentric words and support of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. In 2017, he ran for deputies in this district, got 3rd place (after Khovanskaya and Galyamina), and received 11% of the votes. He has no motivation to actively participate in the 2021 campaign, since he is in one of the leading places in the general part of the LDPR list. Despite mentions in the media, according to Gosdumetr, only 6% of voters know him, of whom a critically small proportion of people (14%) are ready to support him.

Maxim Ivanov, the Russian National Union (ROS), has not been seen in any social and political activities. He did not appear in the polls of Gosdumetr.

Viktor Kataev, RPSS, is a municipal deputy in the Molzhaninovskiy district, where the opposition has a majority. He was closely associated with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, has some recognition in this area. However, it should be taken into account that Molzhaninovskiy is the smallest district in Moscow in terms of population. He cannot count on a significant number of votes. According to “Gosdumetr”, 3% of voters know him, of whom 18% will support him.

Sangadzhi Tarbaev, New People, is a showman. Most likely, he will take over a small number of the youth electorate votes. There is no great recognition, but there is an active campaign in social networks.

Alisa Goluenko, Green Alternative, is an opposition municipal deputy of the Khoroshevskiy district. She was active in 2017 and may campaign organizing meetings with voters. Goluenko does not have large resources. She is a functionary of the “Green Alternative”, previously ran for “Yabloko” and “Just Russia”. The degree of publicity according to “Gosdumetr” is within the statistical error: 3% know her, 11% of them are ready to vote (the lowest result in the district).

Zoya Andrianova, The Greens, is a deputy of the Begovoy district from Yabloko. She does not have many resources and is not well-known to voters. 4% know her, 19% of whom will support her in the elections.

Independent candidates Alexey Melnikov, Alexandr Arkhangelskiy, and Larisa Aspektnaya are little known, despite, for example, Melnikov’s statements about the active collection of signatures. They may be backup administrative candidates, but most likely will not be registered. Arkhangelskiy is associated with United Russia, and Melnikov is supported by the Moscow Aviation Institute and maintains a video blog.

Prediction: the victory of Galina Khovanskaya with a result of 30-40%. It is possible that her two main rivals, Brukhanova and Litvinovich, will together gain a comparable number of votes or even be able to get ahead of her together. However, the opposition’s victory is only possible if resources are combined, which is extremely unlikely.

Electoral District 200 – Medvedkovskiy

Name	Party	Date of birth	Job title, field, or organization	Place of birth	Location
Anisimkova Polina Nikolaevna	The Greens	6.05.2000	Proekt-N	Moscow	Moscow
Arbuzov Andrey Alexandrovich	Civil Platform	11.12.1966	Retired	Moscow Oblast	Moscow Oblast
Babushkin Andrey Vladimirovich	Yabloko	28.01.1964	Civil Rights Committee, Otradnoe district deputy	Moscow Oblast	Moscow
Velmakin Mikhail Vadimovich	Green Alternative	26.02.1982	Laboratory of Complex Sociologic Research	Moscow	Moscow
Zagrebnoy Yuri Leontievich	Just Russia	23.02.1959	Editor of “Mossovet” media	Volgograd Oblast	Moscow
Zapotylok Evgeniy Vasilievich	New People	11.05.1983	Formula Advert	Moscow	Moscow
Orlov Mikhail Viktorovich	Communists of Russia	16.05.1994	Master Media	Moscow	Moscow
Parfenov Denis Andreevich	CPRF	22.09.1987	State Duma deputy	Moscow	Moscow
Pevtsov Dmitriy Anatolievich	Independent	08.07.1963	Theatre “Lenkom of Mark Zakharov”	Moscow	Moscow
Stepkin Evgeniy Valerievich	LDPR	4.08.1989	Unemployed	Belgorod Oblast	Moscow

Districts: Altufievskiy, Bibirevo, Lianosovo, Otradnoe, Severnoe Medvedkovo, Severniy, Yuzhnoe Medvedkovo

This district has a small number of candidates. There is no candidate from United Russia.

Independent candidate Dmitry Pevtsov is one of the most famous candidates in Moscow. He has administrative support and is a supporter of the current government. He directly calls himself a “Putin fan.” Pevtsov is a very famous actor and is especially well-known to people over 30 years old. He collected signatures for registration, and an active campaign is underway with the full support of local authorities. His status as a self-nominated candidate is due to the fact that the representative of United Russia had not run for office earlier in the district. According to Gosdumetr, he is known by 42% of voters, 26% of whom are ready to vote for him.

Denis Parfenov, CPRF, is a current deputy of the State Duma, elected in this district. In 2016, he received the lowest share of votes among all the winners—less than 20%. Key advantages for Parfenov are the absence of administrative pressure in the district and the presence of a large voter base. Parfenov will conduct an active campaign with good chances of success. According to Gosdumetr, 23% of voters know him and 31% of them will support him. Support from Smart Voting will significantly increase his chances of success.

Andrey Babushkin, Yabloko, is a current municipal deputy from the Otradnoye district and constantly participates in elections at various levels in this district. He was only elected as a municipal deputy and enjoys confidence among local activists, but he is not so well-known at the city level. As a member of Yabloko, Babushkin is an opponent of any alliances with other organizations. He may be able to get part of the protest electorate, but it is likely he will yield to Denis Parfenov.

Yuri Zagrebnoy, Just Russia, is a journalist and was a deputy of the Moscow City Duma in the 90s. Later, he took part in municipal and city elections, though he never won. Zagrebnov has connections with the Moscow Mayor’s office and is not an oppositionist. Despite his great experience, he is almost unknown to voters in the district. According to Gosdumetr, 3% of voters are familiar with Zagrebnov, but just a quarter of them are ready to vote for him.

Evgeniy Stepkin, LDPR. is a little-known candidate. The big problem for Stepkin will be his status as unemployed in the bulletin. Previously, he ran for the Moscow City Duma where he received 6% of votes in the district. Most likely, his rating in a passive campaign will be lower than that of LDPR, but it should be kept in mind that in 2016, the representative of LDPR managed to take second place in the district—the best result for LDPR in its history. Stepkin is recognizable for only 2% of voters, 10% of whom will vote for him.

Mikhail Velmakin, Green Alternative, is an experienced municipal opposition politician who has been a deputy in the Otradnoye district several times. He does not have the necessary resources for victory and is familiar only to a group of activists of the district.

Evgeniy Zapotylok, New People, is a candidate who will try to receive a small number of votes from young voters. He is focusing his resources on running an online campaign. The voters do not know him, and his rating is minimal.

Mikhail Orlov, Communists of Russia, is a spoiler candidate for Denis Parfenov and is capable of taking 2-4% of the vote. He constantly participates in campaigns at various levels. By the age of 27, he had run more than 20 times, never winning. Orlov will not conduct an active campaign and does not live in Moscow.

Polina Anisimkova, The Greens, is 21 years old and one of the youngest participants in the elections.  This allows her to count on additional votes of youth voters, which will be determined with the choice at the polling station. She isn’t conducting a campaign and has no history of social and political activity.

Andrey Arbuzov, Civic Platform, does not have any established rating. The voters do not know him, and he is not campaigning.

Prediction: the main struggle will unfold between Pevtsov, Parfeonov and Babushkin. Parfenov has a chance only if he runs an active campaign that activates his entire electoral base and recevies  support from Smart Voting. Pevtsov’s victory, however, looks a little more likely. Babushkin can affect Parfenov’s chances negatively by taking a significant part of the protest votes.

Electoral District 205 – Preobrazhenskiy

Name	Party	Date of birth	Job title, field, or organization	Place of birth	Location
Besdenezhnykh Ksenia Alexeevna	Independent	09.07.1997	Yam! Restaurants Russia	Perm	Moscow
Vasserman Anatoliy Alexandrovich	Independent	09.12.1952	Businessman	UkrSSR	Moscow
Gladkova Yulia Genrikhovna	RPSS	26.05.1966	RPSS	Ufa	Moscow Oblast
Demchenko Vyacheslav Olegovich	New People	16.03.1986	Federal Corporation of Business Support	Lipetsk	Moscow
Dorman Daria Igorevna	Independent	01.01.1990	Unemployed	Moscow Oblast	Moscow
Zagordan Nadezhda Leonidovna	Green Alternative	24.03.1984	Research scientific center, Informatics and Management, Izmaylovo district deputy	Moscow	Moscow
Isaev Evgeniy Nikolaevich	Independent	02.06.1983	Unemployed	Sverdlovsk Oblast	Sverdlovsk Oblast
Ischenko Nikita Sergeevich	Civil Platform	26.02.1989	“Arkuda”	KazSSR	Moscow Oblast
Koryagina Natalia Grogorievna	Party of Growth	11.09.1970	Businessman	KazSSR	Moscow
Kostycheva Marina Alexandrovna	Rodina	9.12.1989	Government of Voronezh Oblast	Germany	Moscow
Medvedev Anton Vladimirovich	LDPR	4.11.1985	Unemployed, Izmaylovo district deputy	Moscow	Moscow
Obukhov Sergey Pavlovich	CPRF	5.10.1958	State Duma office	UkrSSR	Moscow
Popova Alena Vladimirovna	Yabloko	15.02.1983	Civil Corpus	Sverdlovsk Oblast	Moscow
Sidorov Yaroslav Severovich	Communists of Russia	29.09.1968	Communists of Russia	Moscow	Moscow

Districts: Vostochnoe Izmaylovo, Golyanovo, Ivanovskoe, Izmaylovo, Metrogorodok, Vostochniy, Preobrazhenskoe, Severnoe Izmaylovo, Sokolinaya gora

There is no candidate from United Russia.

Independent candidate Anatoliy Vasserman is in this case a candidate from the government. He is known as an active participant in intellectual TV games, mainly, Svoya Igra. Vasserman acts as a supporter of the Soviet model of state development, supports Stalin,[10] and speaks out against the opposition. He represents the left-wing electorate, is loyal to the current government, and is well-known among voters. According to Gosdumetr, 66% of voters know him, and 49% of them are ready to support him. He has experience participating in elections and ran for Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) in 1994, receiving 2^nd place in the district.

Alena Popova, Yabloko, is well-known among activists as  an active participant in protests, though she has a controversial reputation. Popova supports the law against domestic violence and works to develop her media presence. The voters know her poorly: according to Gosdumetr, 5% of voters know her, 60% of whom are ready to support her. With an active campaign, she could garner a lot of votes.

Anton Medvedev, LDPR , is one of the few municipal deputies in Moscow from his party and is unemployed. LDPR has a low rating. Despite this, he is well-recognized in Izmaylovo. Medvedev, according to Gosdumetr, is known by 18% of voters (second highest result after United Russia), 40% of whom are ready to support him.

Sergey Obukhov, CPRF, is an employee of the State Duma and was previously a deputy. He is the political strategist who largely determines the party’s citywide campaign. He has never won in the district and will not conduct an active campaign. Obukhov, according to Gosdumetr, is known by 13% of voters, 64% of whom support him. He risks not even getting into the top three.

Nadezhda Zagordan, Green Alternative, is a municipal deputy of the Izmaylovo district. She is active at the local level, especially in the field of improvement. She is attempting to form a team for municipal elections in 2022. She likely uses the Duma elections to expand her voter base for the future. 4% of voters know her, and 41%  of them are ready to vote for her.

Yaroslav Sidorov, Communists of Russia, is the spoiler candidate for Sergey Obukhov. He is actively participating in elections at all levels in different regions. Over the past 16 years, he has taken part in 32 campaigns, though he has never won. He will not campaign. Voters often confuse him with the Communist Party candidate. According to Gosdumetr, 4% of voters know him, and 57% of them are ready to support him.

Yulia Gladkova, RPSS, is a former representative of CPRF. In 2019, she received 36% of the vote in the elections to the Moscow City Duma and came in second place. She is actively working and will probably count on the votes of CPRF. In fact, the success of 2019 is not due to personal recognition, but to the rating of CPRF and the support of Smart Voting. According to Gosdumetr, only 4% of voters know Gladkova, and 29% of them are ready to support her.

Vyacheslav Demchenko, New People, has not previously been involved in social and political activities. He is associated with the pro-Putin movement, “ONF”. According to Gosdumetr, 3% of voters know him, 11% of whom are ready to vote for him.

Nikita Ischenko, Civic Platform, is unknown and inactive. According to Gosdumetr, 4% of voters know him, 48% of whom are ready to support him.

Natalia Koryagina, Party of Growth, is unknown and inactive. According to Gosdumetr, 3% of voters are familiar with her, 33% of whom are ready to support her.

Marina Kostycheva, Rodina, is an employee of the State Duma and the government of the Voronezh Oblast. She is a candidate without any recognition or activity. 3% of voters know her, 28% of whom support her.

Independent candidates Ksenia Bezdenezhnykh, Daria Dorman, and Evgeniy Isaev do not have the resources to collect signatures and will not be registered. Isaev is a member of United Russia who lost the primaries.

Prediction: Vasserman’s unconditional victory

Electoral District 208 – Tsentralniy

Name	Party	Date of birth	Job title, field, or organization	Place of birth	Location
Balyaeva Zukhra Rinatovna	Independent	2.06.1979	Social worker, district deputy in Mordovia	Bashkiria	Moscow
Vinnitskaya Tatiana Gennadievna	New People	13.01.1977	Viva Russia!	Novgorod	Moscow
Dzhagaev Iosif Ruslanovich	Independent	22.09.1989	Civil Initiative party	Vladikavkaz	homeless
Zakharov Dmitriy Alexandrovich	Communists of Russia	2.07.1985	Unemployed	Moscow	Moscow
Koshlakov-Krestovskiy Dmitriy Vladimirovich	LDPR	24.08.1972	World Civilizations Institute	Moscow	Moscow
Leonov Oleg Yurievich	Independent	10.09.1970	Missing People Search Centre	Moscow	Moscow
Mitrokhin Sergey Sergeyevich	Yabloko	20.05.1963	Yabloko, Moscow City Duma deputy	Moscow	Moscow
Ostanina Nina Alexandrovna	CPRF	26.12.1955	State Duma office	Altay Krai	Moscow
Kharaidze Ketevan Guramovna	Green Alternative	9.04.1958	Tverskoy district deputy	Georgian SSR	Moscow
Shevchenko Maxim Leonardovich	RPSS	22.02.1966	Vladimirskaya Oblast Duma deputy	Moscow	Moscow
Shirokov Andrey Vyacheslavovich	Party of Pensioners	3.01.1958	RPSS	Moscow	Moscow
Yushin Anatoliy Pavlovich	Civil platform	11.11.1974	Lawyer, Presnenskiy district deputy	Moscow	Moscow
Yakubovich Yakov Borisovich	Party of Growth	4.05.1981	Head of Tverskoy district	Bryansk Oblast	Moscow
Yandiev Magomet Isaevich	Just Russia	29.07.1968	Lomonosov Moscow State University	Grozniy	Moscow

Districts: Arbat, Basmanniy, Zamoskvorechie, Krasnoselskiy, Meschanskiy, Presnenskiy, Taganskiy, Tverskoy, Khamovniki, Yakimanka, Lefortovo

There is no United Russia candidate in the district. It was supposed to be Karen Aperyan, but he did not submit the documents to the election commission. This is probably related to the low level of support for the ruling party in this district. In this regard, independent candidate Oleg Leonov was nominated by the authorities, but he is not officially associated with United Russia.

Independent candidate Oleg Leonov is a hidden candidate from the government who receives a lot of administrative support. He is the coordinator of Liza Alert, which searches for missing people. The organization is popular among activists, including opposition representatives. Leonov previously stated that he did not support Putin, but later participated in meetings with him.[11] Leonov is loyal to the authorities, and budget organizations helped him collect signatures. He will probably try to get opposition votes through his active campaign.

Sergey Mitrokhin, Yabloko, is a Moscow City Duma deputy and former head of the party’s Moscow branch. Mitrokhin actively participates in meetings with voters. He was elected as a deputy of the Moscow City Duma in 2019 with the support of Smart Voting. Previously, his participation in the elections in the districts in Moscow has been unsuccessful. There is a possibility that the ruling party will support Mitrokhin. The current deputy from United Russia, Nikolay Gonchar, has publicly stated that his party can support Mitrokhin.[12] Perhaps, this is done to discredit him. At the same time, Mitrokhin can also expect to receive support from Navalny’s Smart Voting.

Nina Ostanina, CPRF, is a party office worker. Previously, she was a deputy of the State Duma and carries a certain weight within the party. At the same time, the voters do not know Ostanina; a lot of resources will not be spent on an active campaign. Ostanina opposes vaccination. Her rating will likely correspond to the number of people who always vote for CPRF.

Dmitriy Zakharov, Communists of Russia, is an active participant of the elections and a spoiler of candidates from CPRF. Previously, he was a municipal deputy in the Donskoy district from Just Russia. He is mainly engaged in criticizing CPRF.

Magomet Yandiev, Just Russia is a deputy of the Moscow City Duma. He was elected because of the support of Smart Voting. Before that, he was a little-known municipal deputy. After the election, he publicly declared that he supported Putin. Yandiev currently doesn’t have much support.

Yakov Yakubovich, Party of Growth, is the current head of the Tverskoy district from Yabloko. In 2018, he was supposed to participate in the elections for the Mayor of Moscow from Yabloko, but refused to participate despite winning the primaries. Later he actively collaborated with the authorities. Outside the Tverskoy District, he is almost unknown to voters.

Dmitriy Koshlakov-Krestovsky, LDPR, was an active participant in the elections to the Moscow City Duma in 2019 where he received 20% of the vote. He was a classmate of the son of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. In 2019, he spent a lot of money on an active campaign. He will probably be active in these elections as well and supports Putin. The rating of LDPR will not allow him to get a high rating.

Maxim Shevchenko, CPRF, is a well-known journalist and deputy of the Vladimir Oblast. In 2018, in the presidential elections, he was a confidant of Grudinin. He runs a video blog, and at the moment he is one of the leaders of RPSS. Shevchenko has a chance to gain a lot of votes with an active campaign but will likely not have a chance to win.

Ketevan Kharaidze, Green Alternative, is a municipal deputy of the Tverskoy district. She became famous after she was accused of fraud by the authorities soon after she was nominated for election. This increased her recognition, though in general, Kharaidze’s rating is insignificant.

Andrey Shirokov, Party of Pensioners, is a functionary of his political organization. He actively worked in government agencies but has no experience of winning elections. He is unknown to voters.

Tatiana Vinnitskaya, New People, has never been involved in social and political activities. She is unknown, but at the moment her headquarters is campaigning hard on social media.

Anatoliy Yushin, Civic Platform, is a municipal deputy of the Presnenskiy district. Outside of his district, most voters don’t know him.

Independent candidates Zukhra Balyaeva and Iosif Dzhagaev do not have the resources to collect signatures and will not be registered. Balyaeva is a member of United Russia and may have been considered as a reserve candidate.

Prediction: the main struggle will unfold between Leonov and Mitrokhin. The result will depend on administrative support, candidates’ activity levels, and Smart Voting.

Electoral District 210 – Chertanovskiy

Name	Party	Date of birth	Job title, field, or organization	Place of birth	Location
Barmenkov Evgeniy Valerievich	The Greens	26.05.1989	Sibtel	Tula	Moscow
Batashev Anatoliy Gennadievich	Green Alternative	18.01.1976	Information agency, Big Balashikha	Vladivostok	Moscow
Butkeev Vladimir Anatolievich	Just Russia	22.03.1954	Retired	Krasnodarskiy kray	Moscow
Korshunkov Vladislav Sergeevich	LDPR	8.12.1999	Western administrative division in Moscow	Ukraine	Moscow
Krapukhin Alexey Igorevich	Yabloko	20.03.1987	APRA	Moscow	Moscow
Nachevskiy Mikhail Vladimirovich	New People	2.07.1993	Plekhanov Russian University of Economics	Moscow	Moscow
Romanenko Roman Yurievich	United Russia	9.08.1971	State Duma deputy	Moscow Oblast	Moscow
Smitienko Stepan Borisovich	Civic Platform	30.10.1984	Promsvyzbank	Moscow	Moscow
Tarantsov Mikhail Alexandrovich	CPRF	13.07.1962	Moscow City Duma	Volgograd	Moscow
Taraschanskiy Leonid Asirovich	Communists of Russia	3.12.1959	Unemployed	Moscow	Moscow
Udalov Dmitriy Alexeyevich	ROS	29.12.1980	Military service	Stavropol	Moscow
Yuneman Roman Alexandrovich	Independent	03.04.1995	Housing Alternative	Germany	Moscow
Yaseneva Yulia Konstantinovna	Party of Growth	27.12.1990	Stroganov Moscow State Academy of Arts and Industry	Moscow	Moscow
Yatsevskiy Artemiy Andreevich	RPSS	21.04.1997	Logistics and engineering in construction sector	Moscow	Moscow

Districts: Severnoe Butovo, Yuzhnoe Butovo, Yasenevo, Chertanovo Tsentralnoe, Chertanovo Yuzhnoe

Roman Romenko, United Russia, is a famous cosmonaut and current State Duma deputy. He promotes military-patriotic education. Until 2011, he did not participate in social and political life. Romenko is one of the least recognizable candidates from United Russia: according to Gosdumetr, 27% of the district voters know him, 49% of whom are ready to support him. The party allocates a lot of money to support him.

Independent candidate Roman Yuneman managed to collect enough signatures for registration,[13] though there is a possibility he will not be registered. The result of registration depends on how dangerous a candidate is for the authorities. Yuneman is running an active campaign with a big budget. He has the support of many activists and has nationalist views, which can alienate part of the opposition. Support from Smart Voting is possible, but earlier in the elections to the Moscow City Duma, he did not receive it when preference was given to the communist candidate. 16% of voters know Yuneman according to Gosdumetr, and 62% of them will vote for him.

Mikhail Tarantsov, CPRF, is another contender for support from Smart Voting. Previously, he was a deputy of the Volgograd oblast Duma. At the moment he is the head of the district office of the Communist Party in Severnoe Medvedkovo. He is quite active and has supporters, but most of them live in the north of Moscow and outside of the district where he is running for deputy. Tarantsov’s recognition is almost the same as that of Yuneman – 15%, 77% of whom are ready to support him (the highest percentage in Moscow). In this regard, at the start of the election campaign, Tarantsov looks like a more probable candidate for Smart Voting than Yuneman.

Leonid Taraschanskiy, Communists of Russia, is Tarantsov’s spoiler candidate. Taraschanskiy has been matched with a candidate with a similar surname in order to confuse voters. He took part in the elections to municipal deputies in Yuzhnoe Butovo and lost outright. Taraschanskiy, according to Gosdumetr, is known by 4% of voters, 62% of whom  are ready to support him, probably because most of the respondents confuse him with Tarantsov.

Alexey Krapukhin, Yabloko, works for Rusfond and is engaged in charity work. He can count on the votes of the liberal opposition, but he has no individual recognition. According to Gosdumetr, only 4% of voters know him, 28% of whom support him.

Vladimir Butkeev, Just Russia, is a former State Duma deputy and an experienced politician. For the last 15 years, he has not distinguished himself in any way. 8% of voters know him, and 43% of them are ready to support.

Vladislav Korshunkov, LDPR, is a little-known, 22-year-old candidate. He has made populist statements and has not participated in earlier elections. He is one of the youth leaders of the party but  is not ready to conduct an active campaign. Voters are unfamiliar with him: 4% know about him, and 27% of them are ready to vote for him.

Yevgeniy Barmenkov, The Greens, is known among activists in relation to the protection of Bitsevskiy Forest. He is familiar to representatives of civil society but does not have the resources to campaign actively. 4% of voters know him, and 30% of them are ready to support him.

Artemiy Yatsevsky, RPSS, is a formal candidate. He is unknown and is depicted with a cigar in campaign materials. Less than 1% of voters know him.

Anatoliy Batashev, Green Alternative, is an environmental activist in Moscow Oblast. For some time, he worked as adviser to the head of the city of Balashikha. He is not expected to be gain a significant percentage of the vote. According to Gosdumetr, 4% of voters are familiar with him, 38% of whom will vote for him.

Mikhail Nachevskiy, New People, is a new candidate. He studies digital economy. He is actively campaigning on social media, however, he has almost no rating. According to Gosdumetr, Nachevsky is known to 1% of voters, 63% of which will vote for him.

Yulia Yaseneva, Party of Growth, is a teacher at the Academy of Arts and Industry. She is an unknown candidate: 4% of voters know her, 57% of whom are ready to vote for her.

Stepan Smitienko, Civil Platform, is an economist and employee of Promsvyazbank. He has not been noticed in social and political activities, although according to his official biography, he was previously an assistant to a deputy of the State Duma. 2% of voters know him, 33% of whom  will vote for him.

Dmitriy Udalov, ROS, is a serviceman. He has nine higher education degrees, which should attract the attention of voters on the official poster. He is inactive and has almost no campaign. There is no data on his recognition.

Prediction: if Yuneman is registered, a serious struggle for the support of Smart Voting will unfold between him and Taraschanskiy. Because Romanenko at this stage does not have a high level of recognition, the opposition has a chance to win. Romanenko, in any case, remains the main contender for the deputy mandate.

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[1] Smart Voting. https://votesmart.appspot.com/ (accessed August 19, 2021).

[2] WCIOM. “The Ratings of Political Parties.”  https://wciom.ru/ratings/reiting-politicheskikh-partii/ (accessed August 19, 2021).

[3] Yavlinsky interview. https://www.dw.com/ru/grigorij-javlinskij-kritichno-o-navalnom-putine-i-vyborah-v-rossii/av-58317732 (accessed August 19, 2021).

[4] Information from https://cikrf.ru/ (accessed August 19, 2021).

[5]Ilya Graschenkov. “Has Navalny divided CPRF?“ https://echo.msk.ru/blog/delober/2779230-echo/ (accessed August 19, 2021).

[6] “Party of Growth has introduced Dmitriy Gudkov ally as a State Duma candidate.” https://asafov.ru/3379 (accessed August 19, 2021).

[7] Gosdumetr results: https://www.facebook.com/miloserdov.case (accessed August 19, 2021).

[8] “For Lobanov!” https://chronicles.igmsu.org/igmsu/lobanov/ (accessed August 19, 2021).

[9] Khovanskaya Galina Petrovna. https://whoiswho.dp.ru/cart/person/591702 (accessed August 19, 2021).

[10] “Vasserman: ‘People stopped believing the negative image of Stalin.’” https://sputnik.by/20190417/Vasserman-v-negativnyy-obraz-Stalina-sozdannyy-Khruschevym-perestali-verit-1040830310.html (accessed August 19, 2021).

[11] Leonov interview. https://meduza.io/feature/2021/06/10/podderzhivayu-li-ya-vlast-navernoe-net (accessed August 19, 2021).

[12] “United Russia stays without a candidate on one of the hardest districts in Moscow.” https://www.rbc.ru/politics/09/07/2021/60e700cf9a794705c266a768 (accessed August 19, 2021).

[13] “Voters have signed twice.” https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4928938#id2092856 (accessed August 19, 2021).

Each summer in Czechia, café waiters put out large bowls of water so that dogs taken for a walk under the scorching sun can cool off. Dog owners in Russia, however, have to make sure that their dogs don’t try to eat anything during their walks—as it is not rare to come across poisoned meat set out as baits by dog hunters.

Russians’ relationship to man’s best friend is quite different from that in the West, where stray dogs are relatively rare, and even adopting a rescue dog from a shelter takes a considerable amount of effort. In Russia, it is easy to become a dog owner, and just as easy to abandon it.

Nonetheless, in May 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a list of instructions aimed at promoting the “a society with a responsible relationship toward animals”. Notably, he ordered records of pets and monitoring stray animals, as well as “encouraging voluntary sterilization, vaccination, and tagging of domestic pets.” The list of measures is published on the Kremlin website.

But there’s a catch—three years ago, Russia had already adopted the Federal Law “On the Responsible Treatment of Animals” (which also includes a proclamation on the “principle of humanity”). That law has not been effective.

According to official data, there are over 650,000 homeless cats and dogs in Russia. Volunteers diligently pick them up off the streets, but there are many more still looking for a home. The underlying problem seems to be lack of responsibility. Owning a pet is not just for fun and taking care of a pet means taking care of its needs, too (walks, food, the vet).

A Crime Unpunished

London resident Tanya G. recently bought a puppy for 800 British pounds, and has already received complaints from her neighbors, who did not appreciate the dog’s whining. “If we mistreat him, the neighbors might call the police. First, regular police might deal with the case, but then they would transfer it to specialized unit,” she says.

A review of laws in the United States, New Zealand, Great Britain, Czechia, and Italy all show that the states are serious about ensuring animal rights.

In Germany, those who abuse animals are subject to up to three years in prison or a fine of up to 25,000 euros, notes Takie Dela.

According to German police data, about 6,000 animal abuse crimes are committed each year.

For comparison, in 2019, Russia registered just 490 violations of laws on animal cruelty.

This is not a matter of Russians simply being much kinder to animals, but is the result of the state turning a blind eye to this type of crime.

The law “On the Responsible Treatment of Animals,” which declares that animals are “capable of experiencing emotions and physical suffering” is ineffective. Those caught violating the law are let off with a simple slap on the wrist.

Volunteer Ksenia Vasilchenko works to find homes for dogs, including abroad. She says that many dogs are sent to Finland and Germany, and before the pandemic, they were also sent to the United States, Czechia, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

In June, a dog named Snowball emigrated to Germany. He had been living in an industrial area of Russia, where some “nice guys” shot him for fun with a pellet gun. One of the pellets hit his spine, causing serious damage. His surgery and recovery cost about RUB 100,000 (~ USD 1.350).

Vasilchenko feels that the Russian law is ineffective, because it is impossible to prove the crime took place, because dogs are seen as things, and because there are no animal control officers in Russia.

Lidia Kondrashova, a communications expert for the RAI charity fund which helps stray animals, agrees. “Unfortunately,” she says, “Law 438 (On the Responsible Treatment of Animals) and Article 245 in the Criminal Code (Animal Cruelty) exist on paper, but in practice, no one is ever punished for these crimes.”

“First of all, we need to ensure that the laws are enforced, and create agencies where anyone can go and report animal cruelty,” she states.

As far as the infamous dog hunters, who leave poison on city streets, Kondrashova believes they should be criminally prosecuted.

“Today, animal cruelty is punishable with a fine of about RUB 80,000 (~ USD 1.100), corrective work, or imprisonment for up to three years,” she says. “But in practice, these sentences are very rarely handed down, and law enforcement agencies are extremely reluctant to take on animal cruelty cases, or even talk about it”.

Programs for catching, sterilizing, and vaccinating animals before releasing them back into their original environment have not been a success either (despite being mandated by the Law on Responsible Treatment of Animals).

“In practice, what we see is the dogs are caught, the government spends some money on them, and then the budget runs out, so they are just taken to the neighboring region and released into the forest, where they die of hunger, parasites, or get hit by cars,” Kondrashova explains.

Everything is God’s will

Kondrashova notes that the law also includes a provision for education, to teach people to have a humane relationship with animals, but, “as far as we can see, that change is not taking place”.

“We need to focus on educating people, and right now only some animal welfare organizations are doing that, but they don’t have a lot of resources. We need to give people at least some key information: explain why they can’t let their pets run around outside, why they need to sterilize them, take them to the vet, etc.”

“Today”, she continues, “pet owners have a lot of archaic ideas about what it means to keep a pet, which has a negative impact on animals’ quality of life and can often pose a serious danger.”

“The law on responsible treatment of animals includes provisions that pet owners must spay/neuter their pets, care for them properly, and take them to the vet when they need it,” she says.

Vasilchenko echoes that sentiment, noting that “in our country, there is no information about sterilizing pets— in Europe, you will not see any dogs that have not been neutered, unless you are at a kennel. Here, people project their own reproductive aspirations onto their dogs. “Let my dog be a mom!” they say. There is also a religious element. There was a cat running around with kittens outside of my apartment, and when I said she needed to be spayed, the old women there said, “Aren’t you Orthodox? That is a sin! Everything is God’s will!”

In Russia, there are no free sterilization programs—you can’t simply take your cat to get spayed, she laments.

Despite the fact that in large cities, dogs are tagged at state budget expense, there is no consequence for not tagging one’s dog. “There is not a single tagging database in the entire country,” Vasilchenko adds.

The role of money

Vasilchenko states that the Russian Kynological Federation (RFK) does not monitor dog breeding, and there are no breeding quotas.

“Half the kennels are torture chambers! They restrain dogs to forcefully breed (and they do it without stopping), and then they kill them,” she describes. “When you buy a purebred puppy on Avito for RUB 15,000 (~ USD 200) , you need to understand the true costs, and why the price is what it is. Mixed-breed dogs are simply thrown away— no one wants them.”

“This is about money, too: breeders sell puppies without verifying what kind of conditions they are going to live in, who the owners are,” says Vasilchenko. “Take huskies. This is a beautiful breed, but you need to know that they are really difficult to train and take care of. They require a lot of attention, patience, and an active lifestyle. Once the puppy has torn apart the entire apartment, people throw them out of the house, and that is very common.”

Vasilchenko describes how people constantly call the shelter, hoping to get rid of their pets. “A girl will call and say, ‘I want to get rid of my 8-year-old Spitz. I got him when he was still a puppy, and I don’t want him anymore. His eye has started to run,’ they see them like things.”

Far too easy

Vasilchenko believes that dogs suffer because in Russia it is too easy to get a pet.

“If you sign an official contract, put down your passport information and recognize that this is a responsibility, things would be different. But instead, people take home Fido, feed him bones, and when he dies, they go get another dog. It is far too easy to abandon a dog,” she says.

In Europe, in order to take a non-purebred dog home from the shelter, one needs to take part in an interview and pay EUR 400-450.

“Signing a contract with the shelter, which only approves you after they have seen your lease (if people rent, they need to show they have the landlord’s permission) and proof of employment. If you are not capable of paying EUR 400-450, how are you going to take the dog to the vet in Germany or Finland?”

European dog owners also have to pay for obedience training, sterilization, required insurance, and pet taxes. If a resident of Germany, for example, wants to stop paying taxes on his or her dog, they will have to explain to the authorities where the dog has gone.

Meanwhile, Russians do not want to spend money on their pets, even when it comes to their health. “Some people want to take a dog home, and when we ask what happened to the last one, they say, ‘She died. She didn’t eat for three days, then she had some swelling, and died.’ And they didn’t even think to take the dog to the vet!” says Vasilchenko, indignant.

A glimmer of hope in the city

Despite all of this, Vasilchenko believes that awareness is growing. “In large cities, it’s become fashionable to adopt a rescue dog from the shelter”

“But people still love status symbols: when we put up photos of purebred dogs, the phone will ring off the hook. But mutts are unique, they don’t look like any other dog. If I have five purebreds in front of me, I can’t tell the difference between them, but I know who the mutts are right away,” she says.

Lidia Kondrashova agrees, noting that in large cities,  such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, attitudes toward pet ownership are changing, and “more and more people are treating their pets like companion animals.”

“This is facilitated by infrastructure development—there are more parks for walking, public places where you can take your pets, more vet clinics, etc. It is easier and more convenient to take care of your pets and make sure they are comfortable,” she says. “However,” she continues, “things are not quite so rosy in the regions, where the quality of life is rather low, and people are just not very concerned with animal welfare.”

What can we do?

Vasilchenko urges limits on dog breeding and registration requirements for pets—starting with dogs— complete with passports, vaccination cards, and (preferably) free sterilization.

“We shouldn’t forget about the carrot and stick approach: if you offer free sterilization, you also need to introduce fines for neglecting dogs. If someone finds your dog abandoned, wandering around the street, you pay a RUB 20,000 (~ USD 270) fine,” she suggests.

Vasilchenko believes that better enforcement of laws on “animal cruelty, neglect, and any violence toward animals.”

“We need social education, we have to explain to people that dogs whose owners provide good care, will not attack people,” she says. “Remember, that cruelty comes from home – why is it that the weakest one in school is always bullied?”

Gradually, though, Vasilchenko believes that appropriate measures will spread to the  regions, which always lag behind central cities.

For Lidia Kondrashova, the highest priority is spaying/neutering, vaccination, tagging, stray animals; as well as introduction of strict monitoring of breeding conditions, with punishments for those that violate laws and regulations.

“That would prevent uncontrolled breeding and stray animals,” she suggests.

“All of the tamed animals (generally dogs and cats that used to be someone’s pet and cannot survive on the streets) or those who are capable of being socialized need to be taken off the streets and to shelters so that they can be around people and find new owners,” says Kondrashova. “But here, there is one major caveat—the shelters we have, as they are today, are not able to provide the animals with quality care, and finding new owners becomes the full responsibility of volunteers, who are catastrophically few in numbers.  This is why one of the biggest issues the government needs to resolve is a complete overhaul of the shelter system.”

With regard to dog obedience training, similar to what is available in Europe, for Kondrashova, “in the context of such deplorable conditions for stray animals in our country, obedience classes seem to be unattainable.”

“Responsible pet owners will talk to dog trainers and animal psychologists, they read books and watch videos about how they can better understand their pet. Unfortunately, there are still very few people like that in Russia,” she says. “Organizing responsible pet ownership classes would be a logical step for the government’s efforts at solving this dangerous problem.”

Kondrashova notes that the government has already discussed the possibility of introducing a pet tax, which already exists in the West, but “as things stand today, that would probably result in a huge number of pets being abandoned by owners who do not want to incur any additional costs.”

“We get a lot of emails telling us ‘why don’t you take care of people first, and then worry about dogs?’ Of course, the people who write such messages are not helping anyone at all,” says Vasilchenko.

In a country where some people still live in barracks, it will probably be some time before the general public adopts a humane attitude toward man’s best friend.